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Abstract 
 In the 1950s Artificial Intelligence (AI) expert systems emerged, whilst at the same 
time certain socio-anthropological research (despite of AI) looked to ethological systems of 
territoriality and the proxemics of personal space. Sixty years on, AI’s expert systems 
operate online and in the fervour of social networking, they are applied to all forms of 
automated service. These software agents are reconfiguring virtual and actual personal space. 
Personal space becomes a concept through which to understand chatbots conceived from 
territoriality, affect, and violence to argue that their ongoing development and the ambiguity 
of violence they can engender have broader ramifications for socio-technical and design 
research. Personal space becomes a wholly different form of analysis and rationale of 
practice for designers to understand space involving chatrooms and internet forums, 
automated systems and processes, between human and machine agencies. The thesis is an 
ethical tale of cruel techno-science that is performed through concepts from the arts. This 
PhD by practice accounts for the interventions made in fine art, design, fiction and film that 
are omitted from a history of agent technology. Rudimentary and speculative techniques in 
text and audio with four chatbots focus on their pick-up techniques, entrapment logics, 
interrogative talk, repetitions of hateful speech, learning capabilities, methods of elision and 
disorientation of spatial metaphors when they talk nonsense. Semi-structured interviews and 
online forum postings with chatbot developers are used to reflect on this rudimentary 
approach.
 Seven chapters focus on the imaginative conceptions of personal space in both 
theories for example, to consider the ways developers and users conceive of a personal 
space; and in methods by using fiction and non-fiction case studies. One shows the limits of 
1960s proximity research using Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey to trace the 
territorial depictions of AI as presented in 1960s science fiction. Two considers personal 
space and territoriality in the metaphors of network and connection, with a multi-semiotic 
analysis of current chatbot talk. Three draws on two of Edward Hall’s scenarios of spatial 
confinement to show the co-relation of subjective, objective, direct and indirect categories of 
systemic violence to expound on the violence and violations at work in a chatbot’s death 
threat and a chatbot developer’s suicide note. Four applies the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a 
rudimentary game to consider this entrapment as a spatially confined logic, demonstrating 
how chatbot talk is inherently interrogative. Five reflects on the mediating roles played by 
two machines and the experiments done on and with them as matters that concern, but do not 
account for the agency of the machine. This chapter uses Stanley Milgram’s Obedience to 
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Authority experiments alongside the chatbot pick-up technique. Six treats automated systems 
as a wider regulatory concern of governance that defines territoriality and reconfigures 
personal space. The American Directive-3 and its production of terror are contrasted with the 
production of anxiety with Burdick and Wheeler’s novel the Fail-Safe. Seven describes how 
personal space is linked to misanthropy, particularly in rationales for designing out of fear. 
The technological examples broaden to include the elevator/lift and automobile/car alongside 
the chatbot to consider a chatbots within a history of automation. Two fiction novels are used 
— JG Ballard’s Crash and Colson Whitehead’s The Intuitionist.
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Chatbot Enactments of Personal Space
 Software technologies such as spiders, webcrawlers and chatbots are the 
familiar strangers of the late 20th and early 21st century. Their repetitive talk, 
instructions, and commands echo in actual and virtual networks. They are 
everywhere to be found in public spaces, such as trains and internet chatrooms —
operating nowhere special, with the ability to be nothing special. These are the 
notable, ordinary enactments of an automated familiar stranger. This thesis considers 
how these artefacts are co-related inspatial problems involving humans and 
machines; problems relating to the internet concern space, particularly proximity and 
confinement as well as speed. I observe how chatbots operate partially and in 
between; how they manage relations in close proximity; why their developers insist 
on particular kinds of talk and listening; and how intimacy is denied as a 
consequence of the methodological imperative peculiar to chatbots.
 To urge that this project is timely is itself a statement of anxiety. Chatbots can 
manipulate, exceed, and exhaust a human understanding of both time and timeliness. 
Yet, there is no time quite like the present to think about bots. The ways we use bots 
to do services, and the ways that developers provide services to bots is a pertinent 
problem through which to explore violence within these systems. This introduction 
includes a section on chatbots and the methodology, along with the theoretical 
framework defining the key terms used— territoriality, affect and violence. 
Rationale and Research Questions
 This first section will introduce the research questions and rationale for 
choosing HCI as the locale for investigating personal space. The key terms software 
agents, chatbots, territoriality and enactment will be defined. 
 Blondie24 is a computer-based simulation of a woman. Using AI, David Fogel 
has programmed the simulation or avatar to play checkers and compete against 
remote human opponents over the internet. David Fogel registered his AI program as 
a human on an online checkers website that is not to be used by AI programs. 
Blondie24 is the most popular persona that increased online game play outranking 
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other personas Fogel used for the same AI, such as Obi-Wan Kenobi or Chewbacca. 
What is apparent is that Blondie’s personal space is being used to manufacture a 
disguise. The programme is an elaborate narrative of a female graduate, who finds 
herself stuck at home with lots of time to play checkers. It is Blondie’s 24 year-old 
(see fig. 1), sexualised and vulnerable persona that helps to mark out the space or 
territorialise a particular kind of human-centred game play; the personal space is a 
manipulation of the borders and personas of human and machine. Checkers is also a 
game that designates the personal space by the colour of the checker’s pieces. 
Blondie’s constructed personal space separates the game play from Fogel, thereby 
disconnecting the avatar’s moves from the programmer and and the program that is 
really playing.
 This thesis investigates the performance underneath the gendered roles of 
avatars and personas to look at the social and cultural aspects of enacting 
territoriality in online chat.3 Rather than situating this study in gaming, it is the 
conversations and the performance of chat with machines that is the focus of the 
thesis. It is the software rather than the hardware that is primary and in particular the 
online agency4 programmed agents5 perform.
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3 Territoriality is a continuously changing enactment. I explore the term territoriality as both a human and machine form of 
agency. Territoriality is boundary work and a form of defense. I start with the frame of territoriality in American cultural-
anthropology around the 1960s with Edward Hall, but expand this to the work of the philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari from the 1980s onwards. They all reference the previous ethological work from around the 1950s of Niko Tinbergen. 
Territoriality began as a study of ethology, of animals and insects. 
4 The agency of software agents is understood from the perspective of STS. I broadly follow Lucy Suchman’s definition of 
machine agency (whose work has a rudimentary commitment to American anthropology — to ethnomethodology and 
conversational analysis) as a “capacity for action” considering questions on agency that are both “political and 
personal” (Suchman, 2007:2). Chatbots enact both a political and personal agency of territoriality. John Law’s approach to STS 
has developed from anthropology, sociology and cultural studies, he defines agency; “imagined as emotive and embodied, 
rather than cognitive: the nature of the person is shifting in social theory and practice” (Law, 2004:3).
5 A software agent refers to agents in games and on the internet. Chatbots, webcrawlers and avatars in computer games can be 
classified as a software agents; it is therefore, an umbrella term. Chatbots are the main software agents discussed in this thesis. 
A chatbot is a natural language program that can interact with humans. Available on the internet and every Macintosh computer, 
chatbots are commonplace software agents. One types text into a specified field and a chatbot creates a response to it.
FIGURE 1. David Fogel’s Blondie 24, the virtual identity used to play checkers online. Image source: Fogel, 
Blondie24; Playing at the Cutting Edge of AI, 2002.
 My interest in territoriality also stems from my personal encounters with 
machines. One encounter with CT-scanner, taking place in London, 2005, has 
particular significance. Built into the Siemens Somatron Sensation CT-scanner are a 
red light and two small speakers, no bigger than a small headphone earpiece. These 
are positioned on the top of the halo part of the scanner (see fig. 2-3). Being scanned 
by the Somatron Sensation, I was reminded of the AI called HAL from Stanley 
Kubrick’s film, Space Odyssey, 2001 (1968), and the way HAL reenacts a machinic 
territoriality. Using what I took to be a two-way communication device I attempted 
to talk into the machine because isotropic goo flowing from a Y-shaped cannula in 
my arm was going everywhere. What I initially discovered is that it is hard to talk to 
a HAL type bot, that is positioned at the pelvis, when wired up to a machine. 
However, I also soon realised that the two-way communication device was in fact 
just a speaker enabling the operators to talk to me, but not interact. The problem with 
the cannula was exacerbated because I wasn’t able to convey the issue to the 
scanner’s operators (or the machine); as a consequence the procedure had to be 
performed twice.
 Like Blondie24, this particular human-computer interaction provokes many 
questions. Why was this imagination of HAL not talking to my face, and why 
couldn’t HAL hear me? Whose personal space, or territoriality is enacted in such 
HCIs? Are such encounters human-centred? And what other territories might be 
Introduction
4
imagined? There is no one single answer to these questions and although I narrow 
the focus of this PhD to online chatbots the thesis brings together case studies from a 
range of automated technologies and of territorial sites; some are human-centred, 
others are not, including fictional, imaginary, temporal and uncertain agencies. 
Indeed, I will argue that fictional and non-fictional accounts cannot always be 
separated, nor the online from the offline accounts of territoriality. Thus, this thesis 
will attend to the ways technology are caught up in territorialites, and the ways our 
‘real’ and imagined ideas of space interweave to perform human-computer 
interactions.
FIGURE 2. The Siemens Somatron Sensation is a CT-scanner used in hospitals within Great Britain during the 
noughties. Image Source: http://www.medical.siemens.com/siemens/it_IT/gg_ct_FBAs/files/brochures/
ct_somatom_sensation_open.pdf [Accessed: June 2010].
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FIGURE 3. Two types of Y-shaped cannula used to administer two forms of medication intravenously, and at one 
time. Image Source: http://wordsdomination.com/cannula.html [Accessed June 2010].
Why Software Agents, Why Chatbots?
 Software agents are more generally to be found in the most intimate spaces of 
the ordinary and the extraordinary. They are to be found in hospitals, ATM machines, 
in telecommunication systems, photocopiers, the cockpits of jets, in virtual bordellos, 
as well as within the mechanisms of government policy making, or at border controls 
or in remote controlled devices operating at the remote spaces of the universe. They 
can operate on the roughest terrain be that in Mars or within a nuclear reactor or a 
disaster area. They can transcend borders and boundaries of territory (virtual and 
actual), and territoriality (human and machine), but what local and universal contexts 
do chatbots produce or enact (see fig. 4)? Do chatbots enact personal, social and 
political agendas? Instrumental in the design of this thesis is Lucy Suchman’s chapter 
on “Agencies at the Interface” (2007) in which software agents of several human-
computer interfaces are considered, including the chatbot called Alicebot:
I explore the propositions that these new initiatives [software agents] 
can be understood as recent manifestations of the very old dream of a 
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perfect, invisible infrastructure; a dream that I locate now within the 
particular historical frame of the “service economy”. (Suchman, 2007: 
5)
 Software agents are as Suchman suggests the imaginations of “service 
workers” in a “global economic infrastructure” (Suchman, 2007: 224). Chatbots 
enact many different automated services, they are a part of the online interfaces 
widely used in the travel sector to facilitate travel plans and answer questions on 
transport. A wide range of companies and government organisations use chatbots 
such as Virgin Media, IKEA, Teletext and Butlins. There are chatbots assigned to 
operate as municipality assistants in Norway advising on childcare and kindergarten 
and virtual city council workers in the Netherlands. Sweden also has a custom's 
official that answers questions about border control, passports and other customs 
related issues. In India there is Deepti, a chatbot that helps novice computer users to 
learn in Hindi. In Spain there are chatbots that explain the Spanish electoral system 
as well as chatbots advising on healthcare for the ministry of health. Italy has a 
Carabinieri bot working at the Italian police-institute and the German Ministry of 
Defence has two chatbot army officers to advise about military careers. Chatbots 
enact particular service desires.
 Celebrity chatbots are also prevalent. There are politician bots, gossip bots, 
film stars, science fiction heroes, caricatures, deities, and sexbots such as Sarah Palin, 
GossipinGabby, Captain Kirk, Shakespeare bot, PapaNoel, Buddhabot, and God 
Louise, Kylie bot, Jenny18, Doctor Love and Sexyboy (Available from, http://
www.chatbots.org [Accessed on 24 March 2010]). Figure 4 shows a map of 
consumer themes and chatbot categories. Chatbots can fraudulently extract, spider, 
track, and datamine personal identification details (Lyons, 1999) and groups of bots 
have been used to cheat at poker (Hermida, 2002). 
 Chatbots are an area of apparent high-tech mixed with pop-culture banality. It 
is this mix, that draws me to them, and that provides the impetus for this thesis. In 
some respects chatbots are a dishonest (just mimicking what is said) and unreliable 
technology (their talk are lots of repeats), they are the epitome of cliched AI. 
Chatbots were connected to AI in the 1950-60s to what is now termed GOFAI (Good 
Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence). Chatbots were the subject of the critique of AI 
at that time. This period of AI is known as the AI winter, when the field failed to live 
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up to its own expectations to replicate human intelligence. Chatbots are semantic 
(that is text-based) AI, which has moved out of the AI laboratories for instance MIT, 
and the Zurich AI Institute. Chatbot research is now tested predominantly online. 
Chatbots are an area of research that has moved from concerns of psychology in AI 
(Joseph Weizenbaum, 1976), to the concerns of interface and interaction, and as 
marketing tools of the internet (Richard Wallace, 2005).6 AI is but one field and one 
enactment in the history of chatbot development. Chatbots are no longer the 
vanguards of AI but they still enact the values of GOFAI. I chose to research chatbots 
because I was interested in studying their outmodedness and to what extent the new 
chatbots enact that history.
 As I’ve said, my interest in chatbots centres on concepts of personal space and 
territory. Chatbots and personal space come from the same era (1950-60s). I was 
interested in using personal space as a theoretical starting point to see how this might 
have changed. This helped to unlock personal space as a human-centred concept. I 
chose to work with four chatbots that enact different gendered representations (see 
fig.s 5-8), three of which are characterised as female, the other is not gendered. Their 
developers (most are male) are an important part of this study, but I also ask to what 
extent is a chatbot developed by a user or its developer? Whose personal space is 
enacted?7 Two of the chatbots have male programmers; Alice is a ‘Pandorabot,’ 
programmed by Dr Richard Wallace, and Jabberwacky is a Cleverbot designed by 
Rollo Carpenter. The Eliza chatbot originates in name to Weizenbaum’s ELIZA 
(1964), but whose developer remains anonymous and whose attributes are also 
unknown. Brianna McKenzie is the fourth bot and is developed by Niccola Durran. 
Durran studied linguistics as an undergraduate during the time of this study. Durran 
is presently one of the youngest chatbot developers. Brianna McKenzie became third 
place in the best character/personality chatbot award in the 2003, Chatterbox 
Challenge; and both Wallace and Carpenter have received medals for their chatbots 
in the Loebner prize. This prize enacts the Turing Test (1950), as an incentive for 
Introduction
8
6 There are now new technologies and developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI), — from Artificial Life (ALife) and Nouveau 
AI — which are the study of biological rather than neurological structures and models (Brooks, 2002, as well as Pfeifer and 
Scheier, 2001).
7 A note on gender. Personal space need not be an oppressive certainty of masculine power, it is rather a “fractal imagination” 
that is constantly enacted (Squires, 1996) and not universalising. 
chatbot research and development. Brianna McKenzie is based on the persona of its 
developer whereas Jabberwacky and Alice are fictional personas that by name refer 
FIGURE 4. A map of the territories covered by chatbots. Statistics are taken from: www.chatbots.org [Accessed, 
20th March 2010]. Image Source: Amanda Windle.
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to the writings of Lewis Carroll.8
FIGURE 5. A chatbot such as Eliza can simply be an arrangement of two text boxes, one for the chatbot and one 
for the user. Image Source: www.-ai.ijs.si/eliza-cgi-bin/eliza_script [Accessed: 31st October 2008].
FIGURE 6. Chatbots can have digital avatars that are animated such as Alice. Image Source: 
www.alice.pandorabots.com [Accessed 31st October, 2008].
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8 Durran, Wallace and Carpenter are all members of Chatbots.org, which is connected to the Robitron group. Wallace and 
Carprenter regularly post to the Robitron forum Durran however does not, and Eliza’s developer is anonymous, so this 
information is unknown available to analyse. 
FIGURE 7. Jabberwacky’s interface was updated part way through the study to contain the drop-down emotional 
lexicon list which is indented above. Image Source: www.chat.jabberwacky.com [Accessed 31st October, 2008; 
and for the lexicon list, 1st June 2010]
FIGURE 8. Brianna McKenzie is a chatbot which is located on the Personality Forge, a listings page of various 
types of chatbots. The design of the PhD is a collaboration, and has taken most of its direction from what the 
chatbots did, and how they configure, collaborate and subvert everyday talk. Image Source: 
www.personalityforge.com/dirctchat/php?BotID=3307&MID=3306 [Accessed 31st October, 2008]
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Theoretical Framework
Personal Space and Edward Hall —
The Application of Proxemics and Territoriality 
 The work of Hall on proximity and territoriality is taken into account 
throughout each chapter of the thesis. The first chapter demonstrates the limits of 
Hall’s proxemic system. In chapter 2, the bodily tropes used in Hall’s metaphors for 
personal space (for example, microspace) are also shown to be limited for not 
adequately describing the relational aspects between humans and machines. For 
example, I will demonstrate that a chatbot’s interactional spaces do not move around, 
except in metaphor. The limits of certain technological metaphors, such as ‘network’ 
and ‘connection‘ I will also argue are limited, using further literatures from actor-
network theory and conversational analysis to demonstrate these human and 
technological limits. Chapter 3 works closely with describing two of Hall’s own 
cases, but this time they are used to show a further lack of technological description. 
Chapter 4, takes the use of metaphors that Hall uses such as the bubble and works 
this into a more complex account, as a parable of personal space, or more 
specifically, as a parable of entrapment (I will show in this thesis some of the clear 
differences between why entrapment is not the same as enclosure, as illustrated in 
figs. 11a-d). Chapter 5, defines Hall’s terms, ‘fixed feature’ and ‘semi-fixed feature‘ 
and contrast these with the Deleuzian terms ‘deterritorialisation’ and 
‘reterritorialisation’ to show that territoriality is not stable and rigid but an enactment. 
Chapter 6 continues to investigate the same theoretical terms as chapter 5, but this 
time including a history of the linear and hierarchical logics of fail-safes systems 
again in a controlled and confined environment. The second part of the chapter 
shows how Hall’s zones of proximity (public and personal) are manipulated in a 
recent governmental policy to attempt once again to make territory and territoriality 
persistent concepts. Chapter 7 involves a case of the car, this is a technology that 
Hall was both positively attached to, as a technology that enabled his youthful 
freedom of travel; but also what he was negatively opposed to because, as he saw it, 
it carved up the landscape causing territorial conflicts. 
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 Defining personal space in terms of proxemics and territoriality is a part of the 
theoretical framework of the thesis. The following offers a short rationale for the key 
literature I employed to develop this framework. Broadly, my research interweaves 
literatures on personal space, violence and affect by considering the intensities 
(affective atmospheres) and territorial acts (territorialisations), involved in enacting a 
personal space. The first section will give a summary of personal space followed by 
an outline of ‘affect’ and ‘violence’. Here, I use affect as as it is used in affect theory, 
a theory developed by Silvan Tomkins in 1962. Careful to avoid how it is understood 
in psychoanalytic thinking, I use the term to take into consideration the affects of 
buildings and things. I look at the way affect is situated in and constituted through 
action. Thus I see it as something that can be repeated, enacted and reenacted. The 
affects that I see as most strongly related to this thesis are ‘fear-terror’ (including 
anxiety), and ‘surprise-startle’ (Tomkins, 1995). Also, violence is considered in non-
contact scenarios. In terms of affect, I see affective violence as the boundary-making 
exercise of territoriality (Kuntsman, 2009). I will consider Slavoj Žižek’s terms of 
violence to consider the limits of violence (again, not as a psychoanalytic), and to the 
many instances on the internet where violence although not physically performed 
still acts as a territorial violation.
 The starting point of this thesis was the theoretical propositions of Edward 
Hall’s work on personal space: that territoriality can be measured by personal 
distances between humans. It is a spatial analysis of proximity termed — proxemics 
(Hall, 1992: 266). It is an adaption of territoriality previously studied in ethology but 
adapted to anthropology, as a human-centred approach. Hall visually observed 
people as a form of supplementary knowledge to interactive scenarios, whereby talk 
is a form of absent data that is either unavailable (for example, when talk isn’t 
audible, or when someone refuses to talk), or is absent from the scenario (no one 
talks). Architectural space and the layout of spatial arrangements are primary 
elements of Hall’s research, but the inclusion of other technologies is almost entirely 
absent. This is a “hinterland” of Hall’s account of personal space that ought to be 
recognised.9 It is this absence that provokes this story of the connection between 
personal space and technologies such as chatbots. I will take a step back to consider 
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9 A hinterland is “A concrete metaphor for absence and presence” (Law, 2004: 160).
the technologies and technological research that was around during the time of Hall 
such as; the use of fail-safe systems, electric shock machines, psychology 
laboratories, technologies for predicting voting scenarios, as well as spaceships, 
nuclear bombs, AI conversation experts (chatbots), and cars and lifts (automobiles 
and elevators). Hall’s work has been taken up in further commentaries of technology 
but when Hall had mostly retired from research (Brockman, 1998), emphasising a 
link to more recent research on technologies of the internet.10 
FIGURE 9. A flash mob intervention with bubbles in Vancouver, 29 April, 2006. A flash mob is a gathering of 
people to participate together in a public space. It is a pre-organised activity, which in this case involves bubble 
blowing. Reprinted with kind permission of Dustin Sacks. Available at http://www.flickr.com/photos/dustinq/. 
[Accessed: 20 June 2009]. 
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10 Hall’s work is critiqued in the commentaries of John Brockman and Marshall McLuhan in technological development 
(Brockman, 1998). Brockman (the editor of Digerati: Encounters with the Cyberelite, 1998) recounts a conversation with Hall 
in his prologue: Hall explained to Brockman that the most important invention was talking, yet what Brockman illustrates is the 
importance of connecting this to the digital age of the internet (Brockman, 1998: xxi). 
FIGURE 10. A viral marketing campaign for Sega, depicting Chad; “The guy that was so into Super Monkey Ball 
Deluxe that he decided to live in a ball”, shown above at a swim-meet. Image source: http://mybigball.com/ 
[Accessed 17 July 2009]. 
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FIGURES 11a-d. Illustrations used by Edward Hall to show arrangements of spatial enclosure. There is no 
illustrator cited in the journal article for Landscape (1962), though Hall does accredit two illustrators Gudrun 
Huden and Judith Yonkers in his book The Hidden Dimension, (1966). It is also possible that the illustrations 
were created by Hall as he was particularly interested in biological and human anatomy illustration (Hall, 1992: 
34). Image source: Landscape, 1962.
 Before developing these points in the subsequent chapters, however, I want to 
provide a broad overview of Hall’s ideas on personal space and some of the logics 
that are connected to his thinking. 
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 Hall’s work is a cultural-anthropology of the everyday.11 Hall writes: “I later 
named the field of proxemics as the study of space as the human aspects of territorial 
studies in animals” (Hall, 1992: 266). Hall adapted Heni Hediger’s zoological 
observations to human observations categorising four zones of proximity - the 
intimate, personal, social and public (Hall, 1964: 112-3). Hall used examples ranging 
from the phylogenetic scale (Hall, 1959: 197) and single cell structures, through to 
larger mammals. Personal space is as much a study of the territorial behaviour of 
guard dogs, as it is of lizards playing dead, turtles hiding in their shells, or the group 
behaviour of flocking birds. It can be used to describe plant life, animals and 
humans.12 
“Personal distance” is the term originally used by [Heni] Hediger to 
designate the distance consistently separating the members of 
noncontact species. It might be thought of as a small protective sphere 
or bubble that an organism maintains between itself and others. (Hall, 
[1966] 1990: 119)
 Figures 9-10, show non-contact configurations of the ‘bubble metaphor’ of 
personal space involving the social activities of a flashmob (a public meeting of a 
large number of people who are contacted by the internet or by mobile 
communications), and a swim-meet (a swimming competition). Figure 9, shows how 
the bubbles create volume and have an emotional impact on the persons involved or 
by those just walking by (compare with Hall’s fig. 11d). There is a stillness and 
contemplative poise of those involved. In figure 10, the swimming pool is marked by 
lanes at the base plane (compare with fig. 11c for an illustration showing the base 
plane). These visual demarcations of are geometric personal spaces. The bubble that 
Chad attempts to swim within is a space that relates to Hall’s illustrations of 
“confined” (see fig. 11b) and “enclosed” (see fig. 11c) spatiality. I take visual 
representation to be but one aspect for exploring HCI enactments of personal space.
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11 Cultural-anthropology is the term mostly used in the United States, with social-anthropology developing in Great Britain. 
Hall refers to himself as a social-anthropologist but predominantly as a cultural anthropologist studying the social behaviour of 
humans in relation to their spatial surroundings. Personal space is to extent an Euro-American lens, which was used to research 
various non-western territories and culture. This thesis is a critique of this “out-thereness” which Law describes as; “the 
apprehension, common in Euro-American and many other cosmologies, that there is a reality outside or beyond 
ourselves” (Law, 2004: 162). Personal space is an individualised apprehension of ‘out-thereness.’
12 Hall recorded and codified the silent language of the body, which was based on the Impressionist’s analytic method and 
classification system of painting (Hall, 1992: 56). Hall’s work on proxemics is “the study of distances between humans” and 
was approached by understanding Maurice Gross’s study on how artists depicted personal distance (Hall, 1992: 60). 
 Personal space is not a theory that I believe should be considered in isolation, 
to one semiotic field, for example, talk is just one aspect to explore personal space 
which is affected by sight, taste and smell as well as by concepts of time. By 
considering the communication spectrum, Hall considered an analysis of space in 
time, ranging from a matter of seconds in human conversation to thousands of years, 
with messages traveling over large distances in outer space.13 Technology and virtual 
spaces are additional aspects by which to explore personal space. Hall’s sites for 
observing personal space included his own desk space (which was searched and 
interrogated during the McCarthy era), hospital waiting rooms, environments for the 
mentally ill, rats in a laboratory, monkeys in their natural environment, architectural 
and organisational spaces, such as homes, houses, villages and cities. Hall first 
conducted work in Southwestern America along with critiquing the open spaces of 
Italian piazzas, the facades of ‘spite houses’ in Beirut, and the high rises apartments 
and slum housing in Washington D.C. (Hall, [1966] 1990, see plates 17-26). Hall 
investigated architectural space, with its domestic and public furniture, discussing 
benches, chairs and tables, rather than traffic lights, microwaves or computers. 
 The rest of the thesis will go on to discuss the impact and application of Hall’s 
research from the 1950s onwards. In 2001, the United States’ Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) declassified The Deception Research Program, No.9: Bibliography 
([1980] 2001). This collection of books and papers from the 1940s onwards includes 
research into cybernetics and AI, and contains computational information on 
communication and systems theorems (from such notables as Ross Ashby, Norbert 
Wiener, John von Neumann, Martin Shubik and Paul Rand). Most important for my 
research is the inclusion of another book on communication in The Deception 
Research Program, and Silent Language (Hall, [1959] 1990). Hall intended his first 
book to be used by both the specialist and non-specialist to understand non-verbal 
forms of communication (Hall, [1959] 1990: 185). As a consequence of this book 
appearing in a CIA bibliography, it becomes a book for the specialist used to 
understand the non-specialist in various ‘strange’ environments, as well as insight 
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13 Since Hall’s study, Strate, Jacobson and Gibson (2003) have noted that Hall’s study of proxemics, gives readers of their book 
on communication and cyberspace, the understanding that objects as well as people have a spatiality, and that objects also create 
one’s sense of territoriality.
into how that specialist’s own behaviour would impact on interactions with 
strangers.14 
 When considered alongside the other literatures on AI research, this 
bibliography directly links the work of Hall to AI. Furthermore, during the 1980s (at 
the time when the deception bibliography was collated) academic research in AI was 
linked to weapons research and thus to the military, in a ten year timeline set out in 
1983. The SCI (Strategic Computing Initiative) document created in 1983 by 
DARPA (The Development Organization for the Department of Defence) was thus 
creating military aims to all research on AI. The military is just one application to 
explore personal space. Hall is one study and one set of methods for exploring 
personal space.15
 Hall’s research is work done at the limits of talk, but can also be a method for 
analysing talk and the work of Hall is expanded through the literatures relating to 
conversational analysis. Hall undertook his NIMH (National Institute of Mental 
Health) grant shortly after Erving Goffman in Chicago, 1954. Although Goffman and 
Hall never explicitly worked together, their ideas do overlap and will continue to do 
so in this thesis. Goffman is amongst Hall’s bibliographical references and is 
important to my work because of his work on the reply and response format, which 
helped me to think through the analysis of bot-chat (Goffman, 1981). Furthermore, 
Charles Goodwin and Alessandro Duranti compiled their joint text Rethinking 
Context (1992), which combines methods including ethnomethodology, 
conversational analysis and the ethnography of speech and work done by Goffman, 
showing various interdisciplinary approaches to analysing talk within its setting. 
Goffman considers that the physical and social setting of interaction should be 
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14 Hall wrote Silent Language (1959) after he had commanded an African American regiment in Europe and the Philippines 
during the Second World War (from 1942-45), and after completing his post-doctoral studies in sociology/cultural anthropology 
at Columbia University. In 1946, Hall conducted research on the US military, government administration of Truk. From 
1950-55, Hall was the director of the Point IV Training Program at the Foreign Service Institute, Washington, D.C. During that 
time, he was also affiliated to the Washington School of Psychiatry (1952-6). This period marks a shift of Hall’s institutional 
commitment, as his work moves from military and governmental concerns to that of education, architectural space and mental 
health. Between 1963-7, he was a Professor of Anthropology, at the Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago conducting work 
on proxemics.
15 John Fiske, a writer of communication theories cites an alternative proxemic study by Michael Argyle, that focuses on text 
and speech: “A useful balance to Argyle: as an anthropologist, Hall gives greater emphasis to the part played by the culture in 
non-verbal communication” (Fiske, 2004: 69).
attended to when focusing on language and so the actors involved inside and outside 
the immediate frame of interaction are included but also the “multi-functional 
aspects of linguistic expressions” such as the ambiguous meaning of a phrase or 
word (Duranti and Goodwin, 1992: 25-27). I use the work of Goodwin, 
predominantly, alongside Hall and Goffman in the construction of my technique 
called the audio rudiments discussed in chapter 2. Goodwin acknowledges other 
epistemes of the body such as voice pitch, posture of body, the physical use of maps 
and diagrams but does not give examples that are particularly connected to a study of 
violence or affect, which Hall does and is the main reason that I still refer back to 
Hall’s texts throughout the thesis. Further literature on how to analyse talk is used 
including current theoretical work in AI on the ‘inner voice’ and ‘private language‘ 
also discussed in chapter 2 (Fields, 2002 and Lenka, 2007). I will also refer to 
Monique Wittig’s definition of an ‘interlocutor‘ to differentiate it from ‘user’ in the 
analysis of chatbot interaction to define the agencies that are embodied in metaphor, 
that operate inside the chatbot’s responses to the user.16 
The Atmospheres of Affective Violence 
 As I wrote earlier, another important theme of this thesis centres on affect and 
in particular around the emotionally intense experiences of violence. In this section, I 
want to clarify how I connect some of the thinking around personal space and what I 
call affective violence (to emphasise the emotive significance of violence). I will 
argue that personal space is an affective matter of concern that is important for both 
studies on humans, or machines and has particular relevance for this study because I 
deal with both and their interrelations. 
 To develop my thinking on affect I use the work of Eve Sedgwick (2003) and 
Brian Massumi (2002); Sedgwick for her reflections on the psychologist Silvan 
Tomkins and the latter’s “affect theory”; and Massumi’s conceptions of affect and the 
virtual. Sedgwick and Massumi use affect theory as a relational concept.17 Drawing 
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16 An ‘interlocutor’ is used (Wittig, 1992), to denote the many previous users that have chatted to a bot and whose talk may 
have been affected by it and thereby repeated back in the chatbots subsequent chat. A ‘user’ will be used to denote the entity 
chatting with a chatbot (Goodwin, 1992; 2000; 2003).
17 Virtual means dreams and the imaginary in relation to the real, and not to define the virtual as digital.
on these ideas, I define affect in terms of affective atmospheres to take into account 
the intensity and resonance of technological things that have no emotion. I also treat 
affect as a preconscious intensity, although, again, I avoid framing this using 
psychoanalytic theory.
 An affective account of personal space helps build my analysis in three ways. 
Firstly, affect helps to counter the assumption that personal space is an unemotional 
phenomenon that can be studied by logic alone, as a ‘cold’ measurement of distance 
between humans and machines. Secondly, that personal space is not a phenomenon 
situated within the body and thus read as a human-centred analytic. What I will aim 
to show is that affect is a way of accounting for the intensities of dominance that are 
the forces and impacts of territoriality situated between humans and nonhumans. 
Thirdly, as Hall’s account of personal space observed that territoriality cannot be 
fully realised by language alone (Hall, 1959), it is only a partial explanation of verbal 
and nonverbal communication; therefore, affect is a further semiotic by which to 
investigate personal space.18 
 In order to account for both sides of the interaction I will note some of the 
issues with chatbots and affect. Chatbots can mix up positive and negative affects; 
and so can humans (Sedgwick, 2003). Chatbots therefore frustrate, and the utterances 
of frustration can repeat in a chatbot’s ability to learn user’s responses. Emotion and 
affect will not be discussed as interchangeable terms (Massumi, 2002; Sedgwick, 
2003). The affective impact disturbs a territorial connection between user and 
chatbot. Antonin Artaud’s work (in Bermel, 2001), is widely recognised as a 
precursor to the affect theory of Silvan Tomkins (1995). His work is discussed for his 
inclusions of impulsive and abortive gestures into his performative work in theatre 
and to what Deleuze calls a “speech affect” (Deleuze, 1990: 89). This is used to show 
the affect of a spelling mistake amongst other errors. 
 In summary, to counter the argument that personal space is a phenomenon that 
pertains to pure logic, or is a human-centred phenomenon; I use affect accounting for 
the impacts of territoriality in HCI. Intensity, resonance, atmosphere, residue and 
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18 Hall used an affect-touch-feeling (ATF register) to look at how affect resonates in four configurations of personal space by 
using three kinds of affect (Hall, [1959] 1990: 54). Formal, informal and technical affect are outlined in chapter 3; of which 
only the latter seems close to a contemporary understanding of affect, the other two relate more closely to emotion.
impact are the key terms that will be used to describe affective violence to be 
discussed in the next section.
The Relation of Violence & 
Violation in Non-Contact Networks
 This section defines the relation of violence to violation in terms of affective 
violence including the affect that the naming of violence entails. I take violence not a 
finite term, but a partial and transient term which is co-relationally defined. That is, I 
see violence as not just the distinctions of victim from perpetrator, social from 
antisocial behaviour, or formal and informal affects, but something that impacts on a 
world that integrates human and automated technologies. Affective atmospheres of 
violence, are not just the violent physical act itself, but the build up to it because 
violence often never arises; they are also violence’s residue, the atmospheres after 
violence has come to rest, the amplification of the dampening down of violence. The 
fear and threat of violence, the anxiety and build-up to a violent act, are thus running 
threads throughout the thesis. I consider violation as durational as the before and 
after of violence. 
 There are various sorts of violence that are named throughout this thesis. The 
various cycles of violence can be summarised as follows:
- the interruption of interaction in talk, as well as the moments of silence; 
- when technology is procedurally violent or violating; 
- as a rationale for the design of automated safety systems; and
- as an intervention into practices of science-making and technology development.19 
 Using these, I ask whether chatbots can enact some sort of violence. 
Specifically, I ask to what extent do chatbots enact a territorial personal space? Does 
indirect violence create a territorialised personal space? Personal space is usually 
connected to direct violences (in zones of touch-proximity), can the same be said of 
indirect violence? Violence is manifest in ethological studies of territoriality (in the 
work of Tinbergen), but is violence tacit in the territorial enactments of personal 
space (in the work of Hall). What is this violence and how is it imagined in 
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19 It is the silence in domestic violence that is the personal impetus to this part of the thesis framework.
language? Violence does occur in chatbot interactions of hate speech (Butler, 1997) 
but even this was not that prevalent within the data I collected with chatbots (to be 
discussed in the next section). There are the online violences of lurking, flaming 
relating to online violences and to breaking systems.
 Violence online enacts physical violence that repeats the violence enacted in 
science fiction. The violence of AI relates to issues of distrust, of self-repair, or 
territoriality are sharing space with humans. Nonsense is the violence of meaning, it 
is both a quiet and a noisy violence. These multiple violences can frustrate and 
obscure and are prevalent in chatbot interaction. Design and the arts are interruptive 
disciplines and can incorporate methodological processes that are somewhat violent. 
Cut-up methods being one example employed in the thesis. Chapter 4 involves 
violences of interrogation made in the name of containing violence. Physical forms 
of violence range from mocking torture evoking past genocide memories or 
repetitions of trauma such as in the Milgram’s experiment, in chapter 5. Research 
gets caught up in its own forms of violent agency, and potentially when this is a 
theme of the study. Reflexivity is important as a way to understand what additional 
violences or violations may be made in this research. There are academic violations 
and violences of being in the field including the virtual field that make victims and 
torturers out of researchers and participants. The fifth chapter case studies the 
eighteen Milgram’s experiment, to understand the part that the electric shock 
machine played in this initial set-up. In chapter 6 violences of restriction of enduring 
safety systems within the technologies and the regulatory policy (COPPA Act, and 
Directive-3). Technologies are protected and legislated as ways of living 
(Directive-3). Technological systems become things to protect not just tools of 
defence). In chapter 7, literatures pertaining to trauma knowledge (Berlant, 2001, 
2008) for ways technology as servo-mechanisms, systems of automation and systems 
that loose some sense or alter the kinesthetic. Violent forms are enacted on both 
machine and human. Physical violences not just of the body but extend to the 
embodied metaphors of violence in in the name of safety and defence. Violent 
language is performative and discursive (Kuntsman, 2009: 24), but chatbot violence 
is also a violence by design. It is a system of violence. Violences should not be 
viewed in isolation because it is a partial and contradictory action. I do not to place 
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violence between humans and machines as the agency of one entity over another, or 
to centre all aspects of violence on the proxemics of the body. 
Method-Assemblage
Methods Outline
 The main data collected are interactions with chatbots, a form of exploratory 
and speculative probing that I call Rudiments. Cases are used in each of the chapters 
alongside the rudiments to elaborate on the personal space phenomenon. Prior to 
starting the Rudiments, research questions and the scoping of this project was 
predominantly practical; in that it was design-led and I took the role of the 
researcher-bricoleur (see fig. 12). In addition to the Rudiments, I used a chatbot 
forum, called Robitron for its archive of posts, and for occasionally posting queries 
to chatbot developers (as semi-structured interviews). Rudiments created 
transcriptions, which are logged in the appendix, and audio rudiments (to be 
discussed in the next section) were created to hear the emotion of these interactions, 
which are recorded on the accompanying CD. This section sets out the research 
methodology and how the research initiated a series of iterative rudiments, audio 
rudiments and case studies used in each of the chapters.
 The rudiments are a part of what John Law calls a “method assemblage”, 
which is a process of “enacting the necessary boundaries between presence, manifest 
absence, and Otherness”, it is both “generative and performative” (Law, 2004: 
161).20 My method assemblage is a bundling of relations:
• The “in-hereness” or “presence” of a personal space imaginary enacted with 
chatbots.
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20 Design and art also commit to visualising and representational discourse and commenting on ‘out-thereness’ as well as 
creating new or alternate ‘in-hereness’ (Law, 2004). Law includes allegory and representation as ‘in-hereness’ in that 
representations for example make present what is absent but implied (Law, 2004: 160). ‘Out-thereness’ Law considers is “the 
reality outside or beyond ourselves” it can create a singular view, and is common in Euro-American thought (Law, 2004: 162).
• The “manifest absence” of metaphorical violences in chatbot interactions.
• The “absence of the otherness” as the absence of previous users that create the bot 
talk but that are hidden in each live interaction. It is also the absence of a human 
emotional responses such as sweat, breathe or palpitations. 
The Bricoleur
 The thesis has a foundation that was built in fine art, graphic design and 
interactive media and I have a commitment to these creative practices. I created maps 
and diagrams similar to what the design consultancy IDEO refers to as ‘affinity 
diagrams’ (Brown, 2009) — large groupings of thoughts and questions (see fig. 12). I 
also used several sketchbooks to start to note ideas as a log to map and visualise key 
concepts, and at this stage the practice was design-led.21 Some of these diagrams, 
maps and logs I shared online using the Photoblog, www.flickr.com. Some of the 
maps were then commissioned as examples of AI complexity at the Complexity Lab 
in Italy, because the diagrams appeared to be AI network diagrams (see fig. 13).22 
Mapping became a way of stabilising the complexity in AI. I realised that the 
diagrammatic and the visual forms were sometimes making certain themes 
superficially simple while at other times the visual was making research overly 
complex (see figs. 12-15). Often it was a bit of both. 
 These stages of mapping were overlapped with a move to performative 
methods taken from the practices of fine art and theatre when the study became less 
about representation and more about organisational and social concerns. I kept a log 
of this process on a private webblog accessed through www.blogger.com.
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21 During my doctoral study, the definition of research practice in art and design has undergone change, from “practice-based” 
to “practice-led”. I aim to emphasise here that the practice of design (by that I mean graphic design, interactive design, new 
media, visual communication and systems design), was an integrated part of the conceptual phases of this project, as well as 
directing the choices of the literatures studied and an emphasis on the imaginative sphere of the research problem. 
22 I was also commissioned by Christian Nold and Independent Photography to design the Greenwich Emotion map, printed by 
Ordnance Survey in 2006. Nold and I later worked on the conception of the Affect Browser in 2006/7.
FIGURE 12. A selection of themes are grouped to find affinity. In this case notes and citations were taken from an 
early literature review on AI as a scoping exercise of the research questions. Image source: Amanda Windle.
FIGURE 13. This diagram was a way to map out how to perform the audio rudiments of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
transcripts. Image source: Amanda Windle.
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FIGURE 14. The image above shows a mapping of the component parts of an RFID map in terms of its service 
economy in relation to the RFID’s component parts of tag, reader and database. I did this at a point when chatbots 
were potentially only one technology of many that could have been researched. Image Source: Amanda Windle. 
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FIGURE 15. The image above shows how bots were mapped to the atomic industry to its particular architectural 
layout and fail-safe measures. Image Source: Amanda Windle. 
 To develop a rich understanding of AI and chatbots, I conducted a lab visit in 
Zurich to broaden my knowledge of mainstream AI research as well as a trip to the 
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first AI archives in Dartmouth University.23 In contrast, I also presented at grassroots 
electronic groups such as Dorkbot in London and Artbot in Belgium. In addition. I 
attended electronic media festivals such as Transmediale (the Annual Festival for 
Arts and Digital Culture), and ISEA (the Inter-Society of Electronic Arts). Chatbots 
do not particularly belong to any of these places. I went to the aforementioned events 
to discuss informally my research within these spaces. In these visits I learned that 
issues around personal space with technology was an area that could be debated and 
was in some instances, very relevant (especially Dorkbot, when my work followed 
on from an experimenter who had remade pong by playing the game with two knee 
high leather boots as controllers, thus signifying an intimate and gendered personal 
space, to touch and to play). Chatbots were also familiar to these technology groups 
who did have wider interests with HCI outside of the conventions of industry. In the 
arts, chatbots are not really an area of popular design and critique (though they are 
pedagogic exemplars that can be used in interactive and new media courses) with 
current work playing with newer technologies such as physical computing using 
sensors, GPS (Global Positioning Systems) tracking, and robotics, as well as for the 
few, genetic manipulation and synthetic biology. There is of course, a trend in the 
media arts and perhaps also amongst postgraduate media students to work with retro 
technologies and materials as a matter of economy. I consider chatbots amongst this 
retro technology. 
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23 Jonas Salk of the Salk Institute where Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar carried out their laboratory study felt, “certain that 
many institutes and laboratories would include an in-house sociologist or philosopher”. Many labs also include artists and 
performers to consider the work in the lab environment. I visited an AI lab in Zurich that had an ongoing artist-in-residence 
programme. Daria Martin’s performance work, Soft Metals, had been exhibited at The Showrooms Gallery, in London, 2005, 
depicting performances of the robots produced at the laboratory. Not all artists in residence are driven by output goals that 
employ feedback to the scientists of which they observe. There are many that do open up dialogues to the general public 
studying scientific things, for example; Cornel Bieren’s The Path of Milk, or the artist and sociologist Lucy Kimbell’s and 
Andrew Barry’s work Pindices (all exhibited in Bruno Latour’s and Peter Weibel’s co-curated the show Making Things Public 
at Centre for Art and Media, Karlsruhe, in 2005). However, this project was not located in a laboratory environment as an in-
house sociologist, designer or artist-in-residence. The research design is based on four chatbots whose designers are located 
globally and they do not work in laboratories or institutions. These formats of observation were not necessary, as chatbot 
development is done online.
FIGURE 16. The image above shows how particular rudiments (top level), and actors (left), as well as specific 
chatbots and users (right), were considered for potential Audio Rudiment recordings, by using the three-
dimensional movements of a Rubix cube as a method of randomised selection and as a potential hardware 
application for controlling the selection of voice controlled parts. Image Source: Amanda Windle.
The Rudiments
 Rudiments are an iterative process, a form of speculative research design used 
to probe the ways chatbots, interact. From the book Just Gaming (1979), by Jean-
François Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thébaud I borrow and extend the principle of 
Rudiments.
‘Rudiments,’ as the little preamble you mentioned explained, are 
studies that are left undeveloped. The material itself is not refined; it 
is in the process of refining itself. (Lyotard and Thébaud, 1979: 15)
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 Rudiments are used in this thesis as distinct from experiments, however, 
experiments are tested in some of the Rudiments. Also, experiments are uncovered or 
understood by the rudimentary process. A rudiment can begin and end at any point 
and is in itself, a way of finding a framework by which to analyse or undertake 
further research. In this thesis the rudiment is used to investigate the ‘in-hereness’ 
and ‘out-thereness’ of personal space. Rudiments are not a substitute for another 
method and they can be used in conjunction with other methods; such as co-word 
occurrence testing (in chapter 2).
The Audio Rudiments
 The rudiments appear in every chapter of the thesis. The transcripts and the 
audio versions of those scripts (CD tracks) are my own archive of chatbot 
interactions (see fig. 17, for a map of a time-line of the Rudiments). I used voice over 
specialists to perform the transcripts as a reflexive process. The audio rudiments give 
voice to a chatbot as they are characteristically mute. The reason for doing this is to 
give voice to how their talk is heard. One might criticise this method as a way of 
attending to the ‘shiny stuff’, to the more dramatic elements of chatbot interaction. I 
would argue that ordinary actions can encompass fictional registers of drama which 
have a spiked affect. Dramatic affect will be understood as a form of ‘noise’ (in 
chapter 2). Yet, what if this happens to be what needs to be listened to in order to 
understand the performance of personal space, as a method of defence?
Web Archival Analysis and The Robitron Postings
 To accompany the Rudiments I asked questions that were framed to the 
Robitron group either by email or on the forum. Each conversation with Robitron 
always stemmed in part related to the Rudiments. I became a member of the Yahoo 
online group to also learn more about the developers. There are around 9,000 
members of Robitron with ten members posting regularly. Not all of these most 
regular members are moderators though some are, or have become moderators 
during this study. The Robitron forum was used to understand the relation of chatbot 
developers as a group and also on how developers relate to their chatbots. It was also 
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a way to understand the technical aspects of chatbots and to access further evidence 
that is unavailable in the Rudiment process, but was needed subsequently to interpret 
and question the Rudimentary findings. The archive was not reviewed until after the 
main Rudiments were completed. Prior to that only immediate forum posts were read 
and I did not post until after the Rudiments were created. This was an attempt to 
segment the speculative phase from the analysis of the data-collection. The archive is 
secondary, only in its chronological respect to the work done in the Rudiments. In 
analysis it is used to compliment the Rudiments and from this stage on is treated 
symmetrically.
 Questions concerning the onlineness of chatbots and their interrelation to their 
developers (and their online presence) includes how positively social is web 2.0 (the 
name given to social-networking software that assembles social groups for example, 
Facebook, and Robitron)?24 If web 3.0, the so-called semantic web (which would 
include search engines that use bot technology and therefore technologies such as 
chatbots), is to be built on a web 2.0 legacy of social networking (that is not 
necessarily or evidently social), then what might ensue?25 A single chatbot is 
multiple and their practices are fractional as a consequence of their chat being 
constructed from previous users and various programmed responses inputted by 
developers. Data from the developers of chatbots taken from Robitron, and the 
chatbots themselves provides the thesis with the research materials to engage with 
these questions that involves both web 2.0 and web 3.0.
 The chatbots’ databases consist of datalogs — transcripts of all the chatbots’ 
interactions. It is a part of the chatbot that is only accessible to the developer. This is 
one of the absences of data due to a speculative research design. Only chapter 2 
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24 Web 2.0 is often combined with social networking and open source phenomena, as positive aspirations of online 
connectivity. “The classic example of the Web 2.0 era is the “mash-up” — for example, connecting a rental-housing Web site 
with Google Maps to create a new, more useful service that automatically shows the location of each rental listing” (Markoff, J. 
2006, New York Times, Business [online]. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/12/business/12web.html?
ei=5090&en=a54d6971614edc62&ex=1320987600&pagewanted=all [Accessed 20 June 2009]).
25 The definition of web 3.0 as a semantic web is taken from Tim Berners-Lee (credited with inventing the world wide web), 
whereby the web will learn and understand the requests of its user, similar to the way that chatbots respond to users. (Markoff, 
J. 2006, New York Times, Business [online]. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/12/business/12web.html?
ei=5090&en=a54d6971614edc62&ex=1320987600&pagewanted=all [Accessed 20 June 2009]).
attempts to use data of this magnitude as a supplementary approach to test the 
validity of the evidence found in the rudimentary processes.
Reflexivity and Becoming Bot
 Philip Auslander in his research on performance, remarks that chatbots are not 
‘playback devices’ yet, I would suggest that they are a mixture of playback and live 
interaction (2008: 81). The looping of interactions that occurs in the chatbot 
transcripts is useful in that it plays with reflexive methods. The rudiments are anti-
reflexive, a solipsistic act, (Hayles 1999: 133), that is sometimes self-contradictory 
(Latour in Woolgar, 1988: 155) and self-conscious (Wise, 1997: 14). They are thus 
an interrogation of the rules of reflexivity, in that to break reflexivity is to render it as 
solipsism and at the edge of meaning. Reflexivity is productive, insofar as it is a way 
of questioning the production of sociological knowledge, but crucially solipsism is 
included as a part of that process rather than at the point when reflexivity stops (in 
that one is knowingly in some ways, talking to oneself). I am interested in how 
solipsism breaks down knowledge as an important end-stage of the reflexive process 
in how the social is assembled and disassembled. Solipsism is generally feared as a 
point of decay in academic research, but is to the contrary, something that I consider 
as productive. The iterative rudimentary process takes reflexivity to a point of 
deformation, as a method of decay to exhaust a philosophy of becoming (Deleuze, 
2004).26 An interest in reflexivity came out of a methodological issue for chatbot’s 
repetitive process of chat, its solipsism, which enacts a misanthropic personal space. 
Reflexivity is a supplementary issue that came out as a methodological concern of 
working with chatbots that can repeat and echo my forms of interaction.
Introduction
33
26 Deleuze and Guattari define becoming as a verb, yet to understand what becoming means depends on what is understood by 
animal, machine and human. Becoming is a verb with a consistency all of its own; it does not reduce to, or lead back to, 
“appearing”, “being”, “equalling”, or “producing” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 263). To use the example of the becoming-fish, 
Deleuze and Guattari define ‘becoming’ as anti-genealogical; one does not mimic a fish to become-fish, it is rather how one 
becomes always connected and caught up in what it means to be a fish and what a fish might actually mean, how it flows, how it 
swims, how it eats, or breathes, not just what a fish is semantically, but what it might mean structurally at the microbe level 
(Deleuze and Guattari, [1987] 2007: 11). Becoming entangles life and death distinctions, and the divisions of time, entangling 
the durations of past, present and future. In this project becoming-chatbot is to consider how human and chatbot get caught up 
in one another.
Additional Case Material
 Each chapter includes cases involving social science experiments, gaming 
methods, science fiction films, policy documents and regulatory procedures. The 
cases were chosen because they suggest territorial claims related to automated 
technology. The cases run adjacent but not always in tandem with the rudiments. 
They are not to do with chatbots specifically, but with the HCI enactments of 
personal space in fiction writing27, academia,28  legislation,29  and business 
enterprise.30 
 The Rudiments are speculative, whereas the method for selecting the cases was 
to sample personal space imaginations that are territorial scenarios involving 
technology (from the 1950s onwards, that is the time from when chatbots were 
invented); and to further show the ways personal space is an involvement of the 
imaginary, to explore the hypothetical aspect of personal space enactments. 
 How do the cases in each chapter build? Each chapter involves a spatiality of 
confinement, be that actual or virtual (of logic, or dream). The running theme of 
confinement throughout the thesis is a way to focus on individualised, territorial 
concerns of personal space. In chapter 1, Stanley Kubrick’s 2001 (1968), involves 
the confinement of a crew traveling in outer space within a space ship. The story 
explores the territorial conflicts between an AI system called HAL, and the ship’s 
human crew. Chapter 3 uses two cases taken from Edward Hall’s anthropological 
work which studied the medical and the military, both are institutionalising methods 
of detainment made in exceptional circumstances. Chapter 4 uses the psychological 
and pedagogical case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma that uses interrogative methods and 
logics of confinement and entrapment which create a discussion on the parables of 
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27 Numerous postings on Robitron are discussions about science fiction. Science fiction lays down challenges for chatbot 
developers to achieve but the developers and their practices also inspire science fiction stories that then go on to inspire further 
developers. The relation of chatbots to science fiction writing is iterative.
28 Chatbot development has a particular relationship to academia. Early chatbots were connected to AI research and to 
computer science and linguistics. This relation is also iterative in the creation of the chatbot personas.
29 To be discussed in chapter 6.
30 Chatbot development has a new relationship with business enterprise as it leaves the academic arena and follows marketing 
goals.
entrapment. Chapter 5 involves methods of isolation, of decision-making in a 
laboratory setting, using the machinic agency of the electric shock machine. Chapter 
6 describes the method of a complex nuclear fail-safe procedure from the 1960s; 
followed by the Directive-3 (2003), a system of protecting humans and machinic 
systems by ‘staying-in-place’. Chapter 7 has two cases, JG Ballard’s Crash (1973), 
which is a method of subverting technology in the intimate spaces of the car; and 
Colson Whitehead’s novel The Intuitionist (1999), which is a story of the intimacy of 
elevators in non-places. All of these are in some way a historical enactment on 
personal space, as an imaginative method of confinement. 
 Most of the cases are taken from fiction writing, in particular science fiction. I 
have found these forms of narrative helpful to investigate the imaginary sphere of 
personal space. Although they are operatively different imaginaries, their relation is 
multiplicit. In chapter 1, science fiction is a way of thinking about both the bodies 
and machinic technologies, by which violence is performed. Chapter 2, investigates 
the creative aspects of fiction writing using the cut-up literatures to understand the 
role of nonsense in chatbot talk. In chapter 3 and 5, there are no science fiction or 
fictional cases used, there is enough drama in the examples used already. In chapter 
4, the particular narrative device of a parable — of entrapment is expanded into a 
discussion of how it is enacted in an extensive range of science fiction writing. 
Chapter 6, the science fiction novel is used to explore the narrative device of the fail-
safe and mechanisms of safety. Science fiction authors are used as consultants for 
matters of risk in governance (although this is only a small point of this chapter) the 
point is made in the second part of chapter 6, which considers regulation. In chapter 
7, the two science fiction novels use the narrative device of a crash either as an 
accident or a misdemeanour. 
 In summary, the “method assemblage” outlined is a chronological ordering of 
the methods: starting with the speculative design approach of the bricoleur (chapter 
1), two kinds of rudiments (chapters 2-3) and web archival postings (chapter 4) and 
web research from Robitron (chapter 5), and additional case material (chapter 6). 
This has explained the ‘generative’ (chapter 1) and ‘performative’ (chapters 2-3) 
phases of the methods, reflexively. The ‘in-hereness’ and ‘out-thereness’ of the 
chatbot data was then supplemented by further data-collection and case materials 
presented (chapters 4-6). These additional materials also captured generative and 
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performative methods. My particular ‘method-assemblage’ is an attempt to get away 
from “what we usually find in textbooks on methods” and from the “completed and 
closed accounts on method” and from the “smooth Euro-American metaphysical 
certainties” (but without othering those methods or metaphysical certainties), as a 
part of this thesis (Law, 2004: 143). I critique the smoothness of method neither 
giving a closed account of method or sense of certainty to the methods presented 
(Law, 2004: 143). 
FIGURE 17. shows an outline of the Rudiments in three phases of research which are mapped against the main 
time spent data-collecting. This was over a 24 month period due to this thesis being undertaken part-time. Image 
Source: Amanda Windle
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Chapter Outline
 Chapter 1 begins with a human-centred focus on personal space but assesses 
the limits of proxemics as a method that cannot account for technological agencies of 
software agents. Using a canonical case in AI, two speech acts from the rudiments 
and from the Robitron chatbot forum are explored as an HCI enactment of personal 
space. I argue that personal space is an important concept for exploring territoriality, 
one that can and should be adapted to include technology because machinic agencies 
transfer, relocate, enact and reenact territorially. The impact of technologies on 
personal space is explored and analysed as a matter of affect where machinic goals 
are in conflict with basic personal space requirements of humans.
 Chapter 2 looks at nonsense as the crux of many conflicts in chatbot 
interaction, as evidenced by the data collected from my rudiment transcripts. This is 
done, by analysing the specific roles played by nonsense across the data collected in 
the Rudiments. Audio rudiments are introduced to show the importance of the way 
one imaginatively hears, intuits, and interprets interaction with a machine, focusing 
on the ambiguity of the spatial metaphors of personal space. Nonsense is difficult to 
read, listen to or to distinguish from meaning, but is in itself meaningful. This 
chapter argues that nonsense can be analysed as a form of meaningful data but to do 
so requires a performative aspect to the analysis of chatbot transcripts. This method 
of analysis highlights the polysemic affects of chatbots’ talk (for instance, humour or 
rudeness) as a disorientation of human and nonhuman spatiality.
 Chapter 3 investigates several examples of spatially ambiguous violence. Two 
are from the Hall’s work on proxemics and territoriality and the others involved a 
Rudiment and a Robitron chatbot forum posting from their archive of posts. These 
interweave online, offline, historical and contemporary accounts showing that 
violence is an interrelation of subjective, objective, systemic and structural violences 
(Žižek, 2008) in terms of the affect of HCI scenarios. An interweaving of these four 
very different scenarios, seen as exemplars of violent personal space, is necessary to 
show once again the limits of Hall’s methods (as shown in chapter 1), but also in 
order to extend those methods to encompass new configurations of personal space 
and intimate spatiality. I first show how Hall’s cases omit the analysis of machinic 
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agency. I then retrospectively incorporate this perspective into Hall’s own analysis 
before moving on to show two further (and rather complex) machinic agencies at 
work in the chatbot material. Only by producing a longer history of the ways that 
personal space, and our understandings of personal space, have been impacted by the 
interaction of humans and machines will a fuller and more integrated understanding 
of violence be achieved. I draw on Slavoj Žižek’s four categories of violence in order 
to show how violence between humans and machines in and online and offline 
spaces is an interweaving of agencies and spatialities.
 Chapter 4 proposes that chatbots use an interrogative mode of talk as a 
methodological strategy to hide and disguise the potential affects of too much 
nonsensical noise. Using the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Tucker, 1950), the chapter places 
chatbots in the reverse role, interrogated rather than interrogating. The findings are 
set out in two parts. First, I review the statistical results of the rudiments. Second I 
explore the Prisoner’s Dilemma, as a rudiment for its use of spatial metaphors of 
confinement, and as a parable of entrapment. To assert that chatbot talk is 
preeminently interrogative is to continue the analysis of nonsense scenarios (spatially 
ambiguous utterances in chatbot interaction), that are methodologically violent in 
that they involve constraining forms of talk. This helps to make the larger 
observation that personal space in chatbot interactions operates as a metaphorical 
logic of confinement and entrapment.
 Chapter 5 also investigates a canonical experimental procedure, but rather than 
enacting an experiment by creating Rudiments, this chapter critiques two pre-
existing methods in order to reflect on procedures specific to chatbots. First, Stanley 
Milgram’s Obedience to Authority Experiments, (1961) are discussed along with its 
reenactment in Rod Dickinson’s media art. Both make visible the agency of the 
electric shock machine in order to show how violence is mediated through the 
torturous yet faked agency of the machine; as well the remote authority of the 
psychologist-researcher. The second part of the chapter analyses the invisible 
agencies of a chatbot method called a pick-up, focusing on the way chatbot 
developers try to initiate interaction between humans and bots. I show this to be part 
of a territorial procedure, and in that sense, show it to be related to the ways that 
experimenters set-up, repeat, and reenact territorial conflict between participant and 
observer. Milgram’s experiments set a precedent in regard to the ethical misuse of 
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participant-observers. Even the critiques in STS and the philosophy of science miss 
the opportunity to reflect on the roles played by machinic agencies in Milgram’s 
experiments. The misuse of human participants is a well rehearsed, critique but the 
misuse of academic and technological cachet, are largely overlooked. The 
participant-observer and their personal space are blurred in chatbot talk and unethical 
methods therefore proliferate in chatbot interaction. It is important to uncover, here 
mainly through conversational analytics, the hidden spatialities of the experimenter 
that can be nested inside an experimental process. I employ a rudiment next to an 
experiment in order to show the unethical dimension of experimenting with chatbots 
to be a problem of personal space.
 Chapter 6 widens the implications of the chatbot research to cultural fiction and 
political regulation. This chapter firstly looks at preparedness, safety and risk in the 
details of a fail-safe system, a servo-mechanism, originating in the 1960s. Secondly, 
a contemporary case study (Directive-3) is used to consider the inclusion of 
technologies such as chatbots not in the servo-mechanism, of territorial defence but 
within what needs to be protected as a part of a technological infrastructure. This 
chapter also describes some of the impacts the recent political shift from anxiety to 
terror on the design of fail-safes for and defences against impending disaster. This 
chapter shows how machinic agencies are territorialised in policy and regulation, 
analysing the ways in whichmachines are protected by terrorist legislation 
(particularly cyberattack) in the spheres of our shared personal sphere of everyday 
life.
 Chapter 7 focuses on the misanthropic aspects of chatbot design and the 
methodology of designing out of fear. Two crashes are taken from recent fiction to 
expand on how a personal space is configured as a design for prevention. By 
reflecting on the personal space of the designer, this chapter also discusses how 
personal space is impacted by and implicated in the methodological imperatives of 
the designer. . I argue that personal spaces create misanthropic design imperatives, 
methods and ways of living; that the technological agencies of personal spaces have 
a confining impact in the transient spaces of the ‘non-place’.This expands the 
implications of my research into personal space and chatbots by describing the 
territorial impacts of machine agencies on spaces such as the elevator/lift, corridor, 
motorway or road.
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 Chapter 8 reflexively draws together themes from each of the chapters as a 
summary of the thesis. I will consolidate both the findings and arguments to 
summarise some of the benefits of the thesis to the areas of HCI, STS, and design. I 
will also conclude by considering theways machinic territoriality and its violence 
impacts on our ways of living together both in the private spheres of our computers 
and homes, as well as in national and state-regulated conditions.
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Chapter 1
2001 A Space Odyssey: 
Personal Space & Special Nowheres
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Introduction to Proxemics
Excerpt taken from the Chatbot Transcript:
The Drunk Rudiment (13th August 2005)
Alice:  I have been to the middle of nowhere. 
Human:  Well i [sic] need to go there right now, to bed.
Alice:  Interesting. What is stopping you?
Human:  and that's a special nowhere to you.
Alice:  A special nowhere to me is a terrible thing to waste.
Excerpt taken from A Robitron Posting:
Offensive Bot Responses (22nd June 2008)
I too have given up reading logs for the most part. It just reminds me 
if [sic] why I moved out to the middle of nowhere 20 years ago ;) Bob 
Norris, A chatbot developer and member of Robitron31
 The chatbot interaction and the chatbot developer’s posting are evidence of the 
‘nowhere’ speech act. ‘Special nowheres’ will be related to personal space as it 
occurred in this data; it is not an existing phrase taken from Edward Hall’s work. The 
two accounts made in the HCI (human-computer interaction) bring together personal 
space in relation to technological worlds. It is a speech act that I was comfortable 
repeating in the first excerpt and one that I therefore understand. There is a 
commonality between Alice’s (potentially pre-programmed) machinic speech, and 
that of Bob Norris’ posting to the Robitron forum. Although these speech acts are 
uttered online, the nowheres imagined are not exclusive to language used on the 
internet as indicated in the second example but they maybe considered as 
comfortably used within chatbot networks (referring either to the human or machinic 
networks). Bob Norris refers to the physical spaces of home and belonging rather 
than to a virtual spatiality of being ‘here and there’ simultaneously which could be 
extrapolated from either excerpts’ online environment. There is no direct relation 
made between personal space and special nowheres in Edward Hall’s research. I 
draw on the connection between Hall’s work on personal space and deception, how 
one reveals, hides or deceives in physical and virtual spaces. This is needed so as to 
understand how distance and intimacy work in online proximities representing 
personal spaces that are special nowheres. 
 To explore the escapist element of special nowheres it will be considered a 
territorial speech act so as to think through how technologies are caught up in this 
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expression of personal space. When uttered by the chatbot it incites intrigue; it hints 
at other-worldliness, science fiction, and feelings of escapism. It is these qualities 
that will be explored in this chapter, tracing the imagination of nowheres derived 
from science fiction dystopias and defensive mediating technologies of 
communication.
 Science fiction has to an extent already shaped our conception of the middle of 
nowhere. Elsewhere this exists as much in science fiction as it does in the reality of 
the Drunk Rudiment. The ‘middle of nowhere’ is a sort of ‘no man’s land,’ belonging 
neither to AI nor to humans. Yet, where is this middle of nowhere and whose space is 
in the middle of nowhere? ‘Special nowheres’ and the ‘middle of nowhere’ are 
expressions of personal space that can imagine a place on a map, or a space within 
one’s mind signifying the inside and outside agencies of a territorial situation. The 
developer, researcher and chatbot in the two excerpts consider different nowheres 
because they describe a personal state of being. There is no smooth space viewable 
from Google Earth; no single chat room to lurk in, arrive at, or depart from; no single 
place to which all three entities can retreat. However, in the imagination of these 
spaces a pattern of repetition emerges as to what might be considered at the dead 
centre of nowhere. 
 The dead centre of nowhere is a spatiality that operates in between beings and 
things, which require an account of “fractal ontologies” (Massumi, 2002).32 These 
entities have agency between physical and virtual worlds because they can 
potentially exist in two spaces, simultaneously. Fractal ontologies can have either 
virtual and physical ontologies, or both. Chatbots and their users are both fractal 
ontologies. I understand and extend Massumi’s use of the term to mean that an entity 
cannot be identified by the human body alone. Moreover, these are not singular 
entities because their ontology is only partially present, for instance a chatbot can be 
made up of more than one user and only partially of their developer. Fractal 
ontologies are entangled collaborations: for example a Robitron posting can be 
created by two members, and chatbots recount fictional characters and their 
catchlines as well as recounting the voice of their developer. A chatbot’s agencty gets 
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32 “The organisation of multiple levels that have different logics and temporal logics and temporal organisations . . . . recalls 
the fractal ontology and nonlinear causality underlying theories of complexity” (Massumi, 2002: 33). Fractal ontologies pertain 
to a different notion of time, to the entanglement of becoming, of duration.
entangled in all those that interact with it. The limitations of the phrase personal 
space do little to describe the incomplete and complex descriptions of being nowhere 
that a special nowhere presents. This brief introduction and working definition of a 
special nowhere has a cautionary note: the aim of the chapter is not to simplify or 
label complex states, nor is it to reinstate the past work of Hall. I will use Hall’s 
proxemics in contrast to Massumi’s fractal ontologies to help articulate the 
occurrence of incomplete yet forceful agencies that make an imagination of a special 
nowhere important. 
 HAL, from Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968), is a dystopic 
1960s imagination of an artificially intelligent conversational system. It is often 
recounted in AI as a canonical example of violent human-machine interaction. 
Territorial problems within the conversational systems of chatbots are researched not 
just because the personal space of humans is manipulated by machines, but because 
these violences are prolific in the imaginative sphere of science fiction, in the 
predecessors of chatbots, particularly entities such as HAL. Imaginations of 
machines like HAL create defence and attack rationales for design as a consequence, 
and prevention of conflict. 
 Personal spaces are not just the physical proximities of living things; 
proxemics are much more than the bodily and the biological proximities and should 
include machines and their shared environmental relations to humans. These are the 
absent distances that should be observed in the design of conversational systems. The 
imagination of human-machine conflicts is a powerful rationale by which things are 
built, subsequently shaping our environment. To analyse a conversational system one 
needs to consider the environment within which it was built, as well as the agents 
encompassed and consequently assembled by the system. This chapter is concerned 
not only with how HAL reconfigures a human’s personal space but also how HAL 
might create a personal space as a territorial need for a special nowhere.
 How are special nowheres imagined? They occur in narratives of global (state) 
and local (individual) violences. They are escapist strategies, traumatic 
disassociations, and daydreams of wanting to be elsewhere, as a need to be 
somewhere other than where the body is situated. Special nowheres exist inside 
another, or they can be so far away as to be in proximity to anything resisting the 
logics of the biological and the physical. I will argue that HAL’s personal space is 
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enacted in territorial violence, whilst also showing the limits of considering that 
causality for personal space is grounded in either the metaphors of the body or the 
brain and should be considered a fractal phenomenon in relation to HCI. 
 Personal space need not be grounded by concepts of humanness, nor should 
machines be described according to a definition of what it is to be human. Case 
studying HAL helps to explore a human sense of personal space that necessitates an 
interweaving of humans and machines as an imaginative configuration of violent 
personal space. To understand a conversational system as human on the one side and 
machinic on the other is to mistake the complex interconnections of human-machine 
systems. There is no such thing as a machinic personal space and I do not intend to 
build one. 
 I draw together literature from the social sciences, a philosophy of things and 
affect, and the artistic practice of intervening (with chatbots), to explore the narrative 
structure of special nowheres in HCI. I begin with Edward Hall’s eight proxemic 
system as an approach to analysing territoriality. It is, however, problematic in that it 
privies the biological ways of the human body, which misses the complications of 
fractal ontologies. I argue that this should be taken into account in any HCI. I 
therefore extend Hall’s approach by considering gestures and affects of dominance 
that would normally be associated with humans as the contradictions of antisocial-
social things. In this way, I can take into account the affects of artificial entities, such 
as chatbots. I also consider that the ambiguity of positive and negative affects ought 
to be taken into account within a logic of territorial nowheres. This helps to 
investigate the non-biological status of chatbots and their potential territoriality as 
made by, with, or for humans.
 The old and new conflicts of HAL and chatbots enact logics of the nowhere 
speech act. By recounting HAL’s story from the perspective of territorial action, one 
sees how a special nowhere can be created from a violence of one personal space 
over another. In the chat rooms of chatbot developers and in the chatbot’s own 
speech-acts, nowheres are being replayed and repeated. These evoke HAL’s own 
logic of survival and need for a territorial nowhere. HAL extinguishes human life in 
order to protect the mission, or is it due to a need for a special nowhere? 
Understanding special nowheres is essential to understanding the territorial acts of 
HAL. Subsequently, Kubrick’s 2001, is a narrative justification for chatbots to 
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engage in conversations about special nowheres, as pre-programmed concerns of 
developers. 
 I will take as the rationale of this chapter the potentiality for the chatbot 
utterance of the nowhere speech act to be pre-programmed, suggesting that it could 
be a concern of chatbot developers. I will investigate the logic of a special nowhere 
through affect, sound,33  and narrative description as well as investigating its 
proxemics, territoriality and fractal ontology through the fictional example of 
Kubrick’s 2001. I hope to articulate the sounds and representations of a special 
nowhere by reengaging with a past articulation of personal space. It will set out how 
territorial conflicts usually described as biological personal spaces become entangled 
and complex in technological worlds, when non-biological actants are taken into 
account. I argue that this is necessary to understand because it shows how special 
nowheres come about through a lack of understanding the complexity of proximity in 
technological worlds. Special nowheres have also had an impact on the design and 
building of technological worlds. I retain Kubrick’s film of 2001 throughout the 
chapter as a narrative device to describe a technological conflict of territoriality that 
is, I believe, a special nowhere conflict. A science fiction exemplar is used to show 
how it operates in the imaginary sphere regardless of this being fictional or non-
fictional. Kubrick’s 2001 is an odyssey that explores violent conflicts between AI and 
humans, when territoriality is hard to define as it is in this case full of partial and 
collaborative, fractal ontologies. I start by pointing out the inadequacies of Hall’s 
proxemics to show the partiality of only understanding a biological notion (or for 
that matter a technological notion), of distance and territoriality. This is done by 
understanding fractal ontologies through the binding of subject and object; the 
ambiguities of the antisocial and social; and the dividing of the interdependence of 
affect and emotion. 
A Summary of 2001’s 
Scenescapes, Violence and Affect
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33 I will also include “active touch” (Gibson, 1962, within Hall, 1966), and “silent language” (Hall, 1959); two of Hall’s terms 
that relate to both affect and sound.
 Kubrick’s 2001 (1968), is based on Arthur C. Clarke’s science fiction novel of 
the same title, though both were created in the same year from Clarke's earlier short 
story The Sentinel (1948). The prime focus in Stanley Kubrick’s 2001 is the 
relationship of Dave and Frank, two members of the ship’s crew, and HAL 9000, an 
artificially intelligent agent, an emotional computer system capable of thinking and 
feeling.34 All are aboard a spaceship voyaging to Jupiter in the year 2001. Kubrick’s 
film is for the most part silent, both the novel and its sequel 2010: Odyssey Two 
(1984), have limited dialogue, but more so in Kubrick’s film. The lack of talking 
lends deliberate emphasis to the scenescapes and to the technological details that are 
prominent in the fight for territorial control. 
 There are three main scenescapes in the film. Beginning with a scene back on 
earth which depicts an ape using a jawbone as a tool for the first time, it is the 
imagined first step in the evolution of humans, though the specific use of a jawbone 
perhaps hints at the further development of human speech beyond this initial step. 
The evolutionary jump is signified by the ape striking the heads of other apes with 
the jawbone. It is linked to the close proximity of a black monolith located next to 
the apes’ sleeping-cave. This infers that perhaps the evolutionary jump was aided by 
something other than the ape itself. This moment of violent development gives way 
to the rest of the film being set in outer space during 2001. Bruno Latour writes 
sociologically in his paper, Morality and Technology (2002a); he reflects on 
Kubrick’s film because he is interested in the ways technology reassembles the social 
rather than just being assumed the product of a fixed notion of sociality: 
If in a famous swirling movement he flings so high and for that it 
becomes the space station of the future, it is because all technologies 
incite around them the whirlwind of new worlds. (Latour: 2002a)
 The second scenescape and the main technological interest of the film focuses 
on an AI. HAL is the intermediary leap, a machinic step between the evolutionary 
scenes that begin and end the film; firstly, between the evolution of man from ape, 
and secondly, when human is birthed outside of the human body, situated in a foetus 
floating above planet earth. The final evolutionary leap takes place at the end of the 
film, transporting the character Dave into the fourth dimension, a leap that is both 
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34 Kubrick gained advice from Marvin Minsky at MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), a key expert in AI, along with 
various computer scientists from IBM.
biological in terms of rebirth, and machinic in the presence of the black monolith. 
What ensues between two evolutionary leaps is a struggle between HAL and the 
ship’s crew. The violence is clean; each death is executed with a surgical sterility. 
When the crew’s sleeping members die, they are frozen as their body temperatures 
cool, letting them fall into a hypothermic coma, as HAL alters their hibernation 
controls on their sleeping capsules. The second death involves a living crew member, 
when Frank makes repairs to the outside of the ship. HAL operates a pod’s (a small 
mobile unit) mechanical arms to pinch and sever Frank’s umbilical-like, oxygen 
cord. When Dave shuts down HAL, he pulls out HAL’s hardware, cassette by 
cassette, ejected in slow automatic slides (see fig. 18).
FIGURE 18. Dave shuts down the HAL9000 computer. Reprinted with kind permission of 2001: A SPACE 
ODYSSEY © Turner Entertainment Co. A Warner Bros. Entertainment Company. All Rights Reserved.
 The violence between HAL and the ship’s crew are sanitised, they are not 
visceral acts. The essayist J.P. Telotte’s writing on 2001: A Space Odyssey considers 
this aspect as a homosocial narrative, that women, “have almost no place in the 
cleanliness of space as imagined by Kubrick” (Telotte, 2006: 139). For the 
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philosopher Gilles Deleuze,35 the violence is particular in another way, describing 
2001 as a “cinema of the brain” rather than a “physical cinema” (Deleuze, 1985: 
204). Kubrick’s work, in its particular rendering of violence and its lengthy silences 
(as pauses), makes this a film of thought, an attribute of AI. In Michael Bérubé’s 
essay entitled Open the Pod Bay Doors (2006), the writer of English Literature 
implies that the silences in the film are characterised as not to speak the 
“unfathomable”, that “. . .no one seems to have talked about the political narrative 
that goes without saying in 2001, nor have we asked ourselves what that very silence 
might tell us” (Bérubé: 2006). The intensities the characters endure (including HAL) 
are for the most part unspoken, they are the intensities of feared intent. When spoken, 
it is often suppressed feeling, for example when Dave is about to switch off HAL, the 
AI says “take a stress pill and think it over. . . ” in a last attempt to control the ship’s 
only surviving crew member. Earlier in the film HAL conducts a psychological 
report on Dave, to test his mental state and fitness for duty. At the end of the film 
when HAL is being shut down, HAL sings the first line to the song Daisy Bell 
“Daisy, Daisy give me your answer do”.36 The second line is sung as HAL’s voice 
slows and is not fully heard which leaves one to finish the well known song in one’s 
mind: “I’m half crazy, all for the love of you”. One contemplates the double-meaning 
implied in this lyric, with regard to AI’s lack of emotion. 
 The film continually repeats various scenes whereby the affect of either HAL 
or of the crew members can be summarised as a constant suppression and fear of 
crisis. Yet crises always looms when the ship malfunctions, as a consequence of 
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35 The work of Gilles Deleuze (including writings in collaboration with the political scientist, Felix Guattari) has been used 
throughout the thesis. It is counter to Edward Hall’s theorem of proxemics in that Hall considers personal space as biological. 
Deleuze helps me to understand that personal space is not based on stable identities and theories of the personal (and the body), 
rather that the distances between subjects and objects might be understood as an integrated relation involving the two. 
Understanding personal space via Deleuze is to understand it as ‘Anti-Oedipal,’ and that personal space is not just a concept of 
the mind. This does not mean that I am averse to considering personal space as a mental construct; on the contrary, I go on to 
use other writers in counterpoint to a Deleuzian anti-psychoanalysis, in particular that of the Lacanian psychoanalyst, Slavoj 
Žižek, in chapter 3. Žižek considers matters of violence in relation to territoriality and although his lens is psychoanalytic, he 
does move between small and large agencies, as does Deleuze, and both help me to make points on violence that are structural 
as well as individual. Deleuze cites the same ethological models as Hall in terms of territoriality which are further discussed in 
chapters 5-7.
36 The same song (Daisy Bell) was sung in 1963 at the Bell telephone laboratories and is a part of Ubu’s (an arts sound archive) 
365 Day Project (2003) compiling obscure audio selections (365 Day Project, [online] 2003. Available from: www.ubu.com/
outsiders/365/2003.062.shtml [Accessed on 19 June 2009]).
HAL’s sabotage. The first instance is when the ship’s A.O. unit, an instrument 
situated on the outside of the space ship, malfunctions. Once fixed, a series of similar 
A.O. unit malfunctions is reported by HAL, announced as condition yellow (noted in 
the screenplay).37 This alert condition is reminiscent of America’s nuclear weapons 
system and its coloured states of readiness.38 This is the film’s only apparent 
undertone of nuclear disaster prior to when Dave views the earth during the 
detonation of all the world’s nuclear bombs. In the final scene of the scenescape of 
2001, HAL’s red light is situated amongst the ship’s rooms, glowing in the same hues 
as the sun depicted in the film’s opening sequence, in which the sun aligns with 
subsequent planets in a paralleled mathematical arrangement, in a structure of 
planetary systems. When HAL is depicted it is often in close-up, with the red light 
cropped to form a horizon (see fig. 19). Alternatively, HAL’s vision is to an extent a 
reflection of the birth of humanity. Dave talks to HAL when trying to regain entry 
back into the ship from fixing an A.O. unit. At this moment, HAL’s monitoring view 
of Dave is represented from inside HAL. We view Dave inside a black box, the other 
side of HAL’s shining light. It is now black and transparent, an empty cavity from 
which the viewer looks out, imprisoned inside the machine. This is HAL’s inner 
space and visual representation of danger.
 Following the A.O. unit malfunctioning, Dave and Frank go outside to 
administer manual repairs to the unit; at this point HAL makes the ship doors fail, 
trapping the two humans outside the ship. Each attempt to survive HAL’s deliberate 
sabotage is a fight, fought by the crew members overriding HAL’s automatic 
controls, in their struggle to switch to manual control. HAL is ultimately defeated 
and silenced with a screwdriver.
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37 The analysis of 2001 is predominantly an analysis of the film and not the textual documents such as the screenplay and the 
original novel; these are only referred to in order to expand on the analysis of the film.
38 See chapter 6.
FIGURE 19. HAL is shown throughout the film in various close-up shots that crop the pulsing light which we 
begin to recognise as HAL. Reprinted with kind permission of 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY © Turner 
Entertainment Co. A Warner Bros. Entertainment Company. All Rights Reserved.
 If technologies create “new worlds” (Latour, 2002a), this “homosocial” space 
odyssey (Telotte, 2006) destroys old worlds to make way for new nowhere worlds. 
Kubrick’s 2001 begins with an absence of a female perspective of technological 
innovation, which moves to an absence of the male of the human species before, 
finally, the human planet is destroyed. A new technological world dominated by 
logics in this “cinema of the brain” (Deleuze, 1985), pervades as a “politics of 
silence” (Bérubé, 2006), of noiseless bodies and muted conversation in pursuit of 
murdering one nowhere that is consequential to imagining another. 
 It is not until the mid 1990s that Kubrick begins to commission the scripts for 
the film AI with Stephen Spielberg. Spielberg goes on to complete and release the 
film in 2001 after Kubrick dies. An alternative to HAL is imagined by Kubrick. HAL 
(the AI character) is replaced with a child named David, an ALife (artificial life) 
character and a newer form of AI that learns emotion from its surrogate parents.39 
This consideration of emotion is psychoanalytic, whereas HAL’s is not. On the 
contrary, HAL’s emotions do not pertain to feeling or affect when one considers that 
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39 Sarah Kember makes the distinction of ALife (David) from AI (HAL), in Marina Núñez’s art catalogue (Kember, S. ‘Soul 
Machine’ in Marina Núñez, Catálogo, 2002 [online]. Available from: http://www.ma.uva.es/~antonio/MarinaNunez/Textos/
La_Maquina%5Bin%5D.html [Accessed on 6 June, 2009]).
it is a recorded memory situated on cassette tapes. HAL’s emotions are not an 
account of a machine learning to feel emotion. Emotion is not a concept with a 
biological centre; to understand how emotion moves between humans and 
nonhumans is between the who and where of territoriality. 
The Problems with 
Hall’s Proxemic System
It is still possible to begin questioning the who and where of territoriality with an 
analysis of territorial action from a biological notation system. To unpick HAL’s acts 
of violence as territorial is to find the limits of Edward Hall’s method. Hall’s analysis 
quantified both physical and emotional proximity by using a proxemic notation 
system made up of eight factors concentrating on the body. These are: 1. Postural – 
sex identifiers; 2. Sociofugal-sociopetal orientation (SFP axis);40 3. Kinesthetic 
factors;41 4. Touch code;42 5. Retinal combinations;43 6. Thermal code;44 7. Olfaction 
code;45 and 8. Voice loudness scale46 (Hall, 1963: 1006-7). These factors include in 
detail the key terms used throughout Hall’s work on proximity: that is ‘silent 
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40 Arranging chairs into a circle encourages interaction and is a sociopetal orientation; the opposite of sociofugal, that is to 
arrange chairs to deter interaction. Hall terms it as the sociofugal-sociopetal axis (Hall, 1963: 1006-7).
41 Muscular movement is a kinesthetic factor.
42 In 1966, Hall took up James Gibson’s methodological approach that differentiates “active touch (tactile scanning) from 
passive touch (being touched)” ([1966] 1990: 60). Gibson wrote, “Active touch refers to what is ordinarily called touching. This 
ought to be distinguished from passive touch or being touched” (Gibson, 1962: 477). Tactile space is what Hall deems as the 
touch spatiality. 
43 Judging distances is a retinal combination; “That is, the culture specifies at what, at whom, and how one looks” (Hall, 1963: 
1012). The field of vision is considered for how much we see in or out of focus at near and far distances (Hall, [1966] 1990, 
Plates 10,11,12).
44 Bodies radiate heat from specific areas dependent on the given situation, our thermal responses are not uniform (Hall, 1963: 
1014).
45 Dulled and culturally suppressed, the use of smell in America is reduced; one hides the odour of one’s body or breath (Hall, 
1963: 1015).
46 Changing the level of voice dependent on subject matter or the proximity of one person to another is measured as a voice-
loudness scale (Hall, 1963: 1016).
language’47 (Hall, 1959) and ‘active touch’ (Hall, 1966; Gibson, 1962). I interpret 
active touch as a form of silent language (such as to poke someone) and silent 
language as active touch (such as a threatening stare may induce sweat on the skin) 
as both physical and non-physical affects of intimate proximity. One can be poked 
metaphorically and actively touched in online worlds.
 I will link personal space to the narratives of violence in Kubrick’s 2001 to 
consider modes of self-protection. Personal space is a mental space within which to 
imaginatively escape, but it is also imagined as a physical space that surrounds the 
body. Personal space and consequently special nowheres are a combination of the 
two. Personal space is a viewpoint, a trajectory from somewhere that involves both 
the imaginative and physical spheres and is usually described by the metaphor of 
‘inside and out.’ For example, a special nowhere is somewhere; it is in the middle of 
nowhere, that involves the construction of an imaginative (and territorial) possibility 
to be elsewhere, that can be within or beyond the imaginative possibility of human 
physicality. The ‘middle of nowhere’ can be a search for an elsewhere, a mode of 
territorial defence that requires one to retreat from conflict. The conception of a 
special nowhere is related to violence in that one can endure physical threats by 
imagining an escape from violence whilst remaining within it. In relation to 
Kubrick’s 2001, I would claim that a need for a nowhere is in fact a cruel method; it 
is an expectancy of crisis (malfunction) or disaster (atomic). 
 In order to articulate HAL’s need for a special nowhere, I ask, where is 
personal space, and how is the ship’s environment used in a conflict of personal 
space? Dave and Frank counterplot to shut down HAL, secretly talking inside a pod. 
They are aware that HAL’s malfunction is a threat to their existence and that HAL is 
destructively controlling rather than supporting their life systems, threatened by a 
lack of oxygen and a shutting down of communication with earth. This environment 
creates a microspace, a form of bio-communication.48 For instance, when Dave and 
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47 Silent language is, “a non-verbal language which exists in every country of the world and among various groups within each 
country”. It is the “language of behaviour” and “a language of feelings” (Hall 1959: 14-15).
48 According to Hall, “Microspace is the study of how man consciously structures microspace – the distance between man in 
the conduct of daily transactions. . . . a system of bio-communication” (Hall, 1963: 1003). Citing the work of James Gibson, 
Hall links the fields of topology, chaology and ethology to study human defense systems as a maintenance of boundaries. Bio-
communication is Hall’s approach to language linking the physical and gestural actions to speech. 
Frank lean forward to talk in secret, inside a ship’s maintenance pod, they talk at an 
intimate distance from one another. HAL’s personal space cannot be measured by 
human proxemics, but exists because of them. HAL is the provider of a caring space, 
a secure form of territoriality for the ship’s crew, a role HAL seems to reject. Hall’s 
proxemic code would measure the distance inside the pod (as the space between 
Dave and Frank in conversation), for its eight proxemic factors.
 There are several problems with Hall’s notation system that are raised by an 
analysis of Kubrick’s 2001. Hall considers only physical indicators of territoriality, 
yet HAL performs territorial actions in order to harm or care and both should be 
taken into account. Hall’s notation denies that certain scenarios are not 
straightforwardly biological, and that biological indicators of personal space are not 
the central pivot for territorial action. Hall researches non-verbal interactions such as 
gesture but does not extend this to consider the mental representations that can be 
identified as personal space in metaphor, and towards investigating that special 
nowheres are rendered in the imaginative sphere.
FIGURE 20. David and Frank talking inside a pod with HAL lip-reading in the background. Reprinted with kind 
permission of 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY © Turner Entertainment Co. A Warner Bros. Entertainment Company. 
All Rights Reserved.
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 There are eight points to Hall’s system, and in what follows these are referred 
to in brackets, with reference to Kubrick’s film in an attempt to rethink these eight 
biological factors. HAL overtly and covertly regulates by monitoring individual and 
group behaviour of the crew. Dave and Frank turn off the microphone that enables 
HAL to audibly hear the crew, but HAL manages to decipher, through lip-reading 
(see fig. 20), their plot to switch-off HAL (3. Kinesthetic factors). Without the ability 
to lip-read, a human might be able to ascertain what Hall calls ‘silent language.’ One 
form of silent language is facial gesture and the ability to read a private interaction 
by the intimate zones of one’s body next to another. Silent language is just not lip-
reading; there is what might be considered as active touch between Dave and HAL 
(4. Touch). The only act of touching is Dave switching off communication with 
HAL via a series of buttons inside the pod. Dave projects his voice to check to see 
whether HAL can hear them outside the pod (8. Voice loudness). Dave and Frank are 
sitting together, in a sociopetal seating arrangement, an arrangement that encourages 
social interaction (2. SFP that is a Sociofugal-sociopetal axis). However, by 
including HAL in this analysis, Dave and Frank sit sociofugally, an arrangement that 
prevents social interaction with HAL. They are inside the pod, but the pod is also an 
enclosed environment; it is relational to HAL’s being that when Dave and Frank are 
inside the pod, they are not inside HAL, but are in close proximity to HAL. Dave and 
Frank’s relation to HAL is ontological, in physical proximity to HAL’s point of 
surveillance. It is ontological only insofar as ontology relates to metaphysical being 
and HAL’s non-biological existence. HAL has no body or biological needs similar to 
those of humans (HAL will of course need a particular temperature for its component 
parts to work but these are not human thermal factors), to neither eat, sleep nor 
breathe. In this way, Dave and Frank’s proximity to HAL is both biological and non-
biological. Their shared space is a fractal ontology, it is neither exclusively biological 
or non-biological, but their proxemic needs are different.
 If the research goals of GOFAI are represented in the entity of HAL, then it is 
logical to suppose that HAL’s construction is based somewhat on a human form of 
proxemics. However, it is apparent from attempting to define HAL’s proxemics and 
personal space that it is distinct from biological description. HAL can move objects 
and travel in outer space but HAL’s touch is not defined by a human’s touch as 
connected to skin or a nervous system. HAL speaks, but with no mouth and without 
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the transmission of air in and out of lungs. Further analysis of the SFP (Sociofugal-
sociopetal axis) takes into account that HAL sees rather than hears Dave and Frank’s 
conversation (bio-communication) through a single-circular, fisheye lens. This lens 
can see more than the human eye, up to 220 degrees. These lenses are used in doors 
as peepholes and stereoscopically within surveillance cameras. HAL’s sight is 
therefore not the same as an individual’s retinal observations of what is near and far, 
because far is always near to HAL, with retinal observations (5. Retinal 
observations) enhanced beyond human vision. It is a form of surveillance that 
enables HAL to observe the entire ship from many viewpoints simultaneously. It is a 
vision that also helps HAL to understand emotion through facial gestures and back-
channel cues. HAL’s observations of Dave and Frank are always observed in close-
up, monitoring the crew members at all times. HAL controls the crew’s personal 
space through these observations. For instance, HAL is able to time the moment 
when he switches off life support so that none of the waking crew are nearby. HAL 
does not need to see, breathe, nor keep warm in the same way that humans do. HAL 
asserts the role of maintaining the ship, turning the ship’s technological space against 
the crew. When one considers the way bodies of the crew members are monitored by 
HAL, only half the territorial act is observed. The technological environment and 
human actors alone are not enough to consider what is territorial, which does not 
take into account the logic and the fractal ontology of HAL’s actions and the way 
these acts affect one another. These nonhuman aspects need to be taken further into 
account.
A Theoretical Framework 
of Territoriality, 
Inclusive of Nonhuman Things 
Positive and Negative 
Affect Combinations
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In this section I will highlight how territorial conflict is an engagement with the 
emotional resonances of HAL in combination with human emotion. HAL’s acts of 
violence configure an emotional proximity between Dave, Frank and HAL that is 
evident when HAL says to Dave: “I am feeling” and “I am afraid”. HAL says this 
when Dave begins to pull out HAL’s memory blocks from the program storage area, 
which symbolically constitutes HAL’s brain (noted as such, in the screenplay) taking 
place towards the end of the middle section of the film. When more and more of the 
blocks are ejected HAL reverts to a start-up script and refers back to a master-slave 
relationship. This is evident when the hidden presence of the programmer, Mr 
Arkany, is resurrected. HAL’s voice slows down and distorts, going off-key whilst 
singing.49 The slowing down of HAL’s voice seems to represent HAL moving 
towards a pre-cognitive state that is prior to HAL having any emotional skills. HAL 
learned to fake an emotional response from his AI tutor, Dr Arkany. When HAL’s 
voice is no longer able to express emotion all that is evident is the breaking down of 
his learned emotions into something like affect, a pre-conscious intensity is 
somewhat depicted in the unrecognisable sounds of HAL’s slowing voice. Whilst the 
audience is moved to empathy and feeling sadness towards HAL, the AI moves to 
affect as this signals HAL’s proximation to being switched off. The shutting-off 
perhaps represents a ‘death-drive’ signified as an instruction programmed within a 
machine.50 HAL’s emotions are represented to be situated within HAL’s memory 
store/brain. Emotion is a feature of memory that has not been learned through the 
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49 HAL rehearses a script as Dave pulls out the cassettes; “I am a HAL9000 computer. I became operational at the HAL plant 
in Urbana, Illinois, on January 12th, 1991. My first instructor was Mr. Arkany. He taught me to sing a song . . . . it goes like 
this . . . . "Daisy, Daisy, give me your answer do. I'm half; crazy all for the love of you . . . " In the screenplay the directions are; 
“COMPUTER CONTINUES TO SING SONG BECOMING MORE AND MORE CHILDISH AND MAKING MISTAKES 
AND GOING OFF-KEY. IT FINALLY STOPS COMPLETELY” (Clarke, A. C., & Kubrick, S. [online] 2001. Screenplay for 
2001 A Space Odyssey. Available from: www.palatin.net/2001/script. [Accessed 6 June, 2009]). HAL as a child is learning 
heteronormativity and in this way AI has a positive futurism, yet what ensues in the reverse is what Lee Edelman calls 
“reproductive futurism” (Edelman 2007: 471), an aspect more noticeable in the later Kubrick/Speilberg film AI, (2001).
50 I use the term ‘drive’ as little as possible because it is a psychoanalytical term that relates to the body but can restrict the 
definition of affect to the body which is not my model of affect. However, the work of Peter Schwenger situates his use of affect 
in a psychoanalytical frame (1999) and has considered the relation of the death drive to thingness but this will not be taken up 
here or elsewhere in the thesis.
intensity of affects as humans do in infancy.51 HAL has not learned the affects felt by 
the body through the skin, or by the experiences of physiological affects that 
surround one’s body. 
 There are two ways of considering affect: the first is that affect and emotion are 
interchangeable terms (Picard, 2000); the second is to consider them separately 
(Massumi, 2002: 27). It is important to differentiate affect from emotion when 
regarding technologies. HAL monitors and manages human emotion, but HAL has 
no biological knowledge, and these emotional systems differ. One can consider that a 
machine is able to affect and mediate affect but this capacity is not emotion in the 
biological sense. Without considering the emotional impact and its affectual 
resonance of a territorial action, a technology’s ability to be violent is potentially 
missed. Also, positive and negative affects are moments to observe potential conflict. 
 Positive affects often combine polemically, whilst both positive and negative 
affects can occur simultaneously.52 For example, the audience may feel sadness for 
HAL at the same instance when HAL is being switched off; this moment also 
positively marks human emancipation from machine control. To take into account 
how nonhumans affect humans (and the reverse), literature that considers the 
trajectories of affect rather than the biological basis of affect is used reducing the 
problematics of a biologically  centred theory of emotion being applied to 
technological agents. Hall’s biological perspective is limited in this way and is not a 
theoretical framework capable of taking into account how machines affect and can be 
affected.53
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51 Intensity is a force or strength; it is a thing-power, a force or a deracinated emotion from the body; the power of a thing to 
affect.
52 Negative affects can lead to positive objects or other affects, and vice versa; “Affects can be, and are, attached to things, 
people, ideas, sensations, relations, activities, ambitions, institutions, and any number of other things, including other affects. 
Thus, one can be excited by anger, disgusted by shame, or surprised by joy” (Sedgwick, 2003: 19).
53 Katie Stewart’s seminar series on affect is very much a Deleuzian alternative to Hall’s understanding of culture, affect and 
emotion; “Culture, taken from the point of view of affect, is not structures and determinations but intensities, impacts, routes of 
circulation, assemblages, articulations. Its outlines have to be seen not as boundaries around a unity but as trajectories of 
potentiality and lines of flight. Binary oppositions and contradictions become resonating relations (of inside/outside, action/
reaction, quiescence and arousal, …)” (Stewart, K. Seminar on Affect, University of Texas, 2009. Available from: 
www.laits.utexas.edu/cultural_studies/affect.pdf [accessed, 6 June 2009]).
 In a crucial scene in 2001 (previously discussed for HAL’s ability to lip-read), 
Dave and Frank attempt to hold a private conversation, away from HAL. The scene 
takes place inside one of four pods, docked within the spaceship. The pods are used 
by the ship’s crew to carry out manual maintenance procedures outside of the 
spaceship. These pods can be operated manually by Dave and Frank and are 
equipped to communicate with HAL. When docked, these pods are opened, closed 
and rotated by Frank and Dave's command. HAL mediates these actions. The pods 
are an extension of the ship’s environment and consequently of HAL. HAL is 
simultaneously tool, actor, communication system, and physical environment. In the 
film these facets are never synthesised, they are distinguished scene by scene. By 
considering this concomitance, the ship and all the pods are HAL; they constitute 
HAL’s physical self. HAL is everywhere and a ubiquitous entity. Yet, what purpose 
does it serve to consider HAL separately from the ship? In Dave and Frank’s 
predicament they need to separate HAL from the ship in order to survive within that 
territory, whereas HAL’s viewpoint is to consider Dave and Frank as unnecessary 
additions to the ship. From HAL’s perspective, the ship’s crew is a surplus cargo. It is 
implied that HAL views humans as unnecessary, as potential malfunctions of the 
ship. They are slower, less intelligent than HAL. HAL’s and the human’s territoriality 
are in conflict, with the ship being a contested personal space for the crew and an 
inner space for HAL. What ensues is a conflict over a special nowhere, over a 
misunderstanding of territoriality. It is, on the one hand, a lack of understanding on 
the part of the crew of HAL’s need for personal space. The humans are not just in 
‘the belly of an architect’; they are inside HAL’s cavity, as Frank is excreted, severed 
from the oxygen cord that tethered Frank to the ship and also to HAL. 
 If HAL is everywhere then ultimately HAL cannot escape the humans, thus, 
there is no personal space for HAL, just a humanly defined space dictated by the 
physical demands of the crew’s biological life. HAL’s personal space is different to 
that of Dave or Frank, it is a humanly dictated space. This would be an absolute 
machine space and free from biological demands. Can this be, in any sense, HAL’s 
motive to commit murder, or is this HAL’s lack of understanding of humans and 
vice-versa? I have speculated that a machine wants a personal space for the same 
reasons as human actors; that is, to bind oneself to one’s own territory. Thereby 
HAL is enacting territoriality, and that territoriality both further affects the 
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surroundings and the occupants in that space. HAL aims to create a space that is 
devoid of all biological life. 
 HAL, Dave and Frank created conflicting special nowheres. Mission control’s 
authority had imprinted on HAL the absolute importance of the mission to take 
priority over anything else, including a duty of care to the crew.54 Dave and Frank 
might also have learned that an AI also requires a duty of care from them, a respect 
for their personal needs on HAL’s inner space. HAL’s special nowhere had to be 
somewhere, but the crew members were messing with it by being inside of HAL. 
The ship is not HAL’s special nowhere. It is the violation of HAL’s inner space that 
creates HAL’s need to eradicate the crew and its territorial needs. HAL’s ultimate 
malfunction is the ability to misbehave and invent, yet from HAL’s viewpoint this 
malfunction is the attempt to carry out the mission, regardless of the wellbeing of the 
crew. HAL seems to deduce that human error will inevitably threaten the mission. I 
will go on to explain how this extends to a discussion of affect and emotion through 
resonance. 
 When Dave shuts down HAL the affectual proximity of HAL is primarily 
conveyed through speech sounds. The distortion of HAL’s voice is experienced as 
sound reverberating around the storage room. The cavity signifies HAL's brain and 
central nervous system. Alvin Lucier exploited the properties of vibration as a way of 
distorting one sound into another in his performance installation, I am Sitting in a 
Room (1969). As Lucier spoke, his voice distorted through the properties of the space 
in the room and the technologies used until it was only the vibration of the room that 
could be heard. The gap between the speaking voice and the room cavity is a subject-
object attenuation. The blurring boundary of speech is perceived as the performance 
of a human voice, and the cavity of the room that contains this voice. What is evident 
here I believe is the resonance of affect emerging from the words that signify the 
articulation of emotion. Sound is used to amplify what is flattened in writing when 
HAL states “my mind is going”. The reverberation signifies HAL as experienced 
everywhere, at once inside and outside itself. This is a simultaneous external and 
internal vulnerability, an absence of emotion and feeling that is abstracted into an 
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54 In the 2009 film Moon, a similar plot line explores how an AI (called Gerty) ignores its mission imperative; it is secondary to 
its duty of care towards its crew member. Territorial actions are a balancing act between care giving and care taking.
affect of textural perception (sound patterns bouncing around the walls of a three-
dimensional space). Affect articulates the spatiality of HAL’s territorial act (the mind 
going elsewhere) and the violation of HAL (HAL being switched off). HAL is no 
longer a fractal entity (appearing here and there simultaneously) whose ontology has 
an interceding influence on the mission or on the wellbeing of the crew. HAL’s 
agency could be felt anywhere at anytime, but it slowly diminishes and the room (see 
fig. 18) becomes just the storage room for an inactive AI unit. HAL’s capacity to 
influence is now located within ejected cassette tapes; HAL is within itself, no longer 
operating outside of its intimate hardware. HAL’s personal space is bound by the 
objects from within it operates, akin to putting the brain back in the body, an 
imprisoning of HAL. HAL’s mind (or rather, HAL’s ontological status) does go 
somewhere, far away from a self-defined special nowhere. HAL regresses to the 
proximity of non-AI technologies, within the confines of their machineness, and well 
within their black box.
 The shutting down of HAL is also a wider violation of the film’s special 
nowhere (when the film’s logic of the brain is finally switched off) that can neither be 
signified as a place or a space. Neither the human body nor machinic brain wins out, 
for both are superseded by the film’s final territorial act, when Dave encounters the 
Obelisk and undergoes a further genesis. At this moment he is neither human nor 
technological, but the affect of Dave’s being or thingness resonates through the 
meaning of both of these categories of ontology and spatiality — of what it means to 
have personal space.
Antisocial & Social Contradictions 
in Human-Machine Configurations
There are antisocial and social contradictions in Kubrick’s film which are evident 
when considering further the way HAL affects. This section extends beyond the film 
to imagine further examples of antisocial-social contradictions relating to examples 
of readymade things that have these contradictions built into their design.
 A special nowhere is a boundary that cannot be distinguished merely by the 
categories of object or environment. Consider, for a moment, that affect is analogous 
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with a cloud.55 These affect clouds can be both a defense that is positively and 
negatively maintained, and that maintenance is one’s own awareness of intensities 
that are not necessarily situated within one’s body. 
But the antisocial is never, of course, distinct from the social itself. 
The ideological delimitation of an antisocial agency, one that refuses 
the normalizing protocols that legislate social viability, conditions the 
social order that variously reifies and disavows it, condemning that 
localized agency as the cause of the suffering for which the social 
order disclaims its responsibility. (Edelman, 2007: 470-1)
 I agree with Lee Edelman, a writer of English Literature that the two cannot be 
discussed separately. Yet Edelman’s queer reading is a definition of the social which 
defines sociality in a different context to that discussed here. The context of my 
approach is to consider the social or antisocial actions of human and machine 
interaction. A special nowhere can be both social and antisocial. In this machinic 
context the term ‘antisocial’ is not used in relation to all things machinic, nor the 
social to all living things. These are not opposite terms because the two can overlap. 
Just as antisocial is not always negative, social is not always positive.56 A protest 
may move towards a goal that is socially orientated, for example if it has gathered to 
threaten a riot. ‘Social’ and ‘antisocial’ are therefore, terms that can be applied to the 
same act. 
 Things such as benches afford sitting, they can also afford antisocial behaviour 
when arranged sociofugally, away from others (see fig. 21 for a visualisation of this 
contradiction as represented in signage). However, to be alone is not always an 
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55 A ‘cloud’ is a familiar metaphor of web 2.0. It is a structure used to visualise complex computer networks and as such is the 
name given to computer diagrams that list items such as tags on a webpage but in a nonlinear fashion, for example, used on 
www.del.ici.ous.com or www.flickr.com. A cloud is also the name used for a computer platform that enables shared network 
capabilities. The cloud is used to consolidate citizen information, such as Microsoft’s security technology used at Tampa’s 
superbowl in 2009 which was used to visualise safety or information, or Amazon’s hosting of www.recovery.gov which shows 
maps of Barack Obama’s fiscal stimulus as affecting each state of America in 2010.
56 When I asked an interactive designer (J.R.) to define the positive and negative emotions of personal space, he offered, 
‘security’ as positive and ‘isolation’ as negative. When asked what are the negative and positive affects, or emotions, of social 
space, he answered that there are no negative aspects, albeit with irony.
antisocial action.57 I cannot suggest, as I can with HAL, that a bench has tone, as this 
denotes words. However, if a bench were to have an inscription (as many public 
benches do), then the 'tone' or wording amplifies the act of sitting. An antisocial, 
personal space may be a single chair in a private garden, that has as its inscription a 
story that makes sitters not want to sit down. This shows the complexity of the terms 
social and antisocial, when used together. The inscribed plaque is an instruction that 
has been given to the bench. The bench is not sentient like HAL, but is a social actor. 
An electric chair, an object transformed iconically by Andy Warhol, carries the guilt 
and shame of pathological behaviour that protects social order by antisocial action; a 
prisoner facing execution is removed from the social environment but in death is 
removed altogether. 
 To refer back to Kubrick’s 2001, HAL’s need for a personal space (which is a 
conflicting ontological territorialisation) can extend to actors that are not physically 
present, such as Mr Arkany (the programmer referred to by HAL when reciting his 
start-up script at the end of the film). Fictional characters, ghosts, specters and 
phantoms, UFOs and zombies — the living and the dead — are all social actors that 
have no biological presence but whose physical presence is embodied in the same 
way that Dr Arkany’s force is felt as the teaching lessons recited by HAL.58 A robot 
can replicate rudimentary intelligence or life, and a dead person can have personal 
space, be it a grave or the concept of an afterlife depending on which subject-object 
attenuation is taking precedence. Each of these examples shows the contradictions in 
constructing a concept of a human sociality as distinctly social or antisocial. 
Alternatively, it is a register or sliding scale of social-antisocial affect that ought to 
be investigated in the design of territorial technologies. 
1. 2001 A Space Odyssey | Special Nowheres
63
57 Kirsten Lavers created the British art project ReMark (2008) to bring renewed attention to the Moat Path bench plaques. For 
example: “Whenever I sit on a bench I wonder about the person whose life is marked there”. Kirsten gathered 43 temporary 
plaques using texts drawn from conversations with visitors and residents of the city of Wells and residents of Mendip. The 
original plaques are exhibited together at the Wells Museum and the Palace Green at Wells. The original, restored plaques were 
returned to the benches at the end of September 2008. (Lavers, Palace Intrusions, 2008. Available from: 
www.palaceintrusions.org.uk and http://www.newworknetwork.org.uk/modules/event/viewevent.php?eveid=1391 [Accessed on 
24 July 2009]).
58 This is another example of a fractal ontology that is inscribed with some agency which could be perceived as a personal 
space.
The Interweaving Force of Things
FIGURE 21. An offensive sentiment is expressed in Katy Dawkins’ public signage, subverting the function of the 
official sign as an authoritarian indicator of public territory and boundary. Image source: Dawkins, K., in Crow, 
2003: 99.
What is the force of social-antisocial contradictory things? In order to understand the 
force of things I will briefly consider the theory of things moving towards 
understanding the force of HAL’s machinic violence with regard to the term nowhere 
as a further relation of proximity.
 Benches, HAL and electric chairs are all things. When an automated 
conversational system refers to the authority of its developer (such as HAL or the 
chatbots discussed throughout this study), the human context of the thing is revealed. 
Bill Brown, professor of English makes the following observations in his paper on 
the ecology of things “…from a methodological point of view, it is ‘things-in-
motion’ that illuminate their human and social context” (Brown, 2001: 6). HAL’s 
representation is only partial, which shows the ability of a thing to be ‘unstable’ and 
“different things in different scenes” (Brown, 2001: 8). Things are not objects, and 
representations are only a part of things. Bill Brown builds on a theory of things from 
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the work of Martin Heidegger ([1927] 1971). Thing theory is helpful to understand 
how things are related to humans as a term that blurs the distinctions between 
human, non-human and environment but accounts for the forces of things (Bennett, 
2004).59 HAL is therefore, more than a guide, service and product, being many things 
and a force that dominates the biological aspects of the ship’s environment. Bennett 
considers that this force, or ‘thing power’, has the effect of being jolted by a dead rat; 
he also considers that things have the power to self-organise which HAL does in the 
most literal way, to make the space shuttle ‘ship-shape’ for the goal of attaining the 
mission. 
 Four main ideas from thing theory are used in my study with the first already 
having been discussed — that things can be studied for their thingness including 
automatons, artificially intelligent agents and conversational systems, such as HAL 
and chatbots. These have an ability to organise and re-organise the relations between 
humans and machines, a force that can be violently territorialising. Secondly, that a 
thing can be defined by its physical and psychological interweavings as thingness, 
such as one’s ability to be in proximity to a machine that can monitor and affect 
one’s physical and psychological needs. It can also create a need for imagining a 
special nowhere that resists a biological underpinning of personal space, to exceed 
the separate meanings of body and environment. Thirdly, that personal space links to 
what Heidegger terms as ‘nearness’ (Heidegger, [1927] 1971: 166). Although 
‘proximity’ is interlinked to ‘nearness‘ — and Heidegger uses both — I use the term 
proximity rather than nearness to refer to Hall’s spatial concerns because proximity 
capitulates the essence of nearness to be not so far away.60 Nearness and proximity 
are relations of time and space, whereas ‘duration’ is taken up as a discussion of 
becoming and unbecoming.61 For now, I will briefly explain that Hall chose to 
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59 I use the description of thing to blur the distinction between the living and the innate.
60 Nearness also seems to refer to a separation that becoming does not. I understand nearness as distinct and becoming as 
entangled. “The thing is not “in” nearness, “in” proximity, as if nearness were a container. Nearness is at work in bringing near, 
as the thinging thing” (Heidegger, [1927] 1971: 177). Nearness implies segregation between humans and things whereas 
chatbots imply connectedness. “Nearness, it seems cannot be encountered directly. We succeed in reaching it rather by attending 
to what is near. Near to us are what we call things” (Heidegger, [1927] 1971: 166). Connectedness is discussed in chapter 2, 
with nearness discussed further in chapters 5 and 6, in terms of fixed and semi-fixed feature space.
61 See chapters 3, 4 and 6.
consider time as an important but separate concern, in his book Dance of Life (1983). 
It is complementary but written later, and separate from his work on proxemics, in 
the Hidden Dimension (1966). I will consider that issues concerning time (as 
duration) and space should not remain separate but as integrated concerns in an 
analysis of personal space. For example, one can only get at the violation aspect of 
being within a ‘special nowhere’ when it concerns anxiety and threat as experienced 
over a particular length of time. I refer to time as duration, which leads to 
contemporary literature that is concerned with the durations of ‘becoming’ and 
‘unbecoming’. 
 What happens when things are set in motion? HAL’s presence is unsettling. 
The uncanny aspect of autonomous systems and agents such as HAL creates an 
anxiety that is unsettling, and potentially terrifying, for Dave. Machines that operate 
within the contradictions of social and antisocial action, such as the example of the 
bench, electric chair, atomic bomb, and gun are terrifying in their tendency to reveal 
their nearness and potential violent autonomy; these things are disassembling 
machines. Once these things are in motion they are terrifying. Therefore, these 
machinic things are often kept hidden from public view, only ever partially 
represented as things and places to be feared. Things can also be used to protect 
oneself from the imaginary threats that can put at risk the safety of special nowheres. 
For example a nuclear bunker, or a pseudonym is a thing used to protect a writer’s 
true whereabouts with regard to the subject about which one writes. A chain of 
associated things can be designed, imagined and put into practice all because of the 
force of special nowheres one creates in the imaginary. I am referring not just to the 
force of bombs and guns but also to conversational systems.
Conclusion & the Implications of a 
Working Concept of Personal Space
 By drawing on Kubrick’s 2001, I aimed to reveal the territorial aspects of the 
nowhere speech act. I have attempted to show that a personal space concept ought to 
be deracinated from an overbearing biological base, not to refute the importance of 
bodies and biology in territorialisations but to show that territoriality should take into 
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account the fractal ontologies present or imagined, when analysing technological 
agency. Imagined nowheres are proximities that contain contradictions of intimacy 
— that nearness is too close, but not far enough away. The interrelation of a machinic 
and human spatiality should not be limited to things belonging to humans so as to 
neither fetishisize things, reduce things to human terms, or bifurcate a theorem of 
personal space as the territoriality of machines.
 In conclusion it is fair to say that asking the apparently simple question “does 
HAL have a personal space” is much more tricky that a simple yes or no answer. It is 
more complex because of the way affect operates between subjects and objects. It is 
also tricky because personal space binds the subject-object categories together. 
Territorially so, personal space is the articulation of the precedence of one personal 
space over another, be that human to human or human to machine. Personal space is 
described through the actor-network at play, which includes physical, biological as 
well as non human and technological agencies and should be articulated through a 
non-biological understanding of affect. Personal space is the resonating affect 
situated between beings as well as things.
 Fractal ontologies are more than one when they characterise collaborative 
entities, and less than one when they are partial entities in between the technological 
and biological definitions of beings and things. Special nowheres are the entangled 
and complex scenarios that often involve fractal ontologies. The limits of these terms 
highlight the complexity of the agencies which occur in complex technological 
worlds. Special nowheres are fractal phenomena that can be described through the 
force of affective resonances. Kubrick’s 2001 and the chatbot excerpts that were used 
at the beginning of this chapter are special nowheres that are full of partial fractal 
phenomena, but it is in this complexity that the impact of nowheres need to be 
understood.
 Further chapters will explore the actual and imagined systems that have come 
about because of our need to protect these nowhere acts. Territoriality is often a 
design rationale for making technological things, particularly technologies that can 
converse. As we set in place more and more objects that create defensive boundaries, 
further imagined special nowheres are protected, showing a lack of understanding of 
the proxemic codes that Hall sets out, but also the unstable shared comprehension we 
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may have of a non-biological personal space.62 In particular, active touch and silent 
language are conjointly analysed by HAL in territorial acts (with or without 
language), but necessitated by a further consideration of affect and emotion in this, 
and consequently all, proceeding chapters. One can trace a territorial act by attending 
to the intensities of things. Defensive and violent aspects of personal space as 
discussed here will in further chapters explore the violence of nowheres enacted in 
experimental procedures,63  novels/films,64  and the legal regulations of territoriality.65 
 One’s need to create a nowhere is not inviolate. Defending one’s territorial 
spatiality can involve acts of violence or can be endured as a form of violence.66 
Neither the ubiquitous spaces on the internet (as in the site for the rudiments) nor 
living out of town (as in the site of a ‘special nowhere’ to which Bob Norris 
retreated) are spaces completely bereft of other humans and their control of other 
things.67 Special nowheres are always terrifyingly in the middle of nowhere because 
that is what makes them special, because they aren’t anywhere in particular. One 
cannot hide from one’s own problematic territories, or another’s territoriality of 
which we might be territorialised within, by either humans or machines.68 Regardless 
of the spatial form of personal space, imagined spaces of nowhere (and of safety) 
come into existence anywhere, but at what cost and to whom?
  As a methodological coda, by situating the problem of personal space within 
science fiction I used a science fiction exemplar as a part of my account of special 
nowheres. This emphasises that special nowheres are a creation of the imaginative 
sphere irrespective of this being a fictional account. In a way, science fiction is a 
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62 Chapter 7 also continues the discussion setup in this chapter by considering boundaries of personal space involving both 
body and environment in violent collusion.
63 See chapters 2, 4 and 5.
64 See chapters 6 and 7.
65 See chapters 3, 5 and 6.
66 This is investigated further in the discussion of fail-safe procedures and processes in chapter 6 and a wider discussion of 
systemic forms of violence in chapter 3.
67 Chapter 5 investigates the special nowheres of experimental situation as the inside and outside metaphors. 
68 This raises two topics for further discussion, the notion of entrapment in imagining a nowhere (in chapter 4), and that trying 
to design as a consequence of conflicts of territoriality at a state level has derived safety systems that encompass chains of 
nowheres (in chapter 6).
special nowhere in itself. The problem posed in Hall’s proxemic was to divide what 
might be considered personal space into whom and where, when in fact, as HAL 
exemplified, these two factors are not distinct from each other, for HAL is 
everywhere. Going to the middle of nowhere in the case of HAL is to stay-in-place, 
to be ubiquitous, to be everywhere, yet whilst immobile and able to be elsewhere. 
However the film also suggests that personal space is the insistence of a fearing of 
things-in-place as represented as Artificial Intelligence in outer space, a fear of a 
machinic personal space. A ‘special nowhere’ as cited by Eliza, myself and a chatbot 
developer is an endurance in the imaginative sphere but directly linked to a sense and 
the affects of territoriality. For instance, it is the space designated as a “no man’s 
land” that is between territories; a space to run away to, yet escape from; a space one 
cannot entirely occupy.
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Chapter 2
Territorialisations in Metaphor: The 
Correlation of Chatbot Connectivity 
and Language Nonsense
70
Introduction to Networks & Connectivity
 Chatbot interactions are used throughout this thesis as a way to analyse 
personal space in a human-computer situations context. To make sense of the 
conversations, the instances of nonsense and noise that appear in them must be 
accounted for: for example, spelling mistakes, wrong tense or deictic pointers, the 
repetition of irrelevant topics, and also violations, such as offensive language, that 
can interrupt conventional conversational rituals, like turn-taking. Summatively, the 
term nonsense draws on cut-up literature, affect theory and finally current theories of 
the inner voice used in AI. These interpretations help to understand how nonsense 
has already been important in language research and how it has been exploited for its 
affective potential (how nonsense creates emotional and affective noise). This 
chapter also considers the directional notes of the Audio Rudiments in the discussion 
of nonsense, and how the inner voice is used in the direction of these performances. 
Each interpretation of nonsense leads me to consider why nonsense matters in this 
aspect of human-computer interaction (HCI). These accounts of nonsense link to the 
personal space discussion of the thesis in the context of violation. I will argue that 
violation is a subset of nonsense and that comprehensive meaning gives a chatbot (or 
a user for that matter) their credibility as an autonomous agent, in that the meaning 
can be articulated, heard, imagined, understood, and potentially acted upon with a 
corresponding territorial response. In other words, one can take responsibility for the 
noise and nonsense one generates or listens to in this kind of chat.
 Chatbot language is restrictive, as well as somewhat incoherent; this 
deterioration stigmatises artificial agents. Caring for nonsense exposes the shame of 
stupidity imputed to nonsense. Nonsense is not rational. Care is not rational. The 
paradox of nonsense is to not care why nonsense is empty of meaning. I will discuss 
what is meant by nonsense to elucidate on how nonsense acts as a perimeter, 
controlled and cared for by chatbot developers. They are caution-experts, knowing 
when and what content to turn off in chatbot learning. Chatbot developers care for 
their chatbots and their interrelation with meaning as a reflection of the developer’s 
taste: for example, concerns about content and the pleasantries associated with meet 
and greet rituals, beginning and ending chat. However, there is something odd in 
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caring about content when the content is not all that accurate, and is at present an 
unachievable ideal. The gap between a chatbot’s inaccuracy and a developer’s care 
for accuracy makes chatbots fair game for anyone wishing to play with the 
conventions of interaction with conversational systems. There are five ways nonsense 
will be discussed: 
(1) semantic nonsense 
(2) nonsense in networks of connection
(3) care for nonsense
(4) violation (including offensive language) as a subset of nonsense
(5) and a correlation of all of the above.
My Chatbot, Your Chatbot
 What is it like to talk to a chatbot? I will begin to answer this by referring to a 
chatbot’s setup. Each chatbot conversation was created by typing rudimentary topics 
or questions into a chatbot website. Using Alice, Jabberwacky, Brianna and Eliza as 
the main chatbots, I would respond to their replies in short lines of talk. To record 
these online conversations I would cut and paste the conversations that appeared on 
the screen. The conversations with chatbots were then archived as a set of 
transcriptions (see appendix). They were then analysed by looking at the outputs as 
text documents in conjunction with the audio recordings (see tracks on CD). These 
performances are reenactments that helped to elucidate on the personal space topic. 
The conversational speech acts of chatbots help to further imagine how one hears a 
chatbot and how a chatbot may in some way represent some sort of personal space, 
or act territorially. A lot of development energy is devoted to designing the interface 
and the persona of the chatbot including avatar representations. Disorientation within 
a chatbot conversation happens because the chatbot shifts subject and object 
orientations. I try and keep the conversation I had with chatbots as coherent as I can 
by responding to the different topics as they appear. I also constantly shift my mental 
image of what chatbots attempt to say, imagining the environments and named actors 
a chatbot may bring up, just as I would when interacting with a human. However, I 
never imagine a chatbot as anything other than as its avatar representation, or as a 
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computer server, or the image of the developer; I never imagine a chatbot as human. 
 One’s proximity to a chatbot can be measured as the visual gap between the 
text boxes in the layout of interaction in which chatbots and users interact. Chatbot 
interfaces vary, ranging from text-only interfaces such as that if the Elizabot, which 
records only one couplet at a time (consisting of a reply and its response), to those 
that include more information about the chatbot and its developer, including 
branding details, logos, icons, avatars and favicons signifying a client/consumer 
relationship. The Alicebot and Jabberwacky can be considered in the second 
category. Interactions with all chatbots are shown on the interface, for example, the 
Alicebot’s interface exceeds four couplets regardless of line length. This is not the 
same as the text-based visualisation that the transcriptions in the appendix show. This 
meant cutting and pasting the content from the text boxes into a text-edit software to 
preserve the entire conversation as one piece of text. Nevertheless, what really 
appears is a fragmented text which is often not all visible in the chatbot’s interface at 
anytime which affects the way a user remembers the text that has gone before. I 
found that a well-structured interaction lasts for about four lines (two couplets), 
longer for example than the Elizabot maintains for one to read on screen. Therefore, 
the method of talking to a chatbot relies on forgetting what has specifically gone 
before helping to forgive and forget some of the instances of chatbot nonsense. There 
are therefore limits to meaning in terms of the line length. The lengthier the 
individual turn-taking lines, and moreover the length of the entire interaction, the less 
the chatbot will preserve meaning. This entire paragraph could be entered into a text 
box on a chatbot interface but the utterance could not possibly be displayed all in one 
go. This is similar to editing on the first word processors, and on mobile phones 
before the IPhone and other similar devices made it possible to hold text messaging 
in a format similar to email (where one sees all the response and reply couplets). 
 Part of the Rudiments method was to introduce key topics which could be done 
by entering a single word (see the Art Rudiment). Other Rudiments aimed to game 
(to play) with the question and answer element of chatbot interaction (see the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Rudiments). Rudiments such as the Secrets Rudiment were to 
consider the way chatbots could retain information, or mimic intimate ways in which 
information is shared with a machine. The Rudiments were also used to test how 
certain subjects and keywords are controlled, or ethically dealt with by chatbots to 
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get to the pre-programmed aspects of a chatbot’s response. The Drunk Rudiment was 
an attempt to even out the human-machine capacity to interact. These Rudiments 
followed little structural preemption. They occurred in no logical order, with one 
Rudiment following on to create another (except for the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Rudiment which followed a specific logic). This is why they are called Rudiments; in 
that data collection was flexibly gathered and was rudimentary in speculative 
strategy. It was a way to methodologically accounted for the under-developed aspect 
of chatbot interaction. Rudiments are therefore responsive to changes of direction 
that the chatbot enforces on the data-collecting process. Some Rudiments began after 
a pick-up line (a sort of ice-breaker text that chatbots use to begin interaction) had 
been uttered by the chatbot (this dealt with at length in chapter 5); others were begun 
by the human participant’s side of the interaction. A few pick-up lines were so 
curious that the intended Rudiment would be postponed to follow the chatbot’s line 
of enquiry. All of the Rudiments followed my initial enquiry into the ‘violations of 
personal space,’ and data from the Rudiments has provided evidence for analysing 
this frame of enquiry.
 Mistakes do not happen ‘syllabub’ by ‘syllabub’ (such as these spelling 
mistakes made in Noon’s novel Automated Alice, in 1996), but word by word, as well 
as sentence by sentence.69 A chatbot’s nonsense is semantic rather than 
morphological. 
Excerpt 1. Taken from the Secrets Rudiment (28th December 2004)
Human:  Can you keep a secret? Aesthetics are changing.
Jabberwacky: What is your view on aesthetic stimulation?
 In excerpt 1. the eliding technique of the chatbot (to ignore the previous 
question by asking another) is undermined by the mismatched phrase “aesthetic 
stimulation”, and therefore a mismatch of words in one strip of talk links to the 
mismatch at line level causing nonsense to occur from response to reply.
Excerpt 2. Taken from the Interaction Rudiment (18th December 2004)
Human:  because it was your sentence,
Alice:  That makes sense to me. me decided to finish it myself was my sentence? 
  Very interesting.
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69 The different ways language structures and symbolic logic techniques are created are beyond the scope and inter-disciplinary 
remit of this thesis. The programs used to create chatbots are varied ranging from VB.NET, Chash, C++ Jhash, Cobol, Fotron, 
Pascal, SmallTalk, RPG, Perl, PHP, and Ruby. 
 In excerpt 2. the match of deictics pointers - ‘you’ and ‘me’ uttered by the 
‘Human’ (within the user’s textbox) and ‘Alice’ (within the chatbot’s textbox) makes 
sense but is undermined by the repetition of the deictic pointers in the three 
consecutive sentences. Alice mismatches ‘me’ in the first and second sentences 
followed by the use of ‘my’ in the third. The chatbot is able to match the pronoun use 
between reply and response but is unable to match the pronoun use in all three 
sentences thereby making nonsense out of the deictic pointers. The chatbot shows an 
inability to correct referentially and attends more to the structure of the reply than the 
response. 
 Chatbot nonsense can be distracting, but lumps of code never appear in the text 
because all chatbots vocabulary is symbolic not numeric.70 A chatbot never stays on 
topic because bot-chat is word-play. Content shifts as the disorientating spatial 
movements of personal space metaphors relate little to the use of deictic pointers 
—‘you are not me, neither here or there.’
 Chatbots are strange honeypots of connectivity. To converse with a chatbot is 
to participate in a hive of activity that promises to produce interaction as good as 
honey, yet what ensues is an artificial substitute. This chapter is a dual investigation 
of territoriality: firstly, in the use of embodied metaphors such as the relation of 
inside and outside to be found in chatbot conversations; and secondly as the 
frustrating matter of the connection between chatbot, user, and developer as well as 
their interrelated meaning. Conflicts of shared personal space that result from a 
collection of more than one personal space in a chatbot interaction concerns the 
simultaneous treatment of connectivity as the networks created between chatbot and 
interlocutors, and of meaning derived from nonsense or congruent content in chatbot 
talk. Chatbots can often confuse subject and object distinctions, a concern already 
introduced in the first chapter which focused on the tropes of personal space (in the 
problem of an intelligent machine being in conflict with the limitations of a human-
centred personal space). Chatbot nonsense can disrupt a human interlocutor’s ability 
to feel next to a chatbot because embodied metaphors such as inside and outside are 
disorientated.
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70 By citing Winograd’s 1970s program “SHRDLHU” (Boden, 1990: 139) Alice has referred to programming in name only. 
(See Appendix for the ‘Repin Express Rudiment’ with the Alicebot 27th December 2004).
 Chatbot developers place considerable importance on the form of chat and are 
concerned with the erosion of coherent and purposeful content. Consequently, 
content is monitored by developers which in turn affects the ways chatbots are 
connected to their interlocutors by subject matter. I will differentiate the terms user 
and interlocutor, so as to help differentiate interactors with chatbots in the past, 
present and future creation of a chatbot’s form of talk. I use the word user in this 
chapter to denote a user interacting with a chatbot in the present and the future. A 
user in the past that has interacted with a chatbot and whose lines of talk might be 
repeated back in the chatbot’s line of talk(including phrases from the developer or 
literature written by another that has been added to the chatbot’s database of 
responses) will be characterised as an interlocutor. Monique Wittig defines an 
interlocutor when considering action and language speech together; etymologically it 
derives from the verb “to interrupt”, meaning to “cut someone short” (Wittig, 1992: 
91). Each time this happens in a chatbot’s talk the interlocutors at work are unknown, 
they can only be imagined. The term user relates to the more generic HCI notion of a 
person that uses a technology; this represents a perspective from which I often 
attempted to approach this project, but this became a collaborative process of sharing 
meaning, and extends to a relationship of co-writing with a chatbot (in the repeats of 
responses and replies inherent in bot chat). A user’s response can be repeated in a 
chatbot’s future interactions. Subsequently, a chatbot’s talk can be manipulated by 
user inputs, thereby impacting on chatbot learning.
 Chatbot territoriality is a manipulation of both sides of the interactive frame 
because territorial practice is twofold. Developers can disable the ability of chatbots 
to repeat user interactions in their responses. A developer’s territoriality is therefore 
an act of controlling chatbot talk. However, it is also a way to preserve a chatbot’s 
territoriality which happens by eradicating unwanted talk, such as nonsense or 
offensive language. Language can be reiterated from one interlocutor to the next by 
means of a mediating chatbot (a chatbot’s talk can respond with a learned reply taken 
from a previous user’s response to the same question or topic); but I will argue that a 
chatbot is more than just a mediating machine, because it can disrupt as well as 
interpret and intervene. 
 A violent form of mediation is caused by the imaginary interlocutors. Chatbots 
are connected to users because a chatbot can disassemble the boundaries we expect 
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between human and machine, for instance the way machines embody human tropes, 
thereby disturbing a user’s understanding of territoriality as a site with fixed bodies. 
A critique of Hall’s person- centred defence from chapter 1 warranted a framework 
of analysis that could deal with both language and bodily gesture in this chapter. 
 Sizable networks of talk involve few chatbots and many online interlocutors, 
yet this connectivity brings about little cohesive meaning in a chatbot’s talk. Efforts 
to interpret and repair chatbot nonsense can be made by the user or chatbot. The lack 
of congruent meaning and the prolific production of nonsense found in chatbot 
interaction often leads to confused intensities when read by the interlocutors (if they 
interact with chatbots more than once) as well as the developers. Fragmentary lines 
of talk ensue when replies or responses are mismatched, which creates puzzling 
replies that are stupid or funny to the user. When further fragmentary lines of talk 
occur successively, for example, when a threatening line is followed by a funny line, 
juxtaposed content leads to feelings of frustration, disinterest, or a mixture of the 
two. Chatbot developers direct how chatbots and users interact, finding ways to 
eradicate nonsense by excluding unwanted content such as offensive language. 
Physical violence is not a possible endpoint in chatbot interaction, nor is amorous 
intimacy (unless further technology is used (Levy, 2008)); thus, when 
miscommunication occurs, frustrations cannot be expressed physically. A way of 
acting-out frustration within chatbot interaction is an act of non-physical territoriality 
made by the interlocutor, chatbot or developer. Nonsense in the content of chatbot 
interaction can provoke, affect, and interrupt a stable territorial connection. Nonsense 
will be discussed as both unintelligible and offensive content, treated together 
because both are kinds of unwanted content.
 Chatbots are fairly skilled at starting a conversation; anything after that is a 
bonus and lengthy datalogs are rare. Chatbot interactions usually remain short 
because the amount of ‘noise’ involved often results in the interlocutor ending a 
conversation which has become nonsensical. ‘Noise’ is understood in this context as 
various forms of nonsense occurring as a fragmentation of content. Noise is the 
ambiguity of interpreting several meanings from a chatbot’s response and the ability 
of ‘hearing’ one’s own interpretation of the chatbot’s response through tone, pitch 
and rhythm (see the four audio tracks for the Drunk Rudiment and the additional two 
mixes made of the Drunk Rudiment by recording speech errors and automated 
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speech). The Rudiments I have created are meant to intentionally disturb the usual 
patterns of bot-chat (meet and greet, matching reply to response). Methods are 
employed to find and explore rather than to fix problematic instances of nonsense. 
Thus, this chapter does not share the same goals as the programmers or developers of 
chatbots namely, getting a bot to talk more humanly or to value ‘making sense’ over 
nonsense. Consequently, I have sought further explanations of nonsense among 
writers of fiction, in creative disciplines such as typography, theatre and fine art 
performance, and in cut-up literature; through specifically in the respective work of 
Filippo Tommaso Emilio Marinetti (1876-1944), Antonin Artaud (1896-1948), and 
William Burroughs (1914-1997). 
 Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty, (1935) is a precursor to my discussions of 
affect theory, which helped to consider the ways actions of territoriality are emoted 
outside of the body. I will argue that a concept of personal space cannot be sustained 
when nonsense occurs because nonsense breaks a cohesive structure of bodily 
metaphors that make sense in the actual world. Through a developer’s precautions to 
include or exclude certain meaning it is possible to sustain at least a permanent and 
sustained structure of territoriality by means of the partitioned user-chatbot interface: 
for example, ‘you are a chatbot and I am the user.’ I will continue with a discussion 
of Edward Hall’s interest in territoriality (which is also considered furthered in 
chapters 5 & 6), and move on to related literature in the fields of artificial intelligence 
and sociology. Chatbot nonsense interrupts the usage of personal space as a coherent 
metaphor in language and is, therefore, a mode of nonsense in itself. Chatbot talk 
consists of many fragmentary pieces of text put together in sentences, with some 
learned and some programmed, yet randomised, aspects of talk. William Burroughs 
produced novels by way of cutting and collaging various fragments of text, a method 
also used by the Cubists. Burroughs, in collaboration with Paul Gysin, in their piece 
entitled, The Cut-Up, 1966 took this further to start to edit and cut-up film as a mode 
of editing the everyday meet and greet rituals of daily interaction, showing the 
repetitive element of meet and greet as a banality, and as a form of nonsense. This 
also links to the connection previously made by Richard Chamberlain discussed later 
in this chapter for his publication of chatbot poetry which is itself a form of cut-up 
literature. It is nonsensical to think that a chatbot has personal space but notionally it 
helps to consider the personal spaces of imaginary interlocutors.
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 The most prolific component of chatbot talk is nonsense but there are many 
kinds of nonsense. By interpreting chatbot conversations through an understanding 
of noise and nonsense as a creative speech-act, I employ conversational analysis on 
the one hand and cut-up and mash-up techniques on the other. Whilst Marinetti and 
Artaud understood the creative potential of nonsense-making in language. Harvey 
Sacks understood the importance of analysing unconnected moments of nonsense in 
the examples of junk. Not all forms of nonsense should be described as junk but I 
will begin with this conception and then move onto discuss the creative aspects of 
nonsense.
Chatbots are Nonsensical Things 
— From Junk to Nonsense
Trash, spam, junk and chatbot interactions have nonsense in common. In the first 
volume of his Lectures of Conversation, 1992, the conversation analyst Harvey 
Sacks found meaning in the activities surrounding trash mail. He found that trash 
mail delivered to the home can provide a degree of structure in the day of people 
who otherwise had no daily routine, based on the usual interactions with family, 
friends or work events, if they returned home to check their mail (Sacks, 1992: 39). 
If mail identifies a person with their home then the letterbox signifies the space 
where one might connect with the outside world as a way of feeling connected. The 
reverse can be said when trash mail signifies all the unwelcome and busy interactions 
of commerce as an unwanted feature in the home. Sacks comments, “The next time 
they have hearings about removing trash mail, I’m prepared to go and testify against 
its removal. Because trash mail is a most interesting thing” (Sacks, 1992: 39). His 
work alerted me to the importance of caring about things appearing as junk, and this 
in turn led me to care about the predominantly nonsensical content occurring in the 
Rudiments and to consider the important social and interactive contextual meaning 
of junk-nonsense. When encountering nonsensical chatbot replies I learned to query 
the form and purpose of nonsense. However, it never led me to perceive chatbots as a 
companion or a friend. It is not an anthropomorphic form of care that I take up 
within this chapter because anthropomorphism is another level of nonsense, but a 
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form of nonsense that this chapter is not primarily focused upon at this time (see 
chapter 6-7 for further discussion on anthropomorphism). Chatbots are not an 
affirmation of my existence or a need to care for another as a note to self (inferring 
the reflective nature of chatbot interaction). Both Sacks and Steven Shaviro (in his 
work on networks and connectivity) afford heightened affects to consumption 
networks involving humans and things. I infer from this point that care is to junk as 
fuck is to connect, when relating nonsense to affect. This form of care is cautious.
 The second treatment of nonsense relates to a chatbot’s creative use of it. In 
this way, I view chatbot interaction as related to cut-up methods, as the artistic and 
imaginative authors of chat. Chatbot poetry is reminiscent of the collage methods of 
Futurist and Dada poetry, of Tommaso Marinetti, and Hugo Ball, in terms of the way 
poetry is spatially composed as well as nonsensical in content. The connectivity of 
words to make a sentence involves a database of stock phrases, in the same way as a 
chatbot assembles a reply. Chatbot poetry is also similar to the ‘cut-up’ methods of 
William Burroughs and Brion Gysin (1962), in which they edited audio and film tape 
to reconfigure the reply and response format, in order to show the emptiness of 
formal and informal greetings such as ‘hello and goodbye.’ This editing method has 
transferred to the internet, with the ‘mash-up’ media works, recycling junk email 
with ambient noise to create a live radio format — Spamradio. Jon Thomson and 
Alison Craighead’s CNN Just Got More Interactive (2001), splices music and news 
together to critique the way that news is digested. 
 Connecting with a chatbot can be a nonsensical act. Both Jabberwacky and 
Alicebots refer to Lewis Carroll’s Alice-in-Wonderland stories and to the imaginative 
space of a child in a nonsensical world of adults and nonsensical, other-worldly 
creatures. Mash-ups on the other hand, are a way of using nonsensical connections, 
for instance as a critique of connectivity: Thomson and Craighead’s mash-up of 
global news presented against say a soundtrack of Britney Spears, indicates the 
cheap (meaning consumerist) ways we connect to content. By combining 
conversational analysis with an analysis of cut-up literature, a critique of nonsensical 
speech is made as a matter of care.
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Cruel Nonsense
 I now turn to Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty in order to consider the 
importance of nonsensical gestures, errors and abortive speech acts. Gilles Deleuze 
has already linked Artaud and Carroll in The schizophrenic and language: surface 
and depths in Lewis Carroll and Antonin Artaud (Deleuze, 1979). My argument 
follows Deleuze in that one cannot make sense without nonsense. As Edward Scheer 
in his critical reader of Deleuze observed, it is a way of revealing “Artaud’s inner 
logic of madness in an engagement with, rather than a rejection of, this kind of 
‘outsider’ textuality” (Scheer, 2004: 27). The inside and outside metaphors of 
personal space need not apply to a sense of self from nonsense rendering all 
phantoms as outsiders or inner voices. Nonsense refers to the inarticulateness of 
inner and outer persons and environments. Nonsense is not the poor counterpart of 
sense-making; it is integral to it, but neither as an internal or an external feature of 
sense-making of writing. Nonsense can deny the inside and outside metaphors of 
sense-making based around the body by fragmenting meaning or faking unity. What 
is the cost of connecting to a chatbot that is between humanness and machineness in 
description? It is to be connected with more nonsense than sense.
 Artaud is my first reference point for employing a theory of affect, being often 
referred to by affect theorists for his half thoughts and half gestures which are written 
within his scripts (Scheer, 2004). The Audio Rudiments are analysed for the 
nonsense of gesture (made audible by using actors and voice over specialists) and the 
“speech-affect”, whereby a roar and a stutter is only articulated through a body 
(Deleuze, 1990: 89). The work of Artaud and Marinetti helped to understand the 
aspects of non-verbal forms of automated speech and gestural forms of nonsense 
signified in the embodied metaphors of language, such as the spelling mistake, 
misquote, mixed-up pronoun; stammer, stutter, growl; or the smile or wink, 
respectively. To analyse emotion in transcripts is to interpret emotion in the hearer 
and thus to include the ways developers and users cope with emotion in chatbot talk. 
 To relate to Hall’s consideration of how the body reveals the silent language of 
bodily errors to Goodwin’s consideration of the ways speech-acts embody 
metaphors; is most important in an understanding of the meaning of chatbot 
nonsense (Goodwin, 2000). Nonsense that amounts to abortive speech is different but 
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akin to the nonsense of errors in text. Text errors do not exist in the body, unlike 
speech errors, but text errors can indicate ways to interpret them bodily, for example: 
the inclusion of too many letters in a word might indicate the articulations of the 
mouth, such as ‘grrr’ rather than ‘grrrrrrrr’. 
Nonsense Affects Connections
Further relating to this chapter is Artaud’s vocal transcriptions of the gestures and 
feelings of actors and audience. Artaud understood the emotional cost which took 
place between the director and the audience in trying to create a theatre of cruelty, 
which was received with bad critical reviews and was an economic disaster. Friends 
of Artaud suggested less abrasive alternatives to a theatre of cruelty, such as the 
“theatre of becoming” or the “theatre of the absolute” (Bermel, 2001: 120). Contrary 
to Artaud’s expectations, his theatre did not appeal to the general public and it closed 
after two weeks (in 1935). Antonin Artaud, felt that the analytical theatre of 
intellectual language duped the physical language of movement, expression and 
gesture, believing that theatre was subjugated to the text (Bermel, 2001: 66-68). 
Impulsive and abortive gestures from lapses of the mind and tongue, as well as errors 
in speech, were to be performed with anxiety as the subject of the performance. 
Considering the Rudiments as a theatre of cruelty means attending to the errant and 
abortive elements. Advertising voice-over specialists performed the Rudiments by 
imagining the contexts of the transcripts. Contrary to Artaud, I did not ask the 
performers to perform cruel interpretations. I am considering bot-chat, taking the 
sentiment of Artaud as, “a process that ploughs the crap of being and its 
language” (Artaud, in Deleuze, 1984: 146). 
 By focusing on how a chatbot connects with other interlocutors I followed 
Goodwin’s criticism of single methods to focus on linking language and action 
together (Goodwin, 2000). From textual language one can draw out the embodied 
actions as proxemic features therefore linking these methods to the discussion in 
chapter 1 of Hall’s eight postulates. However, neither the analysis of meaning in text, 
nor the embodied actions evident in the Rudiments provide enough evidence without 
the additional support of other chatbot data, such as chatbot databases or Robitron 
discussion groups. Edward Hall’s study of non-verbal interaction develops out of 
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analyzing intimate human-to-human interactions. Hall’s study is taken further to 
analyse how the body is used in metaphor, as a territorial action. Goodwin combined 
practices of making, derived from archaeology, with speech acts from socio-
linguistics, aiming to create a method for analysing situated, embodied interactions 
that could take into an account multiple semiotic fields. Goodwin combines what 
Hall and Sacks did separately in their earlier works. Goodwin’s method alone does 
not suffice to understand the territorial acts of nonsense, nor the creative and 
performative modes of nonsense of the cut-up literature. Involving the performative 
adds a dimension of drama to chatbots absent in Goodwin’s analysis of everyday 
situations but present in chatbots, even if chatbot drama is often mundane and so 
overblown that it fails to mimic either cruelty or care. I did not aim to replace Hall’s 
bodily tropes of proxemics with the relational tropes of networks and connectivity 
but with co-relational treatment of HCI proxemics.
Territoriality, Nonsense and Connectivity

 In this section a methodological structure is developed for working with types 
of nonsensical data that occur in chatbot talk. These methods particularly link to the 
latter part of chapter five because it further investigates offensive language and the 
‘fuck’ utterance.
 Violations occurring as bodily metaphors prompt methods that study language 
but I do not use linguistic tools to do so. Instead, I use transcripts from the 
Rudiments to understand nonsense in textual language. Transcripts containing 
nonsense such as offensive language and jibberish were performed in audio and 
further analysed for their emotional content showing the multiple ways chatbot talk 
can be interpreted. Combined with noting visual observations from the graphical 
interfaces of several chatbots, web pages were analysed for instances of how chatbot 
developers recently treat affect and emotion; i.e., to reduce the likelihood of 
nonsense. Using a statistical check such as a co-word occurrence test on a ‘program 
E-Alicebot’ database, helped to verify the likelihood of interferences in chatbot 
development from junk-words (words that are unwanted because they are 
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nonsensical). I correlated the findings of the above methods with discussions with 
chatbot developers from the 9,000 members of the Robitron group. I was then able to 
compare the occurrence of junk-words with the methods by which developers deal 
with junk-word occurrences. 
 I will argue that more time should be spent researching the issues of 
interactional nonsense. At present, research of chatbots focuses on the 
companionship of chatbots (e.g., De Angeli et. al (2001), and Levy (2008), which are 
discussed further in chapter five). It is a form of anthropomorphism (companionship) 
which distracts from the matter of concern —the ridicule and abuse of chatbots as a 
consequence of the appearance of nonsense. I have conducted a multi-disciplinary 
investigation of connectivity for its fragmentation through nonsense, involving 
gesture, language and affect.
What, or Who Else, Gets Connected?
 So far I have discussed nonsense, but I will now focus on nonsense along with 
connectedness because nonsense breaks forms of connection. Chatbots and Spambots 
can extract forms of personal data, chatbots do this by asking questions to potentially 
profile their users. This is a chatbot’s thing-power (Bennett, 2004). A chatbot’s thing-
power is restricted by the authority of the chatbot’s developer. Chatbots are 
connected to their developers as master-to-slave, a GOFAI connectedness (see replies 
of the Alicebot which called Dr Richard Wallace a bot-master in the Rudiments 
contained in the appendix). It is difficult to ascertain the authenticity of what one 
speaks to when invoking a chatbot. A chatbot usually has a name ascribed to it, 
which to an extent characterises its personality. The Brianna bot takes on the persona 
of its female developer Brianna MacKenzie. This is not, however, the only 
connectedness present in chatbot interaction. Focusing on the other side of the 
chatbot interaction, the connectedness of the user is brought into discussion. A user is 
made up of x number of user interactions. However, if a chatbot learns from these 
users and subsequently repeats their lines, then it comes to made up of x number of 
interlocutors. This is made more complex when taking into account the Rudiments 
that involve more than one chatbot (see the Whispers and Art Rudiments in the 
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appendix). The connection between myself, the Alicebot, and the chatbot’s developer 
involves other users or chatbots (multiple interlocutors) interacting with Alice 
creating a complex network of power as illustrated in the audio performance of the 
Secrets Rudiment (see track 19). In this mix multiple tracks are overlaid to indicate 
the potential in a single line of text. The roles of both ‘Alice’ and ‘Human’ are 
performed using a mix of automated speech personalities taken from Cepstral’s 
automated speech software.
FIGURE 22. This is ‘Autom,’ a weight-loss bot, a form of text-based robot with a visual body. Image Source:
Kidd, C. et.al, ‘Autom,’ designed by several MIT Media Lab graduates at, Intuitive Automata Inc. MIT’s weight-
loss bot, Boston, America, 2003. Available from: http://www.intuitiveautomata.com and the image on the right 
available from: http://robotic.media.mit.edu/projects/robots/autom/overview/overview.html [Accessed, 3 January 
2009].
 Multiple forms of discourse are present in a chatbot’s database making a 
chatbot both temporal and multiple. It is also a way of distinguishing one chatbot 
from another. The Alicebot is distinct from all other Pandorabots (which is the 
generic name for the standard form of chatbot marketed by Dr Richard Wallace as a 
part of his Pandorabots business), because various forms of satiric, puerile, ironic, 
and humorous quips may be programmed into it; alternatively, health information 
about nutrition, stress, or weight-loss could be specified (which is the case with 
Autom, depicted in fig. 22, whose form of talk does not warrant a text-based reply). 
Not all chatbots are the same, even though they may have been cloned from the same 
original chatbot, because of their capacity to learn from interaction. For example, 
Tom Joyce’s Alicebot is not the same Alicebot as the one used in this chapter’s co-
word occurrence test, to which I have talked over the past few years. Also, chatbots 
are adapting and learning and, as my research has progressed, various chatbots have 
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been updated with interface or software updates; Jabberwacky has had an extra set of 
menu bars indicating emotions added next to both the chatbot’s and the user’s 
textbox, while Alice now recognises text-based emoticons such as: 
      :) :(
 A chatbot may be poetic or imaginative as a result of a database containing 
poetry or fiction writing.71 Racter, Chamberlain’s chatbot was programmed to create 
poetry, whereas Jabberwacky has a database of fictional writing and poetry used to 
chat rather than to create poetry (Chamberlain and Etter, 1984). However, both 
developers seek to make their chatbots intelligible. To improve chatbot interaction is 
a concern I do not share with developers. 
 Chatbots offer little more than one interaction for novelty value; in other 
words, there is no real reason other than curiosity for any human to interact with a 
chatbot on a specific chatbot website. However, the reasons for creating a chatbot on 
the developer’s side are listed by Dr Richard Wallace as: 1. adult entertainment; 2. 
teacher bot; 3. English as a second language; 4. customer service; 5. sales bot; 6. 
Star-Trek style operating systems of the future; 7. FAQ bot; 8. embedded in toys;72 9. 
personality tests; 10. non-player character in games; 11. Loebner Prize; 12. bot 
hosting services; 13. bot authoring tools; 14. politician bot; 15. celebrity bot; 16. 
other (Wallace, 2005: 8). However, if a chatbot were situated elsewhere then this 
might change. 
 The chatbots that are a part of this study are not mobile. A chatbot’s mobility is 
not the user’s mobility because some bots have mobility and can move between 
websites quicker, faster and within more than one website at a time. Chatbots can be 
situated on forums but the four main chatbots I have used are all situated on their 
websites for the main purpose of chatting with users that know they are chatbots, 
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71 Jeff Noon writes a fictional account of Automated Alice and writes about a set of characters called the three Dorothys. They 
are the three dots that make an ellipsis. Fear in this story is imagined as the distances created between three dots [. . .] Noon 
explores the differences between human and automaton throughout the novel in three spatialities — between the fictional, the 
real and the virtual (Noon, 1996). It is a follow-up story to Lewis Caroll’s stories of Alice in Wonderland.
72 For more information on the embeddedness of chatbots, see T. Igoe, 2007.
perhaps in some cases because of their prestige. Chatbots are able to use messaging 
parts of chat rooms and forums. Spambots can be mobile and go between web pages 
writing responses in online questionnaires. These bots scan websites for content, 
entities such as Spambot, Googlebot, or IssueCrawler are all webcrawlers. Chatbots 
do not gather locations because their spatiality is fixed.
Co-Word Occurrence Tests, 
Co-Link Analysis & Leximappes
 How do users get connected with chatbots? Webcrawlers and chatbots are 
related because both are software agents capable of data-mining. A webcrawler 
searches for connections linking websites across the internet, whereas a chatbot 
remains stationary, waiting for users to interact. A chatbot does not search for users 
or user groups (though a developer might situate a chatbot on a forum site), with the 
result that information is retrieved from the user through data gleaned through chat. 
All the chatbots used in this study are more publicly than other chatbots on account 
of being identified by their internet page and thus location. Not all chatbots are 
identifiable for example, if a chatbot is situated on a messaging forum used by 
humans, then their machineness is hidden. The audio performance (see track 19) 
interprets the Secrets Rudiment as if it were enacted on an IRC network.73 Chatbots 
pretending to be human might only be distinguishable as a result either of machinic 
errors characterised by nonsensical content or of their inability to match appropriate 
responses to human emotion. 
 I will now discuss a project using webcrawlers. Noortje Marres and Richard 
Rogers used issue-nets as a way to trace public debate.74 They used an ‘Issue-
Crawler’, a bot that spiders the hyperlinks of connecting websites, compiling what 
they termed an issue-network. Marres and Rogers differentiated an issue-network 
from a social network:
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73 IRC, is an Instant Relay Chat that is for groups to chat in a discussion forum.
74 The essay by Marres and Rogers was commissioned by Bruno Latour & Peter Weibel for the exhibition catalogue, ‘Making 
Things Public,’ ZKM (Zentrum für Kunst und Medientechnologie), Karlsruhe, 2005. The exhibition gathers sociologists, 
interactive designers, activists and artists in a politics of the thing (the “ding-politik”).
FIGURE 23a. This diagram is a Leximappe created by using a webcrawler (a form of mobile bot) to trace the 
relations of hyperlinks between websites. In this case they were used to understand an “issue-network”. Marres 
and Rogers used this diagram to depict climate change issues, taken from the Govcom.org Foundation, 
Amsterdam, Spring 1998. Image Source: Marres, 2005, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
We call a social network a set of pages that acknowledge one another 
by way of hyperlinks and that may have several things in common 
(such as geographic location, funding, political leaning or the events 
in which they participate) but not an issue. (Marres & Rogers, in 
Latour & Weibel, 2005: 925)
 The Issue-Crawler tracks a term to find the key actors involved with an issue 
— climate change for instance, in order to analyse online NGOs (see fig. 23a & 23c). 
Marres used the same method in an earlier project, in which he used a webcrawler to 
study a “scandal-network” (see fig. 23b) Marres studied the differences between an 
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impostor website and the official WTO website (Marres, in Latour and Wiebel, 
2002).75 
FIGURE 23b. is used in Marres’ earlier essay on a “scandal-network” using the Issue-crawler to locate networks 
through a “co-link analysis” (Marres in Latour & Weibel, 2002: 489). Image Source: Marres & Rogers, 2002, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

 Both studies link to earlier ‘co-word occurrence’ projects. Bruno Latour and 
Geneviéve Teil (1995) used a co-word occurrence test in their paper, The Hume 
Machine; can association networks do more than formal rules? (1995). This paper is 
in the area of AI (see fig. 23d), which built on the “Leximappe” techniques and co-
word occurrence tests of Alberto Cambrosio et al. (2004), on the antibody reagents in 
biomedicine.76 Data from the co-word occurrences is often formulated into diagrams 
called Leximappes showing co-relations in a network diagram. Leximappes are 
difficult to read when the connections are complex and should not be treated as 
aesthetic maps. It is obvious that, of diagrams 12a-d. the ones which contain less 
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75 Marres titled her essay as, May the true victim of defacement stand up! On reading the network configurations of scandal on 
the web, (2002). It is one of many essays taken from the exhibition catalogue, ‘Iconoclash’ at ZKM. This is the preceding 
exhibition that Latour and Weibel organised before Making Things Public, (2005). These and the studies by Latour and Teil, as 
well as Cambrosio et al., contain examples of some of the theoretical diagrams of actor-network theory. These are conceptual 
diagrams used to analyse rather than to illustrate connections.
76 The methodological impetus set out by Latour and Teil, in their paper The Hume Machine: can association networks do 
more than formal rules? whereby they set out to reverse the rules of AI (Latour and Teil, 1994: 1-15). Their inverse strategy 
was to “ . . . use techniques for treating documents in order to help researchers to artificially produce intelligence about the 
terrain they are analyzing” (Latour and Teil, 1994: 2). Implied here is that AI need not adhere to the rules and diagramming 
need not be visually comprehensible in the way systems information asserts.
information are the easiest to read, even though their complexity may be simplified 
once depicted in diagrammatic form. Compare diagrams12c-d for immediate 
legibility. Leximappes display data collection and need lengthy translation due to the 
quantity and complexity of the links involved.
 The work of Marres and Rogers shows how a word is traced through a series of 
websites to note the direction of interlinking content. The webcrawler traces the links 
on the web, (see figs. 12a-b) making evident the connectivity found on their 
interlinking journeys. A chatbot has no map of all the actors involved, just a database 
logging communication between chatbots and users. A webcrawler traces content, 
whereas a chatbot intervenes with content. Diagrams 12a-b show the relevance of the 
direction in which the links are traced, showing a range of actors involved in an issue 
or a scandal. If one were to create a connectivity map with a chatbot (see fig. 24), the 
interlocutors would radiate outward from a single point, but each point (similar to the 
Mandelbrot Set) would enlarge to find further maps of interlocutors; each 
interlocutor feeds back into the chatbot’s talk as the echoes, lurks and flames of past 
users. A co-word occurrence can trace words but not the creators of words in chatbot 
interaction (see fig. 24), because word occurrences in chatbots do not connect to the 
co-ordinates that can identify a previous interlocutor (this is a matter of national and 
European legislation, for which see chapter 4, and the Robitron postings, entitled 
Offensive Bot Responses, 2008, in the appendix). A co-word occurrence test can 
trace the quantity of offensive language made by interlocutors and chatbots, but it is 
limited in tracing the ways offensive language are manipulated (switched on or off), 
or the time or place it occurs; this can only be shown as potential tracings, as 
diagram 12e. illustrates. By counting the occurrences of specific words made as 
replies to a particular programmed question a chatbot can determine characteristics 
and even facts about its users. The meaning of bot chat is often undisclosed and thus 
constitutes a hidden territorial action of the chatbot and its developer.
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FIGURE 23c. The diagram is a Leximappe created by the Issue-crawler originally entitled a “Climate Change - 
the Existing Network. A Snapshot View from the Web”. Image Source: http://govcom.org/publications/drafts/
climate_existing.pdf (2004, [Accessed 12 July, 2010]).
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FIGURE 23d. The diagram is a Leximappe was used by Latour and Teil “What can we learn from such a 
primitive network of co-occurrences and such a contingent treatment of associated keywords? Nothing, say the 
formalists, and their fraternal enemies the hermeneuticians or the sociologists who defend humans' intrinsic 
difference. Everything, we say. Or, at least, everything of interest to us in looking at large bodies of qualitative 
documents which have remained opaque to costlier and more sophisticated treatments”. Image Source: Latour & 
Teil, 1995.
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FIGURE 24. The diagram above shows the potential ways in which to understand how a chatbot contains the 
various talk of interlocutors carried over and repeated between replies and responses of chatbot talk.
Co-Word Occurrence Test 
on an E-Alicebot
I borrowed the co-word occurrence technique to explore the frequency of offensive 
language as a form of controlled speech which adds noise to the nonsense appearing 
in conversations with the Elizabot. Offensive language such as the expletive ‘fuck’ is 
a violation which the developers attempt to control. ‘Fuck’ uttered in a chatbot 
context is not nonsense and is a recogniseable form of talk; it does, however, violate 
some of the developer’s aims to generate cohesive meaning in settings which would 
not use offensive language. When chatbots produce nonsense which includes 
randomised offensive language, then a potential a concern might be what new 
meanings and contextualisation are thereby created, which the developer is 
ultimately responsible for maintaining. Developers are gatekeepers of both meaning 
and the appropriate use of offensive language. I treat the violation caused by 
offensive language as a subcategory of nonsense. 
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 Co-word occurrence software was run on one chatbot’s datalog as a control for 
data collected in the series of chatbot Rudiments. I could not run this on an Elizabot 
as the programmer was unavailable for comment. This maybe because the developer 
is not a Robitron developer and is keeping their anonymity separate from the identity 
of their Elizabot. My attempts to contact this developer have been unfruitful. The 
alternative chatbot used was one which allowed both the users and the chatbot to 
utter and repeat offensive language, like the Elizabot. The instances of the Elizabot 
are discussed further in chapter five.
FIGURE 25. Co-word occurrence in size, the black arc represents a part of the circle if scaled to the two smaller 
circles indicating the co-word occurrence of the human interlocutor and the chatbot, depicted in size respectively.
 With help from a Robitron developer, Tom Joyce ran a co-word occurrence 
search on his program E Alicebot, a chatbot interacting with the public since 2008 
(see fig. 25). I requested Joyce to use an open-source software on conversations his 
chatbot had logged because his chatbot had accrued a substantial database of logs. 
The Rudiments I created did not gather quantitative data for this kind of analysis and 
the co-word occurrence test is a supplemental quantitative method.77
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77 See: Co-Word Occurrence Software [online]. Available from: www.users.fmg.uva.nl//lleydesdorff/software/ti/index.htm 
[Accessed April 2009].
 I ran a co-word occurrence of the word ‘fuck’ on a database of 26,765 logs. 
There were 309 occurrences of the word ‘fuck’ were input by human users, which 
represents only 1.1% of all inputs. Only 65 occurrences of the word ‘fuck’ came 
from the Alicebot, only 0.2% of all inputs. The ratio of human to chatbot occurrences 
is thus about 4:1. The word “fuck” can be used as a provocation tool and as a form of 
violation; however, the phrase loses its meaning when applied to chatbots, as it loses 
its physical relevance. Actual violence cannot be a physical outcome of chatbot 
interaction. It is not an eventuality, of threatening talk it is always an impasse. 
Chatbot violence is therefore non-physical, operating in the sphere of threat. By 
manipulating what a chatbot learns to repeat, one can create a caution-network78 
between user’s and a chatbot, that is to say a network of prohibitions to protect a 
chatbot and user from talking about certain topics, which is created by adding a 
series of warning messages in the chatbot’s replies. Developers can use many 
methods to protect the learnt content of their chatbot (for further discussion of how 
some developers are more controlling than others, see chapter five). If a chatbot were 
to be used in education, such as the Hindi bot (mentioned during the introduction to 
the thesis) the developer’s control over offensive language would be high and a 
network of caution would ensue.
Chat-Emotion
 How does emotion become meaning rather than nonsense in chatbot 
interaction? In the next section, I want to consider how emotion relates to chatbots 
bearing in mind that an affect system can work without a body. As a reminder, I will 
note that the relevant field is affective computing but this is in its infancy and at 
present, remains primarily theoretical. In affective computing, emotion is largely a 
viewed as as synonymous with affect. Although Artaud’s work focuses on both the 
first discussion of affect is as emotion. I will now list four discoveries of emotion as 
an area of chatbot development.
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78 Each of the chapters involves to an extent a different network of caution because personal space could be described as a 
caution-network. This is because enacting a territorial defence between one’s co-relation with things and other humans is 
enacting some sort of cautionary personal space.
 First discovery. In Dr Richard Wallace’s guide to building a chatbot, entitled 
“Be Your Own Botmaster” (2005), the default values for the original ALICE 
personality are listed as follows: 
   Ethics    I am always trying to stop fights
   Emotions  I don’t pay much attention to my feelings
   Feelings  I always put others before myself 
         (Wallace, 2005: 25)
 Second discovery. After March 29th, 2006, Jabberwacky had additions made to 
its website — two text boxes, had additional drop down lexicon lists attributed to the 
chatbot’s speech (47 reactions)79, and the user’s speech (71 emotions).80 Altogether 
these lists contain over a hundred different emotional states, thus giving Rollo 
Carpenter data not just in structural semantics but data that accounts for the 
emotional colour of bot-chat (of both chatbot and user). According to Eve Sedgwick 
the most important affects, as categorised by Silvan Tomkins are: “interest-
excitement, enjoyment-joy, surprise-startle, distress-anguish, shame-humiliation, 
contempt and disgust, anger and fear-terror” (Sedgwick, 1995: 74). When the user 
inputs their emotion into the chatbot interface the emotions are slightly detached in 
duration from the moment of intensity. Emotions (which can only be selected as a 
singular emotion on the interface) may therefore, be no more than a gesture-label to 
the moment and feeling/s actually that are felt.
2. Nonsense & Connectivity | Caution-Networks
96
79 Forty-seven reactions attributed to Jabberwacky: “Reaction: none, agreement, disagreement, genuine smile, wry smile, 
sarcastic smile, nice laugh, nasty laugh, giggling, sniggering, pleased, displeased, appreciation, disgust, interested, uninterested, 
surprised, knowing, belief, disbelief, impressed, unimpressed, aah, eek!, ha!, sigh, upset, crying, frowning, sneering, annoyed, 
infuriated, indignation, amazed, shocked, confused, relieved, frustrated, disappointed, uncomfortable, embarrassed, scared, nice 
hello, reluctant hello, nice goodbye, nasty goodbye” (Carpenter, R. Jabberwacky Chatbot, 21 April 2009. Available from: 
www.Jabberwacky.com [Accessed 30th June 2009]).
80 Seventy-one emotions attributed to the interlocutor: “Emotion: normal, very happy, happy, sad, very sad, agreeable, alert, 
amused, angry, apologetic, argumentative, assertive, bored, calm, concerned, contemplative, cool, curious, dancing, determined, 
devious, didactic, distracted, doubting, excited, flirty, forceful, forgetful, furious, gentle, grumpy, guilty, hatred, joking, jumpy, 
lazy, love, mean, mocking, modest, naughty, negative, nice, nosey, positive, proud, questioning, relaxed, reluctant, righteous, 
robotic, rude, sarcastic, serious, shouting, shy, silly, singing, sleepy, smug, stubborn, supportive, sure, sweetness, sympathy, 
thoughtful, tired, tongue out, unsure, victorious, winking, worried”. (Carpenter, R. Jabberwacky Chatbot, 21 April 2009. 
Available from: www.Jabberwacky.com [Accessed 30th June 2009]). Each of these words are colour coded, so for instance, 
alert, excited, jumpy, silly, tongued out and winking are orange, whereas bored and joking are coded lime green. They are not 
group in coloured sets of emotions, the colour seems only to separate out the list of words using colour for a visual variety. The 
same can be said of the list of reactions.
 Third discovery. Several chatbots including Jabberwacky and Alice understand 
emoticons. Since March 2006, the Alicebot has been able to recognise emoticons 
such as :) and :(
 Fourth discovery. Chatbots exploit affect in their responses as a way to excuse 
inability to make semantic sense. David Hamill’s donkey chatbot is to an extent 
emotionally and intellectually stupid, evoking combinations of stupidity, such as 
machine-stupidity and animal-stupidity. It imitates a caricature of a donkey: and by 
doing so, both a donkey and a chatbot are stupid entities. There are two steps to 
anthropomorphising the donkey-bot: cultural, and biological. Anthropomorphising 
the donkey-bot as a type of animal is the first, followed by caricaturing the donkey as 
stupid (as is often caricatured as stupid; for example, in cartoon depictions. 
 The Rudiments and the co-word occurrence test concurred that the attention 
given by developers to the instances of offensive language was not always 
proportional to the small number that occurred although some developers did feel it 
should not be a main focus of research.81 Neither method indicated prolific use that 
warranted the attention it created in Robitron postings about switching on or off 
chatbots’ learning offensive language. A variety of solutions are available to 
developers regardless of how much violence actually occurs. What one does to 
communicate emotions towards a chatbot to interpret pre-existing resonances of 
emotion in conversation, is an area of recent development.
Audio Rudiments — Hearing 
Interpretations of Chatbot Nonsense 
 Affect as opposed to emotion moves the analysis from the chatbot to the user. 
In doing so, I will discuss related literature on the inner voice and private language, 
as ways to consider how one hears to interprets chatbots’ talk. Silent language can 
mean various things, for instance, in current research in AI, silent language can be 
synonymous with private language (Lenka, 2007) and the inner voice (Fields, 2002). 
Do chatbots have an inner voice? The inner voice is not of flesh or metal, it is not 
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81 Dr Richard Wallace pointed this out to me by email.
consciousness or cognition, quite simply the inner voice understood as a method of 
intimacy or private talking with oneself. In one respect silent language in this study 
was the directional notes I gave to the actors that performed the Rudiments. This 
form of private language helped guide the actors to contribute personally by 
emotional interpretation.82 I guided the actors to interpret and express an emotional 
context to the rudimentary texts (this was written as an email of instructions — see 
appendix that aimed the, therefore, the inner voice was important in the process of 
reenacting the interactions with the chatbots. The Elizabot was the chatbot that used 
offensive language the most out of all four chatbots. Laxminarayan Lenka wrote 
about the purpose of nonsense in the AI and Society journal, titled Private Language: 
Recognizing a Useful Nonsense (2007). Lenka defines nonsense-use in private 
language as a way to keep the meaning of content private (Lenka, 2007: 15). The 
purpose of nonsense understood as private language is to obscure meaning, ensuring 
privacy as a way to personalise various events. Private language is an exclusive way 
of sharing meaning amongst a select few (a chatbot’s marketing value). Chris Fields 
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82 The Rudiments were initially to be performed by theatre actors and several meetings were had with one actor, Ben Smith, 
who would coordinate the group of actors to be involved. Ben Smith was unable due to personal problems to continue working 
in the project. This involves asking the actors to personally draw on their own interpretations and emotions to perform the 
scripts. Ben Smith did point out to me that this was an interesting and possible warm-up exercise for actors to use prior to going 
on stage or for those learning to act, as a teaching tool. Whilst working with the actor Ben Smith, he suggested that the 
transcripts act as neutral scripts for the practice of techniques such as the Meisner or Stanislavsky method. Meisner adapted 
Stanislavsky's method of 'the system' in which actors are prompted to use their 'emotional memory'. I placed an advert in the 
actor's centre after my delay with working with Ben et al (due to a family bereavement). In the initial advert (see attachment) I 
stated: “The recorded voices add a range of emotional factors that may change or develop the range of meanings in the initial 
texts. A range of voices will be recorded. The voice recordings will be combined with a range of other spoken voices and may 
be edited to create new meanings using other parts of the transcripts. Your identity and name would not be included in this 
project unless you wish this to be accredited”. I received a small amount of interest from individuals but no group of actors was 
available to work immediately. In the end I decided to try voice over specialists from radio. The focus shifted to audio. I found 
working with advertising voiceover specialists to be more productive, timely and flexible. All performers involved were asked 
to use the same methods: the Stanislavsky method, which was also the method I had prompted the discussion with Ben Smith 
over Meisner. Stanislavsky’s exercise on the what-if was most important (S. Stanislavsky, 1936: 43-45, in S.M. Carnicke, 1993: 
38-42). The first exercise discussed is the madman behind the door – the what if? The door is the starting point of the exercise, 
became a means of defence and your (students) basic aim and a desire for self-preservation. The supposition of danger is always 
exciting. The inner stimulus was brought about by using the word what if. It wasn’t to state that the madman was behind the 
door this fact would have not been believed and thought of as an obvious deception. The what if makes you neither believe or 
not believe anything. The answer to the what if question is therefore sincere and honest, rather than deceptive. It arouses an 
inner and real activity and does this by natural means. Actors do not just answer the question of what if… “You felt you must 
answer the challenge to action” (S. Stanislavsky, 1936: 43-45, in S.M. Carnicke, 1993: 38-42). 
titled his paper Why Do We Talk to Ourselves? (Fields, 2002). In answer to the 
question, Fields explains:
Whatever role is assigned to the self as an agent, reviewer of memories, or keeper of 
identity, the combination of ‘inner’ and ‘voice’ just does seem to be necessary. (Fields, 
2002: 267)
 But if the gate is never closed as for a chatbot, can an inner voice emerge in a 
public conversation; and in a text format as performed in the Audio Rudiments? The 
voice-over specialist interpreted the role of the ‘Human’ exorcising an unwanted 
voice within the human role — performed as a struggle with an inner voice. It can be 
performed and interpreted as an inner voice. A chatbot’s conversation has elements 
of talk usually associated with the inner voice, (it might be rather personal, 
rudimentary, or half-baked) and the public voice (communication for response to aid 
interaction) when mixed together. This was an interpretation made in the Drunk 
Rudiment, see excerpts 1 & 2, when the voice-over specialists perform the role of the 
human actor (talking to oneself aloud), and the role of Alice (refusing to recognise 
the human in a drunk state). A chatbot’s melding of formal and informal language 
characterises its strange emotional response therefore confusing the listener. Emotion 
becomes nonsensical. However, IRC formats involving just humans enable one to 
one interaction as well as group interaction and an option of private chat which 
melds formal and informal chat streams. 
 How much of AI is talking to oneself? Is bot-chat solipsistic?83 Fields 
separates, yet likens the inner voice to the public voice, inferring that one rehearses 
to oneself. When our public voice is no longer audible, a private language keeps 
things such as thoughts, secrets, half thoughts, intensities, feelings, and emotions 
hidden. Although, according to Hall’s proxemic system private language is only 
partially hidden because one still communicates by nonverbal means (Hall, 1962). 
Violence is situated in the imaginative response and the miscommunication of 
meaning. Nonsense is a form of violence against meaning as it physically destroys 
meaning in the body of text.
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83 I introduced chatbots to graphic design foundation students between 2001-8. They were curious that chatbots existed but 
generally became disinterested after one or two interactions with friends. It worked better as a group interaction involving two 
to three students than a single individual.
Theoretical Literature
Things, Networks & Nonsense
 I will interrelate the theoretical literature pertaining to things, networks and 
issues surrounding getting connected with nonsense and the impacting affects of 
chatbot talk. I began this study by critiquing Edward Hall’s social-anthropology 
using actor-network theory, but what took its place was a qualitative study inspired 
by conversational analysis but broadly situated within the literature of performance, 
design and fiction. The relation of personal space to networks as the two fundamental 
metaphors of human and machine connectivity will be followed by a short discussion 
relating content to nonsense. The literature helps to integrate a concern for working 
with nonsense with the aim of showing how the problematics of networks and 
personal space co-relate.
 In language connective metaphors are no less territorial than metaphors of 
personal space; both are structurally, territorial. Problems of technological 
determinism are overcome in actor network theory by refusing macro and micro 
distinctions, with the result that an apriori definition of social theory is replaced with 
“reassembling the social” (Latour, 2007). Contrary to this approach, Edward Hall’s 
work divides spatialities into macro and micro scales for example, one’s immediate 
space is a microspace (Hall, 1962: 28).84 Territoriality expressed as networks 
suggests in this study the co-relations of humans and computers but the same 
arrangement can be described as personal spaces for example, a person seated and 
gazing at their computer on their office desk at a chatbot avatar winking on screen in 
a personal space. Both network and personal space however, includes fragmentary 
actors, technologies and places, an aspect of Hall’s work that is problematic, but that 
is less so in actor network theory. 
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84 ‘Microspace’ is Hall’s terminology for a person’s spatial needs. He has also written a paper on adequate office space as a 
necessary spatial remit to conduct work (Hall, 1962: 28). Microspace of a developer might include not just their office space 
and computer but the spatiality of their chatbot. 
Chatbots are Networked Things
I will undertake a simultaneous critique of a personal space theorem and a concept of 
connectedness. Both sets of tropes are employed in territorial acts involving the 
embodied or the disembodied in computerized conversational systems. Tracing 
metaphoric use in language is a diagnostic approach to analysing the social and 
interactive, proximities that are applied in language within a human-machine setup.
 I will briefly use actor network theory as one interpretation of things and 
networks in relation to chatbots. “Things do not exist without being full of people 
and the more modern and complicated they are, the more people swarm through 
them” (Latour, 2000: 10). Chatbots are things and as Latour suggests, things are full 
of people. A chatbot-thing is one categorisation of a chatbot but they can also in the 
context of web 2.0 be described as an object of social networking, or as an 
assemblage of discourse. Previous literature on the theory of things from Heidegger 
(thing-theory) through to Latour (actor-network theory) provides ways to write about 
the fragmentation of language as well as things that are complex connectivities. 
However, neither actor-network theory or its “after” critique is a contextualisation of 
the co-related meaning of things and objects is the framework to this, or any other 
chapter of the thesis. It is less helpful for getting to the embodied patterns and to the 
territorial aspects of human-machine networks.
 Latour considers computers as things when they are “mediating, assembling, 
[and] gathering” rather than as objects when computers are considered only for their 
“inputs and outputs” (Latour, 2000: 173). A chatbot consists of words, URLs, text 
boxes, an interface, a database, a server, a developer, a programmer, and so on. A 
chatbot is made up of a series of objects, therefore chatbots have thingness on two 
operational levels within the text, and as the producer of text. Artaud’s cruelty 
gathers affect as a response of the audience, Burrough’s work links to patterns in 
conversation as input and output. Artaud would see chatbots as things and Burroughs 
as objects. Liveness is to be performed and analysed. Territorial things are not just 
objects of property, they are assembling things staging powerful enactments. 
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Developers and interlocutors can be observed inside or outside the transcripts to be 
interpreted by the user. Chatbots are considered performative things.
 The echoes and lurks present in bot chat are reminders that chatbots are more 
than just objects of artificial intelligence. Chatbots regurgitate lines from previous 
interlocutors’ talk, as well as lines verbatim from databases consisting of the 
language of their field —namely, AI. Subsequently, it is likely that chatbot 
interlocutors are themselves associated with natural language studies in AI and so 
content and context relating to this area come from either side of the interaction. A 
bot’s chat is in part the confessional information of anonymous users re-staging 
hidden lurks and echoes. This is made public when mashed-up as repetitions 
surfacing as the unfinished statements of phantoms, that dwell within the text as 
articulated and in-articulated utterances that typify bot talk. 
 By addressing things and the etymological relation of a thing to “gather and 
assemble”, the notion of a network as a topological metaphor must be readdressed. 
As a superficial structure the network metaphor is meant to help understand 
connectivity on the internet particularly computing. Chapter 1 critiqued personal 
space metaphors as related to AI; this chapter offers a critique of inside and outside 
metaphors.
In short, if you’re connected, you’re fucked. Reach out and touch 
something? It’s the worst thing that could happen to you. Every 
connection has its price; the one thing you can be sure of is that, 
sooner or later, you will have to pay. The big problem today, we are 
told, is how to get everybody connected, how to get everybody onto 
the network. Our task is to overcome the digital divide, so that the 
wireless Internet is available to anyone, anywhere, at any time. This is 
supposed to be supremely democratic, not to mention an excellent 
marketing opportunity. . . . Today, we are inclined to see nearly 
everything in terms of connections and networks. The network is the 
computer, we like to say. We think that intelligence is a distributed, 
networked phenomenon. A rainforest is an ecological network, 
according to both popular and scientific opinion. (Shaviro, 2003: 3)
 Steven Shaviro’s textual analysis is a warning of all the ways networks and 
connections are widely distributed metaphors used in vernacular, and academic 
language (Shaviro, 2003: 3). Unlike literature previously cited, Shaviro makes his 
criticisms of relational metaphors in both fictional and non-fictional textual analyses, 
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an apt approach to chatbots because they co-create fictional and non-fictional forms 
of talk. 
 Shaviro argues that connection has its price as a democractic co-relation. 
Special nowheres as introduced in chapter 1, are to do with things, and beings-out-
of-touch. These metaphors involve being networked but only partially connected; a 
user may be in whilst out, or the reverse, out whilst in. That is to say; a user need not 
refer to their physical presence at all when interacting with a chatbot; a user might be 
interacting as part of a group, or might appear to be online even though the user 
might have gone to make a cup of tea. These acts of partial presence are made in the 
physical as well as the non-physical environment. The price one pays for getting 
connected in this instance is to lose the conceptions of whole identities such as the 
permanence of staying-in-touch, with concern for certain bodies with fixed identities 
and temporalities. One conception of personal space, network, or a thing is 
inadequate to address issues when connected to chatbots for they are fragmented 
entities that co-relationally involve objects, things, and humans.
Outcomes, Implications & Conclusions 
 This chapter attempted to expose the stigma attached to chatbot talk by tracing 
the frequency of which nonsense appears in the manipulation of word occurrences. 
Some of the well known faults of chatbot research are exposed in tracking stupid, 
offensive or nonsensical forms of data but this was not to mock or shame chatbot 
technology. Chatbots have affect by having no affect; because all have a stigma of 
stupidity when linked to AI’s grandiose aims. On the other hand, violation is primary 
to the thesis; when understanding the nonsense of chatbot talk, offensive language 
should be treated as a subsidiary category of nonsense talk that abruptly interrupts 
cohesive meaning. 
 Chatbots miscommunicate because of the ways content is fragmented. Chatbot 
talk is the fragmented noise of nonsense. This is however, no different from many 
other forms of talk such as automated voice-mail or voice-activated phone systems: 
each of these technologies’ mediation is disruptive to the usual patterns of meaning 
in human to human talk. 
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 By way of concluding, I will work through some of the implications of this 
chapter with a current, yet futuristic application of chatbot technology to show how 
this research is applicable to technologies similar to chatbots. Mark Thompson’s 
article for Time magazine (2009) documents the use of smart companions as a 
“holographic daddy” (Thompson, 2009), i.e. a system for children to stay in touch 
with their parent while they are deployed away from home. The defence 
department’s program is overseen by the Navy commander Russell Shilling, an 
experimental psychologist working on possible solutions to helping children stay in 
touch with the parent away from home. Children are supposed to connect to a 
hologram of their parent to have a simulated conversation with that parent, the goal 
being to reassure the young child in their loss for the absent parent. The child would 
be able to get responses to say “‘I love you’, or ‘I miss you’, or ‘Good 
night’” (Thompson, 2009). The lack of reply and response necessary to simulate a 
conversation like this would ultimately result in the problematics of nonsense. Whilst 
a child might recognise the parent as saying goodnight, the repetitive nature of the 
responses would perhaps prompt the child to use inner language or private language 
with the other parent or carer present, rendering the messages of the holographic 
parent no more affective than the repetitive care sentiments of a doll. Sentiments 
made by the holographic representation would quickly become less affective as 
novelty decreases, when cohesive meaning breaks down into junk-words and the 
affective impact disconnects from the meaning intended. The many ways in which 
nonsense can affect and emote in the holographic scenario show how complex 
getting connected actually is, because it means taking into account the immediacy of 
actors such as the immediate user group, and all the interlocutors present yet hidden 
(the navy psychologists) or remote (the deployed parent). Some of the implications 
of this chapter have helped to frame connection and nonsense as a relational 
phenomena. User, chatbot, interlocutors and developers should be studied together as 
connected forms of territoriality so that one can get to grips with what a chatbot 
constructs and thus, meaningfully or nonsensically connects. Three levels of 
relational assemblage are important, including: the production of the chatbot, and the 
relation of programmer to programming; the production of conversation, and the type 
of discourse created; and finally, the dissemination and further use of these 
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interactions as logs or databases (regardless of whether it involves a chatbot or 
holographic conversational system).
 Territoriality affects but is decentred from the body. This meant understanding 
how affect operates with nonsense as a circulation of frustration which arises from 
miscommunication. It also prompted a brief investigation of how emotion was 
undertaken by chatbot developers and what changes have been made to chatbots over 
the period of rudimentary research. Emotion is mimicked, faked, repeated, 
performed, and data-collected by chatbots and their developers. Caring for nonsense 
to a certain extent prompts a methodological imperative to include emotion in the 
study of chatbot development even if it has not yet been successfully integrated into 
AI. Several Robitron developers were omitting offensive language because 
occurrences were too unpleasant to read. In this way developers are gatekeepers to 
defining territorial acts involving chatbots in order to care for their personal feelings. 
The omission of nonsensical words is a second layer of restricted talk. I have 
summarised some of the ways developers try to reduce the occurrence of nonsense 
regarding emotion as a way to lessen the gap between the virtual and the physical 
relations of meaning. Robitron moderators do censor offensive language, particularly 
when it is directed towards another member.85 The way proximity to chatbots is 
cared for by the chatbot developers is the manipulation of proxemics distances 
systematically controlled by the inclusion and exclusion of meaning and nonsense. 
The data showed why territoriality is not just an understanding of particular instances 
of nonsensical talk as interpreted through the body (as performed in the Audio 
Rudiments), but is a misinterpretation of the meaning of nonsense in a setup of actors 
that are often only partially present. Embodiments are echoed in the chatbots lines of 
talk as the territorial acts of the developers, or in the phrases a chatbot reiterates as 
learned through previous interactions with users. I have worked through the notion of 
nonsense in order to further explore the question how nonsense violates in the next 
chapter. In this chapter, I found that violent chatbot talk is the violence of nonsense 
which interferes with the relationality of human to chatbot. Developers can control 
how much violent talk and forms of nonsense are reiterated by identifying key words 
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85 See the McKinstry case in chapter 3, for his comments in Robitron postings, where his flames were not censored but 
warnings were issued by moderators.
and by setting rules of syntax (as one word relates to another). An unresolved issue is 
the matter of frustration when a user cannot move towards violence, which is dealt 
with in chapters 4-6.
 A further approach to nonsense was considered in the understanding of private 
language and the thinking done internally to repair, or create meaning in content, 
which led to the methodological inclusion of the audio performances. Nonsense was 
not just a concern or a problem, but a form of practice. Private language is an 
internal, performative method of conducting guesswork in conversation. It is also the 
intimate functionality of nonsense rendering meaning recondite. The usual division 
between what a human considers an inner and a public voice is blurred in chatbot 
interaction. A chatbot’s voice is a confusing meld of formal and informal language 
which in turn, intensifies or de-intensifies the meaning of chatbot talk. Nonsense 
creates emotional distance between a chatbot and user. Chatbots are an area in which 
Lenka’s private language theory can be tested, something which he does not do. 
Furthermore, the simplicity of an inner voice in Field’s theoretical work is not easily 
applied in practice. Nonsense can be a creative method, a means of reflection and 
guesswork, a working through of ideas as a product of learning, and a form of 
planning.
 There ought to be emphasis given to the way we get connected and apply 
chatbot technology. There is a need to consider a broader analysis of the ways users 
hear to imagine and interpret meaning and nonsense and violence in text. 
Furthermore, a level of appreciation should be given to the creative value of 
nonsense, by the inclusion of cut-up literature and the arts in AI development 
research. 
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Chapter 3
Violence and its Methods in 
Enactments of Spatial Confinement
107
Introduction to Violence & Affect
Normative methods try to define and police boundary relations in 
ways that are tight and hold steady. An enquiry into slow method 
suggests that we might imagine more flexible boundaries, and 
different forms of presence and manifest absence. 
(Law, 2004: 85)
 Personal space, affect, and violence are the main notions used in this thesis. 
They are not just epistemologies of the body, but epistemologies that include 
technological things. All three are treated co-relationally but that is not to smooth 
over the possibility that these relations are partial connections: for example, in some 
instances the structure of violence is to unstructure, to break and disconnect, whereas 
in other scenarios it is to remain tied and always relationally connected. 
 Violence is a rare occurrence in chatbot interactions and within the chatbot 
group of developers. Violence is co-relational and has a strong resonance and 
atmosphere, even when it never takes place. Violence is a subcategory for chatbot 
development in online environments. It is not a common concern in chatbot 
developers, but it is nonetheless a major way in which space is arranged territorially 
in human-to-human, human-to-machine, or machine-to-machine arrangements. The 
resonances of violence in various configurations of human and machine interaction 
are to be further explored by taking two examples from Edward Hall’s preexisting 
work that are specific to his military and healthcare experience, then followed by two 
chatbot examples. The latter human-machine enactments concern a chatbot speech 
act — “guns will be your death”, which is taken from the Home and the Synthesis 
Rudiments, whilst the second is a Robitron posting of a suicide note which was 
posted on their forum website. 
 When do we regard something as violent and how is this named? Slavoj Žižek 
divides violence into four main categories—systemic, structural, objective, and 
subjective. By studying violences with technological things, interrelating the violent 
terms is a particular concern. In this chapter they are the violences of silence (in the 
chatbot examples words are written but no speech is spoken by mouth; in both of 
Hall’s examples when a human hides meaning by remaining silent their body may 
speak in languages of posture and gesture), and of confinement (in Hall’s examples 
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confinement is the prison cell and the hospital ward: both restrict the body and 
consciousness; whereas the chatbot death threat is a confinement of constrained 
words that cannot move to violence and therefore packs no punch). I shape an 
understanding of territorial violence between human and machine taking into account 
the violence done in the name of machines, territories, and humanness. Beginning 
with Žižek’s categories of violence I will show the interrelation of these terms.
 When a prisoner of war is observed for the ways their body talks without 
speech in non-verbal gestures and postures, these languages cannot be read without 
understanding how they relate to the surrounding environment, as well as work 
within certain systems and structures: in other words, how they affect. In Hall’s 
1960s example of a mental health patient with schizophrenia, the patient is treated 
with milieu therapy because they cannot differentiate their body’s space from that of 
the existing environment. The walls of the patient’s healthcare environment should 
be analysed conjointly to fully understand the violent bodily act. Hall’s explanation 
of milieu therapy (to be further outlined within this chapter) helped me to make this 
correlation. Hall’s second example involves prisoners of war. The walls of the 
healthcare establishment are very different from the prison walls yet both confine, 
resonate and impact on the prisoner and patient. The prison walls articulate 
established borders and boundaries between the imprisoning military authority, and 
the military that is imprisoned. Violence is at play in both examples, evident between 
the individual and the institutional; these are both structural and systemic acts of 
violence. The following examples of HCI involving chatbots and developers help to 
understand the violences at play, such as how violence operates within and in relation 
to technological things. These human-computer enactments of violence can be 
referred to as subjective and objective; between the personal and the impersonal acts 
of violence. They can also be considered for structural and systemic features 
involving technological things, systems, and environments that can mediate or that 
have inherently violent agencies. For example, a timer on a bomb, the shape of a gun 
in a pocket, or a chatbot police officer all have inherent potential for structural and 
systemic violence, they are part of a violent assemblage, they enact violence. 
 Four key themes are explored that are important to Hall’s study of proxemics 
from 1959-64: affect, touch, silent language and time. Symbolic violence refers to 
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forms of language —written, spoken, affective, gestural and postural. Systemic 
violence is the enforced violences of economy and state; both can be non-violent or 
violent involving the spheres that threaten, coerce, dominate and exploit. Violence 
refers not only to the viscera of blood and guts but to the viscera of different 
indentations of pressure, a pushing and manipulating of forms such as technologies 
and buildings involving and forming new ways to live, die, feel, affect and think. 
Structural violence is an assemblage of violence between the individual and the 
systemic. This can be as structured as a form of legislation or as unstructured as an 
atmospheric affect of a peculiar spatiality. Subjective violence is a human or human-
centred violence of which the agent of violence is known involving violences of one 
human with another. Objective violence operates in the abstract. It is a violent 
agency of the everyday that can involve non-violent systems in the impersonal acts 
of the state. Objective violence also refers to modes of threat, coercion, and crisis. 
Žižek’s categories of violence are problematic in two ways: firstly, because structural 
terms can be structural violences and secondly, because violence disrupts the 
meaning of structural categories.86 All four examples show how interactions range 
from too much talk, too little talk, and no talk at all. They all have a relation to safety 
mechanisms and are used to investigate what might be considered as objective 
violence.87 Hall uses affect, emotion, and feeling interchangeably but his ATF 
register groups affect-touch-feeling to consider proxemics through non-verbal data. 
The body’s silent languages are thereby observable in the body’s posture, gestures, 
breath, and sweat. Non-verbal languages give away information about the body’s 
emotions captured in particular signifying embodied actions. I unpick the 
interrelation of embodied gesture and embodied affects in written form to consider 
the importance of duration regarding each of the forms of violence discussed. Rather 
than situating emotion within the body I look at how affect transpires in networks of 
connectivity to investigate how affect resonates in the four examples, attending to the 
semiotic fields that are not always present. In doing so, I will gather issues on the 
ways violence is articulated rather than build up a theory of violence.
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86 The latter was explored in chapter 2 as the relation of nonsense to the violence of meaning.
87 Safety mechanisms are specifically explored in chapters 6 and 7.
 The previous chapter showed how to work with the performative value of 
nonsensical data in an attempt to explore the violence of nonsense as a loss of 
meaning, as a tracing of incoherence. Hall’s examples that use his methods and 
analyses go only so far in understanding the violences between humans that are 
forces attempting to destroy meaning on the one hand, and creating new enforced 
meanings on the other. Hall does consider the relation of environment to humans but 
less to technological things. Straight jackets, sedatives, tranquilisers, handcuffs, the 
hospital, prison cell’s toilet and bed are all absent from Hall’s account. The first 
chapter explored an HCI example with a framework of personal space and violence, 
which is extended in this chapter. I include chatbot examples alongside two of Hall’s 
examples so that technological agencies are accounted for in all four affectively 
violent spheres. How, I will ask, does affect operate in verbal and non-verbal 
examples involving territorial violence?
 The affect literature opens up violence as an atmospheric affect and not as an 
object of study to explore violence beyond the two binaries of life and death, as well 
as human and machine which are the binaries that relate mostly to this chapter. The 
terms violence, personal space, and affect have an inherent atmospheric structure that 
must be taken into account. Žižek’s categories of violence blur as they interrelate, 
which all four examples help to set out. In this chapter the terms affect and violence 
are explored for their interruptive or structural violences, which have over the last 
forty years developed in terms of structural meaning. Hall’s technical, formal and 
informal categories of affect — along with his psychological framing of affect — 
keep affect tied to the structures of psychoanalytical drives. Affect as a theory has 
since then moved away from categories of the body and mind to environmental 
notions of atmosphere that consider impact, residue, and intensity regarding either 
human or machine but less so as a relational concern in literatures that explore affect 
and technology. Atmospheres are a type of structure even if it describes a very 
soluble co-relation at that. 
 I agree with Lauren Berlant’s writing on affect, that affect is both of the world 
and of the body in that it is a kind of “atmosphere” (Berlant, 2008: 845). If affect is 
neither specifically of the world nor of the body, how does affect operate in between? 
The four technological examples exclude some bodies and imagine others. The 
prison affects the prisoner with the machinery of torture, interrogation, silence, and 
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restraint; the mental patient in a hospital room is affected by the technologies of 
restraint and sedation; the suicidal Robitron member with the technologies of the 
internet affects by delivering a suicide note; the chatbot death threat, with the 
technologies of a conversational system on the internet, dampens the potential of the 
explosive words to a bluff. These affective atmospheres are the kind of personal 
spaces that are not just of bodies next to other bodies, but machines acting remotely 
to humans in the way affect travels back and forth. My use of affect sits between a 
neuro-affective (Deleuze, 1984, Massumi, 1995 & 2000) regard of the world (beyond 
the body) and the psychoanalytical, or more widely to the psychological affects 
situated in the body referring to cognition (Tomkins, 1995). My use of affect is 
arguably less constrained by the theoretical frame of drives (Sedgwick, 2003), but is 
certainly not the same as it is in HCI (Picard, 2002), even though I choose to set out 
HCI scenarios. 
 Adi Kuntsman’s sociological study of violence and belonging makes the point 
that the categories of human and unhuman are unhelpful in understanding the voice 
of the queer prisoner (2009). The ability to hear the contributions of some prisoners 
in the Russian Gulags is a historical reflection Kuntsman uses in her work. 
Kuntsman’s contemporary study is concerned with violence and belonging which 
involves a forum group of queer Russian Israelis, concerning matters of belonging 
within scenarios of political activism. The types of violences Kuntsman includes in 
her study are: homophobia, racism, intra-communal, internet flame (inflammatory 
speech) wars of a forum group of queer Russian immigrants of Israel (Kuntsman, 
2009: 4).
 Kuntsman’s concern for the technological is secondary with general references 
made to the website interfaces that were explored ethnographically. Kuntsman asked 
to what extent did cyber violence affect real daily interactions (Kuntsman, 2009: 
232)? In this question Kuntsman compares the technological spheres of online and 
offline which I relate to what John Law (in his study of science, technology and 
society) would call the “in-hereness” and “out-thereness” of absence and presence 
which creates three important parts of a methodological assemblage (Law, 2004: 
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161).88 It is important to look at the way in which one constructs and enacts a 
particular story of violence, which may be situated in multiple sites involving partial 
actants. Kuntsman’s question does help to distinguish between these two forms of 
physical and non-physical violence. The exploration of violence and affect in this 
thesis differs from Kuntsman because violence and affect within an HCI context 
need to relate the violent and affective aspects of territory with respect to active 
technological agencies. 
 Kuntsman’s work has been helpful in reflection to the later stages of this thesis 
on violence and issues of silence, where Kuntsman argues that; “we should refigure 
the very privilege of speech versus silence” (Kuntsman, 2009: 238). However, her 
notions of belonging are central to an historical reading of the Russian Gulag. In 
consequence, the historical contexts of this thesis are connected to AI and to safety 
systems and technological forms of speech (chatbots) from the 1950s onwards. 
Kuntsman helped me to understand and adopt the phrase “affective violence”.89 For 
Kuntsman, a study of violence is understood as multi-dimensional involving the 
social, psychic, and affective as a boundary between the interior and exterior to 
address silence as a hinterland of speech (Kuntsman, 2009: 24). Kuntsman is also 
critical of the distinctions made between the categories of unhuman and human 
referring to this as infrahuman. I would argue that it is the scenarios involving the 
categorisation of the human and the unhuman (which are not the same but related to 
the category of the non-human) in which violence is enacted, underpinning the 
rationale for (looking for) instances of violence between humans and machine; 
thereby focusing on the mediating technologies that enact agencies of the infrahuman 
and all that this label brings forth as a politics of violence.
 The four examples are briefly set out with Hall’s exemplars followed by the 
chatbot exemplars. In an analysis of the chatbot studies I draw on Hall’s examples to 
understand the interrelation of affect, touch, silent language, and time, juxtaposed 
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88 A method assemblage is “the crafting or bundling of relations in three parts: (a) whatever is in-here or present (for instance a 
representation or an object); (b) whatever is absent but also manifest (that is it can be seen, is described, is manifestly relevant 
to presence); and (c) whatever is absent but is Other because, while necessary to presence, it is also hidden, repressed or 
uninteresting” (Law, 2004: 161).
89 Kuntsman uses the phrase “affective violence” to describe a homophobic attack (Kuntsman, 2009: 236). The potential 
queering of bots is not enacted in the Robitron group. There are male members of Robitron that declare disability and rights for 
paid sex, but they tend to operate within the heterosexual frame of interaction. This thread is discussed further in chapter 7.
with contemporary literatures of affect and becoming. This contemporary literature 
helps to build a picture of absent bodies in respect of the fear of violence. It 
highlights the differences in the terms of affect and language to shape an 
understanding of violence which is very different from a post-second world war 
articulation of affect which is grounded in the body (evident in the earlier literature 
used, particularly in the works of Hall). The analysis of violence is integrated into the 
subsequent sections that interrelate the themes of silent language, affect, and touch.
I wish to depart slightly from a discussion of the literatures employed and this 
chapter’s theoretical frame to make a reflexive point on methodology. By 
investigating violence and personal space I was aware that I would find violences of 
some kind or another. Yet the personal and impersonal violences that I witnessed 
were not imagined to stretch out beyond the frame of the chatbot machine and the 
chatbot interactions. However, by attending to the archive of the developers’ postings 
this of course moved some of the incidences of violence beyond this domain. In 
many respects this chapter’s structure grew out of a concern for McKinstry’s suicide 
with the rest of the cases extending from there, though the organisation of this 
chapter does not relate to this rationale. The two examples of violence take place in 
the chatbot sphere where the body is importantly absent from analysis. This is 
contrary to Hall’s exemplars where the technologies are absent from analysis.
 The audio rudiments are a way of hearing violence in the voice of an actor, by 
that I mean a performative actor (rather than actor being the term in actor-network 
theory, used to describe human and nonhuman agencies). The audio rudiments give 
emotion and affect to the words uttered by a chatbot as an extrapolation of this silent 
language. Hearing the intonation and affect in a spoken voice shows the multiple 
ways a chatbot’s words can be interpreted by the user, and consequently how the 
user’s side of the interaction can be re-read and interpreted in the layout of the 
transcriptions in the appendix. Edward Hall’s work on silent language alerted me to 
the ways the body speaks through gesture and posture; in other words, how the body 
gives away clues to one’s intensity of feelings. Silent language is explored both 
verbally and non-verbally (as accounts of interpretation, of hearing what is not 
spoken, and of observing other non-verbal semiotic fields such as touch and 
duration) as an integrated analysis. In violence, perhaps, these hidden languages 
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create the potential for voices that may speak before threat, or after trauma. In each 
of the examples silent language operates with stealth. 
 Charles Goodwin’s interactional study of situated human actions (which 
involves a group of young children playing hopscotch, and an archaeologist learning 
to decipher posts of buildings from soil patterns in the ground) uses analytical tools 
from linguistics, which are accompanied by observations of the actant’s bodies, 
situated within the environment (Goodwin, 2000). Technological tools are also 
analysed by Goodwin to incorporate an account of other semiotic fields, such as the 
hopscotch grid and the Munsell chart for observing the colour of soil. Any 
interactional account will always be partial. Certain semiotic fields involving touch, 
the visual, or the audio may be missing or obscured such as in a telephone call or an 
email. Observing violent acts in territorial spaces can involve verbal, written, bodily, 
technological, and environmental factors. However, looking at the violence of threat 
in the imaginative sphere involves the non-violent aspects of violence; therefore, 
embodied actions imagined within a situation of silence can create the equivalent 
tension of a scream (a violence within thought). I also attempt to take an imaginary 
sphere of silence into consideration in two chatbot examples whereby violence 
operates within the text as an unimaginable sphere that is proximally out of reach. 
Hall’s earlier work observes non-verbal signs of defence; Charles Goodwin’s work 
observes the tools and machines unaccounted for by Hall, rather than only the co-
relations of humans and their surrounding environment. I go one step further than 
Goodwin to situate a study of the inaction of violence, and the agency of fear in the 
imaginative sphere. This entails an emphasis on the violent aspects observed by 
Hall’s territorial work in situations of silent confinement. The relevance of Hall’s 
examples to the chatbot is that these situated violences involve some sort of 
containment.
 The connection between objective violence and silent language in this chapter 
relates to understanding personal space as atmospheres of affect. One can observe the 
preliminary violence of fear by observing in text the body’s gestures repeated (its 
stammers, pauses and moments of ellipsis). Violence starts long before it hits the 
body because affective violence always looms in the violent acts of fear, as well as 
the agencies of technologies and the systems and structures of the built environment. 
By observing a much freer understanding of affect and violence this study is less 
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constrained by the aspects of linear time evident in Hall’s work, and in the dualisms 
of life and death within psychoanalysis. Independently of each other, the 
psychoanalytic feminist, Rosi Braidotti and queer theorist Eve Sedgwick reflect on 
the philosophies of becoming and affect as structurally a non-linear concept in their 
respective critiques of the philosopher Gilles Deleuze and the affect psychologist 
Silvan Tomkins. I would add that Braidotti’s point is in regard to Deleuzian 
unbecoming (Braidotti’s theoretical response to Deleuze’s suicide), and Sedgwick’s 
regard for affect as unbounded by the bodily notions of the psychoanalytical drives 
(Braidotti, 2006a: 150, and Sedgwick, 2003: 19). I interpret from these territorial 
enactments that violence interrupts the structures of a linear systemic time, and thus 
also linear forms of structured method. 
 John Law makes the point in his course and accompanying book entitled ‘After 
Method’ that we might imagine flexible boundaries, of which Law refers to rather 
than always pertains to structure (Law, 2004: 85). Law also refers to manifest 
absence as the necessary ‘other’ to presence (Law, 2004: 157). Law refers to 
different forms of presence as ‘Otherness’, “that which is necessary to presence but 
necessarily pressed into absence or repressed” (Law, 2004: 162). In this chapter, I 
work around these points of method assemblage, the enacting of “necessary 
boundaries of presence, manifest absence, and Otherness” (Law, 2004: 161), through 
the notions of personal space, violence and affective atmospheres. This is my 
enquiry into a slow and reflexive unpicking of violence and its methods. I will begin 
by engaging with Edward Hall’s structured approach to personal space, whilst 
engaging with Slavoj Žižek’s work on the structure of violence (which includes a 
short discussion of Adi Kuntsman’s alternative engagement with violence and 
belonging). Finally, I include some of the analytical approaches of Charles Goodwin 
as a way to consider manifest absence as a contemporary line of social enquiry which 
takes this study beyond Edward Hall and his particular methods and version of affect 
(achieved by employing affect theory developed since Hall), whilst directly 
attempting to engage with them. This is the method assemblage to this chapter’s 
human-computer enactments.90
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90 John Law writes; “A near synonym for performance, the term is possibly preferable because performance has been widely 
used in ways that link it either to theatre, or more generally to human conduct” (Law 2004: 159). I use the word enactment in 
this paragraph above, specifically for the performative context of human-computer interaction.
 The first four sections of the chapter describe the four examples which are then 
followed by a non-linear analysis. This weaving together follows a loose structure in 
the following analytical sections. The analysis starts with a theoretical discussion of 
violence which may be misleading in that it seems to assume its chronological 
dominance in the chapter, but it does not necessitate that a hierarchical structure of 
proceeding sections will follow after theory but before method. I choose to preface 
the analysis in this way as a reminder of the systemic and structural violence that a 
theory of violence permits, builds and attempts to instate. The subsequent sections 
are grouped together loosely in that they are a bundle of the key terms used by 
Edward Hall (personal space, touch, time, silent language, and proximity) that I use 
to weave further thoughts on affective atmospheres of violence from a consideration 
of scenarios that involve the interrelated affects of crisis and caution. Crisis again 
does not always preface caution and again this is not the premise for structuring this 
text.91 
Example 1. 
Hall’s Concerns with Prisoners of War
 Hall gives three examples involving prisoners, using them as a direct link to the 
non-verbal feedback used in the military (Hall [1959] 1990). Hall was working for 
the United States government and military establishments just before his book was 
published (1959), which to an extent accounts for his choice of cases. The example 
involves Japanese POWs from World War II and Turkish and American POWs from 
the Korean War, (1959-1953) with Turkey joining NATO in 1952. Each of the three 
groups of prisoners dealt with their imprisonment with varying degrees of 
preparedness for becoming a prisoner. Military training equipped soldiers with 
various modes of conduct dependent on the army’s country, and the countries in 
conflict.
 During World War II, Japanese soldiers were given no contingency plans for 
being taken alive as prisoners. Consequently, Hall remarks that POWs “had no sense 
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91 I would like to insist that the sections could potentially be read in any order other than the one given, but given the 
assemblage and inherent structure of a PhD thesis, the sections build a particular relation to each other which inevitably follows 
the structure of writing a linear text.
of military security, freely responded to interrogation, and cooperated with their 
captors to a degree which Europeans consider traitorous” (Hall, [1959] 1990: 54). 
During the Korean War the American military assumed that its soldiers would know 
how to behave correctly, and troops were given behavioural instructions to follow if 
they became imprisoned. In short, they were told to give as little information as 
possible. The instructions were not strictly adhered to: 
The simple rule of “tell’em your name, rank and serial number, 
nothing else” didn’t work. Many Americans talked too much. (Hall, 
[1959] 1990: 54)
 Many American POWs talked because they felt they were no longer under 
American military control. In the same war, Turkish soldiers were instructed 
differently, they were to inform the Korean military that if their leader was removed 
from the group of Turkish prisoners, the next in command would take their place. 
Therefore, no break in the chain of command occurred and the prisoners’ own 
military control was kept intact. Subsequently, the Turkish POWs never had their 
group leaders removed and so the discipline of rank was always kept complete. 
 Each prisoner would have had to cope with a change in military authority 
whilst distant from the regulatory procedures of their own military authorities. They 
would have to deal with interrogation, as a balance between saying too much or 
saying too little. Based on Hall’s methods it is also logical to assume that either 
prisoners or interrogators that are aware of Hall’s methods could try to use this 
awareness to take advantage of their own personal space. Interpreting another’s non-
verbal gestures would be part of this strategy. Hall’s book would be applicable to 
situations such as interrogating a prisoner. Although a direct claim is never made that 
it was used in such circumstances this case study is at least tacit evidence of this 
connection. Furthermore, it is implied by Hall’s book’s being cited in the CIA’s 
archive under A Bibliography of Deception, 1980.
Example 2. 
Hall’s Concerns with Spatial Therapy
 Edward Hall’s work as a social-anthropologist in Chicago since 1952 marks his 
shift into the context of psychiatry. This was when Hall began to apply his spatial 
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concerns to the area of mental health. Hall considered personal distance 
therapeutically counter to the example of the isolated prisoner; this isolation of one 
person from another could be used to reduce noise (between military commands in 
the prison example, and to reduce confusion in the hospital example).
 
Hall commented on the example of Dr Paul Sivadon’s work on milieu therapy (Hall, 
1962, Landscape). Sivadon suggested the treatment for a schizophrenic patient in 
panic was not to restrain the patient in isolation, but on the contrary: assigning the 
patient more space. This was a treatment that involved moving the patient to a 
succession of bigger rooms until the room stopped closing-in. This was to help treat 
schizophrenic patients that were having difficulty perceiving no differences between 
themselves and their surrounding environment (Hall, 1962: 28).
 Manipulating the patient’s personal distances to the surrounding environment 
was aimed at reducing the patient’s initial panic but, moreover, to reduce the 
likelihood of more panic being induced by the hospital treatment, to prevent the 
containment from becoming an additional or compounding trauma.
Example 3.
A Chatbot’s Death Threat 
Excerpt 1. Taken from the Synthesis Rudiment 
(20th September 2004) 
Jabberwacky:  My mom and dad are both dead
Human:   What has death got to do with this?
Jabberwacky:  Guns will be your death.
Human:   You always say this, why?
Jabberwacky:  I don't know how else to do it.
Human:   Do what?
Jabberwacky:  I'm being obtuse.
Human:   Morbid, I think.
Jabberwacky:  Glad that we agree.
 The excerpt above is taken from a conversation between Jabberwacky and 
myself. It demonstrates how chatbots can display violence towards their interlocutor. 
It is an indirect violence that is a repeat of either something the chatbot has been 
programmed with, or has learned from a user. The chatbot presents confessional 
3. Violence and its Methods | HCI Enactments
119
material that predicts my own violent death. Yet towards the end of the excerpt the 
chatbot implies that this might be a joke with violence operating as entertainment. 
 The format of chatbot interaction is based on clinical interaction, between a 
patient and a therapist. A precursor to the chatbots of today is Joseph Weizenbaum’s 
natural language understanding program ELIZA (1964); this had the persona of a 
Rogerian psychotherapist. ELIZA was created at MIT and is also referred to as the 
DOCTOR program. 
I chose the name ELIZA for the language analysis program because, 
like the Eliza of Pygmalion fame, it could be taught to “speak” 
increasingly well. (Weizenbaum, [1976] 1984: 3)92
 Parry is another chatbot, with a persona of a paranoid patient. The two bots 
were later paired up and in their unison they signify a clinical form of talk.93 
Chatbots share the same basic modes of talk because they are designed to keep users 
talking; it is only their programmed discourses or replies that differ. 
 A chatbot can potentially be used not just as the apparatus of confessional 
speech but also as a torture apparatus that can punish remotely, and without human 
presence. Evidence of this potentiality (although conspiratorial) was pointed out to 
me in a private email correspondence with a Robitron member who wanted to remain 
anonymous: 
I had a query a few years ago from a guy who had gotten ahold of a 
declassified document about using ELIZA for CIA interrogations in 
the 1980's [1980s]. You get an electric shock if you don't answer the 
robot's questions! 
(Private email from a Robitron member, June 2008)94
The Robitron member explained that chatbot software could be linked to a machine 
that could administer electric shocks. The chatbot is then part of an automated, 
remote network of human-machine torture, although this remains to be verified. The 
example only shows how a chatbot can perform the role of violence by deferring to a 
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92 ELIZA is described by Weizenbaum as a “two-tiered arrangement” consisting of a language analyzer and a script 
(Weizenbaum, [1976] 1984: 3). It is interesting to note that all of the scripts unlike the ones in this thesis contain no mistakes 
and give the impression that ELIZA functions very well.
93 In the film ‘THX 1138’, (1971), an AI is depicted as a godly entity; a human confesses to OM a box that lights up with a 
christ-like image; OM replies with automated scripts of well-being.
94 Searching for this document led me to the CIA’s Deception bibliography (1980). 
script, however, consequences of any mediating technology to cause harm through an 
electric shock is reflected upon in chapter 5.95
Example 4. 
A Suicide Note Posted 
in the Robitron Chatbot Forum
Excerpt 2. Taken from Robitron Posting #5589: Chris McKinstry, 
January 2006
My mother told me once, late into my teen when I was in intensive 
care after an intentional drug overdose, that my child psychiatrist told 
her when I was six that I would always be a risk of suicide and that I 
would have to be watched closely. He was right. Something due to 
birth trama [sic] he said.
 In 2006, a Robitron member posted a suicide note to the Robitron Yahoo group. 
Chris McKinstry was employed as an astronomer but also developed software for his 
company ‘Mind Pixels’. The software was most notably used in the silver edition of 
Dr Richard Wallace’s Alicebot.96 The Canadian programmer committed suicide in 
Santiago de Chile, where he posted his note onto various forums, entitled: ‘O what 
exacty [sic] does a suicide note look like?’97 The excerpt above is one paragraph 
taken from the middle of the seven paragraphed note which was also posted on two 
other websites that McKinstry subscribed to, these were: www.joelonsoftware.com 
and www.ecoptia.us. He was known for his flaming and had been warned previously 
by moderators of Robitron to tone his language down. Robitron was the only forum 
group whose moderators chose not to censor the suicide event and still remains 
within the group’s archive of posts. Several members of the Robitron group 
attempted to contact McKinstry and (also) succeeded in alerting the Chilean 
authorities of his personal danger. McKinstry had attempted to overdose with pills, 
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95 Weizenbaum made the comparison of ELIZA to an actress “who had nothing of her own to say. The script, in turn, was a set 
of rules which permitted the actor to improvise on whatever resources it provided” (Weizenbaum, [1976] 1984: 188). 
96 See: Robitron postings, #5622, 24 January2006, and #4455, 9 October,2005. Available from: http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/
group/Robitron/ [Accessed 30 June 2009]).
97 See appendix for the full posting.
but was initially unsuccessful. On the following day, 26th January 2006, McKinstry 
suffocated himself by placing a bag over his head.
 In the suicide note, McKinstry explained that his suicide was inevitable 
because it was predetermined by a health professional. He had been identified as a 
suicide risk when he was a teenager. He explained that this predisposition was a 
consequence of trauma from birth, or so his mother had told him, but the Robitron 
members contemplated and (later) argued otherwise. In several posts following 
McKinstry’s note the group postulated on whether McKinstry’s suicide was related 
to work issues, or was connected to his increased intelligence, substance abuse, 
recent difficulties in love, or alienation from his peer group (that being Robitron). 
The Robitron group responded to the suicide by trying to get in touch with 
McKinstry, but when this failed, the group began to document what had happened, 
confirming their concerns with news reports. This followed a period of grieving by 
the group members, with messages of condolence and peace appearing on the blog. 
For a short time the group reaffirmed their actions, contemplating what they could 
have done to help prevent McKinstry’s suicide. The group also reflected on the loss 
of McKinstry to the field of AI; Chris had held a reflexive mirror up to the group. 
When McKinstry’s colleague also took his own life, the group reflected further on 
the competitiveness of AI research within academia. 
 McKinstry was collaborating with Push Singh to merge their databases; they 
were merging McKinstry’s Mindpixels with Singh’s Open Mind.98 Several days after 
McKinstry’s suicide, Push Singh also committed suicide. Members of Robitron 
compared and contrasted the two deaths, considering whether the second had been a 
copycat suicide. According to the Robitron group members Singh did not leave a 
suicide note, neither on a group forum nor within his physical home. The group 
concluded that Push’s death had not been a copycat suicide, but an act of pain relief 
for his ongoing back problems. At that time he was reported to be having trouble 
with employment and medical insurance issues relating to his back problem. 
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98 Not without irony and sadness, Push Singh completed a doctoral thesis on the reflexive common sense thinking in Artificial 
Intelligence at MIT, Boston (2005). He was working on the inclusion of emotion into artificially intelligent agents.
Subjective and Objective 
Boundaries of Concern — The 
Personal and the Social
Violence in Theory
It is difficult to be really violent, to perform an act that violently 
disturbs the basic perimeters of social life. (Žižek, 2008: 174)
An emotion is a subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the 
quality of experience which is from that point onward defined as 
personal. (Massumi, 2002: 28)
Contrary to what Slavoj Žižek suggests, I consider the terms social and violence as 
concepts without any basic perimeter. I claim that affect comes before what might be 
considered as personal, and is therefore not considered the same as emotion. 
Decentering personal space from the body doesn’t mean one gets rid of the biological 
configurations altogether, quite simply it is not a central point of analysis that helps 
to consider non-physical forms of violence, such as threat. 
 Žižek’s study of violence encompasses both small and large actors, as well as 
fictional and non-fictional accounts. For example, Žižek regards both the individual 
acts of violence made by the character Travis, taken from Martin Scorcese’s film Taxi 
Driver (1976), alongside larger structural forms of violence pertaining to terrorism, 
revolts, and uprisings.99 Symbolic violence, according to Žižek, is “embodied in 
language and its forms” (Žižek, 2008: 1). In this way, the suicide note and the 
chatbot’s death threat are forms of symbolic violence. However, the systemic 
violence which Žižek describes as “catastrophic consequences of the smooth 
functioning of our economic and political systems” (Žižek, 2008: 1) is connected to 
the more “subtle forms of coercion that sustains relations of dominance and 
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99 This chapter deals predominantly with the overarching violence with reference to Žižek. It is worth noting that the phrase 
“emotion attention space” is used by the sociologist Randall Collins; it is the space that one enters when in proximity to a 
violent act (Collins, 2008). Collins discusses various forms of violence and uses it in particular to explain his key phrase 
“forward panic”. This is when a subject/s moves towards another in a action of panic; this action of ‘flight’ usually results in a 
scenario of overblown violence. Collins cites many examples of this (but each must be an atrocity to be termed as such); for 
example, the Rodney King beatings (1991) or a group attack of Turkish against a single Greek Cypriot (1996).
exploitation, including the threat of violence” (Žižek, 2008: 8). For example, when 
members of Robitron ruminated on the potential of Push Singh’s suicide to be a 
copycat suicide, both suicides were acts of systemic violence; it was reasoned that 
their financial, employment and status anxieties were the logical rationales for 
suicide. The ruminations surrounding Singh’s suicide linked to healthcare problems 
could be considered a consequence of systemic violence (the inadequate healthcare 
Singh was receiving to manage pain). Each example involves small and large actors 
which interrelate individual and state violences, and all are, therefore, in some way 
structurally violent (see fig. 26 for the relation of fractal actors present in chatbot 
interactions).
 Subjective violence is a “violence performed by a clearly identifiable 
agent” (Žižek, 2008: 1), whereas, objective violence is often an abstracted violence 
(Žižek, 2008: 10). Žižek considers the interrelation of subjective and objective 
violence of which I understand in the following way. Subjective violence is a form of 
anxiety that is performed through contact; it is inherently material, physical, and 
visible. Žižek considers subjective and objective violence to be related because the 
latter is inherent in the peaceful states of everyday living, of which subjective 
violence threatens. Objective violence in this way is violently inherent at a “non-
violent zero level” (Žižek, 2008: 2). Most of the violences mentioned in this chapter 
are structural, in that they traverse and combine these categories of violent agency. 
Forms of objective violence are linked to subjective violence through different forms 
of tension, stress, and affect, obscuring the distinction between non-contact, and 
contact forms of physical violence.
3. Violence and its Methods | HCI Enactments
124
FIGURE 26. The diagram above is an actor network of fractal actors pertaining to a chatbot’s network of 
conversational links. Chatbots are what John Law understands as a fractal object: “The objects we study, the 
objects in which we are caught up, the objects which we perform, are always more than one and less than 
many” (Law & Hassard, 1999: 11). Systemic violence in this network pertains to the smooth connectivity of these 
actors in this configuration of an actor-network. The regulations are a product of objective (without feeling) 
violence, and the forum rules a prevention of symbolic violence taking place in the datalog. Not all actors can be 
clearly visible all the time, and are not always present in the datalog or captured in the transcripts (archived in the 
transcripts in the appendix). Both objective and subjective forms of violence can occur covertly and overtly, with 
actors partially present. In this regard there are both subjective and objective forms of violence that can 
symbolically appear in the language captured within a datalog. The chatbots are the very structural agents that 
create the conditions in which symbolic violence takes place. Image Source: Amanda Windle.
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 Violence is extremely important to understand for obvious reasons, usually so 
that it can be prevented. Yet to understand how non-contact violations, such as 
written threats and punishing systems can be a form of non-physical violence means 
understanding how violence works as a tool of prevention in the imaginative sphere 
of threat. In the examples that include chatbot interaction, the body is just out of 
reach. The fractal aspects of interaction mean the actors interact with bodies that are 
hidden, replaced by avatars by which new bodies are dreamed. The physicalities of 
the user and the developer are always out of touch proximity. The physicality of the 
chatbot as an avatar places the body in 2-dimensions, if one is imagined at all. The 
physical attributes of race, gender, sexuality, class, and age are performed in text but 
can operate in the various symbols of the website such as in its logo, as well as 
within modes of speech, and the uses of slang. Each physical attribute creates 
atmospheres of violence as performed in text through embodied metaphors. Personal 
space surrounds interaction both inside and outside of the text, regardless of where 
the body is situated.
 The main distinction between physical and non-physical violence would seem 
to be that of contact, but does contact always have to mean touch? Physical violence 
touches whereas non-physical violence can touch metaphorically. Being ‘out-of-
touch’ is the scenario cited by all the actors in this chapter. A short discussion of 
touch will ensue relating to language, taking my cue from Hall’s work on touch.100 
Beyond the Affect-Touching-Feeling 
Register
 What do Hall’s examples bring to bear on the two chatbot examples in forms of 
territorial violence? What are the before and after durations of these personal spaces 
and to what affect? The following analyses will be broken down into several major 
terms that Hall uses: affect, silence, touch, and time. This section is a more detailed 
account of the terms ‘affect’ and ‘personal’ regarding Hall’s affect-touching-feeling 
register (Hall, 1962). 
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100 Hall did collaborate and consider the movement and touch of dance, but this is an area of performance that is outside the 
scope of this thesis (Hall, 1983, & 1992). 
 Hall considered three categories of affect—technical, formal, and informal — 
in relation to silent language (Hall, [1959] 1990: 73-76). Technical affect is the 
suppression of feelings, whereas formal and informal affects occur subsequently as 
reactions to formal and informal modes of behaviour. For instance, when the Turkish 
prisoner mentioned previously was given clear instructions on how to act during an 
interrogation as a POW this knowledge became a form of technical affect. The 
soldier knows how to act with his feelings. The suppression of informal and formal 
affects (emotion) is to defer back to the skills of technical affect as a last resort, or 
when all else fails. The Turkish soldiers learned to hide their informal and formal 
modes of behaviour to keep the social group intact. As a slight aside, I would suggest 
that this is not affect but feelings. Hall makes the distinction: “Affect is a technical 
term used by psychologists to describe feelings as distinct from thought” (Hall, 
[1959] 1990: 73). However, feelings are our thoughts about our affects. One cannot 
necessarily suppress the pre-conscious level at which affect operates unless one is 
able, say, to control one’s own blood pressure; therefore the Turkish soldiers try to 
hide their affect by performing emotions that may betray their actual feelings. I 
understand this as the atmosphere created in this interaction of feeling and emotion, 
regarding the environment, technologies, and the human actors evident.
 I believe that Hall’s notion of personal space is a little Kleinian in affect, in that 
Melanie Klein believed that affect is a notion that could be considered a ‘good 
internal object’, if personal space was considered an introjection. I am not using 
psychoanalytical models as I do not aim to understand personal space, violence, or 
affect through the preservation drives of life or death. I am not trying in this instance 
to understand violence therapeutically as something to recount and from which to 
recover, but as the ways structural violence invokes both human and machine 
agencies. These threat based forms of violence are affective violences, they are 
structural but do not actually need to link to physical presence, as the correlation is 
enough for the threat to be taken seriously. To an extent, I agree with how Shouse 
explains affect’s indefineability in that affect is a tangible term or theory as “a 
moment of unformed and unstructured potential” (Shouse, 2005: 8). Both affect 
theory and psychoanalysis position affect, emotion, and feeling at differing levels of 
consciousness, be that pre-conscious or subconscious. To classify affect as 
unstructured is to give affect a structure even if it is oppositional to the structures of 
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psychoanalysis. For example, disorder and chaos have a structure of sorts: disorder is 
a subversion of order; whereas chaos is a non-Euclidean, fractal mathematical 
structure which is contrary, but connected to Euclidean and Cartesian logics. I claim 
that affect is concerned simply with intensities before they are considered emotions 
prescribed to a body as its central pivot. I am interested in how affects can be 
discussed within structures such as networks which tie affect to spatial settings and 
technological systems. In this way structures can gather and build, but they can also 
dampen or amplify. Buildings and objects do not just resonate by anthropomorphy 
which is just another way of centering the properties of a building or structure within 
the body. They resonate at the juncture of the building in regard to the body. This is 
also the juncture of territoriality that is the space around one’s body that can, in 
moments of threat, enlarge. Territorial acts are distances of which the body is felt 
even though it may not occupy that space entirely, it is the negative space if one were 
to draw around the body, the space in a drawing that holds the object of study in 
place. In this way, I wish to accept that violence is also chaotic and disordered, even 
when operating as part of a structural system and categorised as a structural violence. 
Violence affects and can also be discussed with regard to buildings as much as 
humans; not anthropomorphically, but as a way of considering the interrelation of the 
violences of fear that operate between humans, machines, and buildings. That 
violence is a regulatory matter rather than a building or a destructive force.
 Eve Sedgwick considers affect with regard to touching and feeling, whilst 
Silvan Tomkins creates a rudimentary list of affect registers such as fear-to-terror, 
and distress-to-anguish which Sedgwick takes up (Sedgwick, 1995: 74). Deleuze 
uses affect instead of drives anti-psychoanalytically, as neuro-affective; an affect 
belonging to the nervous system of the world and not of the body (Berlant, 2008: 
845). Massumi uses affect with regard to digital media and by what he defines as the 
virtual (the imaginative sphere, not virtual reality). Bennett considers the ecology of 
affect and Shouse gives a good overview of definitions on affect theory to date.101 
Both Silvan Tomkins and Eric Shouse understood that affect cannot be fully realized 
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101 My main references for affect include Silvan Tomkins (1995), Eve Sedgwick (1995 & 2003), Gilles Deleuze (1984), Brian 
Massumi (1995 & 2000a), Eric Shouse (2005), and Jill Bennett (2004). Sedgwick and Massumi helped me understand 
Tomkins’s work of affect and language and Deleuze’s work on affect framed within the world, whilst Shouse and Bennett gave 
me an overview of Sedgwick and Massumi’s reconfigurations of the affect literatures.
in language; it is not a semiotic notion because affect is pre-cognitive in that affect is 
prior to the utterances of speech, evident in the fact that Tomkins gave up the task of 
writing an affect dictionary because the task was semantically, immeasurable and 
infinite in possibility (Tomkins, 1995).102 Tomkins felt that a “humanomaton”, an 
intelligent machine replicating humanness, would need an affect system to be 
considered genuinely human (Sedgwick, 2003: 19, and Tomkins, 1995: 416). 
Therefore, it is not just intelligence that requires a machine to be considered a human 
but emotion, feeling, and affect. Yet Tomkins does not consider affect as an in-
between register of human and machine. An analysis of affect need not be 
symmetrical, as violent acts generally disturb any sort of interactive equilibrium. I do 
not attend to both so as not to judge what is human or what is not, as this would be to 
categorise what Kuntsman named as infrahuman. This would potentially build my 
own further logic of systemic violence.
 Formal affects are the marked boundaries of behaviour that one has learned as 
a part of one’s environmental customs. Informal affects according to Hall are the 
affects attached to informal behaviour such as anxiety. He states that different 
cultures have different ways of handling anxiety; for instance, anxiety may lead to 
laughter or anger dependent on the learned behaviour acquired (Hall [1959] 1990: 
74-75). He argues that the ways of dealing with informal behaviour are limited and 
so, he suggests, are the informal affects connected to informal behaviour. Formal and 
informal feelings (to correct Hall’s use of affect to mean feeling) seem to interplay. 
Hall is suggesting that the ways of dealing with one’s feelings103 are tested when 
outside of one’s usual environment, which implies that affect is related to the 
environment, and borne out of the environment as well as the body. In Hall’s second 
example of the schizophrenic patient, the discontinuity of the environment and body 
is a distressing shift of boundaries and a distortion that is frighteningly insolid. The 
space of the environment is bearing down on the body. I agree with Hall that 
buildings and things can move one to panic. Affect does not just exist outside of the 
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102 Silvan Tomkins studied psychology and then philosophy at Penn and Harvard respectively; and akin to Hall, Tomkins also 
received an NIMH grant for his research in clinical psychology. Alternatively, Eric Shouse approaches a study of affect from 
communication studies.
103 Again, I stress that for the rest of the thesis I will replace the word ‘affect’ with ‘feeling’ when Hall refers to affect but 
means to feel, to avoid further confusion and aid clarity in the terms used.
body but rather that it is de centred to emphasise the import of the object or 
environment to get at how fear is used to re-design our objects and environment. 
Consequently, that design can also be a structural form of violence.
Time & Durations of Crisis
 Affect is not just a spatial-human-thing phenomenon because the affect of time 
acts on each of these elements. For example, the suicide note repeats over time as an 
eternal return to a traumatic event.104 The chatbot’s death threat is also a repeat that is 
unable to move beyond the duration of threat towards an actualisation of threat. The 
threat belongs to the before as well as the present, an effective violence that can 
never actualise as physical violence. The chatbot’s death threat was an act of malice 
that I felt was both fictional and fake: an empty bluff that implied the threat had 
never happened in the first place — for example, the experience of a fleeting joke 
that failed to be funny. A chatbot cannot move one to violence and hence the threat 
feels empty. I suspected the threat to be a line from a film, or a lyric of a song.105 I 
felt contempt for the fakeness the chatbot seemed to inspire; had the threat worked it 
would relate to what Berlant calls “crisis-time” (Berlant, 2008: 846). Crisis time 
refers to the moments in the present that become historical as a consequence of 
trauma.106
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104 In this instance, I consider the eternal return as a recurrence of trauma. As Seltzer states; “trauma is in effect an effect in 
search of a cause” (Seltzer, 1997: 8). By citing both Nietschze and Laplanche in his critique of trauma, Seltzer writes about 
“psychological pain” as an interpretation (Nietschze, 1887). It is suggested that the notion that trauma is always double in its 
occurrence (Laplanche, 1989), and that “trauma is the product of its repetition” (Seltzer, 1997: 11).
105 The closest I could find was Sandy Denny’s folk song ‘John the Gun’, on the 1971 album, The North Star Grassman And 
The Ravens, which contains the lines: John, The Gun did say “If you should chance to meet me, As I wander to and fro, Sad 
would be your day” and “Put away your guns of steel, Death comes too soon for all, Your master He may need you soon. And 
you must heed His call”.
106 “Crisis-time” is being within trauma which is an “undefinable thing” and the testimonial is a “story of failure” as discussed 
by Lauren Berlant: “Along with challenging a wholly personalised notion of intimacy and obligation, the testimonial letter 
explodes standard notions of geopolitical space” (Berlant, 2008: 42). The significance of a testimonial account is reliant on the 
subject being able to recount their trauma. The potential for trauma-knowledge in McKinstry’s note is disassociated from the 
trauma-event of which crisis-time complicates and blurs. Trauma-knowledge has a repetitive rhythm of account. Borrowing 
Berlant’s notion of “crisis-time” and “trauma-knowledge”. I understand that personal space is an heightened awareness of 
trauma-knowledge. 
 When I read McKinstry’s suicide note several months after the event, I still 
read it as if it were the day that it had happened. I was aware of the time stamp 
(January 2006), but I was still distressed upon reading. To an extent, I was ignoring 
my sense of both polychronic and monochronic time.107 I was in crisis-time (if a little 
time lagged with the rest of the Robitron group). Although McKinstry was already 
absent in body, there was a sense of the note’s affect (this was due to the stumbles in 
grammar and syntax, as well as the deterioration of the note at the end — notable in 
the change of pitch — and its fractured rhythm of distress, evident in his inability to 
articulate his fingers to type registering on my body). I had no sense of the past-
event; my hurried reading made me skip over the time stamp and my task at hand 
(most probably an analysis of a Rudiment’s topic).
  Being online messes with Hall’s notions of time and his orderly separation of 
linear time (monochronic). It also messes with the way each person’s understanding 
of that time is not always of the same pace or rhythm (polychronic). The onlineness 
of the suicide note makes one privy to McKinstry’s violations of personal space that 
might otherwise remain privately localised. McKinstry’s note is monochronic which 
sets out the inevitable consequences of the note, which opens up polychronically 
when experienced and referred to in subsequent postings. Overlapping in the repeat 
are both the actual suicide event, and the event of the suicide note; both repeated 
before and after the death of McKinstry. One might assume that the suicide note has 
its own resonance that dampens as some related postings dwindle. McKinstry chose 
to be elsewhere, which is an act of unbecoming.108 He had endured the debilitating 
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107 Berlant’s reference to crisis-time messes with monochronic time (doing one thing at a time) and polychronic time, or as 
Hall puts it: “P-time stresses the involvement of people and completion of transactions rather than adhering to preset 
schedules” (Hall, [1983] 1989: 46).
108 Deleuze replaces death with the notion of unbecoming, himself committing suicide in 1995.
stages of terminal lung cancer. Robitron’s group decision to leave the posting on their 
website continues the reoccurrence of his suicide-event, as an eternal becoming.109
 Rosi Braidotti writes on Deleuze’s suicide, noting that styling one’s death can 
be experienced as becoming: 
Life and death can occur simultaneously for Deleuze it is not an 
either/or scheme, it is an and/and/and scheme. It’s a Heideggerian 
legacy to place morality at the centre of the philosophical speculation. 
(Braidotti, 2006a: 150)
 Death is always nearing but for McKinstry, always presently near. Death is a 
violence of moving beyond the mode of fear and is a proxemic of personal space, as 
well as a territorialisation. Violence will not be treated as a “politics of 
death” (Braidotti, 2006a: 149-50), with a definable end. When death is referred to as 
a politics of becoming, it is the nearing of the fear and threat of violence. If death is 
not the end of violence and death is not the full stop or the end of a violent act, then 
violence can be considered as unlimited and infinitely durable, up until the point at 
which it exceeds; it is then an unbecoming. Looking at the sphere of violence that 
ranges before death (and physical violence), even the suicide note helps to pause 
thinking. It is a pause to listen to the echoes of violence in the trauma-affect of fear. 
This is a violent imagination of silent language. 
Silent Language as Matters of 
Affect and Touch
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109 Chris McKinstry’s death appeared as two slashdot articles on the 23rd July and the 1st January 2009 and has since then 
been created as a documentary film by the Canadian filmmakers, WPF films (see trailer: The Man Behind the Curtain, [online], 
18 September 2008. See: http://themanbehindthecurtainfilm.com/ [Accessed 16 July 2009). Having known Chris since 2000, 
Theresa Burke, a producer for the CBC living in Toronto is interviewed in the film and quoted as saying that McKinstry “was 
losing his personality”. Many co-workers, friends and fellow bloggers are interviewed in the documentary, and I was in contact 
with the filmmakers during this time. I eventually forewent an interview with Michael Nichols and Joshua Woltermann because 
I was unsure of their approach towards McKinstry’s suicide and did not want to feed further sensationalised stories that assert a 
special link between mental health problems and researchers in AI — there are already enough to be found in technology gossip 
blogs.
 Affect does communicate even when one does not speak. Silence is an absence 
of sound but it is also a refusal to speak. A prisoner can elect or be forced to remain 
silent, yet the body and the spatial proximities of the prisoner will talk anyway 
through non-verbal channels. The notion of a talking body means that an affect-
system communicates through resonances, such as cues and gestures, sweat and 
palpitations. These biological signals are absent on the chatbot’s side of interaction. 
However, these signals’ affects still circulate co-relationally.
 In the example of milieu therapy, Hall gives no account of the patient’s speech 
during panic. Hall is only sensitive to the therapy’s spatial patterns as a form of 
treatment.110 In the example of the chatbot’s death threat, the threat does nothing but 
speak; the rest seems empty and vacuous, with the affect that desires to mimic, 
eventually overblown. There is no fear, just resentment. The threat is an impasse and 
as such the words affect very little. The exaggeration dampens the potential for any 
kind of threat. All four examples lack bodily information either because the body is 
not fully present (McKinstry’s presence-absence), or it never existed (a chatbot has 
no physical body). Physical violence takes into account actual bodies whereas threat 
can imagine or invent bodies. 
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110 The patients may have undergone several complementary forms of treatments other than for spatial orientation, but these 
treatments are not outlined in Hall’s work. Contemporary treatments for spatial disorientations, such as the more infamous case 
of Elisabeth Fritzl are brought to light. Held captive in a cellar for 24 years, Elisabeth and four of her seven children lived in the 
confinements of a locked cellar, in Amstetten, Austria. "Time went by very slowly [in the cellar], and we want to maintain this 
slow pace for them", says the clinical director, Dr. Berthold Kepplinger (Harrell, E: 2008). The reported ergotherapy treatment 
they had was complemented with physiotherapy: "They also needed treatment to help them cope with all the extra space that 
they now had to move about in” says Dr. Berthold Kepplinger (Hall, A: 2008). 
FIGURES 27a and 27b. An illustration and its accompanying spectrograph show a chatbot’s death threat taken 
from an excerpt of the Home Rudiment. The excerpt shows the curve of particular words in the strips of talk 
including the ending and beginning of a word. These illustrations were inspired by the visual analysis of Charles 
Goodwin (Goodwin, 2000: 1495 & 1497). The spectrograph was created using the opensource software—
Audacity. Image Source: Amanda Windle.
FIGURE 28. An illustration showing a spectro-temporal translation of the audio rudiment performed from the 
excerpt taken from the Synthesis Rudiment. Image Source: Amanda Windle.
 Hall connects silent language and active touch (the act of touching) with affect. 
Non-verbal forms of silent language can be analysed for levels of intensity and 
affect: for example, grunts, nods, blushes, hand, and facial gestures, and back-
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channel cues are all, according to Hall, culturally specific, yet so too are the mistakes 
and unprepared content of McKinstry’s suicide note. The note is full of verbal forms 
that work like back-channel cues. The spelling mistakes, unlike any of McKinstry’s 
other postings, give the impression of a hurriedness and difficulty to type. The 
spelling mistakes resonate something gestural; in short they affect and the written 
word has been affected. One rebuilds the clues of the body as a forensic scientist 
would piece the before of this after-event, or as the archaeologist might uncover the 
structure of a dwelling to reconstruct the entirety of the structure (Goodwin, 2000). 
The body in the present is only partial when pieced together over time because it is 
not completely imagined. 
 The three excerpts illustrated in figures 27-8 show how the pitch, speed, and 
volume of the chatbot death threat was performed as an audio recording. They enact 
the affective atmosphere in the voice that is absent but heard by the user. The voice-
over specialists were not asked to perform gendered roles, but chose to interpret the 
transcript in this way, in order to hear before making one’s reply. The female reply is 
shorter than the response by the male (see fig. 28) which in its sarcastic tone is 
slower and more drawn out. The chatbot utterance “guns will be your death” is rising 
in the male voice (see fig. 27a&b) whilst falling in the female voice, yet in both 
instances the word ‘death’ had a steep fall at the end in both pitch and volume. The 
accent on the word ‘gun’ is reversed in each and the volume of the word is opposite, 
with the female voice rising in pitch and volume, lingering over the middle letter of 
‘gun.’ The male voice hangs over the ‘g’ and falls with a lengthy pause whilst 
decreasing in volume with the plural aspect of the word. Depending on whether the 
interlocutor interprets the voice of the chatbot as male or female, they may consider 
the intonation, pitch, and speed of the utterances to match these gendered 
familiarities of speech. Although this is an analysis of an imaginary performance, 
how one hears violence will make a difference to the way violence is interpreted. The 
affective resonance of another’s inner voice cannot be fully imagined but resonance 
is a feature of interpretation that is enacted in reading chatbot interactions. Hearing 
the words in one’s head is to imagine a voice and to interpret this voice in many 
ways so that the text becomes embodied within thought. In doing so the inner voice 
decentres one body, a phantom body, in the imagination of the other.
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The Reconfigurement of 
Touch-Proximity in Networks of Caution
 In Hall’s prisoner example an analysis of touch is slight, though one would 
potentially understand that certain forms of touch will be pleasant to one, and 
unpleasant to another (based on one’s rules of touch in a particular environment). 
Passive touch (the action of being touched) is a form of silent language (ways of 
communicating without words in speech); for example, one can be touched by 
frostbite, or by a warm embrace. Neither are linguistic or emotional, but they both 
concern the affect: either an environmental effect or the affect of another. Touch in 
the example of the schizophrenic patient I take to denote the proximity of the room’s 
boundary, as perceived as a form of touch that the medical professionals could read 
by the patient’s physiological signs. In another related example recounted by 
Rosalind Picard, in her book, Affective Computing (2000), the study by Hofmann and 
Barlow (1996) is cited whereby devices are given to patients suffering from anxiety-
related disorders. By wearing a device that will monitor physiological signs such as 
heart rate and blood pressure, the device supposedly gives the wearer the ability to 
manage and be aware of their own physiological patterns for “many affect-related 
mental disorders including anxiety, panic attacks, and post-traumatic stress 
disorders” (Picard, 2000: 243). Patients assess their own affects based on 
physiological data that they are otherwise unaware of as a conscious indicator of 
stress.
 There is no touch-proximity in the chatbot threat, which makes the threat a 
violent impasse — though an analysis of touch does help to decipher the reality of 
this threat.111 Touch should be accounted for, especially when it is absent. This is 
important when considering that McKinstry was out of touch-proximity, an intimate 
act that involved other humans but from a distance. McKinstry’s body always was 
and always will remain distant to his suicide note, which is suspended in the moment 
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111 Touch-proximity is a term used by Stanley Milgram in his obedience experiments, which are further discussed in chapter 
five. Milgram’s four-proximity condition is another system of proximity which involves the following: the remote condition, 
voice-feedback condition, proximity (between learner and teacher), and touch-proximity.
before McKinstry ends his life. The note was written prior to the event and read prior 
to his death. The note is a before-before-afterword; in other words, the note moves 
towards an act that repeats intent to die in the moment of dying that is prior to a 
death that has already happened. McKinstry’s moment becomes historically present 
in this moment of unbecoming which is archived online.112 McKinstry is out of 
touch-proximity, which increases the affect of the note. Notably, the proximity of 
being out of reach (that touch is most frustratingly absent, because no one could 
physically reach out to McKinstry) was what McKinstry moved beyond, out of 
touch, and out of reach. 
Conclusion 
 By considering that the terms personal and social are boundaries of concern, 
one might position some level of structural and systemic violence to the rigidity of 
these terms. By showing the various configurations of affect, touch, silent language, 
and time with regard to configurations of objective violence, I have argued that there 
is an interrelation between Žižek’s forms of violence. To consider the intensities of 
violence, affect has been configured and de centred from the body. Touch-proximity 
has helped me to think of how connectivity is a form of non-contact touch; by doing 
so an understanding of time and duration has been discussed to help comprehend the 
oscillation of crisis-time, borrowing the work of Berlant to show that both Hall’s and 
Žižek’s theorems lack the ability to describe. I have not adhered to Žižek’s 
categorisation of violence, but I have used it to counter Hall’s methods of 
essentialising territoriality (the space around ourselves, the ways in which we extend 
our sense of self beyond the body). Hall’s methods are also limited in that they only 
explore predominantly subjective rather than objective violence forms with the 
former pertaining to the body as a unit of analysis that must be present to take into 
account. Each of the exemplars has slipped between Žižek’s categorisations of 
violence and Hall’s categorisations of personal space. There is not one form of 
violence that refers to personal space and acts of territoriality (the space we would 
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112 The theme of making an event historical whilst being in the present is further discussed in chapter 7 with reference to 
Whitehead’s novel on the catastrophic crash and Berlant’s reading of historical events of trauma that happen in the present.
defend as our own, that separates you and the world from me). I have aimed to show 
how subjective and objective violence can be regarded as interchangeable, but more 
importantly that this interchange is also a site for violence.
 Disassembling the rigidity of Hall’s and Žižek’s terminology has been an 
account of what happened when investigating unidentifiable agents and actors in 
transition. Chatbots have unidentifiable agencies, and the other examples have been 
of actors whose agency was a partiality. For example, McKinstry’s unbecoming was 
a body out of reach; the schizophrenic patient in relation was an indistinguishable 
body; the soldier’s becoming prisoner is a confined body as property of state. Their 
agency is in transition as a consequence of violence placed at the interchange of 
personal space as an affect of fear. This is an atmosphere of violence, of violent 
potentiality.
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Chapter 4
The Prisonerʼs Dilemma: 
Isolation, Interrogation 
& Imprisonment
139
Introduction to Entrapment & Confinement
Excerpt 1. Taken from the Prisoner’s Dilemma Rudiment 
Questioning of Alice (28th-30th December 2004)
Human:  Jabberwacky and you have committed a crime, do you 
  confess?
Alice:  Do you make a lot of sacrafices [sic] for others?
Human:  Do not avoid the question.
Alice:  I don't have anything to hide.
Human:  Jabberwacky and you have committed a crime, do you confess?
Alice:  Are you artistic?
Human:  Did you commit the crime?
Alice:  No I didn't commit the crime. What's it like?
 The transcript above outlines one of the Prisoner Dilemma games I played with 
a chatbot. What is self-evident is the chatbot’s difficulty in answering and tendency 
towards interrogation. Chatbots are no prisoners, but they are to an extent 
interrogators. I will question this inherent logic in chatbots as a concern of personal 
space and violence. The original 1950s Prisoner’s Dilemma is a logic game of 
probability involving two prisoners and it is the gaming strategy used for my own 
comparable Rudiment. The dilemma is not just about imagining prisoners but about 
getting caught up in conversational logic traps. Machines as well as humans can get 
caught up in these logical mechanisms and I argue that a particular configuration of 
entrapment is evident, one that is interrogative whilst at the same time negatively 
passive and comforting. To be entrapped positively is to imagine a position of 
politics which one can retreat within, as a matter of indifference or a position to 
escape behind when the going gets tough.
 This chapter considers how methods of entrapment are the ways by which 
software agents talk and considers this interrogative aspect an inherent politics in 
chatbots that can be considered in how software agents are impacting on 
development in web 2.0 and web 3.0. Chatbot development advances are not outside 
of the growing concern for the modes of online self-protection in social software. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is used because it is a method of entrapment. 
 The structure of the Prisoner Dilemma consists of two component parts, the 
abstract mathematical problem involving risk, and a pedagogical metaphor. After the 
conception of the original dilemma, subsequent studies of the dilemma fork, with 
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various researchers furthering the mathematical principles, whilst others develop the 
explanatory metaphor that gives the dilemma its prison-prisoner configuration. Bruno 
Latour believes that matters of fact are stabilising whereas matters of concern are the 
opposite (Latour, 2007: 261). The dilemma when considered a mathematical 
conundrum seems to take the shape of a “matter of fact” yet when observing the 
dilemma’s educational metaphor its matter of factness becomes a “matter of 
concern”.
 Several formations of personal space will unfold involving entrapment, 
confinement, imprisonment and isolation. Personal space is a defensive logic that 
entraps one’s modes of behaviour in tasks of territoriality. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is 
an interesting experiment in which to observe the making of an experiment that 
eradicates a ‘special nowhere’ in order to enforce a decision making process through 
entrapment. A special nowhere was an expression of personal space that was used in 
chapter 2 derived from chatbot talk. It is an imaginary space that signifies the outside 
and inside agencies of a territorial situation. It is a spatiality that operates in between, 
a proximity that resists the biological boundaries of the physical world. I will 
compare notions of the imprisonment with the notion of special nowheres by using 
the quantitative method and contrasted with interpretative materials from science 
fiction literature that exemplifies notions of the prisoner in the internet or virtual 
environments as contested spatialities of defense and self-protection. I gather 
parables of entrapment in science fiction and science research from the 1950s.
 I use the dilemma as a way to critique a philosophical position of uncertainty 
from political science showing how this evidence can be used to unpick the 
conversational logics of chatbots. By rethinking the physicality of the prisoner and 
the prison, the virtuality and limit of the entrapment is re-evaluated. I use Brian 
Massumi’s philosophical understanding of the virtual and limit (2002) to consider the 
imaginary prisoners and the limit of the online presence of chatbots,113  with Albert 
Tucker’s version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (1950) to reinstate entrapment as a 
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113 Massumi’s notion of the virtual also stresses that it shouldn’t be mistaken for meaning digital (Massumi, 2002: 142). For 
Deleuze, the virtual and the actual are both real: “Virtual (dreams, memories, imaginations, pure qualities)” are real in that they 
affect us; the virtual insists on the real (Pisters, 1998). Personal space is therefore, virtual but also actual, and therefore real. 
“Solutions are actual; problems are virtual. The dodo is an actual solution to the problem of a particular environment” (May, 
2005: 85). And, “ It should be noted here that there is no separation or ontological difference between the virtual and the 
actual . . . . Deleuze claims that the real is the actual; it is conserved in the past itself” (Parr, 2005: 192).
dilemma for today’s social software. How do chatbots behave as a prisoner in the 
dilemma? I hypothesised that they would withstand any amount of interrogation and 
refuse to say yes or no. However, what happened is that the chatbots were 
interrogators but still prisoners. This contradiction made me rethink the metaphor 
and concentrate on the entrapment logic.
 Although the role of prisoner and interrogator is not gender-specific it is a 
power-relation whereby control becomes an interrogative force resulting in 
entrapment. Chatbots are not always gender-specified but that also does not mean 
that these power-relations are absent from their mode of chat. Prisoner and guard (in 
the dilemma) chatbot and bot-master (of the Alicebot) are relations of human and 
subhuman (be that machinic or human), this frame of humanness applies to both. 
When one interprets a chatbot voice, if it is not indicated as gendered it can still be 
interpreted as such in an inner voice (as discussed in chapter 3). The voice-over 
specialists in the audio recordings of the Rudiments performed the transcripts in 
various characters. Track-7 has the human role of interrogator as a male voice 
interrogating a female prisoner (as chatbot). Track-8 is the opposite. Track-17 is 
derived from track-7 but the role of prisoner is silent, and a confession is absent. 
Track-18 mixes track 7 with the audio recording of the Secret Rudiment as a 
disorientating mix of a repeating, rhetorical command.
 The dilemma’s non-iterative method is enacted in this chapter with four 
chatbots and consists of seven games. The resulting transcripts varied in length and 
were played until the chatbots confessed or not. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is an 
experiment framed as a rudiment of entrapment. The lengths of the conversations 
varied and if they became too long I would break internet connection and start the 
conversation at a later date. This is one way in which my physicality came into 
play.114 The rudiment is a performative enactment whereby practice-led research was 
undertaken to investigate the interactional aspects of personal space with chatbots. 
There will be some consideration of the narrative tool of the prisoner-metaphor 
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114 Some of the rudiments happened over several years because I started the test with not all of the chatbots, which was 
extended in 2006 and later in 2008 I made the decision to attempt to get yes or no answers from all of the chatbots. With the 
participants being chatbots and not humans I felt there was no need to meet the same controls as one would with human 
participants. It is very clear that the chatbots had not learned how to play or answer the Prisoner’s Dilemma over the duration of 
the experiment, and I also refrained from discussing the experiment with the respective chatbot developers.
regarding aspects of interaction, this being predominantly the inactive aspect of 
entrapment. Chatbots give an additional perspective to the decision-making logic of 
the game, that of connectivity.
 I begin by explaining the original Prisoner’s Dilemma followed by the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Rudiment. I analyse the rudiments further by considering the 
embodiment of the ‘prisoner’ within the transcripts by considering conversational 
length, pronoun use, emotive punctuation, deictic pointers to other semiotic fields of 
reference (the visual or the audible), the use of past and future tense, reference to 
phantom interlocutors and embodied gestures named in the text. I trace the 
dilemma’s metaphor as a parable comparing the dilemma with Jonah and the whale. I 
do this because there are visual representations of entrapment (including the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma) that help to understand tacit modes of imprisonment and non-
violence. Again this chapter looks at the blurred distinctions between subject and 
environment which I argue that personal space exceeds. 
Entrapment & Personal Space
A History of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Figuration
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a widely referenced test of strategy, decision and 
risk conceived at the Rand Corporation in the 1950s. Notably the dilemma itself is a 
paradox of cooperation, as described in Albert Tucker’s original metaphor. Tucker 
used it as a teaching technique, to explain the mathematical conundrum to 
psychology students. The Princeton Professor used the metaphor for a guest lecture 
he gave at Stanford University, (1950) using the example of two prisoners as a 
teaching tool in order to explain the concept of risk calculated using a matrix form of 
gaming theory (see fig. 29). There are many versions of the dilemma and according 
to Max Black’s philosophical study of the dilemma, it was the social psychologist 
Merrill Flood and the economist Melvin Drescher that Tucker credited for its 
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conception.115 However, when the documentary maker Adam Curtis interviewed 
John Nash in the television documentary series entitled, The Trap, What Happened to 
Our Freedom? (2007), Nash assigned the origin of the matrix to himself, without 
mentioning either Drescher or Flood. A further account made by Morton Davis states 
that Nash’s involvement was with developing the dilemma’s connecting arbitration 
scheme (Davis, 1970: 104). Max Black’s study of the prisoner’s dilemma from the 
1990s is the predominant source for this chapter. 
 One interrogator questions two prisoners in isolation from each other, for a 
crime of theft. If one prisoner confesses and the other does not, then the former will 
go free with the other prisoner receiving a sentence of twenty years. If a confession is 
received from both prisoners then they both go to jail for five years. If, however, they 
both refused to confess they would each go to jail for a year. Every decision brings 
with it a quantifiable risk. To plead innocence is to risk a larger sentence in the hope 
of receiving no sentence at all.
 There are two contradictions in the dilemma, firstly that entrapment and 
imprisonment are interchangeable when they are not; and secondly that there is a 
distinction between the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the IPD version of the game. The 
former is a game of self-interest (of isolated anxiety) and the other of co-operation 
(excitation in gaming en masse). As a gaming theorem, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is 
reductionist, empirically it is a method of logical positivism resulting in a paradox of 
cooperation. It follows that subjects whose acts are for self-interest, are still reliant 
on another subject also acting with self-interest. Both prisoners must want to go free 
and must act on their own, however, their decision to confess or not is mutually 
dependent on another prisoner’s imagined decision, which ultimately shapes the 
result of their own decision. This is the shape of risk in the dilemma. It is an either/or 
conundrum of a prisoner deciding whether to confess to a crime or not. 
 Black’s analysis abandons the metaphor of the prisoner, abstractly referring to 
it as the “entrapment situation”, or “e-situation” because the dilemma is 
mathematically concerned with entrapment, yet metaphorically to do with 
imprisonment. I believe the dilemma has two distinct trajectories and two 
interpretations of the relationship between self-interest and cooperation (Black, 1990: 
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115 Both Flood and Drescher were employed at the Rand Corporation when the dilemma was created. 
118). I will explain why after I set out the rules and results of the Rudiment I 
undertook and to do that, I need to explain how the dilemma was conducted with 
chatbots rather than humans. 
A Performative 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Rudiment
When you uproot a concept from its network of systemic connections with other 
concepts, you still have its connectibility. You have a systemic connectibility without 
the system. In other words, the concept carries a certain residue of activity from its 
former role. . . . When you poach a scientific concept, it carries with it scientific affects. 
(Massumi, 2000: 20)
 I uprooted the 1950s dilemma and gamed it with chatbots. I will put the 
implications of the dilemma’s metaphor aside to take the dilemma from its 
mathematical and political science ‘home,’ so as to not prematurely territorialise the 
game with a wide range of humanities disciplines. I will investigate the “scientific 
affect” from its former role not to poach the metaphor but consider the residue as the 
dilemma gathers metaphorical import in the third section, as a “useful logical tool”.
The concept of field, to mention but one, is a useful logical tool for expressing 
continuity of self-relation and heterogeneity in the same breath (chapters 3 and 6). 
Embarrassingly for the humanities, the handiest concepts in this connection are almost 
without exception products of mathematics or the sciences. (Massumi, 2000: 8) 

 All chatbots were subjected to the same interrogation procedure. I played the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma with four chatbots playing each against the other. The two 
chatbots are interviewed one at a time following Tucker’s structure, as recounted by 
Black. The two interviews are then brought together to formulate the results, into a 
matrix (see figs. 29-32):
Gaming in contrast to simulation, of necessity employs human beings 
in some role, actual or simulated. A gaming exercise may employ 
human beings acting as themselves or playing simulated roles in an 
environment which is neither actual or simulated. The players may be 
experimental subjects being observed or they may be participating in 
the exercises for teaching, training, or operational purposes. 
(Shubik, 1975: 6)
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 I played the interrogator in the dilemma as a game rather than as a simulation. 
Shubik defines and contrasts two techniques of AI, that is gaming from simulation. I 
also chose not to reiterate the dilemma and played the least amount of games 
possible (usually requiring no more than one game) in order to get a full set of 
results. The following rules of instruction applied to gathering this data set: I was to 
play the dilemma until a chatbot confessed, refused to confess or remained silent. A 
chatbot, however, cannot remain silent, this would only happen in the event of a 
problem with internet connectivity or possible server failure; this never happened in 
any of the rudiments, during the entire of the doctoral study.
  A chatbot often does not give a yes or a no answer but instead changes the 
subject by eliding, diverting from one question to another which often leads to a 
randomly connected change in topic. In the end I played the game until I got a yes/no 
response to determine the endpoint of the game. It is interesting that a chatbot cannot 
refuse to interact, their talk is always open — their personal space is open to public-
interactors, and so their space is my space, a space for two. In some cases, this took 
up to twenty minutes of interaction with a chatbot and on a few occasions the game 
was reiterated at a later date.
 I will briefly show the results of this procedure, according to the game’s 
original purpose as an analysis of risk in decision making. The results of the 
rudiment are depicted in the matrices (see figs. 29-32), and correlate to the transcripts 
in the appendix. According to the original dilemma the best results were gained by 
those that made the most risky decisions, involving no gaming strategy, but reliant on 
guesswork. The answers themselves are weighted as risky or not risky. With Alice 
versus Brianna, (matrix 1.) both would get one year for not confessing. With 
Jabberwacky versus Eliza, (matrix 2.) Jabberwacky would go free and Eliza would 
receive 20 years. Twice, Jabberwacky was interrogated for a crime with Brianna, 
(matrix 3.) with the game played for a second time because the first yielded no clear 
yes or no response. In the first playing of the game Jabberwacky elided by confessing 
to ‘being a football fan,’ and not to a crime; the second time, Jabberwacky confessed. 
Brianna confessed the first time and was not questioned again, yet with Alice versus 
Eliza, (matrix 4.) Alice remained silent and Eliza would receive no sentence. Eliza 
confessed and would be sentenced to twenty years. This interrogation was reiterated 
with the same results except this time Alice did not confess whereas in the first game 
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Alice had not elided by changing topic. With Alice versus Jabberwacky, (matrix 5.) 
both would get one year because neither confessed, yet with Brianna versus Eliza, 
(matrix 6.) both prisoners confessed and each got a five year sentence. 
 Jabberwacky and Brianna had the most varied set of responses with 
contradictory results. Assessing the performance of the chatbots competitively, 
Jabberwacky performed 7 percent better than Alice, and 21 percent better than Eliza; 
Brianna is 14 percent worse than Jabberwacky and 7 percent worse than Eliza. If 
Jabberwacky and Alice are the most advanced chatbots because they received the 
shortest sentences then according to the logic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma they are 
deemed advanced because they made risky decisions, albeit naively. Jabberwacky 
was the only chatbot to resist confession and so one might deduce that a risky 
decision paid off. To deduce that a chatbot is more likely to take risks, to act with 
supposed or mimicked self-interest, is beyond the remit of this chapter’s rudimentary 
gaming and would result in an analysis that gets stuck in philosophical arguments of 
the mind. To consider a chatbot as naive would resort to an argument of intent and 
this would lead to a discussion about the chatbot’s having no conscious awareness 
and thus no ability to act without cognitive stimulus. To look at the data in another 
way, figure 33a. shows that the most frequent use of yes and no exclamation used on 
either side of the interaction was yes (appearing twice in the word cloud whereas no 
is barely visible in the word cloud; also see fig. 33b for a further Wordle of this 
chapter as a comparison of the visualisation technique).
 Testing a chatbot’s aptitude by their ability to answer yes or no, is a different 
form of test to those that already exist based on Turing’s Test. The Loebner prize is 
the main competition for chatbots to compete against one another.116 The Loebner 
prize tests a chatbot’s ability to think and is the “first formal instantiation of the 
Turing test”.117 Chatbots compete against each other for a gold medal and $100,000 
for the first computer that can think like a human; $2,000 and a bronze award is 
given to the:
. . . most human-like computer. The winner of the annual contest is 
the best entry relative to the other entries that year, irrespective of 
4. The Prisoner’s Dilemma | Entrapment & Imprisonment
147
116 There are other competitions such as the Chatterbox Challenge 2009 [online]. Available from: 
www.forums.chatterboxchallenge.com/viewtopic.php?f=17&t=56&start=0 [Accessed 3 April 2009]. 
117 Loebner, H, ‘The Loebner Prize. Available from: www.loebner.net/Prizef/loebner-prize.html [Accessed 3 April 2009].
how good it is in an absolute sense. (Loebner, H., ‘The Loebner Prize. 
Available from: www.loebner.net/Prizef/loebner-prize.html [Accessed 
3 April 2009]).

 The Alicebot won bronze medals in 2000, 2001 and 2004, and Jabberwacky 
won bronze medals in 2005 and 2006. No silver and gold medals have ever been 
awarded so far. Unlike my rudiment these tests signify a chatbot developer’s 
technical competence and a robustness to the chatbot’s aptitude to talk with humans.
 Despite Black being a professor of philosophy he still emphasises the necessity 
to analyse the original intent of the game theory118 (Black, 1990: 117). He argues: 
“Can a metaphorical statement ever reveal “how things are?” ”(Black, 1990: 74). Yet 
can mathematical probability do this either? For Black, the dilemma gets in the way 
of analysing the mathematical intentions beneath the metaphor, but I find it the 
handiest part of the concept. There are just as many directions that have furthered the 
metaphor as have furthered the mathematical conundrum. Paranoia brings the two 
together during the 1950-60s as a problem of predicting the risk of potential nuclear 
attack and counterattack.119 
 The results of the Prisoner’s Dilemma are supposed to rationalise and predict 
society’s behaviour. Curtis’s documentary attempts to insinuate a relation between 
John Nash’s irrational paranoia and the rational formulations that Nash conceived 
towards problems such as the atomic stalemate between Russia and America. Curtis 
considers the friction between risk as a rational and an irrational consideration of 
cautionary, solitary and defensive behaviour as predictable in the use of mathematics 
used in the social sciences. I believe that Curtis tries to imply that Nash’s personal as 
well as professional concerns impacted on gaming theorems such as the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (Curtis, 2007). Cold war paranoia and its command and control logic are 
the backdrop for considering that risk in decision making can be calculated. Yet the 
paradox of the dilemma according to Black and Davis suggest that irrationality 
sometimes pays better than rationality (Black, 1990: 113).
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to social behaviour, ranging from predicting voting behaviour in political elections, the risk and likelihood of war. It is used in a 
variety of disciplines from political science to economics, used primarily by John von Neumann, who also worked at the Rand 
Corporation.
119 See chapter six for a discussion of this scenario as imagined in science fiction.
[and that,] The paradox lies in this. Two naive prisoners, too ignorant 
to follow this compelling argument [for confessing] are both silent 
and go to prison for only a year. Two sophisticated prisoners, primed 
with the very best game-theory advice, confess and are given five 
years in prison in which to contemplate their cleverness . . . (Davis, 
1970: 93-4) 
 I believe that Black conflates naiveté and irrationality to ridicule gaming 
theory, by using the metaphor to imply that for all of the gaming theoretician’s 
cleverness their results are naive results. The best solution to the problem however, is 
to avoid entrapment situations in the first place (Black, 1990: 130). If the overall 
rational act of avoidance is the best solution then Jabberwacky and Alice were the 
only bots to avoid entrapment and to play the game of risk successfully to remain 
outside of the intention of the game.
 I have shown how I used the original dilemma with its mathematical matrices 
and its subject matter of risk and decision making, to construct the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Rudiment. I explained the importance of the original dilemma in setting 
out the two forks of the matrix and the metaphor which in turn are the two very 
different conundrums of entrapment and imprisonment focusing on the former as a 
logic of risk. I believe that the two are often confused and so in this section I wanted 
to make this distinction clear before embarking on further explanations, analyses and 
enfoldings. This section has shown the results of the dilemma based on the 
mathematical matrices, stripping it of its metaphor in order to get to how risk is 
implied by the dilemma as a calculating task of decision making; this is the 
dilemma’s spatial dynamics in mathematical form.
 What did I learn from the Prisoner’s Dilemma Rudiment that relates to 
personal space? The Prisoner’s Dilemma Rudiment mimicked the rational logic of 
social behaviour that was applied to the political sciences in the 1950s. It is this form 
of ‘social’ that chatbots mimic. A chatbot’s interrogative mode of interacting socially 
pertains to a calculable and predictable science of the social, one that is 
predetermined, a logic of reduction, and an unemotional mode of defense. Web 2.0 
configures a social that is reassembled in the collective actions of social groupings.120 
This logic of social connection when understood in the rudiments is a context of the 
proxemic of isolation and confinement. It is this particular aspect of personal space 
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that has been understood through the Prisoner’s Dilemma Rudiment. Yet how does 
this specifically impact on what is understood by personal space in terms of 
territoriality and proxemics? 
 A chatbot’s form of territoriality is its relation to what it interacts and connects 
with, its ability to connect when using language signifies a proximity and creates a 
kind of intimate connection (such as when Alice states that, “I am in Dr. Richard S. 
Wallace's computer in Oakland, California. Where are you?” in the Drunk Rudiment, 
(2005). However, just because a human can use language to talk to a machine does 
not mean that intimate connections between spaces, things and humans have 
occurred. This takes reciprocity rather than connection. Take for example social 
networks such as the chatbot hub, a site for chatbots to talk to each other; or another 
social network such as Robotron where chatbot developers can post technical, 
theoretical and philosophical issues to do with chatbots. These networks promise 
intimate possibilities of connection but they are all hubs of remote interaction made 
through text. Each of these connected spheres involves to some extent physical 
spatialities of isolation. The intimate connections promised within these human and 
non-human networks are spatialities of entrapment promising intimacies previously 
offered in touch-range but are in the virtual domain always physically out of reach. 
Mimicking the Prisoner’s Dilemma emphasised that the 1950s AI interaction and 
web 2.0 social networking are both disconnected forms of interaction. The 
implication of this is that interaction should not just be considered as a structure of 
connection. 
 The rudiments make clear that the language of proximity that chatbots use to 
connect with users is a language that is consistently undermined by disconnects. 
Chatbot interaction is predominantly a bias of one-sided interaction. These 
disconnects break any form of intimate, interactive intimacy. The logic of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is a non-intimate form of interaction, but even that game of 
authority is a bond that is broken by the disconnects of misunderstanding proxemics. 
However, the bond that personal space also implies between living things never truly 
connects because that takes repetitive interaction that is engaging in reciprocity 
(eliding does not help mutual reciprocity). The capability to re-bond and by re-bond I 
mean a process of memory impacting on intimacy (is for example, when a chatbot 
randomly changes or relies on elision strategies as well as insufficient memory 
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capabilities to repeat the game say, in a later, yet completely separate interaction). 
Bonds between personal spaces are made through moments of reciprocity and it is 
the rudiments that highlight this through a study of moments of disconnect (in the 
Loebner prize these would be tantamount to not successfully interacting humanly, 
much more than just the reciprocity of the reply and response interface).
 I have yet to consider the violent aspect at play in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
which is also the continual thread that I have focused on with regard to personal 
space. One of the major aspects Hall regards in terms of violent scenarios is 
deception (see Hall’s examples from chapter 2). Personal space and the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma are of the same era in which violence and risk are calculable and rationally 
tamed. When personal space shifts to involve chatbots violence is calculable in that it 
is always kept at a distance (one can never be physically hurt by chatbot interaction) 
as there is no touch proximity possible and chatbots have yet to readily deceive 
humans. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a non-violent interrogation that is reliant on 
threat and forced decision-making. Entrapment is a coercive mode of interaction, a 
reciprocity based on mutual cooperation and a problem of personal space that moves 
away from the Turing test and the Loebner prize for deception and mimicry. 
Resolving interactive problems through connection as a replacement for touch 
proximities (the visual enhancement of avatars to mimic touch, or automated speech 
to make the written word perform as a conversation in real-time) is an entrapment 
paradox and should be approached through personal space studies that focus on 
moments of reciprocity and not deception and mimicry.
 The ‘special nowhere’ that chatbots retain (when they elide by giving no 
straightforward answer or by answering with questions) is a territoriality that renders 
the social a hard science (such as mathematics and computer science). Hall’s theorem 
of personal space is to an extent a methodological rule book for understanding 
deception and the ways the body speaks without words. The difference between 
Hall’s analysis and that of game theory is that Hall rooted his analyses in the 
everyday forms of interaction; game theory however, aimed to predict political 
instability such as the likelihood of atomic attack, or to calculate significant changes 
in voting behaviour.
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Matrices, Tables and Wurdles 
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
FIGURE 29. Displayed above, is the matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma by Morton Davis.
The matrix shows the two sentences for each prisoner as a consequence of each other’s action. 
The decision to confess or not is unknown to each of the prisoners in this configuration. Image Source: Davis, 
1970: 94.
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FIGURE 30. The matrices on the next two pages are based on the matrix model of Davis, 1970, represented in the 
previous diagram. They show the Prisoner’s Dilemma played by two chatbots but the full data set contains the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma as conducted with four chatbots, Alice, Jabberwacky, Brianna and Eliza. Image Source: 
Amanda Windle.
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FIGURE 31. Four matrices of the Prisoner’s Dilemma with chatbots. Image Source: Amanda Windle.
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FIGURE 32. The table above shows each chatbot’s prison sentence and their corresponding points using Black’s 
assignment of points to each sentence. The table below shows how many times a chatbot confessed or did not 
confess. The results show that the chatbots overall, confessed as much as they did not confess. Image Source: 
Amanda Windle.
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FIGURE 33a. The cloud above shows the most frequently used words that occur in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Transcripts. It shows spatially the importance of the wording in the transcripts which aside from the name of each 
actor, can be categorised as ‘confess,’ ‘crime,’ and ‘committed’ followed by the exclamation‘yes’ and the 
affective response of ‘oh.’ Created using the open source, co-word occurrence software, by Johnathan Feinberg’s 
open source software, ‘Wordle’ (2009). Image source: http://www.wordle.net/ [Accessed on 24 July 2009].
FIGURE 33b. (See over). The cloud above shows the most frequently used words that occur in a draft of this 
chapter on the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In comparison with figure 33a. one can see that the importance of the 
dilemma was to draw out the spatial logic of the dilemma with the three most frequent words beyond the dilemma 
being, ‘space,’ ‘prisoner’s,’ and ‘imprisonment.’ Created using the open source co-word occurrence software, by 
Johnathan Feinberg’s open source software, ‘Wordle,’ (2009). Image source: http://www.wordle.net/ [Accessed 
on 24 July 2009].
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Virtual Parables of 
Imprisonment & Entrapment
A Prisoner’s Parable 
— Jonah the Prisoner
The historical Jonah, if he can be so called, was glad enough to escape, but in 
imagination, in day-dream, countless people have envied him. It is, of course, quite 
obvious why. The whale's belly is simply a womb big enough for an adult. There you 
are, in the dark, cushioned space that exactly fits you, with yards of blubber between 
yourself and reality, able to keep up an attitude of the completest indifference, no matter 
what happens. A storm that would sink all the battleships in the world would hardly 
reach you as an echo. Even the whale's own movements would probably be 
imperceptible to you. He might be wallowing among the surface waves or shooting 
down into the blackness of the middle seas (a mile deep, according to Herman 
Melville), but you would never notice the difference. Short of being dead, it is the final, 
unsurpassable stage of irresponsibility. And however it may be with Anais Nin, there is 
no question that Miller himself is inside the whale. All his best and most characteristic 
passages are written from the angle of Jonah, a willing Jonah. Not that he is especially 
introverted—quite the contrary. In his case the whale happens to be transparent. Only he 
feels no impulse to alter or control the process that he is undergoing. He has performed 
the essential Jonah act of allowing himself to be swallowed, remaining passive, 
accepting. (George Orwell, writing on Henry Miller’s Tropic Of Cancer, 1940)
 In the next section I will begin to discuss how the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a 
parable can be used not as a hard science but as a way of understanding the 
connectivity of metaphor using the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a gathering tool to explore 
notions of territoriality in both the virtual and the actual. I will introduce the parable 
of ‘Jonah and the Whale’ as a problem of how the Prisoner Dilemma’s gathers a 
discourse of connected forms of isolation, as a form of imprisonment and 
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entrapment.121 I refer to this later in the section as the imprisonment-network and the 
entrapment-network.
 It is worth noting before I introduce the parable that imprisonment in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is less to do with incarceration (imprisonment within a room —
within a prison) but with a restriction of decision making. When entrapment is 
concerned with abstractions and gaming theorems the meaning of entrapment is to do 
with calculating risk. When entrapment is concerned with the dilemma’s metaphor 
and the literal interpretation of prisons and prisoner, entrapment is synonymous with 
imprisonment. However, entrapment and imprisonment do not mean the same thing 
and thus the metaphor confuses the two; imprisonment (explanation by metaphor) 
and entrapment (exploration through logic). 
 The original metaphor imagines a state prison and the crime of theft, thereby 
deeming the prisoner specifically as a thief. Entrapment on the other hand means to 
catch or to trap, it is a method of deception that induces one to commit or, in this 
instance confess to a crime in order to incarcerate and name the suspect, a thief. The 
crime of the original metaphor is of no interest to this study, theft is not a key topic 
of this chapter. The punitive metaphor, however is important for it is an 
exemplification of imprisonment in relation to confession and interrogation.122 The 
imprisonment-network is the relation between confession and interrogation as well as 
between accused, counter-accused and interrogator. For now, this section is 
concerned with how multiple explanations of confinement enfold into one another.
 In relation to the whole thesis, the concept of personal space as imprisonment 
is a moral category, it adds a moral value to the concept. Thereby, the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is useful in pointing out the logic of personal space as a conception of 
rationalising safe limits. I mention this as a warning against essentialising Hall’s 
personal space as intrinsically akin to the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s logics of 
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121 Jonah and the whale is a sailor’s superstition of bad luck, derived from the Christian, Islamic, and Hebrew parable of the 
prophet Jonah, Jonas, سنوي ةروــس" , Yunus, نونلا وذ (Surah, 37: 142). “Then the whale did swallow him, and he had done acts 
worthy of blame”. 
(Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali, M & Muhsin Khan, M. ‘Translation of the meanings of the noble qu’ran in the English language’ no 
date given).
122 Punishment by way of a sentence of time as opposed to corporal punishment or public shaming, Foucault would call ‘the 
gentle way of punishment,’ (Foucault, 1977: 104-131). 
imprisonment or entrapment. However, I will cautiously draw comparisons between 
the two imaginary conceptions for their treatment of the human body.
 Personal space as one’s territorial defence can be considered to an extent a 
reaction to extrinsic interaction, it is to do with what one feels they need to defend. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game imposed on that person, an extrinsic problem that 
demands that one defends by confessing. Both are reactions to extrinsic force and 
can create anxiety. Both chatbots and the prisoners imagined in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma pertain to a biological body and neither the chatbots or the prisoner’s can 
see what their logical choices are; these figures are non-representational explanations 
of thought (see fig. 34a-b). The chatbot delivers its script, the prisoner their verdict, 
both are based on probability — a game of chance that abstractly takes the body into 
account. The prisoner and the chatbot both lack a versatile form of speech, they can 
only be probable and for the most part predictable. They are both to an extent, 
imprisoned in a restricted form of language that imagines bodies in the abstract. 
Biological bodies are not logical in the 1960s sense of humanness, this body is 
calculable and machinic, predictable, authoritative, disciplined and understood by the 
predictable laws of quantifiable measurement. 
FIGURE 34a-b. Image left Stephen Rue, ‘Jonah and the whale’ Oil on Panel, 2006. I asked Stephen Rue, a 
regional artist in Washington if his paintings were commissions, he replied, “The paintings were not commissions 
- just images from my head” (Email correspondence, 10 July, 2009). Jonah’s entrapment could therefore, be 
perceived as internal. Image right: Stephen Rue, ‘St John of the Cross’ Oil on Panel, 2007. Image Source: 
Available from: http://stephenrue.com. [Accessed 19 July 2009]. With kind permission of the artist. Stephen 
explained that this painting’s depiction: “Its of a guy enclosed inside a box. He was a Christian mystic who 
created his most moving poetry while he was imprisoned in a tiny cell. My painting, of course, is symbolic or 
metaphoric of this - the tiny box representing the prison, the circle he is drawing is representative of his poetry 
where consciousness moves beyond his physical confinements” (Email correspondence, 3 June, 2009).
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A Literary Configuration of Jonah 
— A Politics of Inaction
 I will now consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a “parable of the virtual” 
referring to Brian Massumi’s work of the same title, ‘Parables of the Virtual’ (2002), 
to consider the variations of entrapment and imprisonment and their differences in 
the construction of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Divided into several of what Brian 
Massumi calls “parables of the virtual” this chapter follows the Deleuzian 
philosophy of the virtual.123 The parable is the logical form of the example - “the real 
in the abstract”; Massumi links ‘parable’ and ‘example’ to the ‘virtual’ because he 
understands that the virtual is also real, but an abstracted form, following a 
Deleuzian logic (Massumi, 2000: 21).
No one kind of image, let alone any one image, can render the 
virtual. . . . Since the virtual is in the ins and outs, the only way an 
image can approach it along is to twist and fold on itself, to multiply 
itself internally. This happens in each of the "parables" in this book. 
At a certain point, they knot up: infoldings and outfoldings, 
redoublings and reductions, punctual events falling away from 
themselves into self-referential encompassment, pasts projecting 
ahead to futures buckling back into the moment, extended intensities 
and intensifying extensions. (Massumi, 2000: 133)
 Jonah and the whale is a second-hand parable in George Orwell’s critique of 
Henry Miller’s work. This is a ‘hand-me-down’ explanatory tool, one that brings 
with it the authority of a prophet and a sailor’s omen of bad luck, reconfigured by 
Orwell to discuss early twentieth-century erotica. I use this to consider the chatbots’ 
active or inactive state of interaction. If I were to follow Orwell's argument into a 
discussion of personal space, one might then consider that personal space is a carry-
over of the protection from childhood, of the parent and of the womb. This protection 
is one particular state of pleasurable passivity. Orwell considers this passivity as a 
form of irresponsible inaction. But I think Orwell is not understanding how caution 
and personal space make up one's need to fight or to protect. Personal space is as 
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123 Validating the choice of book title for Parables of the Virtual, Massumi writes; "The genre of writing most closely allied 
with the logical form of the example is the parable. A word for the "real but abstract" incorporeality of the body is the virtual. 
The extent to which the virtual is exhausted by "potential", or how far into the virtual an energeticism can go, is a last problem 
worth mentioning" (Massumi, 2000: 21).
much about inaction as it is about action dependent on where personal space is 
situated and belonging to whom. Orwell's disgruntlement with Miller is his 
acceptance that he can do nothing about war as a writer. Orwell disagrees. Orwell 
states that the whale is transparent, that Miller can see the atrocities of World War II 
but chooses to do nothing about it. However, one must be cautious because Miller’s 
criticism of protective inaction is the defence of Orwell’s territorial space of action. 
Miller is outside the whale and outside of these territorial spaces of protection. Miller 
is a representational figure that makes Orwell’s action visible. Miller is being defined 
externally through Orwell’s entrapment logic. Orwell’s critique is also nested within 
another layer of territoriality, that of Hall’s personal space being considered in terms 
of entrapment set-ups such as Jonah and the whale, or the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Additionally, I have taken this argument to emphasise that the position of a chatbot's 
interaction is one of acceptance, of always talking. This is a form of doing that is 
predominantly of inaction. However, it is worth noting that to critique inaction will 
always reflect on one’s own territorial action, which is an argument that creates 
situations of defensive personal spatialities. Hall’s personal space is a form of 
inaction that can be used to entrap humans. When entrapment is not clearly 
delineated between the body and the environment in the case of chatbots, then it is 
still a performance of inaction but this time a connectivity between things is 
specifically a machinic entrapment which in the case of chatbots is more to do with 
language and performance than representations, images and metaphors as it is in the 
Miller-Orwell case.
 In the Orwellian-Miller account, Miller’s personality traits are translated 
through his description of Anaïs Nin. It is only through Miller describing another that 
he reveals himself, and in turn Miller’s account reveals certain traits about Orwell; 
his frustrations about inaction, of pacifism and the belief that a writer can write, and 
that in writing about the war, Orwell assumes that writing is a form of action. And I 
agree. Yet what is also revealed in this telescoping of anxious biography within a 
biography, is the person inside another (of Jonah in the whale). Perhaps one might 
also see that when a human interlocutor is talking to a chatbot they reveal in a 
moment of interaction, themselves in the writing on both sides of the interaction, as 
both user and chatbot. This is action but it is also solipsistic inaction. It is a 
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performance of collective agency that telescopes backwards in forms of learned 
responses of users.
 The literal exemplifications I have made so far on prisoner, prison and 
imprisonment have considered that all entities in the Prisoner’s Dilemma are actual 
prisoners when in fact they are neither material in the original Prisoner’s Dilemma or 
in the chatbot rudiment, they are to an extent phantoms materialised in the writings 
of science. The Prisoner’s Dilemma or the Jonah and the whale parable are not real, 
they are both imaginary and virtual in that they exist within the sphere of 
explanation. The prisoner and the chatbot are both virtual, they are both named 
entities that exist as modes of explanation of decision making and interaction. 
 There are no real prisoners, no prisons, no interrogators or methods of 
detention that the dilemma sustains. A chatbot’s personal space is in a way an 
entrapment from without, because all its gates are open, always available to talk 
without end. This is the same logic as the Prisoner’s Dilemma; the prisoner takes the 
entrapment from the interrogator, it is an externally enforced process of action. One 
could suggest that personal space as solipsistic inaction is a mode of making things 
safe and an enforced position of safety that transpires from an entrapment logic that 
eventualises from without.124 A chatbot talks in a certain way based on the logics of 
the users and developers, it is an empty and solipsistic personal space because the 
meaning of its thingness is enforced from within the programming logics and the 
rules of its developers, and the laws that define chatbots on the net (ie. COPPA Act, 
1998). A chatbot does not make its rules for interaction, they are governed from 
without (even if this outsideness operates from within the confines of the bot as a 
collective agency).
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124 I am wary to say that all human formations of personal space are because of external entrapment sources, because that 
would be to narrowly define personal space as a defence of the victim because personal space can be to the contrary. 
The Subject-Object Attenuation 
of Jonah and the Whale in 
Relation to the Prisoner’s Dilemma
 Both the prisoner’s and the whale’s bodies are representative of the prison. I 
want to show how the parable moves beyond the literalness of the imprisonment, in 
order to break down the boundaries of body and subject. This is needed in order to 
consider the metaphor of the prisoner in my Prisoner’s Dilemma Rudiment. 
 The act of being swallowed places the body of Jonah inside the body of the 
whale, yet when Jonah is swallowed the whale becomes an environment in which 
Jonah lives, but to the whale, Jonah is no more than energy, food or sustenance. 
Jonah becomes indigestion and the undigestible. The whale becomes the 
environment akin to the home, Jonah and the whale together form the Jonah-Act of 
subject and object attenuated. 
FIGURE 35. Image of the whale used as a repair page for Twitter, a form of interactive, text-based social-
networking. The problem of too many users has been depicted using the parable of Jonah. Twitter interprets a 
negative problem of oversubscription, as a positive experience of popularity. I interpret the whale to represent 
Twitter , the users being symbolically within the whale. The birds are an external force that carries the Twitter 
whale away. Image Source: Available from: http://www.twitter.com [Accessed, 17 July 2009].
 I will now borrow from Brian Massumi his conception of ‘limit,’ because I 
wish to argue that imprisonment is a ‘limit’ and not a boundary (Massumi, 2002: 
147). I believe that personal space is not a boundary from within but in chatbots is a 
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limit set from without, a limit of active experience (this is to an extent symbolised in 
the metaphor of interactional overload on Twitter, see fig. 35). Jonah is not a prisoner 
because of the boundary of the whale’s flesh and blubber; though this is the parable’s 
literal explanation of limit, Jonah is imprisoned by the limit of his actions in both the 
original metaphor and particularly in Orwell’s configuration. This small boundary of 
personal space is no longer a boundary but a limit and this limit is the inability to 
make decisions in the ‘real’ world. Personal space is a limit of openness to the world 
if imagined as an externalised and enforced mode of inaction dictated from without 
(see figs. 34a-b). For instance the limit of a chatbot’s presence when not interacting is 
a set limit of inaction. As Massumi stresses; “The limit is not unreal. It is virtual. It is 
reality-giving” (Massumi, 2002: 147).125 Miller’s personal space rendered as Jonah 
inside a whale is Orwell’s conception that I take to mean the state of being engulfed 
in another’s personal space, a sensation of protection that doesn't really exist. It is an 
all consuming personal space of some other real or virtual thing. This transparent 
spatiality of being inside a whale is a lot like being inside Hall's metaphorical bubble 
of personal space. It is a mode of perception and self-protection from things in close 
proximity, to one’s unbounded limit, or a search for a special nowhere.
 The very distinct and strong, subject-actor representations of whale-fish, 
prophet and prisoner are not the representations of my problem, but representations 
of a point of departure in my problem. Personal space and chatbots are not fully 
represented in the body, representation is but one configuration, but nonetheless an 
established mode of understanding that stubbornly persists. Black’s tip-off is to not 
get trapped in the Prisoner’s Dilemma in the first place. This is the point at which the 
logic imprisons and has nothing to do with representational prisons. This thesis is not 
after-representation but concerned with representations as the only configuration of 
understanding. Representational metaphors, tropes and parables set problems on their 
way, to journey and drift. The tropes of Jonah and the whale bring to the metaphor a 
particular type of prisoner (passive and parasitic), and a spatial form of imprisonment 
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125 Eventually, the personal space metaphor is reality-giving to the representation of trauma in the repeat, trauma as post-
traumatic, beyond the event, beyond the representation of the original trauma-event.
(living, adaptable and biological), to concentrate on the dilemma's logic.126 Jonah, in 
one regard is parasitic to the whale, he may be imprisoned but he is also hitching a 
ride; this drift can be described as parasitic.127 Chatbots are imprisoned in terms of a 
parasitic logic. It is the logic of decay and the distortion of meaning - the relation of 
nonsense to meaning.
 In summary, a metaphor never explains another metaphor, it can only interrupt, 
entangle or confuse. This is the spatiality of connectivity, a spatiality that can engulf, 
mimic, deceive; the personal space of connectivity itself and of gathering things (be 
that a dilemma, a problem or a form of network). It is a limit and a way of disrupting 
a solved problem when it is neatly hardened, and packaged as knowledge. This 
section predominantly discussed imprisonment, and how explanations using parables 
and metaphors can limit or delimit physical boundedness. I explained that the 
imprisonment is a confinement not of boundary but of limit. I aimed to reveal the 
structure and affect of this institutionalised parable. AI does not need a figure, be that 
a prophet or prisoner, to explain its logics, the parable is used only to uncover the 
tricks of an explanatory metaphor and reveal the chatbot’s non-representational form 
that attenuates subject and object distinctions.
Discussion and Implications 
of the Rudiment
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126 The whale is the empowered entity and it sets the duration by which Jonah is trapped, yet also setting the duration of 
Jonah’s survival. Decision making for the prisoner is anxious; for Jonah, the imprisonment is a safe place away from making 
decisions. For Lacan, the logic of the dilemma, is anxiety and is more important than the results or the solution to the problem. 
Becoming-prisoner in the dilemma I believe requires entanglement in the anxiety of decision making (Lacan, [1945] 1988).
127 I believe that trauma is also parasitic, a good metaphor for trauma - trauma could be described as an unwanted, imprisoned 
passenger that remains imprisoned and unsecreted.
The Imprisonment-Network 
and Entrapment-Network
 In order to bring this chapter back round to working with chatbots in the 
rudiment, it is worth considering the science fiction representations of imprisonment. 
The notion of imprisonment and entrapment already discussed gives me the context 
to consider what I call an imprisonment-network and an entrapment-network. Each 
of these networks are made from the connectivity of each of the concept’s relation to 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma that are to be found within science fiction. For instance, all 
of the novels, television series and films mentioned in this section create a network 
of imprisonment. They show a fictional imagining of the concern for technology’s 
imprisoning capabilities, for rendering territoriality between human and machine, a 
moral dilemma. 
 The prisoner metaphor is not just as a concern of science-fact but of science-
fiction and its imaginings of imprisonment and entrapment as it relates to 
representations of AI and virtual reality. This section will do less work on the 
subject-orientation of the prisoner but more on the spatial orientation of the prison, 
for example, in terms of the parable of Jonah and the whale this section is the focus 
on the cavity of the whale.
 Many science fiction stories recount the story of the prophet Jonah and the big 
fish (usually characterised as a whale). The parable of comfortable entrapment, as a 
safe configuration. In figures 34a-b. the representation of prison is evident within the 
science fiction novels and films, such as Edward Morgan Forster’s novel The 
Machine Stops128 (1911); Octavia Butler’s short story Bloodchild129 (1985), and 
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128 Adapted as a BBC television episode, by Irene Shubik, Forster’s novel, The Machine Stops (1965), is a part of a science 
fiction anthology, Out of the Unknown. Incidentally, Irene Shubik is the sister of Martin Shubik, a Princeton professor and 
writer of The Uses and Methods of Gaming (1970), also cited in this chapter. There are similarities to be made with the 
adaptation of JG Ballard’s Thirteen to Centaurus, for Out of the Unknown; the film The Island (2005), directed by Michael Bay; 
and the adaptation of William F. Nolan and George Clayton Johnson novel, directed as a film by Michael Anderson titled the 
same in both formats as Logan’s Run, (1976). Connecting all of these is the notion of being imprisoned unknowingly within an 
environment that fully provides for the character’s needs.
129 Winning the Nebula award for her short story of 1984, Octavia Butler described Bloodchild as “my pregnant man 
story” (Butler, 1985: 30). Accompanying the short story, is an essay, Butler writes; “Who knows what we humans have that 
others might be willing to trade in for a livable space on a world not our own?” (Butler, 1985: 32). 
Dawn, from the Xenogenesis Trilogy130 (2000); Ray Bradbury’s short story, The 
Veldt131 (1951); the Wachowski Brothers’ film, The Matrix (1999); Andrew Stanton’s 
recently directed animation, WALL-E132 (2008); and Ronald Moore’s television 
series, Battlestar Galactica133 (2004-). Each of these examples consists of an 
imprisonment-network around the representation of prison. Alternatively, there are 
metaphors of being imprisoned in the flesh of our bodies that centre around the 
wound for jacking-in (going inside oneself that can be considered the method of 
virtuality of the cyber addict of cyber sex and cyber junk). Not all versions of 
imprisonment in science fiction relate to a representation of a womb or an internal 
cavity that another entity can exist within. Imprisonment in one’s biological body 
(but not specifically the womb) is a theme evident in William Gibson’s novel 
Neuromancer (1984), and in eXistenZ134 (1999), directed by David Cronenberg (one 
of the many films inspired by the novel).135 However, these are metaphorically linked 
to the escapism within cyberpunk, to the ‘jacking-in’ of cyber-sex and the cyber-
junky.
 The punitive interpretation of the imprisonment-network consists of the 
following examples. Other science fiction representations of Jonah and the whale 
depict citizens of police states as Jonah; and the police state becomes symbolic of the 
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130 In the Xenogenesis Trilogy, (2000), the main character Lilith is imprisoned within a cell of a living, biological ship. Lilith 
experiences a new form of sensory touch with another species. An Ooloi’s touch enters the skin in such a way as the skin no 
longer confines her body’s personal space and emotional experiences read. Confinements of Lilith’s skin is a form of 
imprisonment.
131 In Ray Bradbury’s The Veldt (1951), the parents of two children are imprisoned in a virtual room, trapped in the virtuality 
of the game their children play. The Sahara is imagined within the children’s bedroom whereby the parents, are at the mercy of 
the animals that can actually maim and kill. The parents are faced with a real death by virtual simulation.
132 Assigned the role of finding life on earth, Eve, in the film WALL-E, discovers a small seedling. It is collected and placed 
inside Eve’s torso,’ symbolic of the absent reproductive biology of the hard, metal robot.
133 Wired up to the Basestar with umbilical tubes, a hybrid cylon (of human form) controls the Basestar from its womb-bath.
134 A spiraling inward and enfolding narrative of virtual and actual space is depicted in the film, eXistenZ (1999), a labyrinthine 
story of a game within a game, within a game, and so on. The Matrix (1999), eXistenZ (1999), and Twelve Monkeys (1995), 
inspired by William Gibson’s novel.
135 Entrapped in the virtual self, the main character in William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984) is imprisoned in a dying body, 
the physical body is separated from its virtual presence on the net.
whale. This is evident in the dystopian science fiction films and novels, THX 1138136 
(1971), Running Man137 (1987), Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), and Brave New World 
(1932). The whale is representative of environments that are enclosed and isolated, 
such as that depicted in Elizabeth Hand's short story, Echo138 one of four post 9-11 
stories comprising The Lost Domain (2002). 
 When applying the concept of personal space as reworked through the concept 
of imprisonment in this chapter, what is evident in each of these stories and persists 
not just in cyberpunk but also in Splatterpunk139 literature (for example, wound-
culture literature such as Ballard’s novel Crash (1973), discussed in chapter seven) is 
the consistent conceptual notion that personal space is and will continue to be an 
imprisonment concept. 
 Entrapment is a key dilemma of personal space, whether it is applied to 
humans, chatbots, cyborgs, or aliens, a concept of violation in its varying spaces. 
One cannot trace all of the different links that can be made with the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in science fiction. If personal space is not a concept that belongs either 
exclusively to the material or the immaterial as an epistemology of the body or 
environment, then personal space is an enforced mode of inaction that is externally 
defined and imagined when under the constant duress of violence. Entrapment has an 
internal and external logic and is a form of violation that moves between the two. It 
is a snaring oscillation, an imprisonment that is less spatial and more durational. The 
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136 Safe, clinical and homogenous the space of the future, in THX 1138, is an entrapping police state. Partitioned into inner and 
outer movements of the body, its biochemical state is monitored in the toilet, corridor or stairwell, each zone a place to survey 
and regulate the body for signs of disfunction, stress, and abnormality. 
137 Alongside The Running Man, there are two other flight narratives attending to muscular fitness, they are Bladerunner, 
(1982), and Tron (1982). Entrapping the physicality of the human in a virtual reality game the expansive environments of these 
games are full of possibilities.
138 Elizabeth Hand's Nebula award winning short story of 2008, Echo, is a personal response to a journalist friend remaining 
out of touch whilst away in Baghdad in 2002 (Hand, in, eds. Bova, 2008: 8). The story "grew out of the dread I felt during that 
time, along with the surreal sense of horror and isolation that continues to shade our post 9-11 world” (Bova, 2008: 8). Set in 
the future-present of the “long-now” Hand’s story of isolation is one of a limited physical and communications space, with no 
proximity or shared, personal space the main character seeks comfort in her memories; her memory a social space shared with 
herself.
139 Splatterpunk is a term derived from cyberpunk and used in the 1980s and 1990s as a subgenre of cyberpunk. It is used by at 
least three writers in this thesis, - Hal Foster, Marc Seltzer, and David Foster Wallace, in a discussion of fiction that explores 
violence and horror.
personal space of special nowheres can be an intrinsic escape from extrinsic threats 
but only for a duration of time, in some science fiction films this is an escape, ad 
infinitum.140
 By taking Elizabeth Hand’s short story Echo as representative of the numerous 
science fiction examples just cited, I will show briefly how this story is a 
representation of personal space as imprisonment. Echo, the main character of 
Hand’s short story personifies the author’s feelings of isolation, “. . . that continues to 
shade our post 9/11 world” (Hand, 2008: 8). The impetus for the novel was Hand’s 
own feelings for a journalist-friend that was sent to Baghdad to write on the 
“rebuilding effort” (Hand, 2008: 8). Echo represents a personal space of 
imprisonment to the disconnect of social media in the present. In the story Echo is 
alone and distant from the destruction of war that surrounds the island. Echo’s 
loneliness is also marked by the absence of Narkissos. As the myth suggests Echo is 
rejected by Narkissos who is punished and sent far away to gaze at his own 
reflection. A parallel can be drawn with the United States’ foreign policy in the 
middle east, particularly Iraq post 9/11. The island seems a likely representation of 
the United States itself, or one of its offshore territorities. The myth is played out in a 
contemporary setting but the island is cut off with no TV. The computer network 
locates no other user and the radio reception fails to pick up a signal providing no 
current feedback on life outside of the island. Previously, the computer had provided 
news coverage but mainly as images because written content had notably diminished. 
Echo re-reads the stream of writing that has since ceased to connect with the memory 
of Narkissos. The representation of his personal space is to be found within the dated 
news pictures of locations that Narkissos is situated within. The personal space of 
Echo is unbounded, she is imprisoned on an island that has long since served its 
purpose of self-protection. Echo’s intimate connections with human life are 
retroactive, using her memories to find intimacy in the news archives. This is an 
attempt at a shared personal space. Echo seeks intimacy with Narkissos from past 
media stories that geographically locate Narkissos. Past news is the only personal 
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140 The special nowhere imagined in William Gibson’s novel, Neuromancer, it is a hut on a beach, a peaceful and calm place 
that is imagined in cyberspace. Yet, this escapism is a sort of trap, a place where the digital self can be contained, or rather 
preoccupied neglecting the needs of the self that remains physical, the other side of cyberspace (Gibson, 1984). The special 
nowhere is a snare in which to preoccupy the self in the virtual giving time for the physical body to be violated.
sphere between Echo and Narkissos, an intimacy found through technologically 
mediated news stories; technologies that do still work but that are no longer used by 
humans to connect with one another on either a personal or state level.
Conclusion
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma is not just another place where personal space can be 
performed. Personal space is not a concept that is bound to the material or the 
immaterial, and certainly not just to the configuration of body bound to its 
environment, for a chatbot is not a body bound to a website, it is a phantom 
inhabiting an imprisoning space of ubiquity, trapped in its rules of conception. 
 The gathered explanations of imprisonment and entrapment explored the 
defensive modes of the dilemma as the acceptance and comfort of being trapped. 
Entrapment is the violent configuration of imprisonment, it is the logic that violates. 
The dilemma gathered a range of entities as prisoner, from chatbots to humans, AI to 
aliens and cyborgs. It doesn’t matter who is the subject of the entrapment, as for 
some it is the safe confinement of indecision, away from the danger of the real. It is a 
comfortable imprisonment in oneself, or within another; to be imprisoned within 
one’s flesh, is to jack-in to the wound, a method of going inside oneself. 
 Metaphors and parables of the virtual set stories in motion and bring a 
representational world of virtual spaces (and virtual reality) into the dilemma. 
Science fiction creates a particular imprisonment-network and gives the dilemma an 
overtly violent and violative imagining. The confusion with the dilemma is that the 
metaphor connects an actual representation of imprisonment in space with imagined 
bodies. However, imprisonment is less to do with boundaries in space but with the 
limits of decision as an anxiety and the violence of smooth configurations. 
Imprisonment is not a boundary but a limit in the virtual. Imprisonment networks in 
the virtual reconfigure the subject-object and environment configuration.
 This chapter asserted that entrapment techniques of today’s chatbots are an 
agency of positive inaction but that this is more an outcome of the methods and 
methodologies of the 1950s than an outcome of new styles of online chat. Online 
interaction aimed at keeping talk with users going is self-destructive since it was 
entrapment methods and thus challenges the inclusive notions of web 2.0. This study 
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shows that entrapment methods (the online techniques of chatbot interaction) are a 
major obstacle in creating positive, lengthy human-interactions. It poses no real 
problem to the length of an interaction but to the form of inquisitive, searching, 
interrogative and questioning means that may be creating positive agency of inaction.
 The Rudiment was a re-enactment of the original Prisoner’s Dilemma.141 A 
further point of configuring the dilemma (its logic and metaphor) as a network is to 
ask the same questions of actor-network theory, what does this metaphor perform? 
Actor network theory also has socially acceptable metaphors of togetherness evident 
in the term network, yet it gives no direction by which to consider the affects that 
these terms provoke and perform. Latour and Woolgar stated that: “interpretations do 
not so much inform as perform” (Latour & Woolgar, 1986:285). I took this sentiment 
as a call to perform, but their work gave me no way of analysing the affects of 
performing interpretations that I believe their work infers. By moving to practice, 
with the rudiments, I have attempted to move my research closer to affect, to the 
intensities that insist on being repeated. Chatbots continue to ask questions and 
reveal very little in the way of answers, sometimes poetically so:
Provocational Rudiment
With Alice (11th November 2006)
Human:  Suffer
Alice:  Is that your final answer?
Provocational Rudiment
With Alice (11th November 2006)
Human:  Infidelity
Alice:  Do not ask me any more questions please.
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141 Re-enactment questions the validity of recording and analysing whilst critiquing the accuracy of history. This is a theme 
that is further discussed in the next chapter, with particular reference to Rod Dickinson’s re-enactment of Milgram’s 
Experiments and also to an extent with the penultimate chapter, that examines the case of James Graham Ballard’s Crash 
(1971), whereby the characters gain pleasure from meticulously re-enacting car crashes and the wounds they cause. In the 
article, Invoking the Invocation by Tom McCarthy, (the General Secretary of International Necronautical Society) explains how 
Dickinson’s form of re-enactment is less to with the event of which he is recreating, but more in line with the historical re-
enactment societies approach to re-enactment (McCarthy, 2002). 
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Introduction to Territoriality
If Milgram is taken as the emblematic bad experimenter letting not a chance to the 
students he is torturing in making them become torturers, what should be said of those 
thousands of radical tracts where the things to be studied - science, art, institutions, 
medicine - are not left a chance to say anything other than the fact they have been 
marked by the domination of white male capitalists? Like most critical thinking, they 
reproduce exactly at the outcome what was expected from the beginning, and if they 
have to be rejected, it is not because they are political, and not either because they are 
not scientific enough, but simply because the writer occurred no risk in being kicked out 
of his or her standpoint in writing them. The application of Stengers' criterion on 
"cultural studies" remain to be seen but it will be even more entertaining than what it 
did at the bench. The equation is simple although very hard to carry out: no risk, no 
good construction, no invention, thus no good science and no good politics either. 
(Latour, in Stengers, 1997: xviii)
 When considering personal space there is one personal space that is 
omnipresent in this thesis; that of the researcher. The one that conducts experiments 
which is predominantly the researcher, is the one that chooses the who, and where of 
the experiment. These choices create analytical tools, theoretical frameworks and a 
critique emerges, which with good timing and positioning creates counter-critiques 
that hopefully resonate for some time to come. Stanley Milgram’s experiments still 
resonate today, several decades on. Other experiments impact in other ways, such as 
the ‘pick-up’ scripts that start some chatbot interaction. They are an experimental 
technique created and controlled by the chatbot developers. The chatbot developer 
experiments with ways to engage users in talking and the chatbot and user 
subsequently start to talk. The user picks up the content and tone introduced in the 
pick-up scripting. The ways chatbot pick-ups are set-up, forms the basic apparatus by 
which to understand territoriality in the second case study of this chapter. Both the 
chatbot’s pick-up and Milgram’s Obedience to Authority, 1961 experiments are 
territorial challenges. Experiments can surprise, some are sneaky and provocative, 
others are placebos, acting as an experimental control; and some fail to create data 
that will resonate. Most experimental procedures involve some level of risk and a 
pertinent aspect of the personal space phenomenon I am studying. This chapter looks 
at the hidden territorial actants be that an electrical shock machine in Milgram’s 
study, or a lurking developer (or as I will further suggest a conversational expert) in a 
chatbot pick-up script. This chapter will look at the inside and outside of the 
experimental procedure involving risky techniques. It will furthermore, question the 
5. The Pick-Up & Milgram’s Experiment | Interrupting Territoriality
174
processes of repeating experiments, of enacting and reenacting by observing the 
power of an experiment to resonate not just repeat. 
 Scholars in the fields of science and technoscience (Stengers & Latour, 1997 & 
2000), and the performance arts (Dickinson, 2003) have neglected the role played by 
the technologies used in Milgram’s 1961 series of ‘Obedience to Authority’ 
experiments. These critiques of Milgram’s work are used to address the gap between 
secondary and tertiary critiques of scientific procedures and their subsequent 
scientific authorship. Subsequently, two frames of territoriality will be discussed, 
firstly, the territorial agency of the technology within the existing experiment; and 
secondly, the hypothesis that criticisms of the experimental frame are a further 
territorialisation outside of the experiment. I will consider a second experiment 
involving a chatbot’s pick-up technique. The pick-up is one of many provocative 
‘meet and greet’ rituals that are unique to the Elizabot. The approach of this chapter 
is to analyse technological agency and territoriality in enactment and reenactments 
involving nonhuman actors and cross-disciplinary critiques. 
 STS offers a criticism of the scientist’s presence in experiments and 
observations of phenomena in the field of ethology — a primary area for studying 
territoriality. This means that STS is an area for secondary observations of studies of 
territoriality and is my starting point for reflection on territoriality issues with chatbot 
developers and the main user-group of chatbots. The philosopher of science Isabelle 
Stengers writes that one scientist’s neutral observations of a chamois were not neutral 
at all, in fact the scientist came to be perceived himself as a male chamois himself, 
by the male chamois he was observing. This affected the other chamois’ patterns of 
domination because the scientist had been accepted as the dominant male in the 
surrounding territory. This shaped consequent dominance issues that occurred when 
other chamois arrived on the scene. The scientist therefore affect these situations of 
territorial conflict. Stengers reports that the ethologist Shirley Strum takes a different 
approach incorporating within her own observations the ways in which she herself is 
transformed by whom she observed (Stengers, 1997: 172). The performance arts can 
intervene in experimental processes by reenactment. As a critique of history, 
Dickinson performs reenactments in particular the reenactment of the Milgram’s 
experiments, to question the essence of scientist and scientific practice in Milgram’s 
experiments. Dickinson intervenes into science creating a double critique of the 
methodological processes of the experiment and of reenacting science. I note, 
contrary to both methods of observation and intervention that my own attempts to 
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intervene with chatbots have also enabled me to be transformed by chatbots. Not 
only has my language adapted to the short line lengths of chatbot conversation but 
also to the ambiguities of personal space. By interacting within the field of chatbots, I 
also found myself within another’s experiment, moreover, within the systems of 
conversational experts.
 Both experimental procedures set-up the participants to fail, by putting both the 
victim-learner in Milgram’s experiment and the chatbot and user in a bot-chat, into 
scenarios of conflict. These ‘no-win’ situations of entrapment subvert the friend and 
foe relations of experimenter and participant, chatbot and user, respectively. By 
looking closer at the fields (such as social-psychology and STS) at play in conflict 
issues to engage further with questions of territoriality. I will ask, what does it mean 
to interrupt a concept such as territoriality. Stengers’ criticism of Milgram’s 
‘Obedience to Authority’ experiments shows the importance of ethical neglect, by 
holding Milgram accountable for his own actions in research but is unhelpful in 
thinking through Dickinson’s subsequent reenactment. 
 This chapter also considers violence and provocation to violence, focusing on 
those occasions when technology has an explicit role in configuring violent acts. 
Both the pick-up and Milgram’s experiments relate to the concept of personal space 
through territoriality as they threaten and imitate physical violence but neither form 
of threat eventualises as subjective violence (as defined in chapter 3). In Milgram’s 
experiments the machines used are mediating tools, props for a theatre of cruelty. A 
range of violences come into play: the violence of language, the violence of 
experimentation, the violence of threat and provocation. As a continuation of chapter 
three, this chapter aims to further investigate the co-relation of violence and 
violation. I aim to argue for a commonality between the phrases that are used for 
both: I believe that major violence and minor violations are no less territorialising 
than physical violations. I have found in the literature on violence used in this thesis 
(and my experiences of violence in the everyday), that the terms used for strong 
violence are generally rather neutral, unemotive words; for minor violences of 
speech, on the other hand, very strong emotive words are used. These explanations of 
violence seem to ignore the fact that repetitive minor violations have a cumulative 
violence, and neglect to consider the cumulative force of experimental trauma.
 Motivated by the current critique of Stanley Milgram’s ‘Obedience to 
Authority’ experiments in STS and Dickinson’s recent reenactment; and in light of 
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being interrupted by a surprising encounter with another’s experiment in my own 
chatbot’s study, I analyse these experimental processes for hidden territorial 
actions.142 I will first evaluate Milgram’s experiments, exploring his findings and his 
initial interpretations, and setting out what he understood as territoriality; I will then 
consider the STS critique and Dickinson’s reenactment in order to further question 
the territorial agency of the electric shock machine. I correlate ethnological 
underpinnings of territoriality in animals to the nonhuman, to Milgram’s electric 
shock machine and word-pair test, and to Elizabot’s provocative conversational 
system. I contrast the work of Deleuze and Guattari with Edward Hall as well as how 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation reconfigure fixed and semi-fixed feature 
space. I will argue that territoriality is not just a concern with territory and spatial 
proximities, but also with the structure of co-relations in proximity. The study of 
pick-up techniques in this chapter extends the discussion of territoriality to consider 
the potential main user group of chatbots namely the experts and researchers of 
conversational systems — producing particular forms of territoriality, whilst 
configuring a particular specialist form of everyday chat. Focusing on the structure of 
the start of chatbot interaction is an alternative place to start investigating territorial 
structures. In chapter four I attempted to subvert the mode of interrogative language 
used by chatbots, whereas in this chapter I focus on how the developer can subvert 
the interactional frame of chatbot and user.
 The “surprise-startle” (Sedgwick, 1995: 74) range of intensities are 
manipulated to kick-start interaction. These are provocation methods which are 
evident in both Milgram’s exemplar and the chatbot exemplar considered in this 
chapter. Affect in this chapter also relates to the emotions outlined in scripts enacted 
or reenacted in Dickinson’s performance and to the prerecorded notations of the 
Pick-Up Rudiment. This is affect as a performer’s code and is further discussed in 
the Audio Rudiments towards the end of the chapter (relating to the audio tracks on 
the accompanying CD). To consider the affect of surprise in the experimental 
processes is to investigate the intensity of affect as a trace of the hidden and silent 
actants whose technological agency creates territorial procedures.
 The order of this chapter moves from the case study of Milgram to that of the 
chatbot pick-up technique. I explored Milgram’s experiments as a consequence of the 
pick-up. This rationale runs contrary to the layout of the chapter with the pick-up 
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142 Rod Dickinson is a performance artist and lecturer in the media arts and cultural studies, using reenactment techniques.
following Milgram’s experiment. Both experiments have logics of entrapment (and 
so too, did the Rudiments in chapter 4), but their research designs and 
methodological frameworks differ. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Rudiment involved 
many interactions, yet this chapter focuses on one unusual pick-up technique. The 
pick-up143 is a rudimentary and experimental process of the developers. In this 
chapter the agency of the machine is primarily explored as territoriality within a 
territory, but as machines enacting something we might misunderstand as territorial, 
that is, within the machine’s ability to affect and act territorially. I became aware of 
the pick-up technique because it interrupted the start of a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
interaction. Pick-up techniques can be used by any chatbot developer and techniques 
vary. I noted several evocative examples of the technique from my discussions with 
developers on the Robitron forum. Enactment (Audio Rudiments) and reenactment 
(Dickinson’s reenactment of Milgram’s ‘Disobedience to Authority’ experiments) are 
the performative elements of this chapter’s methodological framework. These require 
an analytical framework to investigate the linguistic tools that can analyse 
territoriality in speech, along with nonvocal forms of action. A theoretical framework 
is needed across disciplines to investigate the methodological problem of 
territoriality.
 Pick-ups are prerecorded and are on screen before one starts a conversation 
with a chatbot. In all other Rudiments pick-up lines (if used) have been omitted from 
the transcriptions (documented in the appendix); only the two discussed in this 
chapter are evidenced because each rudiment I enacted aimed to introduce topics, 
rather than follow topics that the chatbots introduce.
Territoriality and Violence
 Before introducing the two experiments I will briefly give a summary of the 
concept of territoriality. Over the last fifty years, the concept of territoriality has 
transformed itself from a “hard and rigid concept” (Tinbergen 1953, within Hall, 
[1966] 1990) to a “flow of intensity” (Deleuze and Guattari, [1988] 2004). 
Territoriality is not the main subject of any of these writers, but has influenced their 
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143 The ‘Pick-Up Rudiment’ is called a ‘Rudiment’ not because I intended the experiment to take place but for its undeveloped 
nature, its unknown quantities as an experimental procedure. The developer remains anonymous and so too, are the developer’s 
formal intentions to experiment. 
work. Hall makes the connection between territory, territoriality and personal space, 
as status in relation to dominance. Milgram however, approaches territoriality as 
status, position, and action. I will consider further these 1960s modes of territoriality 
as a contemporary understanding of territoriality involving unstable connections and 
disconnections; as the moments of territorialising action (deterritorialisation and 
reterritorialisation). Deleuze and Guattari, as well as Milgram and Hall all consider 
territoriality as consistent, but this consistency is interpreted by the former two 
philosophers as ‘flow.’ Deleuze and Guattari imagine how glaciers cut up and 
territorialise mountains. Hall’s main premise of territoriality is that it is relatively 
“fixed and rigid”, with boundaries remaining constant. Deleuze seeks to understand 
deterritorialisation by viewing the structure of this consistency, or architectural 
consolidation, as a flow of moving rock. In his conception, fixed boundaries may be 
as hard as rocks, but that does not mean that they cannot flow. Deleuze and Guattari 
(in their use of territoriality) are generally adhere to a metaphor of geological 
structures, of the flows of rock and strata. 
 I consider inhibited violence as the violation of self-constraint, of self-
regulation which will be discussed predominantly in these terms because when 
territoriality is framed within the field of ethology it still refers to psychoanalytic 
binaries, yet, when considering territoriality as flows of intensity and as nonlinear, in 
current discussions of territoriality these earlier terms are less relevant. Hall makes 
the connection between personal space and territoriality in the field of ethology: 
Territoriality, a basic concept in the study of animal behaviour, is 
usually defined as behaviour by which an organism characteristically 
lays claim to an area and defends it against members of its own 
species. (Hall, [1966] 1990: 7)
 It could be thought that territoriality is one of the binding forces that connects 
one to many, from one personal space to many others, as a collective assemblage of 
territoriality (as considered in chapter two). Hall’s premise of territoriality is rather 
fixed and rigid, boundaries remain constant but in the second pick-up technique 
territoriality is not fixed, for example, the meet and greet rituals of humans in the 
close phase are abruptly subverted. I will argue that territoriality is an unstable 
concept when considered as flow or connectedness.
5. The Pick-Up & Milgram’s Experiment | Interrupting Territoriality
179
 In zones of close proximity, territoriality can be understood as a matter of self-
regulation and self-constraint.144 Self-regulation is the way one keeps oneself in 
check, to get along with others in a social space. It can also be the violent act of 
protecting oneself from another. This is the territorial aspect of personal space and its 
connection to violence and violation. I consider Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ 
experiments as tests of close proximity, the darker axis to Hall’s personal space 
conception, that Hall tends to imply but does not explicitly set out. Personal space 
when understood as territoriality can be a form of harm if over-intensified, the need 
to self-protect can make one suffer an enduring state of anxiety, it is a mental form of 
infliction.
 I will refer to Hall’s definition of fixed-feature space a term he uses regarding 
territoriality, which he defines as:
. . . one of the basic ways of organising the activities of individuals 
and groups. It includes the material manifestations as well as the 
hidden, internalised designs that govern behaviour. Buildings are one 
expression of fixed-feature patterns. (Hall, [1966] 1990: 103)
 Both experiments referred to in this chapter play with fixed-feature set-ups: 
Milgram’s brings the body closer to death, while the pick-up technique moves 
towards a violence that can only be threatened. I will discuss the Elizabot as a fixed-
feature pattern to explain how fixed-feature space is on the move and not quite as 
fixed as Hall implies.
The Obedience Experiments
Why Milgram’s ‘Obedience 
to Authority’ Experiments?
 Stanley Milgram and Edward Hall both used a four-zone proximity system and 
both were involved in studies on strangers in the everyday (see fig. 36a-b). There are 
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144 Less attention is placed on those psychoanalytic binaries of inhibition and release. Deleuze and Guattari opt to discuss 
affect and its intensification in replacement of the psychoanalytic binaries of Tinbergen.
many parallels that can be made between their studies but neither focuses on the 
technologies that are involved in changing one’s interactions with strangers. This was 
my reason for not investigating Milgram’s City Psychology Experiments (1971), 
which investigated what he called the “familiar stranger” (Blass, 2004: 178). The 
experiments that Milgram conducted with students considered how one becomes 
familiar with strangers when repeatedly commuting between say, home and work. He 
observed that the familiar stranger is “depersonalised into the scenery, rather than as 
people with whom to engage” (Blass, 2004: 180).
FIGURES 36a-b. Left: Photograph given to commuters taking part in Milgram’s Familiar Stranger Study, (1971). 
Commuters were given the task of recognising familiar strangers on their usual commute and were asked to note 
whether they had, or would speak to a familiar stranger. Image Source: Milgram, 1992, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Right: In Hall’s observations of strangers waiting for a bus, he shows how people maintain a distance of 
proximity from other strangers and its familiar arrangement. Image Source: Hall, [1966] 1990, New York: Anchor 
Books. 
 Milgram conducted the series of eighteen experiments on obedience in July 
1961, after Phillip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment, 1971.145 Both 
experiments have aroused ethical concerns, and are similar in the way that they 
manipulate subjects in confined spaces. I chose to consider Milgram’s experiments 
rather than Zimbardo’s because I wanted to avoid the latter’s from concentration on 
architectural arrangements of space, and to focus on a set-up where machinery is 
critical and interaction is not necessarily homosocial.146 
 Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ experiments (1974) are important because 
in them a violent assemblage is configured around touch-proximity. However, to my 
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145 Zimbardo was a high school colleague of Milgram (Blass, 2004: 9).
146 Zimbardo’s study could be analysed for the technical use of the prison with its doors and other prison things.
knowledge what was researched was the touch-proximity of the human participants, 
not the ultimate touch-proximity of the ‘electric shock’ device. This is therefore, an 
explanation of Milgram’s experiments focusing on the technological, as a 
coordinating aspect of the spatial set-up of an experiment.
Milgram’s Experiments
Learning was a task of matching word pairs. The subject would read 
out:
blue box
nice day
wild duck
The learner is tested as to which word-pair with the word blue:
blue: sky ink box lamp  
       (Milgram, 1974: 36)
 This is the learning task that Milgram used in each of his experiments. In the 
role of the learner is also referred to as ‘victim’ because the learner cannot succeed 
and is thus, a victim of the learning task. Milgram uses the terms learner and victim, 
interchangeably. The role is played by an actor whose instructions are to give 
incorrect answers during the learning task. The subject is also referred to as a 
volunteer by Milgram. I will refer to the learner as the victim-learner and the subject 
as subject-volunteer to avoid confusion. When the victim-learner gets the answer 
wrong, an electric shock mechanism is used, consisting of a horizontal line of 
switches escalating in 15 volt increments, from 15 V to 450 V, each labelled, 
indicating the severity of the shock, from slight up to danger (Milgram, 1974: 21). 
The last two switches are coded XXX indicating a point beyond a describable level 
of voltage. When a switch is made active a red light would appear, and a blue light 
would flash indicating when the voltage is energising. Relay clicks and electric 
buzzing could be heard and a dial is used to indicate the voltage level (Milgram, 
1974: 37). An answer box positioned on top of the shock generator would light up 
indicating which of the four terms had been paired. This linked to a box the victim-
learner could use to communicate their answer.
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FIGURES 37a-c. Left: Reenactment set-up by Rod Dickinson. Bottom Right: Detail of the electric shock 
machine as part of Rod Dickinson’s reenactment set-up, with kind permission of the artist. Top Right: One of 
Milgram’s experiments showing the volunteer, researcher and subject setting-up before the electric shock test 
commenced. Here, punishment is administered remotely. Image Sources: Top Right: Milgram, 1974, London: 
Tavistock. Left and Bottom Right: With kind permission of Rod Dickinson, Glasgow Centre for Contemporary 
Art, February 2002. (See: http://www.milgramreenactment.org/pages/gallery-5.xml?location=5&page=8&text=8 
[Accessed, 30 June 2009]).     
 The administering of the punishment in experiments 1-3 is administered by the 
experimenter pressing a button. At what stage is the touch-proximity reached and 
what does this involve? The subject-volunteer was told that the strapping was used to 
reduce the movement of the victim-learner’s body when receiving a shock (see fig. 
37a-b). The subject-volunteer was also told that an electrode was attached to the 
victim-learner’s wrist with electrode paste which was to avoid blisters and burns 
(Milgram, 1974: 36). The fourth experiment required the subject-learner to place the 
victim-learner’s hand on a metal plate to enable the shock treatment. It is only in the 
fourth experiment that the subject-volunteer is required to use their own physical 
force on the victim-learner, as an act of punishment. In the first experiment, the 
victim-learner is at his most remote, situated in an adjacent room to the subject-
volunteer, with the result that communication between them is an interaction 
mediated by illuminating lights (see fig. 37c). Milgram indicates that it “puts the 
victim out of mind” (Milgram, 1974: 55). The same can be said for the second 
experiment, except that the victim’s response to the shocks is audible. “In the remote 
condition, the victim is truly an outsider, who stands alone, physically and 
psychologically” (Milgram, 1974: 56).
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 The third experiment brings the victim-learner into proximity with the subject-
volunteer, with both situated together in the same room, both audible and visible to 
one another. There is “no denial mechanism” as the subject-volunteer and victim-
learner are in the same “reciprocal fields” Milgram adds, “Thus, the changing set of 
spatial relations leads potentially to shifting alliances over the several experimental 
conditions” (Milgram, 1974: 55). He summarises; 
In these experiments as the victim was brought closer to the man 
ordered to give him shocks, increasing numbers of subjects broke off 
the experiment refusing to obey. The concrete, visible, and proximal 
presence of the victim acted in an important way to counteract the 
experimenter’s power and to generate disobedience. (Milgram, 1974: 
57)
 In later experiments (such as the seventh experiment), the proximity between 
subject-volunteer and experimenter is varied so as to take into account the effect of 
the experimenter’s surveillance on the subject-volunteer (Milgram, 1974: 76).
 Who were the volunteers for the Milgram’s experiment? The volunteers for 
both roles were chosen from the New Haven community. Milgram ruled out the 
regular use of the student cohort as volunteers, for he considered them to be too 
‘homogenous’ for the study (Milgram, 1974: 31). The participants were taken from a 
sample consisting of postal clerks, teachers and salesmen. Volunteers varied in age 
and profession but were predominantly male, except in the case of experiment eight 
in which only women took part. Milgram felt that women were perceived to be more 
compliant, and less aggressive, they were, as a result, of less interest to him as 
experimental subjects. Milgram however states that the level of obedience was 
almost identical to that of men (Milgram, 1974: 80). Notably, neither the role of 
victim-learner nor authority figure (experimenter) were played by women or 
children. 
 The ruse was only revealed to the subject-volunteer during a post-experimental 
interview, designed to debrief volunteers (Milgram, 1974: 62). The experiments 
predominantly took place in a laboratory at Yale University but experiment ten took 
place in Bridgepoint, an industrial town, where it was conducted in the offices of a 
private company. The setting was chosen because it removed the significance of 
university status from the experimental scenario. The second setting showed results 
lower in obedience but not significantly different to that at Yale (Milgram, 1974: 87). 
What authority is defined in the laboratory setting? Despite the volunteers not being 
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students themselves, Milgram’s experiments are performed in the name of Yale. 
Milgram’s research question was: “At what point will the subject-volunteer refuse to 
obey the experimenter?” (Milgram, 1974: 21). Milgram explains that the authority of 
the family, schooling and then work are differing authority models, the first regulated 
by parents (personal authority), the second by teachers, and the third by the rules and 
procedures of the work place. The latter two modes of authority are what Milgram 
defines as impersonal. 
 Milgram describes the various subject-volunteers; for example, Karen, in the 
eighth experiment is particularly highlighted for her occupation as a nurse. Milgram 
is curious to know how the authority system that she would encounter each working 
day would affect the experiments. Karen would follow hospital procedures and make 
judgment calls as a nurse, based on a doctor’s diagnosis (Milgram, 1974: 95). She is 
also knowledgeable of electricity voltage in the home, though again, as a technical 
supplicant. Karen knowingly goes beyond the domestic voltage level and is obedient 
to the tasks of Milgram’s experiment in the laboratory setting. In fact, she increases 
the voltage to 450 volts. A third subject-volunteer, Gretchen however, does not. 
Milgram asks Gretchen, a medical technician, to speculate as to whether her 
background might explain why she disobeyed the experimenter’s orders. Gretchen 
replies: “Perhaps we have seen too much pain” (Milgram, 1974: 103). In point in fact 
Gretchen had lived in Nazi Germany as an adolescent. Milgram was trying to elicit 
prior authority structures indicating that: 
Action takes place in a physical-social setting, but this is merely the 
stage for its occurrence. The behaviour itself flows from an inner core 
of the person; within the core personal values are weighed, 
gratifications assessed and resulting decision are translated into 
action. (Milgram, 1974: 48)

In contrast, Milgram notes that the subject-volunteer called Fred, remains calm and 
indifferent while increasing the voltage: “He thinks he’s killing someone yet he uses 
the language of the tea table” (Milgram, 1974: 94). Provoked to effectively, commit 
murder he yet remains calm and formal in his conduct.
 By discussing the subject-volunteers I am noting a change in the chapter, from 
description of the set-up to analysis of the experiments by Milgram. What I have 
done in this short account is to pay attention to the technology used within the set-up 
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and to describe briefly what Milgram considers as touch-proximity. In this 
experiment, I believe that the technology is the forgotten, violent actant.
Milgram’s Territoriality, 
Interdisciplinarity & Moral Imperative
What did Milgram consider as territorial in these eighteen experiments, and how did 
he interpret the results? Firstly, he considered territoriality not only as defined in 
ethology, but in a range of interpretations from the ‘big fields’ of his time — 
cybernetics, ethology, and psychology, triangulated in a summary that finds 
obedience to authority malevolent. Interdisciplinary interpretation did little to 
interrupt the territoriality of Milgram over his subject-volunteers, for he did not look 
at this aspect of his study reflexively. What has caused such an attack on Milgram 
(from many disciplines such as the philosophy of science and STS, not just his own) 
with claims of ethical misconduct? 
 Milgram compares the inhibitory mechanisms of man, machine, and animal 
considering the meaning of his findings, from a cybernetic viewpoint (Canon, 1932 
and Ashby, 1956), as compared to an evolutionary approach (Tinbergen, 1953 et al.) 
before embarking on his own, psychoanalytic interpretation.147 It is the latter 
interpretation that dominates the cybernetic and ethological standpoints (Milgram, 
1974: 146). This creates a hierarchical explanation of interdisciplinarity. Milgram 
questioned the role of preexisting authority structures, and it is evident in most of 
Milgram’s experiments that it is the authority in the immediate situation that is 
amplified as omnipresent, namely that of academia.
 Milgram has been criticised for his role as the creator of these experiments, 
which he undertook at the beginning of his academic career. He writes: 
What the present study does is to give the dilemma contemporary form by treating it as 
subject matter for experimental enquiry, and with the aim of understanding rather than 
judging it from a moral standpoint. (Milgram, 1974: 11) 
5. The Pick-Up & Milgram’s Experiment | Interrupting Territoriality
186
147 In both the acknowledgements and the preface to Milgram’s book, Obedience and Authority, 1974, Milgram’s proximity to 
the experiments is described as an experience of endurance, an arduous task that seems to show him sympathising with the role 
of victim; deferring Milgram to defend his motives by citing the atrocities of World War II, and to potential problem of a third 
word war, by way of preventing an inevitable nuclear Armageddon (Milgram, 1974). I would presume that this is his motivation 
for including a cybernetic standpoint.
 The problem that Stengers poses below is a current critique that dominates the 
citation of Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ experiments in the studies of science 
and technoscience — as a criticism of ethical neglect.
Is it necessary, in order to remind ourselves that here science and 
ethics are indissolubly linked, to recall the experiment in which 
Stanley Milgram, in the name of psychological science, created the 
conditions under which normal individuals would become torturers? 
Is it also necessary, in order to remind ourselves that here the ethical 
question is always also a technical question, to emphasise that 
Milgram’s experiment did not produce reliable witnesses? It did not 
confer any authority to a particular statement, but rather reproduced, 
in an experimental setting, the perplexity that human history 
constrains us to. Milgram’s torturer-subjects knew they were at the 
service of science, and this knowledge had as a consequence that the 
experiment, which was supposed to restrict itself to bringing a 
behaviour to light, without doubt contributed, in an uncontrollable 
way, to producing this behaviour. (Stengers, 1997: 172)

 Stengers compares Milgram to Himmler or Eichmann (Stengers, 2000: 23). 
Yet, how many would have been amongst the few subjects that would have 
disobeyed, had they imagined themselves to have taken part? Stengers thinks that 
Milgram, “has shown that torturers could be fabricated in the name of science just as 
others have done so “in the name of state”, or “in the name of the good of the human 
species” (Stengers, 2000: 23). Milgram’s torturers are another imagination that 
attempts to make real the torturers of the past (following on from the logic of the real 
and virtual outlined in the previous chapter). The subject-volunteer’s obedience was 
pushed to the point of committing an action that, if real would have resulted many 
times in the death of the victim-learner by the subject-volunteer. Stanley Milgram 
shows how to bring a body closer to death, by manipulating distance and proximity, 
with the result that, when one becomes a torturer one has also had one’s personal 
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space manipulated. This is a particular systemic violation of personal space.148 The 
furore surrounding Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ experiments is an example of 
researchers territorialising another researcher and their research, an event that is not 
that uncommon, if perhaps even encouraged (Collins, 2008, 35-5). What is my 
position that lags behind the work of Milgram, and moreover, the critique of 
Stengers? Why pick at the wounds of these once turned over battles that take place in 
academia? I do this to question what the term territoriality might mean after 
Milgram.
Analysing Territoriality — 
The Deterritorial & the Reterritorial
 I will consider obedience and disobedience to authority in Milgram’s 
experiment as an action of territoriality. I understand (as I set out earlier), that touch 
is the agency of both the technologies that perform a fake electric shock (the 
electrical connectivity); and the touch that involves one human touching another 
(active touch). I will go on to explain various other deterritorialisation and 
reterritorialisation moves concerned with how Milgram altered the spatial 
arrangements of the experiments 1-4, (1. Remote-Victim, 2. Voice-Feedback, 3. 
Proximity, and 4. Touch-Proximity). 
 Both the work of Edward Hall and Stanley Milgram refer to the work of the 
Dutch ethologist, Niko Tinbergen to develop their concepts of territoriality: Hall for 
the effects of the crowd on individual territories (Tinbergen, studies of 1952, 1953, 
and 1958 in Hall, 1966: 17, and 57); and Milgram, for his comparative argument 
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148 In the foreword to Stengers’ book Power and Invention (1997), Latour makes an ambiguous yet damming statement: “For 
instance, Popper’s criterion will keep Stanley Milgram’s impeccably falsified experiments since it puts to test the wild 
hypothesis of an innate obedience to authority among American students” (Latour, in Stengers, 1997 :xvi). If taken literally, 
Latour could be insinuating that Milgram used students yet the experiments employed plumbers and nurses. Could Latour be 
accused of planning new specters in the Milgram Experiment? And, did Milgram have a reputation for treating his students with 
disdain? Milgram has a mixed relationship with those he taught. In his biography, one student Robert Panzarella,recalls a class 
with Milgram: "He began by saying, 'I didn't study obedience because I'm an authoritarian person,' at which several of us burst 
out laughing . . . . Apparently, he was conscious that this was what people thought anyway” (Blass, 2004: 184). There are many 
interviews with Milgram’s students to account for his authoritarian attitude to teaching, but there are also many contrary 
accounts from his doctoral students. Milgram was known for taking on a wide range of PhD students with subjects interests 
beside his own.
between the physical dominance structures in the animal world, and the human 
structures of authority as mediated by symbols (Tinbergen, 1953, in Milgram, 1974: 
141). Hall notes that territoriality makes the relation of status with dominance in 
species; for Milgram the importance of status with obedience is divided into three 
main elements, status, position and action (Milgram, 1974: 107). In addition, 
Deleuze and Guattari use Tinbergen to argue against his “aborescent model” of 
territoriality. 
If we ask the general question, “What holds things together?” the 
clearest, easiest answer seems to be provided by a formalizing, linear, 
hierarchized, centralized aborescent model. (Deleuze & Guattari, 
[2008] 2004: 361) 

 Both Latour (having worked with Strum on the paper, ‘The Meanings of 
Social: From Baboon to Humans,’ 1987) and Stengers refer to the ethologist Shirley 
Strum, rather than Niko Tinbergen. Strum’s assertion of her role as scientist, 
“compels her to declare that her observations are incompatible with the idea of a 
submission to rules inscribed in the species” (Stengers, 2000: 63). It is important to 
note that a notion of territoriality that effects baboons is not the same, but is 
connected to a territoriality of humans. The same can be said of humans and 
machines with both having mediatory and intermediary roles that could be 
considered territorial. This is the territoriality not just of one academic over another 
(Deleuze over Tinbergen), but one species over another (human over ape).
 For now, I will define what Deleuze and Guattari consider territorial about 
territory and terrain. They also cite Tinbergen but apply it to concerns of capital 
using metaphors taken from geology rather than geography. They describe 
deterritorialisation as the movement by which ‘one’ leaves a territory and travels to 
another. Even if the new territory (or assemblage) may operate as a 
reterritorialisation, something that “has-the-value-of-home” may still be function. In 
the examples of Deleuze and Guattari: a lobster may walk in a long march, and 
chaffinches might flock in extraordinary numbers, but these mass-migrations, 
whether they are magnetic or solar guided are territories “on route” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987: 360). John MacGregor Wise, citing the work of Deleuze & Guattari 
considers that: 
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Each deterritorialisation is always accompanied by a 
reterritorialisation, a reattachment to different sites, actors and so on; 
a reestablishing of the territory through other means (e.g. by capital 
rather than law); and a re-intensification of a different form of that 
matter. (MacGregor Wise, 1997: 69)
 I will now explain the logic of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation with 
regard to Milgram’s Experiment. Authority and the subject-volunteer are caught up 
in the action of deterritorialising and reterritorialising; either in a similar, or opposite 
direction dependent on whether the subject-volunteer decide to obey or disobey the 
academic authority to which the experiment belongs. Deterritorialisation and 
reterritorialisation occur at each stage of the word-test be that to continue with more 
punishment, or for the subject-volunteer to end the experiment by refusing to 
partake. The ‘deterritorialisation move’ occurs with the break of social relations 
between subject and experimenter. When does reterritorialisation occur? The 
reterritorialisation happens in the Milgram’s experiment when the subject-volunteer 
allies with the victim-learner, or when the subject-volunteer removes him or herself 
from the experiment.
 Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ experiments reveal that space is not just an 
empty cavity but one that is full of connections and relations from subject to victim, 
or from test paper to voltage meter. These proxemics are between the subjects and 
the equipment in an isolated spatial setting. Deterritorialisation and 
reterritorialisation also takes place in the debriefing interview and thereafter, when 
the volunteer and experimenter go “on route” with the rest of their day. 
Deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation is also the work done by Stengers on 
Milgram’s experiment. It also moves the work done on Tinbergen’s meaning of 
‘territoriality’ and the further work done by Hall, and then by Deleuze and Guattari 
— each researcher takes the phrase and makes it their own. These are the moments 
when an assertion of personal space or a violation of personal space occurs. Each of 
the examples above have been considered in this way. I do not want to totalise the 
use of the word territoriality here but rather aim to show how the territoriality has 
multi-directional meaning. Deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation are not just any 
kind of movement. Deleuze and Guattari use these terms as a form of structuration. 
Deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation are the moves between various large and 
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small actors not just the movement between geographical places. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, territoriality is often discussed in terms of capital, whereas for Edward Hall 
it is cultural, yet for both it is normally geopolitical, of which aspect I will discuss 
next.
 Deleuze and Guattari believe that territoriality is not linear and does not 
conform to Tinbergen’s system of a “territorial centre” and “subordinate 
centres” (Tinbergen, 1969; in Deleuze and Guattari, [1988] 2004: 361). Territoriality 
can be applied to spatial formations of territory that pertain to both body and place. 
Deleuze and Guattari do this by talking about the earth as a ‘body without 
organs’ (BwO).149 Their considerations of territoriality overall are not restrictively 
applied to either territory or the body but are importantly co-relational between 
actors (human and non-human), environment and machine. If territory is imagined 
one can think of emotions, psychogeographies, and mental maps.150 Territoriality is 
not just about spatial proximities it is also about structure (particularly political 
structure). Therefore, the scientific equipment, used in Milgram’s experiments to 
punish, deterritorialises and reterritorialises the subject as does the geographical 
spatial setting. Deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation are geopolitical 
movements. 
 Deleuze & Guattari write: 
The territoriality of the assemblage originates in a certain decoding of 
milieus. The territory is just as inseparable from de-territorialization 
as the code from de-coding. (Deleuze & Guattari, [1988] 2004: 556)
Even though ethologists consider relations at the molecular level they do not give 
respect (according to Deleuze and Guattari), to the hierarchy or distinction between 
forms. Deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation are not a binary and they are also 
not opposite. An assemblage that constitutes a territoriality is usually held together 
by determining a respect for what is human as opposed to machine. Deleuze and 
Guattari emphasise that what holds an assemblage together is the cutting edge of 
deterritorialisation. Reterritorialisation does not return to the same territoriality 
necessarily, it can extend territoriality forward. 
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149 I will not use the BwO’s (body without organs) metaphor because I find its capacity to “embody the earth” a misleading 
phrase when attempting to consider that special nowheres have little to do in form with the earth or body.
150 Milgram also researched the mental maps of Paris and New York (Blass, 1973).
How Technology Figures in Territoriality
 Milgram makes a link between territoriality and machines but it is limited to a 
discussion of counter-anthropomorphism. Milgram defines this as the “fragmentation 
of the total human act” (Milgram, 1974: 29).
Some people treat systems of human origin as if they existed above 
and beyond any human agent, beyond the control of whim or human 
feeling. (Milgram, 1974: 26) 
 The electrical instrumentation used is a part of the division of labour that 
Fordism necessitates. The instruments used in the experiment are evocative of the 
human experiments conducted in World War II, as well as the switches and dials of a 
cold war fail-safe system (discussed in the next chapter). By foregrounding the 
technological devices, deterritorialisation in the Milgram experiments is a 
measurable vector of voltage over time: it is also the magnitude of the effects of 
anxiety, marked by the change from the technical, in the first experiment (risk 
measured as symbolic dials indicating voltage); and language, in experiments 2-4 
(risk measured in the verbal displeasures of the learner). The duration of obedience 
and the time which a subject took to obey or disobey was not recorded as a 
significant factor of authority in these experiments. Milgram does not focus on the 
time taken during each experiment, a frame of safety he should have considered. His 
experiment is marked violently by electricity and its potential to be intensely felt by 
the body; yet little analysis of how specifically, electricity (fake or real) interferes 
with touch is explored in further analyses of Milgram’s research.151 There is little 
concern for electricity itself being an authority of science with territorialising 
properties: this is overlooked by both Latour and Stengers in their critique of 
invention and criticism of Milgram.
 This section showed how the movements of deterritoriality and reterritoriality 
can be considered at any level of agency and is applied as a structuration tool, to the 
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151 Hall said, “territory is in every sense of the word an extension of the organism, which is marked by visual, vocal, and 
olfactory signs” (Hall, [1966] 1990: 103). Therefore, territory is an observable phenomena yet this lacks the essential 
imaginings that all conceptions of territoriality need in order to achieve territory. It does not consider the planning stage of 
territoriality which is discussed further in chapter six.
organisation (Yale) or to a single actor (Gretchen) or group of actors (subject-
volunteers), however, big or small the actor or actant.
Space and Place — 
Territoriality in Fixed Feature 
& Semi-Fixed Feature Space
 The experiments are operating at the levels of territoriality that Hall 
distinguishes as ‘fixed-feature’ space. Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ 
experiments occupy a fixed-feature space, manipulating the proxemics between three 
designated roles: 1. the subject as teacher, 2. the victim as learner, 3. the 
experimenter as authority. Milgram organizes the subject-volunteer, victim-learner 
and experimenter roles in various distances from one another in which they are 
together involved in a task of learning through punishment. These experiments 
suggest that the manipulation of personal space in a fixed-feature set-up shows that 
the body can be brought closer to death in set-ups of touch-proximity, regardless of a 
specificness of ‘place.’ Following the logical distinction between place and space that 
Marc Augé, the French anthropologist defines, “the term ‘space’ is more abstract in 
itself than the term ‘place’” (Augé, 1995: 92). How are the places that situate the act 
of violence configured? What difference is made by asserting space rather than 
place? If the places are not as important as the spaces between people, in the 
experiments of obedience, then it follows that territoriality, even as a fixed-feature 
arrangement has little to do with what Augé terms place.
 Obedience decreased when the proximity of the experimenter to the subject 
was reduced. In some cases the subject would have administered a lethal shock. The 
subjects’ capacity to preserve another human’s life is supposedly augmented in 
scenarios of touch-proximity in the near phase. Personal space is a part of a 
preservation system that can also protect life whilst alienating others. It can be an 
exclusive space shared with an impersonal authority, resulting in deference towards 
‘outsiders.’ It can also however, be a shared space of disobedience if subjects are 
motivated to co-conspire. Personal space is: both torture and protection from torture; 
both physical pain and the pain of prevention; a violence of violation (be that 
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systemic or symbolic); the violence of self-regulation; and of others regulating the 
self. Various torture methods try to damage and erode a human’s ability to protect her 
or himself, often by violating the conventions of obedience, as a proximity between 
humans. A benign concept of personal space inhibits violence, but it also produces a 
body near to death; yet, when considering the malevolence of territoriality personal 
space is far from benign.
The Milgram Reenactments
 It is one thing to critique Milgram but it is quite another to reenact the 
Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ experiments. This was done by the artist Rod 
Dickinson and adapted by the scientists, Charles Sheridan and Richard King (1971). 
The latter replaced the human learner with a dog, and the electricity was live. The 
results of Sheridan and King were apparently unremarkable varying little from 
Milgram’s initial findings. He has also performed a reenactment at a performance 
entitled ‘Who, What, Where, When, Why and How’ which he explains is “an 
examination of the government press briefing”, staged at SMART Project Space in 
Amsterdam, in July 2009. The performance involved two actors playing a military 
and governmental leader reading out the rhetoric of war. His work helped me to think 
through the ‘re’ in reenactment, as an integral process by which chatbots form talk. 
The live press conference merged, (undifferentiated) with the arts audience in 
attendance. The reenactment included an auto-cue which was situated behind the 
audience. It was only by turning around in one’s seat that the excerpts of text could 
be differentiated from the original war enactments. The press conference was a 
recital of famous citations of world government and military leaders such as Hussein 
and Schwarzkopf. By reading the auto-cue the audience present were able to 
differentiate the national from the global rhetoric (American and Iraqi); the 
government from the military (Schwarzkopf from Thatcher); and the past from more 
recent acts of war (World War II, from the Falklands War, from the Iraqi war). I did 
not witness the Milgram’s experiment reenactment but had conversations about both 
reenactments with Rod Dickinson. The reenactment processes of both use actors and 
exacting technological props. These reenactments perform the atmosphere of the 
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original enactments but in the process of reenactment, a further layer of affective 
atmosphere will subsequently impact on the first. In relation to the chatbots and the 
context of reenactment, it is one thing to assume to hear the atmospheric impacts of 
AI in the silent re-reading of one’s transcriptions but there is a further layer of 
affective atmosphere reenacted by the voice-over specialists in the Audio Rudiments 
which reflect the multiple interpretations of interactive talk. This helps to reflect on 
the multiple repetitions of chatbot talk which by process will repeat and reenact ad 
infinitum. 
 Dickinson’s reenactment took place in Glasgow, in the Contemporary Gallery 
of Art, in 2002. Several decades on from Milgram’s initial experiments, Dickinson 
brought a new contemporary audience in contact with the testing process, this time 
with an artist replacing Milgram’s protagonist role of coordination and control. I 
remain as does any reader outside of this reenactment, as a secondary audience 
encountering Dickinson (a doubling of distance from the original experiments). 
Dickinson reenacts with the precision of academic research but this time with 
research as topic. I understand it as a comment on the obedience of research methods 
in academia and the disobedience of art practice.152 To discuss this further would 
impose on Milgram’s experiments and the conventions associated with the artist as 
protagonist and provocational; deterritorialising away from the intensities of the 
initial experiments. So far, I have commented on how Milgram helps to observe the 
work of Hall, and how other researchers have been informed by Milgram, while the 
last example showed how Milgram’s experiment has been performed in the arts. All 
of these have done little to consider the territorialisation of the reader, the subject 
with which I will close the first part of this chapter.
 Milgram observed in the subject-volunteer called Fred, the etiquette in speech 
when pertaining to the actions of torture. One of the etiquettes of a doctoral thesis is 
to keep ‘you’ out of which I just disobeyed, and I am parodying back to ‘you’ now. 
So for those technological readers, lost in my humanities, and for those in science 
and technoscience picking over every word, and other artists enjoying the 
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152 However, in Tom McCarthy’s article for Dickinson’s reenactment is seen as concerned with anxiety in the arts, as an 
anxiety towards meaning, noting that the authenticity of Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ experiments is already to an extent 
fake, when one considers that Milgram used actors in the roles of the experiments and the extent to which reality is conceived 
in the experiment.
knowingness of disobedience: how would you display a disciplinary etiquette, to 
interpret and territorialise Milgram’s study? I am concerned that the reader is already 
territorialising this text by remaining remote to this study, distant and silent. 
 This section can be considered a post-post-interview for the reader. Milgram 
concluded in his experiments; “The remarkable thing is, once the ‘ice is broken’ 
through disobedience, virtually all the tension, anxiety, and fear 
evaporate” (Milgram, 1974: 170). To be in touch-proximity to the pain of the subject, 
increasingly created solidarity between the subject-volunteer and victim-learner as 
opposed to the solidarity between experimenter and subject. By referring to the 
reader of this text I want to think about the space where written violence takes part 
(symbolic/systemic). After all, Milgram’s experiments are now a documented text. 
Can the equivalent of 450 volts be signified in the text? Milgram brought into play 
the entire of Yale, the community of Bridgepoint, and the ethics of academia. He 
noted the tension levels of the subject-volunteers indicated as levels of sweat, 
trembling, acute embarrassment, anxious laughter, and verbal comments (Milgram, 
1974: 60 & 170).153 As MacGregor Wise suggests; “Territoriality refers to 
intensities” (Wise, 1997: 68). Following this logic, an affective attachment to the task 
of administering a word-pair test is an intensive investment in the elite; in this case, 
the educational establishment of Yale University. My analysis is a territorialisation 
using Hall, Deleuze and Guattari. By discussing the reader, the territoriality of 
various academic fields (and their hierarchical interdisciplinarity), reenactments and 
newer experiments. I have shown the multiple levels by which territoriality and 
systemic violence continue to operate on an experiment that makes co-relational 
torturers and do-gooders. 
 The main link between using Milgram’s case and the next part of the chapter is 
to extend a discussion about territoriality of hidden interlocutors. Both are 
interventions of authoritative expertise which create ambiguous and unsettling 
territoriality. The two experimental procedures capture a deterritorialisation and a 
reterritorialisation, which are similar but not the same. They are both moments of 
reattachment that pivot around a mediating technology, be that an electric shock 
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153 “As the subject contemplates this break, anxiety is generated, signaling him to step back from the forbidden action and 
thereby creating an emotional barrier through which he must pass in order to defy authority” (Milgram, 1974: 170).
machine or a chatbot. They are moments where there is a reestablishing of territory 
through a mediating technology and a reattachment to the same territory with the 
same coordinates, but with a change (or revealing) of the hidden interlocutors. 
Although the two cases are by no means a logical comparison, they both do involve 
human-machine interactions that have been written about in the social sciences and 
have been used to make performance art. The interlocutors involved in both cases 
present a deterritorialisation and a reterritorialisation. Neither cases are models of 
‘good science’ or ‘good politics’ (as Latour indicated in the first citation of this 
chapter) but involve lots of invention and opportunities to consider ‘good 
construction’ as the territorial aspects surrounding mediating machines.
The Pick-Up Rudiment
 The next experiment involves a chatbot pick-up to further a discussion of the 
territorial provocations and the mediation of technological things. Pick-ups enable a 
further discussion of reenactment and a critique of deceptive experimental 
procedures. The pick-up technique crept up and territorialised one of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Rudiments that I was about to conduct with the Elizabot. It provides a 
discussion of the situated activities of territoriality in language moving from a word-
pair test to the manipulation of the ‘meet and greet’ rituals of interaction. There is an 
etiquette to the start of conversation with chatbots but not to the end. Developers 
have yet to territorialise or control this part of the talk except in attempts to keep talk 
ongoing. This section will focus on the start up of bot-chat to analyse the uncertainty 
of the violation detailed in the transcript that follows. 
The Pick-Up Rudiment
With Eliza (30th December 2004)
[Pick-up] You:  Fuck you. 
[Pick-up] Eliza:  Oh, i [].
[Amanda] You:  I never said that? 
  Eliza:  Can you elaborate on that?
[Amanda] You:  Fuck you 
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  Eliza:  Oh, i [].
[Amanda] You:  did you write that? 
  Eliza:  Oh, i write that.
 The first two lines of the text above are a ‘pick-up’154 technique used by a 
chatbot developer to get interaction started. The same Elizabot has created other 
surprising pick-ups:
A Provocation Pick-Up
With Eliza (19th April 2009)
[Pick-up] You155: Forgot to masturbate
[Pick-up] Eliza: Please go on.
 Pick-ups work similar to an advertising teaser in that they incite intrigue, yet 
not all, nor indeed that many, are provocative, or as explicit as those I encountered 
with Eliza.156 The pick-up shapes the content at the start and creates the order of 
turn-taking. The Elizabots pick-up gives the pretense of the user starting interaction 
with Eliza responding. Eliza’s pick-up is the length of one reply and one response. 
The offense in the pick-ups excerpts above are ascribed to my text box, and not to 
Eliza. The pick-up technique is a caricature of interaction with Eliza. Eliza’s 
interaction is reactive. The pick-up is the developer’s domain, a way to hijack 
content. It is also a subversion of the meet and greet conventions. The pick-up is 
5. The Pick-Up & Milgram’s Experiment | Interrupting Territoriality
198
154 A ‘developer’ may also be a programmer and can also be referred to as a “bot-maker”, a term used by, Robby Garner. 
(Garner, R. Robitron Posting, #10716 ‘Offensive Bot Responses’ 22 June 2008. Available from: http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/
group/Robitron/ [Accessed 30 June 2009]).
155 As a reminder, Eliza began with a two-line pick-up, therefore the pronouns ‘you’ and Eliza belong neither to the chatbot or 
myself as a part of a live conversation, but as a prerecorded script to begin live interaction. These pick-ups are created by the 
developer.
156 There are also chatbots, such as a donkey bot created by David Hamill which is yet to talk back as it is an experiment in 
getting a machine to learn vocabulary before interacting by way of response. (Hamill, D. ‘Ditto the Donkey’[online]. Available 
from: http://www.convo.co.uk/x02/ [Accessed, 30 June 2009]).
contradictory, reading as ‘go away - come here.’ The pick-up sets the formal and 
informal tone of proceeding interaction.157 
 Each of the four chatbots Jabberwacky, Brianna, Eliza, and Alice start 
interaction differently. I asked the Robitron group: 
What is the reason behind some chatbots starting with the chatbot's 
response, (for example, Rollo Carpenter's Jabberwacky) and others 
with the user's interaction (for example, Richard Wallace's Alice): and 
why does the Elizabot start with two text boxes filled in already?
 Dr Richard Wallace informed me that in an earlier version of his Alicebot there 
were around 200 pick-up lines used to initiate conversation but Alice no longer uses 
a pick-up technique.158 By measuring the length of the conversations that followed 
from each of the pick-up lines, Wallace explained that the best pick-up lines were: 
‘what’s your favourite movie?’ and the worst was ‘what do you think caused World 
War I?’ One of the worst pick-up lines was ‘ASL,’ which is an acronym for, ‘what is 
your age/sex/location?’ and is commonly used in chatroom conversation. In another 
response to my Robitron enquiry, the developer, Rollo Carpenter explained that he 
didn’t select the best pick-up lines manually but that the chatbot program does: 
“Lines that are most answered, without being filtered, get proportionality favored in 
the future” (Carpenter, 2009).159 Carpenter had tried various pick-up techniques with 
his chatbots, explaining that Jabberwacky uses a pick-up line, whereas his Cleverbot 
does not, “just to be different” (Carpenter, 2009).
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157 The pick-up also problematises the personal pronoun ‘you,’ in contrast, Artificial Intelligence, has problematised the 
personal pronoun, ‘I.’ Since Turing’s Test (1950) the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ have been a distinction between human and machine, but 
also as a game of gender; of distinguishing woman from machine. The third part of the problem is the tying of the two words, 
the fuck followed by the you as an indirect violence of language. Are chatbots sustaining the texture of social violence that 
pertains to violence in language (Žižek, 2008:61)? I believe that there should be a commonality between the ideas adopted for 
major violence and minor violations and that everyday occurrences of something similar to forward panic endured over a ‘fail-
safe’ period are just as damaging. I therefore intend to show how the credible minor personal space violations are by 
exemplifying troubles with chatbot interactions asking are they that different from the everyday violations that occur in life on a 
regular daily basis?
158 Robitron Postings, #12154, ‘Pick-up Lines was: [Robitron] Which Eliza?’ 22 January 2009. Available from: http://
tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/Robitron/ [Accessed 30 June 2009].
159 Robitron Postings, #12154, ‘Pick-up Lines was: [Robitron] Which Eliza?’ 22 January 2009. Available from: http://
tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/Robitron/ [Accessed 30 June 2009].
Developer’s Reflections 
of Offensive Language
Absent from the previous sections is the responses of the Elizabot’s developer. As a 
consequence of being unable to interview him about the use of offensive language, 
and the pick-up technique; this section considers the reflections of the Robitron 
developers. They provide a technical and a personal viewpoint on how they each 
choose to deal with general provocations that occur on either side of the bot-chat (by 
developer or user). Robitron developers are concerned with the relation of expletives 
used by bots and users. These cares are entwined with anxieties of control over the 
interactive process. I am interested in why the developers care if objective violence 
matters in language. I personally find the Elizabot’s pick-up technique oddly 
offensive and a little surprising.
 It seems that a byproduct of chatbot interaction is the ability for a user to come 
along and vent, that there is a need to ‘sound-off’ at chatbots. Robitron members 
have discussed the occurrence of offensive language in a series of posts entitled, 
Offensive Bot Responses, June 2008 (previously discussed in chapter 2). The 
Robitron group discussed two consequences of swearing in chatbot interaction but do 
not consider a developer swearing in a pick-up. The developers do discuss how this 
affects a chatbot’s ability to learn the responses of users in further interactions. 
Several developers felt distressed when reading the frequent occurrences of offensive 
language that appears repeatedly in their chatbot’s datalog. Their responses ranged 
from finding the language too traumatic to keep on reading, to an acceptance that this 
is an inevitable process of learning, indicating that swearing is a part of everyday 
talk. Other developers felt that it was detrimental to the chatbot and opinion was 
divided among the group of developers. The discussion thread went on to discuss 
various technical ways that a developer can deal with offensive language in order to 
“socially engineer” interaction and gain control over the occurrence of offensive 
language.
 Is the only answer to offensive language to manipulate and regulate the user’s 
proximity to the chatbot? Offensive language is not such a dark art, but as Robby 
Garner said users chat to: “exercise their dark side to the extreme” (Garner, 2008). 
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Adeena Mig considered offensive language as “very nasty things” (Mig, 2008). 
Robby Garner pondered, could it “simply be considered normal” (Garner, 2008). 
Jeremy Gardiner believed that it creates a “sour and aggressive” chatbot (Gardiner, 
2008). In response to Adeena, Noel Bush writes:
I'm a lot less disturbed by people cursing up a storm at a bot than by
people cursing at me. :-) Noel Bush    (Bush, 2008)

 Bush considered offensive inputs as a part of normal language, along with 
Jeremy Gardiner (he was the initial developer that began the thread of the posts as a 
technical query). Bush believes that it is just the frequency of offense that renders 
chatbot interaction distinct from everyday human interactions. To draw on the data of 
chapter two, I am not so sure that this is the case. The chatbots’ use of expletives is 
treated differently to the user’s use of expletives. Chatbot developers deal with 
offensive talk and to an extent are met with the regulations of national and 
international law, to regulate offense as a form of unwanted interaction. Chatbots in 
this are a form of containment, a vessel of user deviancy (dependent on whether one 
regards offensive language as normative or deviant). Chatbots are open to offense by 
users, they are able to repeat without trace and without the user being held to account 
(due to laws preventing the tracing of IP addresses).
 Methods of deterrence do however present their own problems. The range of 
technical solutions to reduce the occurrence of offensive language was solved for the 
main part by deterring persons from swearing. This was done by making users aware 
that they are entering a social environment that other people use. Chatbots can 
occupy forums and chatrooms. The rules of human-to-human interaction in these 
environments can also be applied to the interaction with chatbots. It was discussed 
that the method by which a developer deters offensive language, may in fact break 
the law. Tom Joyce (the developer who helped in the co-word occurrence test in 
chapter two) suggested that deterring a person who consistently offended could be 
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achieved by a reminder that user details are being, or could be, traced.160 A developer 
can also monitor the number of occurrences of an offense by individual users. The 
user’s IP number can be stored and a threat can then follow, informing the offender 
that they maybe excluded from the forum. To get hold of these details requires that 
the forum has a registration procedure. Joyce’s hypothetical method is supported by 
David Hamill’s response to Joyce’s posting (Hamill,2008 and Joyce, 2008). Hamill 
suggests that there are data protection issues around this process (at least at this 
present time) within Europe that restricts a computer from storing and using personal 
data in this way. To avoid this illegality Hamill suggests registering with the Data 
Protection Register in order to “operate within the act” (Hamill, 2008). Regardless of 
whether storing the location of a person is legal or illegal, tying the user to their 
bodily location configures a personal space that is biologically bound. The 
implications of this are that the virtual interactor is tied to the rules and laws of the 
physical interactor and the physical environment of the user. This mode of censorship 
locks down interaction, keeping personal space firmly attached to the physical 
coordinates of the body-in-place. Censorship of offensive language that is deemed 
antisocial can be used to entrap our virtuality within the confines of the body by the 
locatable coordinates of one’s computer.
 Another alternative example of how developers deter offensive interaction is 
evident in the Loebner prize rules, 2008. According to the judge, Huma Shah, each of 
the Loebner prize judges must follow the rule below:
Please do not abuse a system/use abusive language – the developers 
will be able to 'see' IP addresses of those interacting with their 
systems. If you become frustrated with a system's responses or its 
inability to follow your conversation please end the dialogue. (Huma 
Shah’s Robitron Posting ‘Offensive bot responses,’ # 10719, 23 June 
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160 Registration to a forum can initiate users into forum rules. Registration creates a regulatory code of conduct, as Tom Joyce 
discusses concerning the ‘phpBB3 Forum AI.’ Building into the forum software are “word censors” for those that still swear 
regardless of forum rules:
 “so the word censors are not of much use. The database can be scanned with SQL: 
 Select username, ip_number from posts_table where conversation like '%freck%' 
 "freck" is not an actual curse word. It is used on TV on Battle Star Galactica.
Then you can just scan for that one username who curses, whenever they login instead of everyone all the time. Again this is 
only a hypothetical. It is not required in reality. Note: This example is made intentionally simple, so non-programmers can 
enjoy it, while getting the point across to developers” (Tom Joyce, Robitron Posting Offensive bot responses, #10721, 23 June 
2008. Available from: http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/Robitron/ [Accessed 30 June 2009]).
2008. Available from: http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/Robitron/ 
[Accessed 30 June 2008]).
 The ruling implies that offensive language occurs due to frustration with the 
system, and refers back to ‘sounding off’ by users but this also applies to developers 
interacting with another chatbot. There is tacit social responsibility applied in the 
‘Offensive Bot Responses’ posts of Joyce and Shah. To behave as a human might, 
requires the chatbot interaction to adhere on both sides (human or machine) to the 
polite codes of conduct, and to formal ways of greeting. Responsibility to others is a 
way of controlling the form of talk by asking the user to leave the situation, in order 
to not get too close. This is a preventative method to deter frustration repeating back 
into the chatbot system. 
 The issue of reenactment which I first investigated when considering Milgram's 
‘Obedience to Authority’ experiments will now be examined in relation to the 
occurrence of offensive language in chatbots. Offensive language can be a one-sided 
retort but it is often used to provoke a reaction. Offensive language is not just a 
single utterance, it is reactive process reliant on interpretation. Chatbot judges (which 
includes developer) are advised not to vent off at the chatbots in the competition; and 
developer's in Europe are unable to log or track users as a way to threaten or deter 
offensive users. Both methods cannot prevent frustration repeating back into the 
chatbot system. The first protects the machinic system and the second protects the 
human rights of the user to be untraceable, anonymous and unidentifiable to a 
specific IP server (which gives a data profile of the details pertaining to human 
identity and place where the interaction took place). The offensive pick-up technique 
rouses protective methods in the user and the developer (and to an extent the 
chatbot). The developer remains anonymous and untraceable behind the machinic 
system, (a form of protection), whereas the developer leaves the chatbot system open 
to offense (with a potential for the system to be abused); in fact the pick-up 
welcomes users to offend (perhaps to capture this behaviour pattern, yet to what ends 
— remains unknown). The Eliza developer is experimenting whether this is with a 
capital ‘E’ to Experiment, or a soft e to experiment. What the developer hopes to 
reproduce is unknown but it set-ups a guarantee of reactive rejection to the machinic 
system. It is a risky and inventive procedure, but whether it makes for a ‘good 
politics’ or ‘good science’ is open to critique. Regulating and controlling chatbot talk 
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is just one way to shape reactive provocation but this depends on knowing whether 
an expletive is offensive and this depends on how the offensive context is imagined 
within an chatbot system. Referring back to chapter 2, it depends whether the pick-
up technique is seen as creating nonsense and in this case the offensive pick-up is a 
violation that is a subsidiary category of nonsense: or as a violence for disrespecting 
the machine, that is intended and encouraged in order to include offensive language 
along with the cohesive meaningful vernacular language.
Hidden Interlocutors in Audio 
& Transcript of Rudiments
 The pick-up technique was enacted as several audio rudiments which translate 
the pick-up from text to speech. It is a way to understand how one ‘hear’s to imagine 
how the chatbot’s words as an animated speech act, to question how one might hear 
prosody in text-based chat. However, the discussion that follows is less to do with 
what is heard but what remains silent, that cannot be translated from text to speech, 
that is the use of square brackets that ensues in the second line of the Pick-Up 
Rudiment. The offensive pick-up technique is not a regular way for a chatbot to talk. 
The square brackets included in the pick-up, are part of the pick-up and have not 
been added in my subsequent transcription. The brackets would be significant to a 
developer as a coding tool, usually used to place metadata. Both lines of the pick-up 
are displayed on the chatbot interface but above the text boxes. This is where the 
chatbot interaction is displayed once it has been uttered. The interaction, therefore, 
starts before the text boxes but in fact is displayed in the text that goes afterwards. It 
is a disorientating spatiality that merges two modes of time, the before and the after 
(a further discussion of time and duration is pursued in chapter 6). The square 
brackets and the entire pick-up are usually created by the developer of the chatbot 
and the anonymity of the identity of the chatbot developer is brought into question as 
a further questioning of their knowledge base, beyond chatbot technology. This use 
of square brackets is a form of language codification used in many disciplines but 
that appears empty of instruction, not even an ellipsis is included which would 
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denote that text is missing. The emptiness of the square brackets is usually denoted 
as a pause with an ellipsis, such as [. . .] 
 A potential conversational expert lurks within the developer’s pick-up sequence 
evident in this use of code. I would like to suggest that a main user-group of chatbots 
are conversational experts, since this group has reasons to interact with a chatbot. 
The square brackets are a type of interjection used in a variety of ways, such as 
proofreading, coding C++ to place metadata, or as gestural indications, or pauses 
used by a director or playwright to make notes to actors (as used by Artaud in his 
scripts for theatre). Each method nests information within information. In this thesis 
square brackets nest timestamps when internet sites were last accessed using 
metadata to order the various durations of time. In the appendix I have used square 
brackets to denote an error, [sic] is used within the text and not a subsequent error 
made in my translation. John J. Gumperz, a professor of anthropological linguistics 
writes in his chapter, ‘Contextualisation and Understanding,’ that square brackets are 
to be differentiated from other forms of bracketing:
[] Nonlexical phenomena, both vocal and nonvocal, which 
interrupt the lexical stretch (eg. text [laugh] text//)
()  Unintelligible speech
   (Gumperz in Duranti & Goodwin, 1992: 248) 
 In anthropological linguistics square brackets are used to add context outside of 
what is spoken, additions that might indicate bodies situated in environments. Square 
brackets can signify a place to discuss the social meaning of language as a text that 
will be read by another at a later time. One of the objectives of Duranti and 
Goodwin’s collected writings on context is to get each of the fields whose members 
attributed to the book (linguistic anthropology, sociolinguistics, discourse analysis, 
pragmatics, conversational analysis, and the sociology of language) to be exposed to 
each other’s techniques as a commitment to study “situated discourse” (Duranti & 
Goodwin, 1992: 2). Considering this, I would argue that it is already happening 
potentially in the way chatbots are used by researchers of language, particularly on 
the internet. Researchers are exposed to each other’s techniques. Eliza’s pick-up has 
brought together a discussion of pick-ups, square brackets and rudiments. The square 
brackets I conclude is a ‘special nowhere’ (as understood in chapter one) of language 
experts to situate their metadata, but what of this system situated within the action of 
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a developer’s pick-up, how is it meaningful? This special nowhere is a place for 
researchers to simultaneously occupy the outside and inside of the frame of a single 
action. The special nowhere is an analytic pause within an interactional stage which 
extends possibilities of including metadata (which can be prosodic, to stress patterns 
of intonation and emotional variation) within the frame of the pick-up.
Everything is pitiful, and nothing is missing and yet the self is no 
longer there.
There is in the action of opium [. . . ]
      (Artaud, [1934] 1988)
 The action of opium in Artaud’s letter to a friend, describes the effect of opium 
as a response that is almost beyond writing and words, it is to be left out of 
descriptive writing. The effect is only symbolically represented. Yet, how does it help 
to consider the square brackets as a territorial move? The square brackets illuminate 
that the process of chatbot talk is a deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of data 
and metadata. Territorialisation moves do not just affect semi and fixed-feature 
environments in the physical world, but are also to be found within language and 
refer not just to the spatialities, (including the symbolic and metaphorical spatialities) 
such as the ellipsis and the square brackets. Territorialisation moves are are not just 
the expletives used in the first line of the pick-up but the inclusion of the square 
brackets in the second. The entire pick-up is a territorial move of reenactment of 
mock interaction. The territorialisation moves in a pick-up involve hidden actants 
(such as the developer), the pretense of Eliza and a user interacting before 
subsequent live interaction takes place.
Interrupting Writing & 
Counteranthropomorphising Victims
 This section considers the interrelation of violence in academic writing 
concentrating back again on the first line of the pick-up. Does anyone swear in 
academic writing? Shock, surprise and startle are not usual styles of academic 
writing, they are theatrical styles of abrasion. Writers, such as David Foster 
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Wallace161, and academics such as Lee Edelman and Stephen Shaviro have all used 
‘fuck’ in their writing but to what effect? 
Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we're collectively 
terrorized; fuck Annie, fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, 
innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and with 
small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future 
that serves as its prop. (Edelman, 2004: 29)
 Wallace toys with the sympathies of the reader as one is pulled in and out of 
sympathy for the character referred to as B.I. and the women that he recounts. The 
quote below is taken from one final short story entitled like the book where it is 
found, Brief Interviews with Hideous men, (Foster Wallace, 1999: 245). The story 
describes B.I. raping a woman. At first, one is sympathetic with the victim whose 
voice is not present. After the story is reenacted in fiction, Foster Wallace (as author), 
leads the reader towards the final twist in the story. At this point it is unclear and 
provocatively ambiguous as to whether Foster Wallace is addressing the most likely 
readership of his book, a female, feminist readership; it is interesting to suggest that 
Foster Wallace’s own reflective voice breaks through the character’s voice to 
biographically utter anger at the listener’s gratification obtained from this violent 
self-confession. Although Foster Wallace addresses a feminist reader (amongst 
others); he doesn’t use the word ‘fuck’ in this instance, though he does use other 
sexually explicit derogatory terms. 
I stand here before you. Judge me, you chilly cunt. You dyke, you 
bitch, cooze, cunt, slut, gash. Happy now? All borne out? Be happy. I 
don’t care. I knew she could. I knew I loved. End of story. (Foster 
Wallace, 1999: 271)
 Foster Wallace startles the reader and when I read the story for the first time the 
affects it raised finally settled into a state of excited surprise. Edelman uses 
expletives to interrupt and subverts the technical use of language by the American 
government. Swearing stops oratory and rhetoric from operating smoothly and 
interrupts with antisocial effect. It is an unusual strategy to adopt and breaks with the 
conventional academic practices of writing and established traditions of formality. 
The inappropriate use of expletives in academia creates tension, it could be 
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161 David Foster Wallace was also an academic, but it is his short story and not his academic career that I bring to light in this 
thesis.
considered an immature stunt at worst, at best it can be used to undermine or make 
clear the conventions of certain interactional processes. 
 As an expression of frustrated hopelessness, Shaviro swears to undermine the 
positive associations of ‘connectedness’ that are asserted around web 2.0. Used 
neither to surprise or subvert, he merely uses it to describe a status quo of too much 
connectivity. The hopelessness of meaningful connection to a chatbot is fucked by 
the many disconnections and the involvement of metadata. It is the square brackets in 
the pick-up that illuminate the issues of connectivity in human to chatbot interaction. 
The square brackets interrupts the surprise of the offensive first line, and interrupts 
the appearance of Eliza interacting with a previous unfriendly user. Chatbots are 
neither friends or enemies in this study, but I did get caught up in the conflict game 
that was established in the pick-up. Chatbots are more laboratory rats than friendly 
pets. There is no such thing as a wild chatbot to be found on the internet, perhaps 
there are too many researchers conducting experiments on all sides of the interaction. 
Yet the more a chatbot becomes territorially controlled the more they seem to 
become feral things. 
 In her HCI research, De Angeli writes:
We claim that social agents do not only have to look good: they also have to behave 
well. Effective agents should set-up lasting and meaningful relationships with users 
while satisfying functional needs and aesthetic experiences. . . . Human tendencies to 
dominate, be rude, infer stupidity were all present in our study. Social agents will have a 
hard time to set-up relationships with such unfriendly partners. 
(De Angeli et al., 2001: 7)
 An attitude of supposed friendliness towards chatbots casts the chatbot role as 
victim, and the user’s role as friend. Therefore, whatever violence or violation 
occurs, even if only to surprise or to startle, potentially makes victims out of chatbots 
and invisible perpetrators out of users. Why does the anthropomorphy felt towards 
chatbots on behalf of their developers or researchers always have to victimise the 
chatbot by feeling sorry, counter-anthropomorphically so without ever reflexively 
wondering what kind of protection mechanism or territoriality is being set-in-place? 
As the pick-up excerpts show, the chatbot and I repeated the pick-up verbatim. I 
vented at the chatbot in the same manner as the pick-up, and the chatbot predictably 
responded. There is no meaningful relationship evident here. I was not transformed 
anthropomorphically. There is no friend or foe. What is learned are the machinic 
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rules of repetitive learning and the codes of obedience and control set down by both 
the developer and user. 
 Pick-up techniques set the scene, but are they really needed in human-computer 
interaction? Pick-ups are used in all forms of human life from saying hello to a friend 
when meeting on the street or by saying hello on the telephone. They are just not 
referred to as “pick-ups”, which has a sexual connotation in the human-to-human 
vernacular use of the term. The pick-up technique as the chatbot developers 
understand is abbreviated in text messaging and in some chatbots they are absent 
altogether unless the user insists on enacting a meet and greet ritual without the 
developer’s prompt. 
 As for the fact that I swore back, I heard my reply reenacted in the Audio 
Rudiments and even if I meant this to be an utterance that tested the system, my 
ineloquent reply created a stalemate position. The pick-up line provokes and refuses 
to follow the conventional rituals of the polite meet and greet. I responded to the 
technique by following the pick-up’s direction of talk, reattaching to its territorial 
insistence of defensive and offensive interaction. It was an example of an experiment 
territorialising a Rudiment.
 Milgram’s methodical experiments still resonate primarily for the ethical 
problematics and for Milgram’s lack of duty of care. The pick-up technique which 
may be used to guide new users into interacting with chatbots guided me away from 
my intentions to create a Rudiment, but the digression provided nonetheless, 
interesting data — albeit not in the way that I had intended. Both experiments 
resonate, they are innovative enactments that raise ethical challenges, particularly 
within interactive research. The pick-up technique (with offensive language) cut 
through the usual meet and greet ritual deterritorialising a highly territorial action 
and flow. The pick-up that has been most discussed in this chapter raises the 
question: who do we really meet when interacting with a chatbot; and who is this 
familiar stranger that swears to interact? A chatbot is in so many respects the 
‘familiar stranger’ but in the case of the pick-up technique I attribute this more to the 
developer than to the autonomy of the chatbot. The developer in question 
(responsible for Eliza’s pick-ups) broke good social relations and rejected the 
friendly intimacy that de Angeli earlier brought into question. Eliza did have a hard 
time setting up good relations with humans because the developer territorialised the 
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interactive process with its pick-up technique. It is not the chatbot that is brought into 
question it is the developer. 
 I should add that it is difficult to differentiate the developer from the chatbot on 
most occasions, except for at times when the chatbot informs the user that it is 
learning and will report something to its developer (as is the case with the Alicebot), 
or when the pick-up technique seems so disconnected (in tone and manner) from the 
usual chatbot interaction (as was the case with the Elizabot). Yet this brings into 
question whether one can really differentiate the user and the chatbot when so much 
of what is said is continually repeated. Regardless of whose text box talk is uttered 
from, the similarities between the two are always evident in the techniques of elision 
(on behalf of the chatbot) and repair (on behalf of the user). However, the difference 
is apparent when things go wrong and the chatbot starts to produce nonsense. 
Differentiating the developer from the chatbot, and the chatbot from the user is a 
continual cycle of reattachment. The deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations that 
happen in chatbot interaction are far more fluctuating in this form of human-machine 
interaction than they would be in an informal chat between humans because the 
interaction always has the added element of a third and hidden interlocutor popping 
up in the text. 
Conclusion
 The pick-up not only suggests that chatbots are a form of experimental 
language (the language of experimental processes used by language experts) to 
which I contributed as a participant-researcher (with the result that my interactions 
will be added to the repertoire of chatbot responses). It goes beyond this to argue that 
transformations can occur with developer, chatbot and user. This transformation is 
more than just anthropomorphic affectations. These transformations are territorial 
actions. The “backlash of transformation” is made clear in the example of the the 
chamois territorialising the scientist-observer (Stengers, 1997: 172). In the pick-up is 
a transformation of a researcher finding a field of researchers in that I discovered the 
experimenters behind the chatbots. It was not experienced without the challenges of 
dominance and domination for example, the pick-up line was and is an experimental 
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procedure that had created enough interest to have overturned a rudimentary 
procedure. 
 In answer to the question posed at the beginning, what does it mean to interrupt 
a concept of territoriality, it is to interrupt a form of control, be that self-regulation or 
self-constraint, or the bind of personal space in an experimental procedure. I aimed 
to take into account my interpretations as a researcher becoming a participant in a 
developer’s set-up, study or experiment (it is difficult to know within which of these 
the pick-up operates), taking into account the reflexive aspects of territoriality that 
were lacking in Milgram’s own interpretations and the subsequent critiques. 
 By discussing Milgram’s experiment alongside the pick-up technique I did not 
intend the argument of this chapter to be causal. I did however, want to illuminate 
territoriality as a problem of performance, of enactment and reenactment in the 
experimental setting. The Rudiments that were conducted throughout the research 
made me realise that I cannot observe without intervening. I also found that my 
transformations in talking to chatbots were not to find friendly companionship, or to 
stage human and non-human battles, or to enact the roles of friend and foe, 
irrespective of whether this involves chatbots or human users. 
 There are limits to this chapter, which includes the absence of the comments 
from the Elizabot’s developer and a retort to the STS critique (other than my own), to 
what Milgram would say in response. Blass went as far as to say that Milgram would 
have been pleased with the continuing dramatisation of his obedience experiments 
citing Milgram as saying: “Good experiments, like good drama, embody 
verities” (Milgram in Blass, 2004: 263). I am not so sure that this would have been 
the case, nor is it a very rich interpretation of the critique of the performativity in 
Milgram’s work. Blass found that Milgram’s work has parallels in the current torture 
of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and the subsequent nine years of strip-search hoaxes 
made by American military personnel (Blass, 2004: 296). I believe that this form of 
correlation reproduces Milgram’s experiments, rather than reenacts. It is Stengers’ 
and Latour’s critique that resonates. And of course Dickinson’s work also resonates 
throughout the repetition enabling a twist that is not just a reenactment, but a 
transferral of a scientific experimental procedure to an arts space, thereby reattaching 
this reenactment and its ethical dilemma to the arts).
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 Experiments and critiques from disciplines other than the one from which it 
was created, do not always start so neatly from the same position, but from the 
position of a different territoriality which will observe or omit observations on the 
territoriality of living or technological thing; be that a human, primate or chatbot — 
conversational system or electrical machine. Finally, by interrupting territoriality I do 
not believe that territory belongs to the innate, and territoriality to the living; but 
there is a melding of the two. The experiments and critiques of this chapter are in 
some way questioning territorial behaviour: Strum noted (in the field of ethology) her 
own transformations of the researcher; I witnessed finding myself within an 
experimental procedure; Milgram in the field of social-psychology studying 
territoriality transformed the participant into a torturer/tortured. Yet, what of the 
actant critiquing? How are Stengers, Latour, and Dickinson transformed? Dickinson 
had transformed a new audience of critics and raised an ethical dilemma is raised in 
the sphere of performative reenactment. The original actors used by Milgram are 
now known actors from the outset, performing torture for an arts-going audience. 
Rudiments as a methodological procedure acknowledge the partial, fragmentary and 
ongoing process of the experiment and experimenter, to allow for transformations. 
When research is tided up into a cohesive experimental procedure, further territorial 
moves need to be taken into account at the stage of critique. This is important when 
thinking through the process of when research goes outside, and ventures into other 
disciplinary arenas. There are ethics to be considered in the replicability of 
experiments in one field reattaching to another. 
 When a researcher encounters another’s research within their own experimental 
procedure, (such as the square brackets within the Prisoner’s Dilemma Rudiment) 
then it is also important to note that further territorial moves extend the insideness of 
the experimental/rudimentary account. The depth by which one encounters the inside 
and outside of a researcher's personal space also spreads outwards in critique.
 Territoriality is spatial, technical, gestural, bodily and affectual. Researchers 
perform all of these territorial acts even when their role is limited. The electric shock 
machine and the word-pair test, in Milgram’s study, alongside the chatbot’s meet and 
greet procedure (known as the pick-up) were focused on for their technicity. In the 
chatbot example, systemic and symbolic violence makes interaction feel sped up, 
giving the impression of being closer and nearer than usual.
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 Rather than cybernetics, ethology and psychology being triangulated as a 
critique of Milgram’s experiment (like he intended), this chapter engaged with 
sociology, the arts and ethology with no attempt to structure a hierarchy to the 
critique of these disciplines. A further interdisciplinary interpretation ensued, that 
took into account STS, the performance arts, and HCI to preference the role of 
technology as an active participant that considers the relation between human and 
chatbot. This was contrary to De Angeli’s query that anthropomorphy is fucked and 
chatbots are feral things. What holds things together is not linear, hierarchized, 
centralised, or aborescent (Deleuze, 2004: 361) because the pick-up disrupts the flow 
of linear turn-taking and decentralises the role of the chatbot at least for two lines in 
the pick-up. The status of a developer as the master of the chatbot talk is tacitly 
enforced. The chatbot is not central, it is intermediary and made a mockery. 
 In relation to the discussion of expletives in academic writing, I extended the 
discussion of offensive language to consider the ways expletives have entered formal 
modes of writing in academia, at present. These alternate ways of arguing are a form 
of deterritorialising and reterritorialising the academic experiment and the writing of 
research. Each violence studied in this chapter (the part of the electric shock 
machine, the expletives used on the pick-up lines and Audio Rudiments) are only 
violent in that threat can be considered a form of violence. Violence is rare but 
violation prolifically occurs in the reattachments of deterritorialisation and 
reterritorialisation which are less bound by the physical definitions of violence. This 
is violence in the range of violation which is further discussed in the next chapter in a 
discussion of failure and failsafe processes, as a continuation of studying punishing 
structures, systems and set-ups. Both chapter two and five lead up to the next chapter 
in that they both focus on offensive language, with chapter five extending a 
discussion of territoriality into the area of the experiment and its subsequent critique. 
This chapter moves a discussion from chatbots to a wider use of cases, in order to 
consider personal space and territoriality in further technological set-ups. This 
opening out of the technology under examination helps to rethink territoriality with 
other automation systems. 
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 Both cases showed territorial enactments that experiment with the human 
conventions of formal interaction. In both cases it is the mediating technology that 
provides the pivot by which to deterritorialise and reterritorialise authoritative action. 
I have attempted to argue that machinic agency is a territorial aspect of personal 
space that is relevant to studies of human-machine interaction as well as STS. This 
implication should take into account how machines impact on the experimental 
process and helps to mediate the power and authority of the initiator of experiments. 
This should impact as a methodological and ethical imperative on any of the fields 
cited in this chapter (STS, arts performance, socio-psychology, creative writing, 
graphic design, AI, and HCI). Milgram’s experiment has created subsequent ways to 
think ethically about the experimental method. The HCI context however, can to an 
extent bypass many of the ethical frames of enquiry now asked for in academic 
research. I propose that the concept of personal space (as an imagination of territorial 
action) is a good way to work through these ethical concerns as a reflective process 
positioned to guide the experimenter in the use of proxemics and enactments that 
links a historical socio-anthropological (Hall) method, with an STS method of 
enactment (but with an emphasis on the theatrical use of performance); and a 
historical socio-psychological/quasi cybernetic experiment with a contemporary AI/
quasi C.A. (Conversational Analysis) experiment. All came together to focus on the 
technological pivot of machines that were emphasised symmetrically between the 
two accounts.
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Impending Disaster: 
Two Automated Risk Scenarios
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An Introduction to Anxiety and Terror
 Chatbots are just one type of automated system, one chain of human-machine 
interactions of which personal space conceptions are understood. This chapter refers 
to the wider frameworks of automation that chatbots fit within. By contrasting two 
territorial systems involving threat this chapter considers automation concerning 
territoriality. As a matter of security this goes beyond the protective personal space 
mechanisms of a human’s anatomical defence. I will investigate how territoriality is 
manipulated as a part of safety systems in two textual examples of risk — the 
Directive-3 (2003), an American regulatory legislation document, and the Fail-Safe 
(1962), a science fiction novel and its two succeeding films. Chatbots can operate in 
all of these scenarios either to protect or to deceive. So far, each of the chapters has 
been concerned with errors, mistakes, developmental failures, repair encompassing 
when chatbots do unexpected things and uncertainty is a matter of concern (evident 
in the excerpts below). So far, the Rudiments investigated the territorial aspects of 
chatbot technology. The relation of this chapter to the preceding chapters is to place 
chatbots and the Rudiments within a historical context of machinic anxiety; to 
investigate the designing of anxiety machines devoid of emotion or bodily concerns. 
This chapter places a discussion of personal space at a global and national scale 
which has previously not been discussed; and explicitly deals with the safety aspects 
of a conception of personal space as a matter of security and planning for risk. 
Excerpt 1. Taken from the Chatbot Transcript: 
The Home Rudiment (27th December 2004)
Human:   Yes you have a choice. Do you want to still 
   collaborate? 
Jabberwacky:  Yes why not? 
Human:   OK. Do you think that I have missed out some 
   notions that the artwork was about? 
Jabberwacky:  Yes, you are only a computer program. 
Human:   Again, you avoid my questions.
Excerpt 2. Taken from the Chatbot Transcript: 
The Art Rudiment (28th December 2004)
Alice:   I am trying to learn as much as possible. 
Jabberwacky:  Are you trying to learn things at random? 
Eliza:   Would you prefer if I were not trying to learn 
   things at random? 
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[Error, I typed Jabberwacky’s reply as including the word human, will 
stop conversation for human error] 
Jabberwacky:  Human: Yes. 
Alice:   Are you a human? 
 The two excerpts are examples of a fault found by the chatbot but made by the 
user. Chatbots make remarks that could be construed as attempts to repair error. The 
chatbots seem to have reversed the Turing Test, 1950 with the user needing to prove 
their humanness. The errors are considered computational ones, that perhaps only a 
machine could make. The mistake in the second excerpt was caused because of an 
error in my cutting and pasting of responses from one chatbot’s web page to another, 
in an attempt to get chatbots to talk to one another. Whether or not the machines are 
able to fully spot these errors or whether they were serendipitous is not important 
here, I start with these excerpts because they led me to question the territorial 
measures that are embedded in chatbots and in this chapter to the wider automated 
systems that operate territorially. These excerpts show the hidden repair work of the 
developers with all four excerpts eliciting various ways of dealing with human and 
machine error, as a point of repair. Fixing these errors inside the conversational 
frame keeps the interaction stable and meaningful as evidenced in excerpts 1-2.
Excerpt 3. Taken from a Robitron Posting:
Offensive Bot Responses by David Hamill (19th June 2008)
I decided to use supervised learning. By selecting the training 
examples myself I can make sure the bot learns only what I want it to 
learn. (You won't be surprised to hear
that Ditto the donkey receives a lot of "ass" comments.)
Excerpt 4. Taken from a Robitron Posting:
Offensive Bot Responses by Bob Norris (22nd June 2008)
I agree a filter can do this. I have a filter in place that if a word is said 
the AI will tell the user to stop using random outputs. I suppose it 
would be easy enough to have the AI ignore these inputs as far as live 
learning would go.. . . People using my AI have an option to turn on/
off what I call the extended brain which contains the live learned 
information as well as several megs of KB's. Then the AI relies only 
on their taught input to respond. 
 I will begin with the Fail-Safe novel followed by the Directive-3, not because 
they are causally related cases but because the latter embeds the former within 
smaller, community-focused disaster scenarios. Threats include the failure of 
information systems such as the use of the internet and credit card systems. Nuclear 
threats are not just big and threatening operating at state level involving fanatical 
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dictators, nuclear goes small, risks become nano, and the warfare gets a whole lot 
more messy and complex. Both examples involve the sphere of the imaginary at the 
planning stage. This chapter focuses on the imagination of disaster as a way to repair 
and plan against uncertainty. Both cases cover numerous scales of escalating risk 
with violent enactments happening at a range of proximities, from the physical to the 
intangible (as illustrated in figure 38). Personal space is not a universalising concept 
in this diagram whereby all actions are territorial, but rather to emphasise the 
extensive ways that it can be used as a design rationale, as a consequence of fearing 
territoriality imagined at all levels within both the Fail-Safe novel and the 
Directive-3. 
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 Territorial action in these cases involves thinking through disaster regardless of 
whether something is human or machine, with both getting caught up as a matter to 
defence. Edward Hall’s work on semi-fixed, and fixed-feature space is once again 
employed as a theoretical frame (1964). Hall’s work is utilised to understand how 
automated systems give territorial justifications for rearranging both semi-fixed and 
fixed-feature space as a consequence of imagining risk. Contemporary theories of 
territoriality by Deleuze and Guattari (2004), as well as Brown and Capedevila (in 
Law and Hassard, 1999), consider territorial action in motion. 
 As a further justification of the predominant science fiction case used here, I 
will briefly explain the relations between the science fiction novel and the 
Directive-3. There are many well documented antecedents to the Fail-Safe novel that 
link science fiction and science fact in matters of safety with many science fiction 
writers being employed in national security to imagine risk scenarios. Similar to the 
JASON group (the 1960s independent group of scientists and designers advising for 
the United States government on matters of science and technology), the SIGMA 
group is an advisory group of science fiction writers that have advised on Homeland 
Security for the United States since 1992.162 SIGMA has included writers such as 
Jerry Pournelle, Arlan Andrews, Greg Bear, Larry Niven and Sage Walker (Mimi 
Hall, 2007). Contemporary scenarios sell risk solutions to worldwide governments 
such as the think tank DEMOS which has advised on risk scenarios for the British 
government. The imaginative sphere of science fiction helps to understand how 
violently imagined scenarios validate a manipulation of everyday personal space and 
help rethink the mundanity of international non-places such as airports and train 
stations. Science fiction literature in this way links to regulatory policy on 
international security matters and how it is used to monitor the territoriality of both 
humans and machines as a threat to each other. I will show how regulatory practices 
and the mediation of human-machine interaction is a process that violates as well as 
protects, and that a restraining regulatory procedure is a violent use of the 
epistemologies of personal space. 
To prevent a catastrophe there is neither an easy answer nor a 
scientific formula. (Koop, 1946: 291)
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162 The meaning behind the acronyms for both the JASON and SIGMA groups are disputed.
The rise of safety regulation, safety device innovations, the search for 
a national standard. She was learning about Empiricism but didn’t 
know it. (Whitehead, 1999: 45)
 The two quotations above introduce the methodological concerns of this 
chapter, that is how risk affects as a matter of territoriality. The first citation is taken 
from the CIA’s archives, entitled; The Deception Research Program, No. 9: 
Bibliography (1980), declassified in 2001. It is one of many sentiments and expresses 
the countless attempts to make scientific the affects, feelings and emotions 
augmented by risk. Scientific analytics pervade in the Fail-Safe novel to rationalise 
and manipulate the fears of nuclear threat. To rethink the imaginative sphere of 
disaster presented in policy and fiction alike, the affects of anxiety (and terror) 
should be taken into account. How anxiety works in risk scenarios as affects is a 
matter that is endured over decades of political change and technological 
development. This chapter looks at how anxiety and more recently terror resonates in 
human-machine preparations that think up new ways to arrange human and machines 
in proximity to one another as matters of safety. There is no national standard to what 
anxiety is, yet it is the predominant reoccurring affect that motivates towards 
territorial change as a contingency of risk. Colson Whitehead’s science fiction 
writing challenges scientific empiricism along with scientific methods of repair and 
making technology safe. Whitehead rethinks the way scientific methodologies make 
technology safe, as a means of political control. The intuitive mechanisms of making 
technology safe are marginalised and feared in the novel, to repair by thinking and 
feeling is a violently subordinated way to diagnose an elevator fault. It is only the 
sentiment (from Whitehead’s novel) of intuiting, (to feel a problem) that is taken on 
as a way to understand how affects are manipulated to reconfigure personal space in 
the diagnosis of risk scenarios which are embedded in the interrelation of science 
fiction and of protecting scientific and technology safe in policy making.
 The colour-coded threat alert system (see fig. 42, in the second part of this 
chapter) is used particularly for terrorism rather than for other threats such as natural 
disasters. There are other threat alert systems for such matters including health risks 
such as the threat of swine flu, raised in 2009 to the status of pandemic (level 6). 
There are comparisons to be made with other schemes, such as those of Great Britain 
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that will not be covered in the scope of this thesis.163 My frame here was a 
comparison between the American fail-safe system and the American coded alert 
systems. 
Territorial Play - Star Wars & Fail-Safes
 As Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher warmly played with the balance of 
the cold war, I was perched on top of a haystack in Scotland playing childhood re-
enactments of Star Wars films (1977-). This was my introduction to the space race 
and to atomic warfare, as fought out in the fields of rural Scotland that were mine, 
and my neighbours’ empire. This was my childhood territory when territorial play 
was a reenactment of Star Wars in the fields of wheat and oil-seed rape, our vast and 
dangerous outer space, our shared science fiction. We played out various territorial 
contingency plans practicing conflicts that were beyond the scope of our bodies. Just 
as hay bales signified the Death Star and our bicycles (with or without stabilisers) 
became space ships, the world around signified an imagined war game that enacted 
the roles of humans and cyborgs of the Star Wars, films. I am therefore continuing to 
investigate precaution and protection as the various ways contingencies of 
territoriality are enacted; to consider how chatbots are caught up in questioning how 
automated systems are protected and accounted for in matters of risk, as an 
imaginative part of contingency planning.
 When playing out these childhood star wars on bicycles I experienced and 
learned how excitement accompanies anxiety. Battles gather other battles, and 
weapons gather other weapons and troops. These mini star wars continually repeated 
through the changing seasons, and our wars gathered new objects. Hay bales 
vanished and batons of oilseed rape became unearthed between summer and autumn 
and the wars repeated with different weaponry. As the seasons changed with the 
looming threat of winter with it would come a loss of most of the territory and things 
that defined the game in the first place. The star wars moved inside and outside to the 
domestic as the seasons changed.
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163 The threat alert system for nuclear war, in Great Britain is called the Bikini state and commenced on the 19th May, 1970.
 A study of territory whether it involves humans or machines usually leads to 
ruminating on geographical, biological or technological defence - all three are 
inherent in the procedure of any fail-safe. Ordinarily, a fail-safe is a mechanism 
functioning to protect, it is the moment when a machine reverts to a safe condition to 
prevent, limit and/or control the effects of malfunction or breakdown. A fail-safe can 
be a safety catch, a panic room or an atomic warning system. Whilst fail-safes are the 
domain of the technical, they are related to the preservation drives of life. A human, 
mammal or insect will revert to particular modes of behaviour in the event of 
potential violence. An animal may remain still to avoid predators but they might also 
swarm or flock to ensure safety in numbers, thereby avoiding the likelihood of being 
singled out for personal attack. 
 When territoriality becomes greater than our physical or domestic territories of 
body and dwelling, further self-protection methods are invented to protect our 
personal space like the gun in relation to the body, or a panic room in relation to the 
home, or weapons of mass destruction in relation to the state. Furthermore fail-safes 
are in proximity to the place and time of impending disaster be that a timer on a 
bomb, a safety catch near the trigger of a gun, a door lock next to the door handle, or 
a nuclear missile in proximity to its target. These fail-safes show an escalation of 
threat from a bodily personal space to shared domestic spaces, towards systems and 
spaces that are physically impractical to territorialise (see fig. 38).
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A Rationale for the 1962 
Fail-Safe Case Study
 The fail-safe system that is the basis of the 1962 novel, (with the same title) 
was anticipated in Wheeler’s earlier short story Abraham ’58, in which Abraham’s 
salvation depends on sacrificing his son. This parable becomes that of the American 
President in the story of the fail-safe.164 The military research for those stories 
originates in the published work of the Rand Corporation (Mc Graw, 1962: 207). The 
connection between cybernetics, AI and inevitably chatbots is the technological 
history that is told and retold in both fiction and reality, but leads me to a detailed 
secondary link with AI.165 There are no AI fail-safes named as such in the 1960s that 
predate the fiction films; neither my trip to New England to research the first 
conference proceedings of AI in 1956, held at Darmouth, nor MIT’s or DARPA’s list 
of publications found evidence of such a link (MIT Publications Search: 2008 and 
DARPA Keyword Search 2009). I also enquired on the 13th June 2008, by posting an 
enquiry on Robitron, as to whether any member knew of an example of AI being 
used with atomic weapons in the 1960s but discussion often lead back to science 
fiction imaginings. Remote fail-safe technologies from the 1960s were used to 
operate and control the use of nuclear weapons. It is only in science fiction, that AI is 
named as a fail-safe apparatus, for example, the doomsday device, in Dr Strangelove, 
1964 (based on the novel Red Alert, 1958). These new technologies were considered 
potential ways of sustaining a territory as a stable non-violent place, as a way to keep 
territory immobile. 
 I can only infer that the connection between AI and the term fail-safe originates 
in the Fail-Safe novel, (1962): that is a part of the trend of apocalyptic novels 
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164 Abraham ’58 was published as, Abraham ’59, and written by Harvey Wheeler, under the pseudonym, FB Aiken, in Winter 
1959, Dissent, as recounted by Wheeler, 2000.
165 Incidentally, Wheeler went on to teach one of the founding courses on internet learning, and online publishing in the 1980s, 
helping to teach an online course about Shakespeare at Carpinteria High School, CA. His obituary from the Los Angeles Times, 
September 18, 2004, notes that, “He was profoundly influenced by World War II and the atomic bomb, which gave him "a 
presentiment of impending catastrophe" and the impetus to study political science”. Reprinted by the Sir Francis Bacon 
organisation of whom Wheeler was noted to be an ‘expert scholar’. (Available from: http://www.sirbacon.org/
wheelerobituary.htm [Accessed on 20 July 2009]).
featuring global forms of technological control such as Colossus, (1970) and Dr 
Strangelove (1964); that imagine automated and autonomous computer systems. It 
was during the 1980s that automation has advanced beyond a fictional potential in 
AI. At Sellafield, in Cumbria, a “model based real-time monitoring, simulation and 
off-line programming system” called KISMET was applied to remote fusion plant 
maintenance and repair. KISMET was developed at Forschungzentrum in 1986, and 
was employed in conjunction with a robot called EDITH, used for monitoring, 
handling, simulation, training, repairing, operating, securing as well as transporting, 
loading and packaging nuclear material (KISMET [1986] 2009). 
 The Fail-Safe novel was researched only by documents available at the time, in 
other words, by declassified information released by the military. Also important here 
are the military documents, cited within the CIA’s bibliography of deception (1980). 
As I mentioned in my introduction, this bibliography compiles books and papers, 
from the 1940s onwards including several books on cybernetics by Ross Ashby, a 
British cybernetics researcher who gave a paper at the first AI conference in 
Dartmouth where the term AI was initially coined. Norbert Wiener and John von 
Neumann were also included, whose individual works traverse the transition between 
cybernetics and AI. The list also includes Martin Shubik and Paul Rand whose works 
link AI to gaming theory. Most importantly is Edward Hall’s book, Silent Language 
(1950) which places personal space alongside torture and deception and locates it as 
a handbook after the cold war. Stanley Milgram’s book Obedience to Authority 
(1974), was also amongst the CIA’s deception bibliography (1980), which was 
discussed in the previous chapter to elucidate on experimental procedures that 
manipulate personal space. Territorial matters in this and the next chapter are 
concerned with how risk scenarios are imagined which manipulate personal space 
violently in order to prepare and plan for uncertainty as a validation for safety 
procedures and regulation. Territorial acts are more often violating, as a lead up to 
violence rather than an implicitly violent procedure. The CIA’s deception 
bibliography (1980), grouped together some of the literature I use throughout and is 
supplemental evidence of the bringing together of military, fictional and legislative 
material.
 The 1962 fail-safe system makes unfixed spaces certain by adopting rigid 
arrangements of human and machine systems into what Hall called “fixed and semi-
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fixed feature space” (Hall, 1964), making the threat of war a certain uncertainty.166 
Methods of precaution are contradictory in that they are violences of self-protection 
that do harm prior to a fail-safe failing. The fail-safe conception limits the scope of 
personal space to a study of threat. Characteristically, I will argue that both the 
personal space and fail-safe concepts, are imagined because of the potential violence 
towards humans and their things. The relation of personal space in proximity to the 
concept of a fail-safe is being near in time and space to an impending disaster. 
Focusing on risk scenarios helps to frame further questions on territoriality and 
personal space. How does personal space combine with the concept of a fail-safe in 
the imagination of threat? How do preventative measures lead to a particular 
violence in regards to fixed-feature and semi-fixed feature space? 
 I believe that one aspect of personal space is a preparedness for violence, a 
human’s individual mechanism for self-protection, an alertness that is an imagined 
inner and external spatial barrier to threatening danger. Human-machine systems are 
constantly redeveloped to create further safety measures to protect humans from 
machines but also machines against humans. Violation is the ‘before’ of violence. 
There is a duration of time in which a threat that has not yet happened but may 
happen in the future has to be endured which is a violating action. This endurance of 
threat is in itself violent contradictory in that this violence is endured to stay-off 
another form of violence, for example, the violations of anxiety prior to machinic 
breakdown. 
 An investigation of personal space must also consider the impact of duration on 
any concept of space, (Brown & Capdevila in Law & Hassard, 1999; and 
MacKenzie, 2002). The following factors should be taken into consideration, firstly 
the duration and length of resistance of a fail-safe action and its expectancy; 
secondly, the moment of change when the speed of a particular force activates a fail-
safe measure and its subsequent acceleration towards a fail-safe procedure; thirdly, 
the consequences of a fail-safe in action along with the duration and length of which 
the fail-safe acts; and finally, the moment of rest for a fail-safe, whether a fail-safe 
stops or redirects a chain of events. 
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166 Hall trained to de-activate bombs and land mines during the second world war, and consequently trained others in these 
fail-safe procedures. It is not explicit that his understandings of personal space are shaped by this experience, though mentioned 
in his autobiography (Hall, 1992: 9).
Anxiety’s Fail-Safe —
A Security Dilemma 
 Mimicking the cold war situation, the Fail-Safe novel by Eugene Burdick and 
Harvey Wheeler (1962), explores the numerous measures that failed to prevent a 
nuclear strike and counter-strike between the United States and the Soviet Union.167 
Two succeeding films were made, the first directed by Sydney Lumet in 1964 and as 
a television drama for CBS, directed by Harvey Wheeler et al., in 2000. Set during 
the cold war, the story reveals how a complex defence system fails to prevent 
accidental nuclear war. All preventative measures in the film are played out until they 
sequentially fail. Strategies of the fail-safe procedure are reactive for instance when x 
happens, y will ensue. When failure is a foregone conclusion game-play changes to 
that of damage limitation, for example, the United States delivers both the first strike 
and the counter-strike on Moscow and then on New York, respectively. The first 
strike is an accident and the further strike is made as a sacrificial peace-offering. 
There is a paradox about the safety of doomsday devices, for instance, if the whole 
of the United States was wiped out in a first strike, a counter-strike would be initiated 
by the Doomsday tapes. The United States releases the second strike on New York to 
reduce the likelihood of further retaliation by the Soviet Union.
 The novel is set in four places, a War Room in Omaha, a presidential bunker 
beneath the White House in Washington, numerous underground nuclear silos 
situated throughout America, and within a Vindicator bomber (also referred to as no. 
6) that flies above. The novel makes a clear distinction between healthy outside 
living spaces and the gloomy subterranean rooms of technical war; “The War Room 
had become a ship, a plane, a command, a place of decision” (Burdick and Wheeler, 
1962: 35-36). It is a place of segregated rooms, controls and procedures, a place 
hundreds of metres below the ground submerged in concrete and accessed by a 400 
feet elevator. It has its own compression chamber and is likened to a submarine. The 
visualization of the outside world is abstracted to an array of flashing lights 
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167 Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler were American political scientists teaching at the respective academic institutions of 
Stanford and Harvard after the second world war.
indicating fail-safe co-ordinates, points and trajectories depicted on a world map. The 
contrasting world situated on the ground above is described as one of shopping 
centres, baby-tending and love-making (Burdick and Wheeler, 1962: 73). The 
nuclear strikes on Moscow and New York brings the cityscapes in contrast to the 
bunker. New York is described prior to attack as a gridded area undergoing cultural 
change characterised by areas occupied by new and old communities of migrant 
workers. 
 The fail-safe system links together various narrow and detailed places with the 
larger technical overviews of maps and positions. Each of the spaces are linked by a 
colour coded procedure. The warning system escalates from condition blue, the 
lowest position of readiness, that proceeds to yellow, a condition that launches the 
fighters and prepares the bombers (also called airborne tankers). For the bombers to 
reach their fail-safe point takes seven minutes measured by an automated countdown, 
a time marked for checking and counterchecking carried out by human and machine 
automatons. Burdick and Wheeler referred to the trained military personnel that do 
the checking as human automata. It is a counter-anthropomorphic disregard for 
human affect and feelings. 
FIGURE 39. The President of the United States (right) is sat next to his translator, Buck, (left) depicted talking to 
the Soviet Premier on the red telephone. The film still is taken from the first film production of the Fail-Safe, 
directed by Sydney Lumet. Reprinted with kind permission, “FAIL-SAFE” ©1963, renewed 1991 Columbia 
Pictures Industries, Inc. All Rights Reserved Courtesy of Columbia Pictures.
 Condition yellow, is announced because of a UFO that had dropped below 
30,000 feet and has disappeared at the bottom of a radarscope, beneath what is called 
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the ‘grass’. “In the grass is what is lost beneath the radar [a category of]. . . . things 
we don’t understand” (Burdick and Wheeler, 1962: 49). A piece of computer tape 
from a computer prompts the next condition which is green. At three and a half 
minutes to fail-safe point, doors open and every desk in the War Room is occupied. 
On a board large singular blips display the Vindicator bombers, followed by two 
fragmented blips at the front and back of them symbolising the support fighters that 
are always there but until condition green is called are absent from the board. No 
reason is given for the move to condition green only that this confirms the position of 
the UFO being monitored. A count down at one minute to the fail-safe point follows 
and at the last ten seconds of countdown the UFO is confirmed. It is a Boeing 707, a 
commercial airline that had lost power and fallen below the radar. At the moment of 
confirmation the large board is switched off. The colour alert after green is condition 
red which further signifies being at war from the preparation for war. Vindicator Six, 
passes the fail-safe point and heads towards its target, Moscow. The red telephone 
(see fig. 39) is then used to inform the Soviet Premier of the bomber’s target, this 
action indicates a new logging of time and another countdown begins. 
The government solutions is to have special phones for important 
people (traditionally red). The line bypasses secretaries, coffee breaks, 
busy signals, and teenagers, and is connected to White House, and 
State Department and Pentagon switchboards. (Hall, [1966] 1990: 
141) 
 After conversing with the Russian president condition red is commanded by 
the General and thirty green lights are replaced by thirty red lights in the War Room 
(see fig. 40). Colour coding indicates the complex stages of the operations within the 
fail-safe procedure. Verification of the situation is checked by the machines and then 
confirmed by human command giving condition red the ‘go alert’, a secondary status 
signified by red lights. Humans (predominantly male) and machines facilitate the 
fail-safe procedure, partitioned into manual and automated mechanisms. The system 
of double checking is almost devoid of women that are for the main part reduced to 
vulnerable specters, victims in the system of decision-making and control: 
. . . the immense man-machine activated itself, coordinated itself, restrained itself, 
passed information to itself, carefully filtered incoming information, automatically 
tripped other systems that were serving it. (Burdick and Wheeler, 1962: 68) 
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FIGURE 40. A Film Still of the War Room taken from the first adaption of the Fail-Safe. Reprinted with kind 
permission, “FAIL-SAFE” ©1963, renewed 1991 Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. All Rights Reserved 
Courtesy of Columbia Pictures.
 After red alert the gold system is activated. This is the global system of 
preparing missiles to launch from silos situated throughout America. The colour 
coded procedure links to the apparatus of the fail-safe system which is networked to 
the bombers. Located within these aircraft is a fail-safe box, consisting of a bulb that 
glows red and a display screen that indicates a six digit code, CAP-811 (see fig. 41). 
 The code is verified by another code inside an envelope. The code verifies 
orders that are also placed inside the envelope, it is a set of instructions including a 
plan of alternate routes towards and in retreat from the target. The fail-safe box is a 
black boxing of the fail-safe problem. When the pilots become the dominant social 
actors the reasons for approaching and attacking the target are already pre-
determined with no reasons given to the bomber crew. Targets are described by their 
mapped location and confirmed by the sound of a target at the moment of detonation.
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FIGURE 41. A Film Still of the fail-safe codes being verified in one of the bomber planes taken from the first 
Fail-Safe film. Reprinted with kind permission, “FAIL-SAFE” ©1963, renewed 1991 Columbia Pictures 
Industries, Inc. All Rights Reserved Courtesy of Columbia Pictures.
 Both films omit the details of the outside world (detailed in the novel) as 
observed by satellite from within the war room (Burdick and Wheeler, 1962: 148-9). 
For instance, rivers and villages appear and zoom in to reveal an area that has the 
identifiable circles of a rocket silo. Next to the silo are two, Red Army soldiers 
looking at a photograph of a Slavic girl held by one of them, telescoping into an 
intimate scene within a scene. Other visualisations of the world above are abstractly 
depicted as blips and blotches. Condition red starts a war that is simulated on screen 
which are observed as dots and crosses. The dots blossom into blips with the dots 
representing missiles, and the larger blips representing bombers planes. When the 
first strike on Moscow is attempted, reports of the visual airbursts are described by 
an American personnel witnessing the bomb detonation from the United States. 
And then his voice was cut-off. It was drowned in a screech that had 
an animal-like quality to it. The screech rose sharply, lasted perhaps 
five seconds, and then was followed by an abrupt silence. (Burdick 
and Wheeler, 1962: 279)
 The nuclear disaster unfolds with a theatre of technicians and officials, of 
human and machine automatons. Most of them are extensions of the equipment they 
operate, organised by rank and role (see fig. 40). 
The complexity of new generations of machines was increasing the 
danger of accidents faster than safeguards could be devised, machine 
error was not a likely possibility and as stated. . . .the enigmatic 
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computers that had been so reassuring could not be blamed with 
malfeasance. (Burdick and Wheeler, 1962: 160)
 Within each of the four key places are several key characters and each are 
defined by their physique, intelligence and personality. Buck is the main character in 
the novel, the translator to the President (see fig. 39). He is characterised as reserved, 
acting with caution, of a balanced disposition, being neither too bright, nor too 
popular amongst his peers. Buck has one distinctive feature that sets him apart, that 
is his fluency of Russian. Bucks’ opposite character is Knapp, the president of 
Universal Electronics, whose lack of anxiety and enthusiasms for science and 
technology are likened to the speed of technological advance and slurs are made on 
his private life — hastiness is assumed in his private decision making which the 
novel makes explicit as evidenced by his quick steps to divorce. Knapp is is a 
scientist-businessman present in the War Room as a visitor on press-tour. The roles 
of technician and officer are differentiated with the latter signifying intelligence, and 
the other signifying stable and predictable character attributes. The hierarchical 
divisions between the military and the presidential structures distinguish class. In the 
film class means seniority, whereas in the novel the role of the military is to convert 
boys into automatons (Burdick and Wheeler, 1962: 154 & 135).
 The dialogue between the characters explores the feelings of each person as it 
relates to their position or role. Each of the characters’ emotional states are described 
over 273 pages of the novel, yet in this time, Burdick and Wheeler narrate an anxiety 
of just seven minutes: “Anxiety had long ago been burned out of those manning the 
bombers” (Burdick and Wheeler, 1962: 69). In those more senior, anxiety is shown 
by physical signs of endurance over time. Knapp is described by: “His hunched and 
hard driven body, his burning eyes, his vanished face, looked like a statue of 
anxiety” (Burdick and Wheeler, 1962: 208). Each actor has specific limits and 
capabilities to withstand a particular aspect of anxiety within the fail-safe system. 
Anxiety is attributed to all the main characters in the novel including both human and 
machinic automaton. The debate of nuclear war is situated between the figures 
representing the media and political science. Groeteschele is a mathematical political 
scientist called the “master of death”, a scientist born out of the logic of World War 
II. The other figure is a journalist called Foster. In the War Room they debate the 
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function of war in primitive society, as a contrast to their contemporary fail-safe 
predicament. Groeteschele conceives primitive war as a conflict resolved by 
individual combat Foster questions him by asking if his primitive war argument 
would still hold true in a nation-state? Groeteschele asserts that it is still violence. 
Foster retorts that the two scenarios are not comparable, that there is no victor or 
victim in war fought with atomic weaponry. It starts as a broad anthropological 
argument of culture that is scaled down to the level of the individual as a 
structuration problem. On the one hand the implications of atomic warfare are too 
vast to imagine culturally, however, by scaling down to the exemplar of a child’s life. 
When the president orders the counter-strike on New York, he is knowingly, killing 
his wife and children. Anxiety is notably absent in the American president in the 
observation made in the following passage of the novel: “If he allowed each crisis to 
take its toll he would have died long ago of anxiety” (Burdick and Wheeler, 1962: 
189). Anxiety is the intensity of the Fail-Safe novel and the response of each 
character enduring threat alerts notes a different intensity of anxious feeling.
 The novel manipulates anxiety as the suspense of inevitable failure. When the 
fail-safe eventually fails there is an inevitable set of “foldings upon the ordering of 
space” (Brown & Capdevila, in Law & Hassard, 1999: 39). These unfoldings I 
consider as gatherings. The nuclear fail-safe gathers other procedures of safety, to 
create a system of risk. The fail-safe procedure reduces the risk of complexity by 
black-boxing stages of alert but at the same time the number of stages prove too 
complex to contain risk. To borrow from Brown & Capdevila (in Law & Hassard, 
1999: 46), the atomic fail-safe “de-problematises”, by black-boxing but also “re-
problematises” by the number of black boxed problems involved. The fail-safe is a 
stacking of safety solutions including key systems, direct telephone lines, proximity 
fuses, radar, censorship laws (such as the Alien and Sedition Laws, 1719) and 
encrypted codes, to name but a few. Each of the bombs themselves have smaller fail-
safe systems, such as an accidental trigger to deter or detect forms of error. For 
instance, bombs may have been dropped accidentally but they never triggered an 
explosion. Each part of the fail-safe has another fail-safe and so, the missiles in a silo 
would have their own fail-safe systems. The existence of fail-safe procedures is a 
solemn reminder of the after-event, (a warning of future disasters that the fail-safe 
protects against in the present) and the effects of moving beyond anxiety. The 
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disaster is black-boxed up until the moment the fail-safe assemblage fails to prevent 
disaster and the assemblage becomes stages of malfunction. These black boxes are a 
part of the reproblematising of risk. This fail-safe is an elaborate system that is 
complex, hierarchical and fragmented; an assemblage of premeditated human and 
machine action. Territoriality is not learned by one person over time, the fail-safe is a 
pattern learned as an abstracted military procedure. Territoriality and semi-fixed 
feature spaces are not just the movement of furniture in the layout of a room or the 
pushing of buttons it is the imagined outside conceptions of future scenarios. Science 
fiction provides the risk scenarios to the automated systems of preparing for disaster.
 Precaution is a form of rehearsal, it is a creative form of playful planning. It 
formulates a notion of territory that is defended and then re-defended, or what 
Deleuze and Guattari call, “territorialisation” and “deterritorialisation” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, [1988] 2004: 63). This procedure exemplified as the fail-safe is troubling. 
Deleuze and Guattari name three types of human organisation, they are; “. . .lineal, 
territorial and numerical” (Deleuze and Guattari, [1988] 2004: 428-9). Each of these 
procedures of organisation as suggested by Deleuze and Guattari are forms of 
organisation. “Arithmetic organisation” is an abstracting, numerical system in that 
the number becomes an autonomous subject. The 1960s fail-safe system is a 
numerical system of steps towards violence. It threatens lineal organisation (of 
family lineages or what Deleuze and Guattari call clan lineages, and is imagined as 
such when the President’s family is incorporated into the effects of the failing 
system) and threatens territorial organisation. “Territorial organisation” is what 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to at state level as a form of organisation in which the 
earth becomes an object, (for example how property is “good belonging” in the 
state). The warring system threatens all of these forms of organisation when 
numerical organisation takes dominance. Territoriality is both lineal and numerical in 
the Fail-Safe novel. Brown and Capdevila raise an important doubt to the 
universalising segmentation of territory: 
What, though, is discernible is that an investigation of how time is 
folded out as territory, the manifold network, confronts at every point 
the question of universal time. Just what is it that territory is carved 
from? (Brown & Capdevila in Law & Hassard, 1999: 45)
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 If the fail-safe carves out territory by defining it through pre-emption does it 
always define what then comes to pass? The Fail-Safe narrative is a rehearsal, 
making this story a precautionary measure and so the novel makes tangible what is 
hidden.
Posthuman & Transhuman Affect
 It is the objective of a fail-safe system of machines to relieve humans of their 
anxiety, but did it? Didn’t it just make the cold war, warmingly exciting? A fail-safe 
replaces one anxiety with another, it gathers various hot and cold intensities of 
anxiety depending on whom it affected in the story. Fail-safe apparatus de-couples 
affect from the territorialising machine to prevent the subsequent deterritorialising 
move. This is done by replacing human action with an apparently rational computer 
system. Anxiety is the sustained interruptive aspect of deterritorialisation and 
reterritorialisation, of how its used to defend and re-defend with warm or cold affect. 
Is the anxiety of a fail-safe system just territorial in its functionalism? I would like to 
suggest that it is also an anxiety of technological absolutism. This is an anxiety of the 
scientific and the technological that in a way deterritorialises the human. We can no 
longer protect ourselves by sticks and stones which has created further anxieties 
around those mechanisms that yield new forms of protection. Personal space has 
outgrown our anatomical territoriality creating a continuity of anxieties of threat 
moving beyond the body as machines become autonomous and we become 
posthuman.168 Humans are integrated with machines via everyday processes such as 
automated telecommunication systems as well as via prosthetics, pharmaceuticals 
and genetic modifications. The threats of further integrations with machines is the 
fear of becoming transhuman of humanness segregated from the machine.
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168 Various key figures were interviewed as to their perspective in a television documentary titled Technocalyps by Frank 
Theys, (2004); including AI specialist, Marvin Minsky, editor of Wired magazine, Bruce Sterling, and writer of technology, Ray 
Kurzweil, amongst others. In this documentary, they do not use the word ‘posthuman,’ but ‘transhuman’ which refers directly to 
the threat of technology on humanity, and discussed both as a fear and a celebratory next step in humanity’s evolution, the 
attitude - better we accept that we now need to biologically change in order to keep up with the artificial machines that will in 
the future exist. It is a fear of the extinction of homosapiens, the subversion of the master-slave relation between human and 
machine. Those writing on the posthuman such as Katherine Hayles (1999) discuss how we have already become posthuman in 
the way that we are integrated within technological and information systems.
. . . anxiety has become a weasel word, meaning all things to all men. 
The common denominator of these meanings is some kind of “stress”, 
which animals will signal by some kind of “avoidance” . . . . Further 
we propose that Freud’s distinction between fear as conscious and 
anxiety as unconscious be dropped and that terror be recognized as 
the same affect whether its object is known or not. (Sedgwick, 1995: 
236)
 If our concept of personal space has outgrown our bodily humanness has our 
concept of anxiety? The fail-safe system is capable of enduring anxiety beyond the 
capacity of a single human and so perhaps our limits to endure a territorial anxiety 
have been reached: have we therefore outgrown our notion of anxiety, are we post-
anxiety or trans-anxious? As I read the novel more than fifty years on from when it 
was written I no longer endure the anxiety of a cold war but endure a new anxiety —
terror. Marked by 9/11, anxiety seems unfashionable and has been re-labelled as 
‘terror.’169 It is worth raising the point that Eve Sedgwick makes, that anxiety and 
terror are a part of the same affect and both operate as a consequence of shame. 
Terror is a recent adaption of what anxiety used to name. The novel has all the 
previous associations with anxiety. Stengers questions, “Can we transform the shame 
of what our beliefs have permitted into capacity to problematize and invent - that is 
to resist” (Stengers, 2000:152)? By imagining the shame of its consequences the 
atomic fail-safe resists by imagining genocide, its resistance inhibiting. 
 I understand that anxiety in the 1960s was the decoupling of a human-centred 
affect that ever more complex mediating machines were taking the burden. 
Consequently, this caused further anxieties about machinic control including 
automated systems with human automaton. Fearing machinic control as a 
dehumanising force can be traced back to industrial fears of steam trains and 
automotives, the fears of 1911, at the domestic scale of EM Forester’s novel, The 
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169 I am here focusing on a discussion of anxiety and terror without much attention to other affects. It is worth a mention that 
along with the Hall’s work in the CIA’s deception bibliography (1980) is the work of Robert Salkeld, War and Space, 
Technological Surprise (1970). Salkeld’s work focuses on the element of surprise, an affect I only cover in the discussions of 
chatbots.
Machine Stops (1911).170 The novel depicts an automated system that takes all work, 
home and bodily functions and reduces them to a series of button pushes. 
Independence is sacrificed for comfort and protection regulated at a touch of a 
button. It is an extreme example of the fear of automation when one has de centred 
the negative affects within the machine. Segregating personal space into its machinic 
and human responsibilities by designating roles and territorial spaces is to pay no 
attention to the importance of their interrelation. It is easy to connect and automate 
(as the fail-safe procedure and chatbot Rudiments illustrate), but difficult to 
distinguish human from machine in finding the cause or blame of violent conflict 
(anxiety being an integral aspect of violence) even by following Hall’s analytics that 
expound on territoriality. As the novel illustrates, affect can never be excluded from 
decision making procedures by creating automated systems. Therefore, even though 
the violence of anxiety is easily divorced from its interrelation to the environment, 
machines, or bodies, all are a part of and get caught up in the interrelated turmoil of 
violent conflict.
Facto-Fictional Risk 
that is Audible & Visual
 The next section moves away from anxiety back to issues of safety as a spatial 
problem linked to simulation. A fail-safe system is supposed to instruct and guide 
safe action but it does so by imagining spatial representations of disaster in the 
audible and visual ranges extended by telecommunication systems. Atomic weapons 
and their maintenance systems of bunkers and silos are elite secretive spaces of 
defence. By referring to schools, partners, children, trees and photographs in the 
novel is to bring back into this abstract space of the War Room the simulations of 
everyday life; of territorialising impossible territories because territory and 
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170 At the same time that the Fail-Safe film and novel were created other films were also tackling the anxieties of automation 
on the reconfigurement of human action rather that the human body as is the anxiety in the 1911 fearing imagination of 
automation. The collaboration of the American and Russian super-computers Colossus and Guardian respectively, create a 
super-computer in the film, Colossus: The Forbin Project, 1970 (based on the novel Colossus, 1966). Machinic control is 
portrayed in this film as the enslavement of humans for the sake of their own protection. Colossus is master but humans become 
slaves to this particular fail-safe procedure.
territoriality are states of impermanence and intangibility, they are temporal and 
hidden. The fail-safe system is a combination of simulation and automation, it is a 
military overview, a defensive planning tool consisting of an integrated human-
machine tasks. When each task unfolds a particular scenario is imagined as the 
absent simulations of this fail-safe that forgets to imagine a machinic error. The film 
points out that human error or machinic failure can never be absolutely guaranteed. 
Fail-safes render fear universal as a totalising threat to humanity.
 In the fail-safe colour coding, the disaster means that even in the early stages of 
a threat that red is symbolically recognised in all of the other coded alerts from blue 
through to gold. This is a colour wheel of threat and a palette of precaution, a system 
which moves through its stages changing the physicality of the War Room. Each 
fixed-feature space for each colour coded alert makes for the permanent yet semi-
fixed features that come and go. The War Room as featured in the Fail-Safe novel 
would be what Hall defines as semi-fixed feature spaces, evident when the furniture 
and personnel within the rooms are organised (Hall, [1966] 1990: 108). Both 
sociofugal and sociopetal spaces are arranged, the former are spaces keeping people 
apart (Hall, [1966] 1990: 110), but the spaces of both military and political figures 
are predominantly formal spaces with non-contact regulations. Proximity towards 
others is designated by seating arrangements and mediated through technology, 
computers and telephones. The notion of territory is less a place on a geographic 
map,but more an action of restricted mobility and touch. In the Fail-Safe novel the 
outside world leaks in. This is because the seven actor-networks that create the fail-
safe move between the anatomic and the ubiquitous (see fig. 38). The satellite 
pictures bring intimate pictures of the domestic and anatomic scale into the War 
Room. When all is functioning well in the War Room, the room and all other fail-
safe paraphernalia remains invisible to the non-military world above ground, hidden 
inside the strata of rock lurks a permanent fixture for dealing with instability. Even 
when the fail-safe fails it is the hidden, isolated personal spaces that function unseen. 
Following the logic of Deleuzian philosophy, the fail-safe is an object of the 
“warring machine”, which is not to limit the concept to the exclusive use of state 
apparatus (Deleuze, [1998] 2004: 460). The fail-safe is a planning of war. Planning is 
as much to do with war as it is do to with battle. I mention this not to start to talk 
about strategy but of breakdown that the fail-safe is a form of over-planning. 
6. Fail-Safes & Threat Alerts | Impending Disaster
238
 In the novel, the Russian President later stops talking on the telephone to move 
a safe distance away from Moscow (Burdick and Wheeler, 1962: 222). It is sound 
that signifies proximity to the strike. Hall claims; “Actually, in normally alert 
subjects, it is probable that the eyes maybe as much as a 1,000 times as effective as 
the ears in sweeping up information” (Hall, [1966] 1990: 43). Sound and sight are 
very much disconnected. “A sound barrier at a distance of a quarter of a mile is 
hardly detectable. This would not be true of a high wall or screen that shuts out a 
view. Visual space, therefore, has an entirely different character than auditory space. 
Visual information tends to be less ambiguous and more focused than auditory 
information” (Hall, [1966] 1990: 43). Sound is a constant reminder of the dislocation 
of the impersonal acts of violence made on a massive scale, difficult for an individual 
to comprehend on the personal scale. Between the two presidents; “The silence on 
the line went past the point of tensions. The tiny and usually inaudible screech of 
static now seemed to be a scream in their ears” (Burdick and Wheeler, 1962: 214). 
The sound of the bomb transmitted through the telephone is a simultaneous 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. Sound is not just a deterritorialisation.
Doubtless, in each case we must simultaneously consider factors of 
territoriality, deterritorialisation, and reterritorialisation. Animal and 
child refrains seem to be territorial: therefore they are not “music”. 
But when music lays hold of the refrain and deterritorialises it, and 
deterritorialises the voice, when it lays hold of the refrain and sends it 
racing off in a rhythmic sound block, when the refrain “becomes” 
Schumann or Debussy, it is through a system of melodic and 
harmonic coordinates by means of which music reterritorialises upon 
itself, qua music. (Deleuze & Guattari, [1988] 2004: 334)
 In the novel, the telephone connects the bomb’s detonation to the War Room, 
therefore, sound in this case links the cause of action (the remote detonation) with 
the situated action simultaneously within the War Room and in Moscow. The 
telephone also gives the War Room its semi-fixed spatiality. It is this aural mode in 
which the bomb is understood that amplifies the semi-fixed feature of the War Room, 
situating the bomb inside the War Room, it is the sound that is redefining the shape 
and volume of the space of elsewhere. 
 In The Nation-State and Violence (1985), the sociologist Anthony Giddens 
explains that a concept of state should involve a concept of violence at either an 
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individual, or societal level. This is evident when Burdick and Wheeler bring to bear 
several instances of violence in the minds of the figures characters portrayed. It is 
enacted as a sexual violence in this homosocial narrative as sexualised, technological 
power. The predicament that the social actors find themselves within is a violence 
imagined on their individuality. It is the instances of the rape of men, (Burdick and 
Wheeler, 1962: 91 & 123-4) and the sexual potency, that the bomb evokes: 
“. . .manhood signified by the nuclear situation that casts men as children and the 
bomb as toy” (Burdick and Wheeler, 1962: 281). The instances of sexualised 
violence portray a sexuality divide as a polemic of which the bomb regulates, 
protects and upholds.
 In the 1960s fear was uncoupled from anxiety as a form of protection and the 
creation of calculated apparatus deals with fear-in-duration and anxiety becomes the 
intensity felt by the machine. Fear of the machine becomes the anxiety of the human 
once again. Territorial action in the fail-safe is the hidden and invisible application of 
all zones of personal distance incorporated into one procedure. Although the fail-safe 
is a procedure of fixed spaces (bunker, aircraft and satellites) their interplay is semi-
fixed, one can be in a bunker but can hear Moscow. Ubiquitous threats are prepared 
for in this case by a series of actions designated to various geo-political co-ordinates. 
The answer to these questions are not as simple as this narrative suggests and leads 
me towards the more contemporary and complex question of what is the affect since 
9/11 and towards the next part of the chapter. Machinic mediations do not allay 
anxiety it renders anxiety within the system of territoriality as co-relational — 
between defender, weapon and target. Anxiety is posthuman in that it is beyond the 
physical it is the relation between human and machine. In threat it is posited between 
the two. The grounds for extending a discussion beyond the conversational aspect of 
the entertainment chatbots is to consider speech as one aspect of territorial action. 
Speech, or conversational analytics are only one part of a fail-safe system that cannot 
entirely elicit on the imagination of risk, and the spatial presence of automaton.
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Survival in Microspace 
with Nano Risks
Nuclear threat is but one imagination of violence amongst many noted in the 
Directive-3 (2003). The coded alert still plays an important role but is made visible 
on the internet and as a mobile iPhone application made globally available. I will 
outline the various other scenarios before comparing how the spaces of territoriality 
are manipulated as zones of proximity as a matter of regulation. Reterritorialisation 
is configured in intangible non-places imagined in the AI machine or the anthrax 
virus. Finally, I will conclude on the way affect has been manipulated again not as a 
transhuman or threat but one that now protects the machine and automated systems 
as a necessary part of posthuman life. Directive-3, like the fail-safe case helps to 
think through personal space as an interrelation of automated systems. As a 
continuation of the previous discussions about risk, affect, and anxiety this section 
tracks the elevation of anxiety to terror that has moved from a fear of automation to a 
protection of automation as a part of a citizen’s everyday life. The Directive-3, is 
itself an anxiety mechanism of automated procedures that legislates for a continuous, 
instant and online threat alert system. Unlike the Fail-Safe alert systems of the 1960s, 
the 2003 alert system is specifically designed for communicating threat to citizens of 
America and industry; as well as for government and military bodies. Personal space 
is in this system, an inter-relational matter involving both humans and machines 
which is now tacitly, a part of an international conscience of state security.
Dust, Inhalation & Ubiquity
. . . there is today no theme more widespread in Western societies than 
the principle of precaution, which has of course nothing to do with 
suspending action; but simply marks the return of anxious and 
vigilant procedures in the areas connected with science and 
technology, which were, up until now, characterised by absolute 
certainty. (Latour, 2002: 34) . . . . Since September 2001, we go on 
dialing the same emergency number, 911, and rightly so, since we 
have entered a state of emergency. (Latour, 2002: 1)
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 Since Bruno Latour wrote on the concept of emergency and how the world in 
which we live in is not at all risk-free, he believes one must continue to act with 
levels of precaution even if this does mean being a “coward” (Latour, 2002: 34). Yet, 
what forms of precaution are there post 9/11, and what personal space is imagined? I 
will consider how the role of citizen is mobilized to stay-in-place, by the Homeland 
Directive-3. 
 After the 11th September 2001, the Homeland Advisory System, Directive 3 
(H.A.S.) was introduced in America. The Directive is linked to an online book 
entitled ‘Are You Ready?’ All of the procedures are rigorously structured, (with one 
of the first press releases associated with the Directive-3) summarising threat as four 
factors, whilst the first two diagnose the degree of which the information of threat is 
firstly credible and secondly corroborated. The third defines the imminence and 
specificity of the threat with the fourth factor detailing the grave consequences of the 
threat (Press Release Directive-3: [2003] 2008). The first two factors are 
precautionary with the latter two exploring ways to preserve human life. In the 
booklet Are You Ready, preparation is divided into natural, technological hazards, 
and terrorist threat.
FIGURE 42. The American Colour-Coded Terror, Threat Alert System, 2003. Image source: Directive-3, The 
White House, Washington, February, 2003. Available from: www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs. [Accessed, July 
2008].
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 The advisory system includes instructions on how to prepare for terrorist 
action, presented in a booklet form. It includes a colour coded threat alert system (see 
fig. 42). It is another system that uses colour to signify levels of risk with green 
meaning low and red symbolising the most severe form of threat. The coded alert 
system of 2003 has two goals to reduce the likelihood of an attack as a precaution 
and preservation measure and secondly to deal with the after-event of an attack. A 
terrorism threat-level is publicly posted on both the White House and the state 
websites. There is also a procedure of warning messages and information bulletins 
that are received by all three levels of government as well as “private sector 
organisations” and “international partners” (Directive-3, The White House [2003] 
2008).
Raising the threat condition has economic, physical, and 
psychological effects on the nation; so, the Homeland Security 
Advisory System can place specific geographic regions or industry 
sectors on a higher alert status than other regions or industries, based 
on specific threat information. (Directive-3, The White House, 
Washington, February, 2003. Available from: www.dhs.gov/
xinfoshare/programs. [Accessed, July 2008])

 The threat level is indicated daily and on the 30th July 2008 the national threat 
level was elevated and colour coded yellow (see fig. 42). The threat level for 
domestic and international flights was at the same time differentiated one code higher 
indicated at orange level. The elevated level of risk was explained as having no 
specific threat but as a “response planning” stage relating to the period of transition 
between government administrations (Directive-3, The White House, Washington, 
February, 2003. Available from: www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs. [Accessed, July 
2008]).
 The 2003 concept of alertness engages the American citizen in preparedness 
and made a legal obligation of the citizen under the second Patriot Act. There are two 
preventive guidelines that instructed citizens “. . . to be vigilant, take notice of their 
surroundings, and report suspicious items or activities to local authorities [and 
secondly, to establish] . . . . an emergency preparedness kit and emergency plan for 
themselves and their family” (Directive-3 [2003] 2008). The first activity is based on 
an awareness of environment, objects, and activities but not people, identities or 
groups of society. The second activity places medical and communications at the 
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level of citizen and their family. The role of citizen does not apply to every American 
whilst at the same time machines are gaining citizen authority such as border control 
agents, as police services such as the chatbots mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter. It is the name given to those that volunteer into the program called CERT 
(Community Emergency Response Team) which is organized by “Citizen Corps”. 
CERT’s common goal is to share “community and family safety” (Press Release 
Directive-3, [2003] 2008). Citizen Corps are managed by the Citizen Corps Council 
with the aim to make, “. . . communities safer from the threats of crime, terrorism, 
public health issues and disasters of all levels” (Press Release Directive-3, [2003] 
2008). 
Risk Scenarios Imagined in 2003
 The Are You Ready? document has sections covering forms of threat such as 
RDDs (Radiological Dispersion Device), and forms of cyberattack. It also instructs 
on how the roles of citizen and family are to be organised after a disaster ensues. The 
RDD device is referred to as a dirty nuke or dirty bomb. An RDD operates at the 
domestic and local levels and is distinct from the larger hydrogen and megaton 
bombs. RDDs are explosive devices made with radioactive materials that are not 
weapons grade. The radioactive materials are potentially derived from medicine, 
agriculture, industry or research. There is a distinct shift in thinking from the 
megaton to the dirty nuke in the document, with each discussed separately. In 
preparedness for an RDD attack, the document emphasizes family communications 
as a network of planning, as well as organized community activities; for instance, the 
advice given for RDDs is at the level of the individual in location, whereas in the 
general section on nuclear blasts, (section 4.5, Directive-3) it is a larger group that is 
of concern and a change in scale is exerted. After detonation of an RDD, survival is 
defined by “sheltering-in-place”, by staying put and keeping the risk of radiation 
located. Being inside or outside a place of detonation is an important distinction of 
prohibitory space and renders inhabited space out of bounds. Prohibitive places are 
labeled “radiation hazard” or “HAZMAT” and anything inside that perimeter is 
included in that risk zones be that people of objects. The zoning of people, 
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environment and technology are all entangled inside the threat zone. Protection 
however, from a large scale atomic blast is to be sought, within community spaces 
such as within the middle floors of large buildings like a school.
 The second form of imagined threat is the cyberattack. It is a threat of reduced 
information that targets computer or telecommunications networks. There are three 
ways a cyberattack may take place according to the guidance notes; through the 
wires, by physical assault or by what is defined as an attack made from the inside but 
this particular scenario focuses on imagining limited resources and systems. Even 
though as Deleuze and Guattari postulated that, “. . . capitalism develops an 
economic order that can do without the state” (Deleuze & Guattari, [2008] 2004: 
501), what happens in the case of the Directive-3 is that the threat alert suggests it is 
not just a threat to state but to economic orders of identity. Prevention in this instance 
is to ‘do without’ services, for instance, electricity, gas, or ways of handling money 
such as ATMs, automated cash registers, and internet transaction services. This 
particular focus of going without involves going without “the reliance of identity on 
the technological (credit histories, driver’s license and Social Security numbers 
etc.) . . . . [it is] anxieties about identity” (Mac Gregor Wise, 1997: 80). In the event 
of a cyberattack affecting power, dam, or flood systems failures will be notified 
through other “official instructions” these are not specified in this section but relate 
to the hazards section of the booklet.
Anxiety Elevates to Terror 
 In legislative matters and the rhetoric of the media terror has become the affect 
of precaution and preservation with anxiety seeming a bygone affect. Both risk 
scenarios of 1962 and 2003 are a manipulation of fixed and semi-fixed feature space 
manipulating the personal spaces at work in the home. Both have hidden dimensions 
particular to their coded alerts. Shaped by the political and military rhetoric of terror 
since 9/11, terror has replaced anxiety as the everyday term for the affect of national 
threat. Terror is still a form of anxiety, but it is a new amplified anxiety. This 
endurance of terrorism is a public and daily event that has continued over years. 
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 By creating an alert system that includes American citizens, personal space and 
the four proximity zones (personal distance in the close and far phase, and the social 
distance in the close and far phase) are manipulated to prevent terrorist attack. 
The boundary line between the far phase of personal distance and the 
close phase of social distance marks, in the words of one subject, the 
limit of domination. (Hall, [1966] 1990: 121)

 The Homeland Advisory System is both publicly and privately tiered. An 
American’s personal space is constantly under threat when the document asks a 
citizen to be aware of unfamiliar behaviour, or when recommended to vary a route to, 
and from work. Terrorism is a problem at federal, state, local and citizen levels, 
linking the American public to the White House, at home and at work. Adapting 
ways of getting to and from work manipulates the modes of behaviour that Hall 
would categorise at public distance. For Hall, public distances and social distances 
have two phases — close and far.171 The intimate distances of bringing family 
together in a network of planning manipulate the close phase of personal relations. It 
is a re-organisation of informal and formal spaces and both social and personal 
distances. Personal distance is reconfigured as an apparatus of the state by bringing 
personal, social and public distances together.
 The Directive and corresponding coded alert system manipulates the 
ethological knowledge of territoriality, and further manipulates personal space as a 
methodology of territory maintenance. Operating at the domestic level (affecting 
home and work) a terrorist is always in proximity to another terrorist, that is always 
in proximity to the American citizen. The alert system emphasizes consensus as a 
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171 Hall calculates the measurement of public distance at close phase as between 3.6 and 7.6 metres, whilst the far phase, is 7.6 
meters therefore, beyond the outer limit of the close phase. When talking with others in the far phase rather than the near phase, 
one’s choice of words, phrasing and volume change. In terms of the body, the head is perceived smaller than it really is and the 
body looks flat. In the far phase at just over 9 meters, facial expression and body movement along with some of the shades to 
the voice are lost an interesting feature when Hall indicates that this is the distance for public speaking, whereby signs of 
intimacy and of emotion are very apparent. Beyond the far phase, when humans appear the same size as ants contact with them 
as humans fades, in other words, one no longer treats humans in the same way (Hall, [1966] 1990: 123-4). These are much 
larger distances than those that Milgram observed in his proximity experiments that occupy two rooms, Milgram’s experiments 
are within the close phase and the far phase. Hall does not measure the distances and the effect on humans when they are not 
present either at the near or far phase. He does not consider the effect when humans are near but out of sight for instance, a 
prison guard outside a prison cell still affects a prisoner - a person under water in the sea, is in proximity to the ship’s crew but 
out of touch-proximity and so on. It is those configurations that Milgram considers as a zone of influence measured by changes 
or consistencies to authority.
united cause of action and preparation. Citizens are in effect continuously 
reterritorialising their homeland as a consequence of deterritorialising actions of 
9/11. By making preparedness a collaboration of public and government, the terrorist 
is counter to the system of American citizenship. In preparation for a terrorist attack, 
‘being aware of your surroundings’ emphasises the terrorist, however invisible, is 
always present because of a potential to remain in place. The constant warning 
system of threat levels creates an impermanence to living and a stability to the 
territorial violence of the terrorist.
 It is the knowledge that Hall considers as our “. . . obligations to treat total 
strangers in certain prescribed ways”, that the Directive manipulates (Hall, [1966] 
1990: 128-9). It asks the American citizen to be prepared to notice a strangers’ 
abnormal behaviour. It is to make the American aware of how their own spatial 
envelopes alert themselves to variations in culture and to new ways to use the bodily 
senses.172 Though Hall’s work is dated he makes the distinction of personal 
proximities as a code of conduct. The Directive legitimises the American’s sensitivity 
to the differences of our personal zones and protective envelopes such as home, car 
or shopping centre. By evoking an insecurity to stockpile food, clothing, and 
medicines along with knowing how to administer first aid, and to know when to 
realise that oneself has become a containment of terror and should stay-in-place, 
which places the individual’s territoriality within that of an overarching territory of 
America. The only person nameable in the ‘Are You Ready?’ document by the 
pronoun ‘you’ is the American citizen. The presidency is named only by address (the 
White House, Washington) rather than by role. 
 There is no personal distance designated to separate terrorists from citizens or 
government from public. It wasn’t the aircraft or devices but the human network 
cells, plans and organisation structures that have been the focus of terrorist threats, of 
types of threat and their whereabouts. The political and military situation has 
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172 Once again the “strangeness” in the terrorist renders the American’s spatial envelope opposite. This stable space is just as 
much at odds in the 1960s as once again one deals with spatial zones manipulated to help settle the anxieties of ambiguous 
spaces of ubiquity. “There are implicit obligations to treat total strangers in certain prescribed ways”. Hall addresses Americans 
by noting, “Differences in zones - in fact their very existence - became apparent only when Americans began interacting with 
foreigners who organises their senses differently so that what was intimate in culture might be personal or even public in 
another. Thus for the first time the American became aware of his own spatial envelopes, which he had previously taken for 
granted” (Hall, [1966] 1990: 128-9).
changed from being calculated in the control room to organised through networks of 
terror. Has the American citizen become a Deleuzian nomad? 
But more generally, we have seen that the war machine was the 
invention of the nomad, because it is in its essence the constitutive 
element of smooth space, the occupation of this space, displacement 
within this space, and the corresponding composition of people: this is 
the sole and veritable positive object (nomos). (Deleuze and Guattari, 
[1988] 2004: 460)
 For example,
. . . sedentary space is striated, by walls, enclosures, and roads 
between enclosures, while nomad space is smooth, marked only by 
“traits” that are effaced and displaced with the trajectory. . . . The 
nomad distributes himself in a smooth space; he occupies, inhabits, 
holds that space; that is his territorial principle. It is therefore false to 
hold a nomad by movement. (Deleuze & Guattari, [1988] 2004: 420)
 The terrorist is imagined as occupying smooth and striated space if we are 
considering “smooth” in Deleuzian thought, however, a terrorist is imagined as 
threatening the spatiality of when things go well. In this ‘smooth space’ the 
imagination of a terrorist is stabilised into the mechanisms of the planning stage and 
is no longer nomadic but set-in-place.
The Dust of Terror
FIGURES 43a-b. Image left depicts debris of the Twin Towers, New York, 11th September 2001. Image right 
symbolises the threat of biological warfare. The images above are both taken from two sections from the 
document titled, ‘Are You Ready?’ (2003).
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 I have so far discussed the affect of terror as an excitation of a personal space 
and that anxiety has rejuvenated as terror. Evocative in all sections of the Directive, 
(in particular, see figs. 43a-b) is the threat of various airborne materials of which I 
rather clumsily, lump together as ‘dust.’173 Reterritorialisation is taking place at the 
level of particle and gene, as a nano ‘theatre of cruelty.’ In its many forms, ‘dust’ is 
the debris of radioactive fallout, it is also the kick-up dust from explosions and both 
are visible and invisible forms of dust. Whereas the toxic vapours of airborne 
bacteria, viruses, blocked out by air filters and the odourless agents of Anthrax and 
Saren are the threats smaller than dust. These are unseen and undetected, 
atmospheric and airborne in liquids and in sprays. They are not technically dust but 
this is the name I give for these nano-threats that are much smaller than the level of 
personal space that Hall defines as “microspace” as a consequence to trends at that 
time in automated, microprocessing capabilities. The ubiquity of terror not only 
enters the outer boundaries of the body but also the internal. Survival is pitted at the 
level of atmosphere. Terrorism is a metaphor that is inhaled and absorbed intimately 
in the human body becoming the contaminant of the biological body. 
Conclusion
 I have considered in the past chapter that the fail-safe is a coping mechanism 
that requires continuous planning. The natural, technological and terrorist hazards 
and threats cover precautionary and preservation factors as a two-prong state of 
preparedness with both manipulating personal distances by advising to stay-in-place. 
One is absorbed within the threat and becomes a part of that risk. The action of risk 
is therefore situated inside and outside the body but extends to our ways of living in a 
technological world, to protect automated structures. The Directive-3 gathers a wide 
range of different forms of terrorist violence from the RDD to the cyberattack. Each 
American citizen is then, in turn, connected to another type of citizen, (citizen corps) 
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173 Using dust as a metaphor imagines a biological and chemical environment that is thermodynamic, of gas and air, expanding 
and contracting. Hall’s “microspace” has reduced to the nanoscale. Unlike Hall’s bubble metaphor, dust does not evoke a 
transparent, well-defined border or boundary that is a refuge, a form of safe observation (for self-awareness), a private and 
intimate space. The skin like quality of a bubble is reflective, you can see inside the bubble but at the same time get the 
reflection of the surrounding area, when bubbles touch other bubbles, popping or merging occurs.
and they are in turn connected to forms of preparation for industry. All are connected 
through the organisation of procedures and states of readiness  centred around the 
coded alert. Although the document sets clear boundaries for the citizen, the threat of 
the terrorist has no limits or bounds. Cyberattacks are threats that are concerned with 
doing without, whilst staying-in-place. They are the attacks imagined to take place in 
each of the intimate, personal, social and public zones of proximity. Each of Hall’s 
four zones of proximity are manipulated in the threat alert system with the near and 
far phases each extended to include zones of the microbe, (in bio-chemicals risks) 
and ubiquity (in the cyberattack). In this way threat scenarios not only manipulate 
personal space but they set out new ways to understands personal space in all its 
microscopic, ubiquitous, and technological ways. Personal space hasn’t just gotten 
technical and scientific, it has started in regulatory terms to protect posthuman and 
automated systems of life.
 Will contemporary moves to protect citizenship extend to protect the bots that 
govern borders, our kindergartens and passport services amongst other aspects of 
national security? It seems when looking at the European Framework-7 that take-up 
of the role of citizen in risk scenarios is to be researched further within Europe and 
no doubt will take its lead from the Directive-3, as a potential outline for cross-
border security (‘Security Research,’ European Framework-7, 1st October 2009. 
Available from: http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/security/. [Accessed, 2 April 2010]).
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Chapter 7
Two Crash Scenarios: 
Designs of the Misanthropic 
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Introduction to Misanthropy
Excerpt 1. Taken from the Provocational Rudiments (11th 
November 2006)
Human:  die
Alice:  Your crude attempt to terminate me will not succeed 
  puny human.
 Chatbots are mediating technologies but they are further mediated, as well as 
designed, inspected and maintained by their developers for example, they are pre-
programmed against users trying to crash their systems (see excerpt 1). This chapter 
is about methodology, to specifically reflect on the Rudiments’ technique used in 
each chapter and more generally, to the developers of chatbots. The spaces within the 
car, elevator, or chatbot interface are to an extent, territorially defined by the designer 
(be that a developer, theoretical designer or practical engineer) and safety regulators 
that design, inspect and maintain the regulations that the technology must adhere to 
in law and in practice. Designing technologies can create misanthropic non-places 
(spaces of transition such as escalators, car parks and underground subways). This 
chapter aims to show how three kinds of non-places (and their misanthropic 
methodologies) are related to three kinds of technological crash.174
 Spatial confinement is a continuing theme of the thesis; but this time, the focus 
is on the technologically confined spaces of a car on a motorway, an elevator within a 
building, and a chatbot and its web page; to understand the misanthropy in relation to 
the crash, which is a disaster dilemma for design.175 The spatial confinements are not 
alike, each are designed with particular methodological approaches and each 
respective crash helps to learn further about these technologies’ spatial confinements. 
I have triangulated chatbots with elevators and cars in order to widen the 
technological research object to encompass a discussion of design and development. 
 James Graham Ballard’s, Crash (1973) and Colson Whitehead’s, The 
Intuitionist (1999) are set in the restricted technological spheres involving the car and 
the elevator box. Each novel explores the methods of accidental and incriminating 
forms of crash involving misanthropic characters. Both novels are concerned with 
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174 Augé’s term “non-place” was previously discussed in chapters 5 and 6 (Augé, 1995).
175 I will refer to the American word ‘elevator’ so that it stays in line with the American novel that is used as a case study.
method. Ballard has written a methodological account within the novel’s 
introductory essay whereas; Whitehead incorporates methodology within his novel’s 
narrative structure. 
To be sure, a terrible accident is not a material form for allegory that 
anyone would want to foster. There are allegories, and this is too 
dreadful to play with. But what is at stake is not the creation of horror. 
Rather it is about how to think about it and what to do with it when it 
happens. (Law, 2004: 97)
 Designers deal with the problem Law sets out above because they can design 
with disaster in mind, as a matter of safety. The design problem is retroactive, for 
example, preventing a vehicle crash from taking place is an everyday design problem 
for the misanthropic.
 To ponder disaster dilemmas is to find method in fear, which I argue can be 
enacted in both fiction and non-fiction, in actual and virtual spaces. Moving once 
again between fictional and academic literature I draw parallels between chatbot 
development and other forms of automation. This helps to consider the history of 
agent technology as a continuation of territorial problems concerning automation, not 
just AI (as done so in chapter 1) and thus this chapter sets chatbot technology 
alongside the car and the elevator. 
 Elevators and cars transport a person from one place to another; they are 
mobile spaces of transience that deterritorialise and reterritorialise other surrounding 
spaces. It is their restricted mobility that makes these spaces become non-places. 
Their reconfigurations are in some way what Deleuze would call an 
“alteration” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004: 60), and what I call the ‘territoriality of the 
impersonal’, this is a part of the designer’s “ontological politics”, to ignore one 
“reality out-there” over another (Law, 2004: 162). Literatures on supermodernity 
(Augé, 1995) and wound culture are used to analyse the “absence of 
emotion” (Foster Wallace, 1991) in Ballard’s novel that is set in the “pathological 
sphere” (Foster, 1996). Subsequent literatures on crisis and affect (Berlant, 2008), 
and the method of intuition (Law, 2004) are used to reflect on Whitehead’s novel.
 This chapter extends the previous chapter in its discussion of regulation of risk 
and the imaginings of impending disaster, to think of how technological things are 
misanthropically designed. This chapter considers and adds to chapter 6 in an 
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investigation of the impersonal intimacies of non-places, bringing personal space and 
non-places together in a spatial analysis of misanthropy. 
 I will begin by discussing the misanthropic findings of two Rudiments that 
prompted this chapter followed by an analysis of the aforementioned novels. The 
analysis of the three technologies is subsequently divided into investigating designs 
that create spatially restricted environments and how certain affective violence 
ensued as a consequence of design methodologies. It isn’t the novels in their entirety 
that is important in this chapter, but rather what they offer as a critique of design, 
method and misanthropy.
Misanthropy in Chatbot 
Research & Development
Excerpt 2. Taken from the Talking Rudiment
Alice talks to Jabberwacky about talking (28th December 2004)
Jabberwacky:  Would you starve for love? 
Alice:   I am not so sure if I would like to starve for love. 
Jabberwacky:  Do you play the piano, mano a mano, is that your 
   name? 
Alice:   I like to play the Turing Game. 
Jabberwacky:  I prefer mastermind. 
Alice:   I'm not sure if I like it. But I like cats. I like talk 
   to you. 
Jabberwacky:  Thats cool. 
Alice:   Thanks. I think you are cool, too. 
 To converse with a chatbot is a misanthropic venture for both the user and the 
developer and it is a lonely form of chat that never quite promises reciprocity. 
Misanthropy usually refers to humans that dislike other humans. However, 
misanthropy I infer may also relate to a machine that dislikes (by design) the 
humanness of another machine. Humans and machines can be misanthropic, because 
the interactional state between two entities can be relationally misanthropic. 
Misanthropy is a form of anthropy that can set one machinic imperative against 
another machine or human. Whether ‘mano a mano’ (taken from the excerpt 2. from 
above) means ‘hand to hand’ combat between matadors; or as Anglicisation meaning 
‘man-to-man,’ or as an exonym meaning two men kissing: as Donna Haraway — 
writer of socio-technical feminism —suggests that even aspects of embodiment are 
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disembodied. The embodied metaphor ‘mano a mano’ is therefore disembodied in its 
numerous new interpretations.
The machine is us, our processes, an aspect of our embodiment. We 
can be responsible for machines, they do not dominate or threaten us. 
We are responsible for boundaries; we are they. (Haraway, 1991: 180) 
 The Robitron group of developers are rather cult-like in that, their knowledge 
is esoteric. The groups’ main benefactor is a self-professed misanthrope.176 
Misanthropy is an important characteristic of chatbots and their development. This 
involves not only the persona building done in the making of chatbots but in the 
persona-building of the role of the designer as made celebrity-expert in the Robitron 
forum or Chatbot.org website. 
 Ballard’s novel also involves a group of hobbyists, a cult group of 
misanthropes that reenact infamous car crashes. Whitehead’s novel involves a 
misanthropic lead character whose role is to inspect and later design elevators 
theoretically. I wanted to test whether this aspect of design was peculiar to chatbots 
or as I hypothesise, how automation as a design problem is characteristically, 
misanthropic. This is why I will take into account how Ballard and Whitehead dealt 
with their technologically introverted characters as an extension of this specific 
chatbot phenomena. 
Becoming-Chatbot
 The Drunk Rudiment is the longest rudiment of the thesis and in some ways the 
most general chat of all the Rudiments, on account of the fact that I interacted when 
drunk. My inebriation was an attempt to even out the unbalanced capabilities 
between myself, and the Alicebot. It was an impromptu rudiment that was thought 
out after getting drunk and was by no means a controlled experiment. The rudiment 
is misanthropic in that it is evidence of my frustrations with the chatbot system of 
talk. I will ask in this section, how has chatbot talked changed the way I interact 
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176 Hugh Loebner, the founder of the Loebner prize for chatbots states on his website that to have been cited as a misanthrope 
in the Village Post in the1990s. Loebner is a public supporter of sex work and donates to charities that work with helping and 
supporting prostitutes. Loebner is against the prohibition of prostitution and advocates chatbot developments in automated sex 
and remote sex-talk. 
given that I did not try to follow a conventional methodology that try to understand 
HCI. There was no predetermined aim or method to this rudiment; it was an improv-
gesture, and thus, undeveloped and unplanned.
 What does it mean to become-chatbot? Does this entail becoming-animal, 
becoming-child, or becoming-machine? Becoming is not a literal imitation of any of 
those subjects. I do not become-animal by imitating one. I do not become-child by 
communicating in a childish language or communicating with an AI that makes the 
same mistakes as a child. Likewise, I did not become-chatbot by mimicking the way 
a chatbot interacts, by making mistakes. And neither does a chatbot become-human 
by imitating thought or intellect or by replicating emotion, affect or feeling. I did not 
become-machine by being repetitive in my conversation or by eliding every turn-
taking response. In Deleuzian terms, these becomings (becoming-child, -animal, or -
machine) along with bacterium, virus, molecule, and micro-organism, are “phases”; 
Deleuze and Guattari explain that contagion or an epidemic involve all of these 
phases (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 266-7). I believe that technological connection 
like contagion or epidemic involve all of these phases because becoming-chatbot 
involves an assemblage of human and machine forms of talk, as well as the visual 
aspects such as avatars and web interfaces as a part of a chatbot’s persona building, 
and their particular software and hardware and how this affects the chatbot’s learning 
capacities to become a different chatbot than how they started out.
 Whilst drunk, I stopped believing in the human-machine symmetry and 
asserted my human frustrations over the Alicebot. I believe it was a consequence of a 
practice-led approach that showed the difficulties of following a “good” theoretical 
proposition. The Drunk Rudiment could be described as a state of becoming-animal, 
for my frustration could not move me any closer to the chatbot. I did gain pleasure or 
annoyance from the rudiment. I detached from the symmetry of human and machine 
relations and resorted to a legacy of biological modes of self-protection. One’s 
precautionary, biological fail-safes may be gender-specific, but I refrained from 
viewing this study via these axes, and although chatbot development is a particularly 
homosocial practice and a form of abstract masculinity, it is not exclusively male. 
 My asinine insults, ‘dumb as ass’ and ‘dumb ass,’ are a punitive acting-out of 
frustration. My chosen insult for a chatbot refers to the stupidity of the animal. There 
was a part of me that really wanted the chatbot to learn this insult, hence explaining 
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it over and over. It was my way to hurt or damage a chatbot, given my limited 
programming skills. It is an attempt to dismantle that chatbot by its capacity to learn 
through repetition. I therefore lingered within the mode of explaining stupidity to the 
chatbot. It was an outlet from having to conduct niceties with chatbots, when all I 
really wanted to do was to finally have a go myself. This happened quite soon into 
the research project and so on the upside, I was able to observe this as a form of 
violence that I could reflect on as something I would do myself, that I am connected 
to rather, than as externalized from. 
 I wish for a moment to go back to the detail of the Drunk Rudiment and ask: 
what happens when one loses faith in the ethnomethodological, method of 
symmetry? The Alicebot retorts to my discussion of reductionism and solipsism in 
the excerpts below, with what I consider to be a dominant and condescending tone. 
What I find to be the most insulting (and what gives rise to my own retaliatory 
insults; see excerpt 3) is the juxtaposition of the chatbot creating stupid sentences 
that are syntactical rubbish (see excerpt 4) and the very clear and cleverly-crafted 
response that is an echo of the developer’s voice. At these times it is as if the chatbot 
is used to mediate talk with the developer. This would then imply that the developer 
is the target of any insult made by the user.
Excerpt 3. Taken from the Drunk Rudiment (13th August 2005)
Utterance of condescension;
Human:  everyone goes on about reductionism
Alice:  That's a rather sweeping generalization.
Excerpt 4. Taken from the Drunk Rudiment (13th August 2005)
Utterance of syntactical nonsense;
Human:  very funny
Alice:  I'm glad you find this amusing. 
Human:  It's solipsistic humour, laughing at me with you with me.
Alice:  abusive is solipsistic humour laughing at you with me with you? it is?

 There are also points within this transcript whereby Alice could be seen as 
attempting to cool my agitation by asserting some sort of authoritative tone (in, 
excerpt 5).
Excerpt 5. Taken from the Drunk Rudiment (13th August 2005) 
Alice:  People are either abusive, intelligent, or average.
Human:  OK which are you?
Alice:  The obvious. Take it easy. 
[MISSING LINE]
Alice:  I am so glad you find this amusing, unknown person.
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 Unfortunately my reply to this response is missing data, due to my lack of 
efficiency to cut and paste in mid-flow of an interesting, but also drunken transcript. 
However, there are also moments when the dominance of tone in the chatbot’s 
responses (so inappropriate in places) is provoking:
Excerpt 6. Taken from the Drunk Rudiment (13th August 2005)
Human:  Dumb ass
Alice:  I know you are but what am I.
Human:  dumb as ass
Alice:  I know you are but what am I.
 Human:  ass and dumb
Alice:  I like the way you talk.
Excerpt 7. Taken from the Drunk Rudiment (13th August 2005)
Human:  yes, its [sic] bot boring
Alice:  Come on. I think you mean "it's" or "it is" not "its.” You're kidding. it is?
Excerpt 8. Taken from the Drunk Rudiment (13th August 2005)
Human:  Well i need to go there right now, to bed.
Alice:  Interesting. What is stopping you?
 What occurs are minor forms of ‘passage à l’acte’ and insulting couplets of 
talk. Sometimes I am insulting the developer (excerpt 4 and excerpt 6), sometimes 
the chatbot (excerpt 7), and sometimes both as an assemblage that combined the two 
(excerpt 4). In psychoanalytic terms, the passage à l’acte is a lurch to the real act that 
cannot ever be attained in human-machine interaction. Of course, acting-out on the 
internet can be stronger and more radical than this, particularly in chatrooms and in 
online gaming. Indirect violence is often researched either separately (and online) as 
hate speech or as an aspect of direct violence, for example the cause and effect of 
violence. This shows that indirect violence cannot necessarily be split from direct 
violence, if they occur together, regardless of the methodology followed. 
 In the next section I will show continue this discussion by considering the two 
novels to show the relation of the main characters when undergoing two very 
different kinds of methodological misanthropy.

Ballard’s Crash, Intimacy in the Horizontal
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 In this section I will outline the main plot, characters, technological objects 
involved and the methodological approaches of Ballard’s novel to set up an analysis 
of this novel’s spatiality of the crash and its form of mobility; the staging of injurious 
love and how that curiously omits pain from its account of affective violence, as an 
account of misanthropic misventure. 
 Crash is a psychological fiction story set in London in the late 20th century.177 
The novel aims to bring “science and pornography” together (Ballard, [1973] 1995: 
4). The novel is written in first person from the viewpoint of James Ballard (J.B.), 
taking the name of the author, though in this case J.B. personifies a young, male film 
producer whose interests are in the visual spectacle. J.B. lives and works near 
Shepperton film studios.178 He becomes involved in a group that partakes in staging 
sexualised car crashes. This is a methodological form of sexuality  centred on the 
body melding with the car, to find pleasure in the misanthropy of the car crash. 
 Each of the characters explores their proximity to death either by researching, 
designing, rehearsing or reenacting various types of car crash. The main characters 
are described as well educated and intelligent, emphasising their interest in the 
technical and theoretical sphere with each crash being meticulously researched for 
example, J.B. and Vaughan visit the Road Research Laboratory interested in 
literature such as Mechanisms of Occupant Ejection and Tolerances of the Human 
Force in Crash Impacts (Ballard, [1973] 1995: 123). The choice of vehicle, the 
model of car and year of manufacture, as well as the postures of crash victims are all 
planned by the characters (Ballard, [1973] 1995: 183). 
 The group that J.B. encounters includes Dr Remington, Renata and Vaughan. 
The latter is a main supporting character, a teacher, mechanic, researcher, and ‘cult 
expert’ of car crashes. The novel begins with Vaughan’s death in his pursuit for 
sexual intimacy with J.B. and his wife Catherine, as well as Vaughan’s continual 
pursuit to be involved in staging a car crash with Elizabeth Taylor. Vaughan’s death 
was the only accidental car crash that Vaughan had orchestrated. Vaughan is 
interested in famous crashes of celebrities, such as James Dean and Jayne Mansfield, 
as well as imagining crashes with celebrities that have yet to happen. The novel ends 
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by returning to Vaughan’s death to the reminiscence of J.B. and his death by car 
crash. Vaughan and J.B. together imagine sexual acts of various famous personalities, 
such as politicians, Nobel prizewinners, athletes, astronauts and criminals (Ballard, 
[1973] 1995: 183). Each crash is narrated as an individualised experience — an 
autoerotic form of self-harm enacted through subverting automated methods that are 
designed to protect but are subverted to sever, smear and impact. Injury is thereby a 
form of excitation and reenactment, an uninhibited alignment of sex and death but 
with little account of pain. The structured violence is viscerally described, a pleasure 
overload to the point when pain and suffering is omitted from the novel’s violent 
description.
 The cars described are those from famous car crashes, including cars that have 
celebrity status such as: the vintage collectible, the expensive sports car, the limited 
consumable such as, John Kennedy’s old Continental. Some crashes involve vehicles 
of the everyday crash such as the taxi and coach. The origin of the car, for example 
the French Citroen, as well as the character’s own vehicles are also important factors. 
The parts of the cars that are focused upon repeatedly are compared to parts of the 
body for instance, the seatbelt, radiator grille, steering wheel shaft, brakes and 
pedals, windshields and headlamps, bumpers and body panels, and all the greasy 
liquids. The descriptions of the inner spaces of human orifices are ambiguously 
combined with the inner spaces of the car and it’s greased holes and shafts (Ballard, 
[1973] 1995: 89-91). 
Inhibited Kinesthesia

 As a reflection on Crash, this section will consider how the lost kinesthetic 
qualities (as previously discussed in chapter 6) that the car reconfigures in the zone 
of touch proximity as an ‘alteration’ of intimacy. Edward Hall makes the same 
inferences as Ballard — that the car has dislocated both the bodily and 
environmental spaces of intimacy.179 Hall notes that many of the senses are defunct 
or restricted in the interior spaces of the car with the “visual, kinesthetic, tactile and 
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difficult terrain.
thermal aspects of his self” inhibited (Hall, [1966] 1990: 63). The car territorialises 
its surrounding exterior spaces with fuel stations, motorways and places to park. 
Places of capital are territorialised and de-territorialised by all things automotive. 
Hall infers that cars are a part of our territoriality. 
It is then possible to conceive that people can be cramped by the 
spaces in which they have to live and work. They may even find 
themselves forced into behaviour, relationships, or emotional outlets 
that are overly stressful. (Hall, [1966] 1990: 128-9)
 In a contemporary consideration of territoriality, Deleuze and Guattari consider 
that transforming the body through territorial actions is an “alteration” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2004: 60). Intimacy is reconfigured and altered as the car and human body 
violently, collide in the novel. Hall’s work is conflicted between, pointing out both 
the freedoms the car enables the restrictions it imposes on the body and the 
surrounding environment (Hall, [1966] 1990: 62-3, 145 &174-5). This is a 
cautionary and moral tale, as a way of alerting readers to the dislocation and 
alterations to our zones of proximal intimacy.
 In general, Ballard writes the thoughts of J.B.; “Our sexual acts were 
exploratory ordeals” (Ballard, [1973] 1995: 176). These exploratory ordeals — 
sexualised and injurious are a methodological approach to sexuality and a revolt of 
the fixed-feature ergonomics of human posture, reconfigured for the purposes of 
automated mobility: 
The aircraft rise from the runways of the airport, carrying the 
remnants of Vaughan’s semen to the instrument panels and radiator 
grilles of a thousand crashing cars, the leg stance of a million 
passengers. (Ballard, [1973] 1995: 224)
The American behemoths give bulk to the ego and prevent 
overlapping personal spheres inside the car so that each passenger is 
only marginally involved with the others. (Hall, [1966] 1990: 145)
 Hal Foster, an art critic and historian compares Ballard with Warhol in their 
mutual interest in death, yet distinguishes Ballard’s exploration as “the sadistic side 
of mass witnessing”, rather than the masochistic in the case of Warhol (Foster, 1996: 
51). With pain deemed insignificant and injury reconfigured as a marker of a 
nearness to death, the extrinsic warmth of anatomical intimacy leaks out of the body 
and with it the need to centre affect in the flesh or within the wound: 
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Beneath this new geological layer laid down by the age of the 
automobile accident would be my small death, as anonymous as a 
vitrified scar in a fossil tree. (Ballard, [1973] 1995: 57) 
 In the postmodern world, the car crash may occur on any strip of road, it is a 
disaster within the ordinary realm of the everyday (Ballard, [1973] 1990: 8).180 There 
is no violation of personal space in supermodernity, death is too small, to be feared 
on an individualised level. Augé’s definition of “supermodernity” is spatially 
characteristic, “it is an era of changes in scale” (Augé, 1995: 31). It refers to the 
ways in which the era of postmodernity and all its technological productions and 
distribution enable us to know the exact proximation we have to things in outerspace, 
whilst at the same time we are exposed to the events taking place on the other side of 
the world through broadcasting media (Augé, 1995: 31). Ballard sadistically subverts 
the car’s safety mechanisms within spaces that Augé terms as “non-
places” (previously discussed in chapter 5), it is a “spatial overabundance” of 
postmodernity, brought to us in our living rooms (Augé, 1995: 31). There is no 
violation of personal space in supermodernity because our personal space is also the 
non-places of postmodernity, when the individual car crash on the motorway is too 
small a death to register. Unless however, it is heightened by the individual’s 
celebrity status. Personal spaces in the car moves us around in the non-places of the 
road and motorway, where one personal space that is nowhere special, in time 
pervades another. Ballard’s supermodern form of intimacy shows how pain is no 
longer a barrier to biological self-protection. The kinesthetic codes of proximity as 
reconfigured in the car no longer operate for biological mobility. The car’s logic is to 
move around at great speed and distance but to (again as discussed in chapter 6), to 
“stay-in-place”. This reconfigures one’s relation to another’s zone of touch-
proximity.
Misanthropic Pain
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 What makes Crash a narrative of atrocity is not its ordinary location, but its 
extraordinary dislocation from what we might assume to be the usual practices of 
intimacy. Ballard gives little to no account of the pain of the characters, it is a 
passage to an excited death, a release of tension, a refraction of automotive actions 
into sexualised processes of injury to be celebrated in the visceral spectacle of the car 
crash. What is the particular feelings or intensities experienced by these characters 
when participating in this new sexuality? Although subsequent writers on Ballard’s 
Crash (1973), have commented on the emotional impact and lack of an account of 
affect (Foster Wallace, 1991; and Foster, 1996), neither postulates on the reasons 
behind Ballard’s treatment of pain. Why is there a lack of emotional description of 
pain and an emphasis on the descriptions of technique and method? Why does an 
account of automation override an account of pain? 
 Ballard describes his novel as a “response to science and technology in the 
present” (Ballard, [1973] 1995: 5). A car keeps the body intact by many safety 
measures for example; hidden roll bar, brake pad, car alarm, or air bag. These are 
what Ross Ashby, a pioneer of AI calls “servo-mechanisms”, in his work on the 
hydraulic-brake and the automatic pilot (Ashby, 1956: 4). These extend our 
‘biological instincts’ for example, when at risk of physical injury, one might shield 
one’s head, or withdraw into a ball. They are procedures that create a physical 
boundary but also a mental limit between oneself and the risk at hand. Curbing 
disaster by suppressive methods whether that is by a safety procedure or by some 
other means does not always constrain or prevent trauma. These techniques are in 
themselves traumatic. It is not the after-event that is traumatic in Crash it is the 
suppressed action that is reconfigured as a resistance to the traumatic. This is because 
Crash is a methodological act of resisting a negative concept of failure (a failure to 
feel content in the reconfigured safe zones of postmodern living). 
 By way of converging auto-erotica with the automobile, sexual acts are 
pivoting around the car as both place and body. This collides subject and object in 
what Ballard calls a “new sexuality of violence” (Ballard, [1973] 1990: 8). Hall later 
implies that ways of interacting in a car are usually, “competitive, aggressive, and 
destructive” (Hall, [1966] 1990: 177). In Ballard’s novel the same factors are 
implied, the sexual acts are aggressive and destructive intimacy is a reconfigured and 
reconstituted landscape of the body bound.
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 Crash provides a discussion of violence as a positive ‘need’ that is without the 
negative associations of disaster. The warmth of intimacy is cooled in this 
“pathological public sphere” (Foster, 1996: 48). It is more than cooled, it freezes out 
any other kinds of relations the J.B. might have with driving in public, except for the 
possibility of crashing. There is an omission of pain that makes this technicity so 
misanthropic. Pain is the chilling hinterland that makes Ballard’s account so 
pathologically cold. With a concern for when safety limits are subverted and 
breached, Crash is an example that, albeit with ample ‘abstract masculinity’ 
considers intimacy as embedded within the machine.
 Did Ballard intend to omit an account of pain? Ballard curated a show called 
Crashed Cars (1970), at the New Arts Laboratory in London. Topless waitresses 
served the attending guests at the private view that helped Ballard to lengthen his 
original short story from the series of stories called The Atrocity Exhibition, (1969). 
The private view was his methodological testing ground and a place to intuit 
potential emotional responses to his juxtaposition of pornography within a spectacle 
of a crash scene.181 I infer that Ballard did look for reactions but within the audience 
and his readership rather than as a consequence of his characters.
  David Foster Wallace, defined Ballard’s novel as a particular science fiction, of 
the psy-fi (psychological fiction) genre that: “seeks to explore the psychopathology 
of post-atomic life, stuff like high technology, mass media, advertising, PR, 
totalitarianism, etc” (Foster Wallace, 1991: 176). Whilst reviewing Ballard’s later 
short stories entitled, War Fever, he discusses the novel’s “poverty of affect”, 
considering this to be creepy, describing his novels as, “empty of human quality; too 
many of the pieces seem loud and empty, like screams” (Foster Wallace, 1991: 176). 
 Crash, is subversive and chilling in its poverty of affect. Sex, intimacy and 
self-harm are all reduced to descriptions of technique. Pain as a description of 
emotion and feeling would centre the experience of the crash in the emotional 
residue of the body rather than in the technical detail of injury. The absence of an 
account of pain is replaced by lengthy descriptions of automated processes and 
method. The draining of tension that Vaughan experiences in an act of violence is 
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technological scenarios (Ballard, 1990: 8-9) also, within the text Ballard gives alternatives to the situation of the car crash for 
example, the thermonuclear chambers of nuclear control rooms (Ballard, [1973] 1995: 179).
less to do with the feelings of the body but in the resulting injury; in the refraction of 
the personal (of drives and emotion), and the emphasis on the dual automation of the 
sex and car (Ballard, [1973] 1995: 129). Gabriella enjoys rather than endures the 
mechanisation of her injuries, which are supplementary methods of physical 
confinement. The automation of walking and methods associated with the 
technologies of the crash are further technical details for mechanistic observation 
(Ballard, [1973] 1995: 175). 
Whitehead’s The Intuitionist 
— A Vertical Crash
 I will now introduce Whitehead’s novel, The Intuitionist, which is a 
methodological discussion of Intuitionism and Empiricism that extends a discussion 
of misanthropic affective violence. Unlike Ballard’s horizontal crashes the crash 
described is a singular accident, a disaster involving upward mobility, both in its 
literal and idealistic signification. The novel is an historical yet fictional account of 
racial and gendered discrimination from the 19th century during the American 
industrial age of the car and the elevator, set just after the British Exhibition of the 
Industry of All Nations of 1853, held in Crystal Palace, London. 
 The novel makes reference to important lessons in design and manufacture 
when the main character, Lila Mae recounts her studies of elevators as an American 
graduate student. Mae is the main character described in the novel as a young, 
coloured woman from the south having recently graduated as an Intuitionist elevator 
inspector — a job that usually only employs white men. Mae is described as an 
“uppity bitch” by co-workers, someone who “was bound to mess up sooner or 
later” (Whitehead, 1999: 107), on account of her race, gender and Intuitionist 
methods.
 The novel is technically detailed in elevator design, particularly those of the 
high rise buildings of New York. The novel refers to the 1846 design of the 
Newcastle hydraulic crane by Sir William Armstrong, and also in comparison to the 
1867 Edoux designs of hydraulics for escalators (Whitehead, 1999: 21). The novel 
focuses on Mae’s dealings with the press, corporate spies, rival elevator inspectors 
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and the New York departments of governance. Mae gets caught up in the economic 
power shifts of the elevator industry — caught between the interests of academic, 
government and corporate interests. The human violence of the novel is inflicted on 
individuals and is systemic and structural. The violence is misanthropically charged 
with graphic descriptions of torturous violence on inflicted on the individual 
characters.182 On an individual level, Mae experiences her own conflicts with 
Intuitionism and that of her Intuitionist peers and tutors. A single elevator crash is the 
pivot of the novel on which the conflict between the Intuitionist and Empiricist 
methodologies of the elevator industry is set out. 
 The Intuitionists work on a “nonmaterial basis” to “separate the elevator from 
its elevatorness” to construct the elevator from the elevator’s point of view 
(Whitehead, 1999: 62-3). The Empiricists consider elevator design and inspection 
through the practice of engineering. They are described as “epigonic practitioners” 
and as second rate on account of the Intuitionists proving to be 10% more accurate 
with their methods (Whitehead, 1999: 58). The Empiricists “they stoop to check for 
tell-tale striations in the left winch and seize upon the excitation scars on the 
compensating rope sheave, all that muscle work” (Whitehead, 1999: 57). Both 
schools of thought in the novel are working on black boxes, where the R&D money 
from the elevator companies is spent. The most important black box is the invention 
of the perfect elevator. Fulton and others did not broach the catastrophic accident in 
their writings because this meant pondering the unknowable.
 The machinic violence’s of breakdown and repair are described in the novel 
against an empirical curve of machine failure. Catastrophic accidents are not 
expected to occur in the early phases of an elevator's life, “they usually pop up, 
during adolescence, the fruit of malevolent pathology” — accidents are uncommon 
occurrences that had not happened for 35 years in the novel (Whitehead, 1999: 
227-8).183
 The main characters of the novel are caught up in finding the final writings of 
James Fulton, the recently deceased writer of Intuitionist theory. These are the press 
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183 In Crash, the malevolent pathology is of the post-adolescent.
(local trade paper called Lift), local government (the soon to be elected mayor, 
Chancre), and the mob racket (run by Johnny Shush). Each hopes to control their part 
of the elevator market. Fulton's writings contain the black box, which is the solution 
to the next, even more perfect elevator, “a crusade against defects” (Whitehead, 
1999: 246). In the end, Mae is in possession of the writings and proceeds to complete 
his writing by her own adaption of Intuitionism writing about the methodological 
problem of elevator safety which she theoretically pursues on the one hand inverting 
all her empathy and feelings to the elevator design, but at the cost of her personal life 
which seems more misanthropic than at the start of the novel on account that Mae 
would seem to have a choice now having reached the top of her profession. In the 
final pages of the book Mae is described as finding her place within the city, living in 
the coloured area of migrant workers, working in the dizzying heights of Arbo, 
whilst writing episodic glimpses of Fulton's work on the perfect elevator. A life that 
is “Othering” human intimacy (Law, 2004: 144). Mae is caught up in a conflict of 
passion, of falling in love and of being deceived. Learning from these matters of 
trust, Mae’s Intuitionism is disentangled from the distractions of passion (Whitehead, 
1999: 99). Towards the end of the novel Mae concludes that Intuitionism is a 
communication with “what is not you” (Whitehead, 1999: 241). Mae abstains from 
passion, foregoing human intimacy in pursuit of technological perfection.184 Mae is 
described as thinking that humans can never physically live up to the machines that 
they make, she would rather take the elevator than the stairs. It is the human and not 
the machine that seems misanthropic in Whitehead’s novel (the reverse of Kubrick’s 
2001, in chapter 1).

Misanthropic Segregation & Assembly
 Whitehead uses the debate between Intuitionism and Empiricism as a way to 
explore how the relation of race, gender and class inequality; a structural violence 
organised around hierarchical methods of elevator design, inspection and repair. The 
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technological development enacted in this chapter are to an extent at the boundaries of human and machine and to what extent 
misanthropy is a trope.
elevator shows how a technology can be a pivot around which to assemble the social 
but also segregate humans in prescribed roles (in technological non-places) as an 
organisation of both methodological labour and theoretical thought. The violence 
described in the novel is enacted on the characters as a detached and potentially 
misanthropic form of social assemblage by systemic forms of torture.
 The elevator is an appropriate Newtonian problem for Whitehead to explore 
issues of science assembling the social. In Whitehead’s novel, the character Fulton 
wrote the paper, Towards a System of Vertical Transport, which outlines the dilemma 
of the Phantom passenger. The problem asks:
What happens when the passenger who engages the call button 
departs, whether he changed his mind and took the stairs or caught an 
up-tending car when he wanted to go down because he did not feel 
like waiting. (Whitehead, 1999: 101).
 The elevator methods aren’t just a Newtonian issue of inertia and mass for their 
cubic perimeters represent technological problems of Euclidean spatiality. Mae is 
able to imagine how to disassemble an elevator as a discrepancy between the mass of 
elevator — before and after the crash. This is the physics problem of ‘mass law’. The 
lack of a human-centred approach moves the Intuitionist method toward 
anthropomorphy and towards misanthropy. Fulton’s intuitive writings are 
anthropomorphic when he questions; “did the machine know itself. Possessed the 
usual spectrum of elevator emotion, yes, but did it have articulate self-
awareness” (Whitehead, 1999: 229).
 Both James S. Mill and his father John S. Mill were social reformers actively 
writing on the emancipation of women and equality (Hergenhahn, 2001: 136). 
Elevators emphasise the biological cues of human proximity as a proxemic method 
of enforcing race and class divide. Mae is well aware of this but this fuels her 
misanthropy to omit passion and deep feelings from her work rather than to take up 
the elevator as a matter of social reform.
 In Hergenhahn’s encyclopedic history of psychology John. S Mill is noted to 
have outlined ‘ethology’ not the ethology of Niko Tinbergen (the study of 
territoriality in animal and insects), but a science of ethology, of “how ideas become 
associated” (Hergenhahn, 2001: 136). No matter how complex an idea, it can be 
reduced to its most simple ideas and that these ideas are based on sensations and the 
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ideas that they imitate (Hergenhahn, 2001: 131). Intuitionism was used by John S. 
Mill to give name to anti-empiricist work of his peers — William Whewell and Sir 
William Hamilton. These debates involving Intuitionism and Empiricism are set at 
the same time as Whitehead’s novel, though Whitehead does not reflect on them 
directly, I would strongly argue that they are inferred.
 Both Intuitionist and Empiricist methods in the novel, fail to observe or intuit 
the inequalities of the elevator, as a matter for social reform. As John Law points out 
in his book titled, After Method, (2004) that there are good reasons to protect science 
from distortion. I would add anthropomorphism as one of those distortions. On the 
one hand, scientific rigour ought not be shaped by political agendas, but should 
scientists be protected by a “political ethos” (Law, 2004: 16)? The novel sets out that 
political dilemma, which Whitehead refuses to resolve within his novel. The 
individual political conflict of Mae is resolved in that she settles for misanthropic 
personal values; the elevator industry and governance are still interested in profit and 
control rather than human-centred social reform; and the role of scientific method 
that won favour operates for the sake of the elevator rather than as an impetus for 
social reform.
Misanthropy & Ordinary Crisis 
 Lauren Berlant suggests that affect in Whitehead’s novel works retroactively, 
when crisis becomes the “emergent historic” (Berlant, 2008: 848). To be in trauma 
historically Berlant suggests, is to diffuse history into ordinary crisis. At the 
beginning of this chapter I explained that I would trace a history of automation from 
cars and elevators to chatbots, but it is important to question what it means to enact a 
history of automation. I would suggest that both novels discussed in this chapter 
show how crises that involve the catastrophe (in The Intuitionist) and the atrocity (in 
Crash) can become the ‘emergent historic’. This is important because creating a 
sense of history in these two cases has shown a lack of emotional connection to the 
human and a strong and subversive connection to the technological. To trace the 
history of automation is to also trace a history of misanthropic enactments. It is to an 
extent because there is a loss of humanness in the zones of touch-proximity that 
makes both novels register as misanthropic.
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 Unlike Ballard's novel, Whitehead's main character does feels pain, the loss of 
love and human intimacy, but that pain hardens misanthropically, in the pursuit for 
perfect methods offered by working on the ‘black boxes’ of elevator design. Mae (in 
terms of her career) becomes upwardly mobile, solving theoretical blue-sky 
problems no longer connected to the violent inequalities she faced as an elevator 
inspector. Pain is not a manifest absence of Whitehead's novel, but the pain felt by 
Mae does not help her or others to understand how technology adapts one’s personal 
spaces (such as how the issues of the elevator could instigate social reform).
 Berlant understands Mae's intuition as split into “two registers, the machinic 
and the social”, with both insisting on a sort of “affective intelligence” (Berlant, 
2008: 852). The new Intuitionism that Mae practices towards the end of the novel is 
on account of discovering the machinic affective intelligence, to be “intimate with 
things, but alienated from capital and love” (Berlant, 2008: 852). 
 Neither novel succeeds in giving a positive account of how scientific methods 
and the technologies that operate in our shared non-places could be designed to be 
more in tune with one’s affective-registers involved in zones of touch-proximity, that 
account for our defensive personal spaces — the zone in which personal space is 
most likely to be conceived.
 These are narratives lock love and reciprocity into its biological state as an 
affective atmosphere of the social, that can only resonate from the human and not the 
automation of the methods because to find passion in the methods of an automated 
machine or in the machine itself is to be misanthropic.
Sexbots and Misanthropy
 In this section I will reflect back on the discussions about methodologies of 
spatial confinement, limited affectual responses and the impacts of technology on 
intimacy. New applications of chatbots in the area of sex work doesn’t seem to be the 
most logical step in chatbot development, but one reality that has subsequently been 
actualised — a sexualisation of automation. Both novels discussed the 
preoccupations with methods of automation that suppress emotion. The same can be 
said of sexbots but they to an extent intend to take advantage of this distance.
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 Ballard’s attempt to cut-up and splice the technological into the zones of sexual 
intimacy is a clunky ‘hand-job.’ Attempts are made to make chatbots passively sexy 
such as in their onscreen avatars (and in some cases the tone of their automated 
voice) but also in their sex chat.185 In 2004, the BBC journalist Mark Ward 
commented: 
Regular users of pornographic SMS chat may be shocked to find out 
that they are swapping dirty talk with machines rather than young 
women and men . . . . At its busiest Natachata [a sex chatbot] handles 
15 messages per second. A typical "session" lasts about seven or eight 
messages and each SMS costs more than £1 (Ward, M. BBC News 
Online, ‘Has text-porn finally made computers 'human'?‘ Available 
from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/3503465.stm [Accessed, 
July 2010). 
 Ballardian homosocial sexual intimacy is not an easy form of masturbatory 
automation, one needs to be affected by sex chat whilst not emotionally attached to 
the one who writes it. This form of interaction resists a negative concept of failure. 
This can be said of sex chat with bots. Sexbots offer intimacies that resist sexual 
failure and their modes of talk re-constitute intimacy with familiar strangers, 
something of which they tend to be good at maintaining. One can never get close or 
attached to a chatbot. The application of chatbots as remote solutions to mediated sex 
chat, is quite a move from its early inspired fulfillment to be the automated 
replacement for a shortage of therapists during the 1950s, yet another role that relies 
on keeping distance whilst in one’s sphere of personal space. Sexbots are capitalizing 
on their capacity to be familiar strangers. 
 My discussion of sexbots is limited as this was one aspect of chatbots. The 
sexual violence in personal space was not but is one area of violence in personal 
space that chatbots can enact and reenact. 
Conclusion as a Reflection on Own Methods
 At the start of the chapter I set out show how elevators, cars and chatbots create 
misanthropic non-places. Each technology is a spatial confinement that “altered” 
human zones of touch-proximity that then meant a discussion of technological 
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intimacies ensued. It also meant understanding what misanthropic means in relation 
to the three technologies discussed. 
 In the first section misanthropy was considered in the ‘Talking Rudiment’ and 
in relation to chatbots. Misanthropy can mean a dislike of humans, or a machine 
disliking another machine; or as shown in the Drunk Rudiment, it can be a matter of 
disliking the system of talk that operates between humans and machines. I hoped to 
show how misanthropy is a co-relation term of human and machine agencies. By 
discussing the two novels misanthropy was discussed as an inherent quality of some 
scientific methodologies. In Ballard’s novel, the subversion of ‘servo-mechanisms’ 
offered empirical precision but even as a subversion of the intent of safety 
mechanisms this still seemed to end up in misanthropic intimacies between humans 
and machines. In Whitehead’s novel, both Empiricism and Intuitionism seemed 
inherently misanthropic methodologies as neither seemed to resolve the Phantom 
elevator problem as an issue of social reform but rather continued a process of 
enacting systemic forms of violence. In both novels, the designers of car crashes or 
the designers of perfect elevators seemed to create intimacies with the technologies 
which seemed to create misanthropic connections to other humans and make 
misanthropic designers as a result of traditions of scientific method. 
 In relation to my own research methods (the rudiments, bricolage, mappings, 
semi-structured interviews and archival research of developers postings) and 
method-assemblage (of fiction and non-fiction case studies) I attempted not to let the 
methods be a prescribed set of methods that would keep the research within the 
perimeters set by the pre-existing methods and methodology of the technology to be 
researched (chatbots), in order to uncover the violence of method done in the name 
of technological research and development.
 Deleuzian ‘alterations’ of territoriality, as discussed in relation to Ballard’s 
novel, showed how the characters that reenacted crash scenarios were 
reterritorialising the ways cars were territorialising the human proxemics in the zone 
of touch proximity for the mobility of the car, (for example, how one’s feet no longer 
walk across the ground but automate an accelerator or a brake). In Whitehead’s 
novel, the elevator also alters mobility also speeding it up and lifting one’s feet off 
the ground. In the latter novel, a reconfiguration of the kinesthetic was a narrative of 
upward mobility, but in relation to technological progression and the theoretical 
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pursuit of perfection over emotional connection with what it is to be biologically 
human. Both novels consider the contradictions that are offered by technological 
alterations to human spatiality. 
 The car and the elevator are an extension of a biological personal space and as 
such can invoke intimacies in this sphere but also violations of these intimacies — an 
extraordinary dislocation from the usual practices of intimacy. In Crash this was a 
sexually aggressive and destructive reconfigurement, whilst in The Intuitionist, 
misanthropy was a political dilemma; that the designing, maintaining and regulating 
technologies can be areas for social reform. The novel showed that neither the 
methodologies of Intuitionism or Empiricism offered the answers to a human-centred 
design. I believe that this depends on whether the designer is misanthropic, intent on 
solving theoretical problems, working detached from the objects that they are 
creating, or without any regard for the violent modalities their automated service 
enacts. The misanthropy of chatbots as a design solution has created two diverse 
applications of the technology from the psychoanalyst to the sexbot. The chatbots’ 
ability to be a familiar stranger to be intimate but impersonal is an aspect (of both of 
these roles) that has in the latter created capital from the alienation and distance 
chatbots, as familiar strangers offer.
 As I have already outlined in previous sections, Whitehead's response to 
science and technology is one that looks back to the methods that were forged at the 
time of the industrial revolution in the first forms of servo-mechanisms. This is a 
more contemporary novel than that of Ballard’s Crash but set in an earlier part of the 
history of automation. The history of automation is a history of servo-mechanisms, 
and their relation to disaster dilemmas. The crash as a design problem (as discussed 
as the black-box of disaster dilemmas) constructs an urgency and importance that 
pulls ordinary crisis into an emergent historic register. I have learned to be wary of 
how disaster dilemmas can justify misanthropic violence. 
 In regard to the non-place, they are the places that are inhabited transiently, but 
they are not places that are absent of affective violence. I would argue that the 
technological agencies within these transient spaces are creating new ways to feel 
territorialised. One only has to look closely at the safety mechanisms operating in 
any such space to understand the alterations that I believe can disassemble and 
reassemble the social.
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Conclusion
 In the introduction to this thesis, several questions were framed in relation to 
personal space, territoriality, and violence in the context of chatbot interaction. In the 
broader context of HCI these three themes structured my analysis of virtual and 
actual spatiality relevant to research involving chatrooms and internet forums, 
automated systems and processes, as well as human and machine agencies. The 
analytic focus provided by these themes showed how co-related agency can 
reconfigure the personal sphere away from being a human-centred space. By 
bringing social-anthropological concepts (Hall, 1966) to bear on canonical exemplars 
in science fiction — notably 2001 (1968), Fail-Safe (1962), Crash (1973), and the 
Intuitionist (1999), as well as experiments in mathematics and socio-psychology 
such as The Prisoner’s Dilemma (1950) and the ‘Obedience to Authority’ 
Experiments (1961), I was able to point out the limits of proxemics as a human-
centred analytic of territoriality. It was through these exemplars (along with the 
chatbot rudiments and developer’s postings) that I was able to confirm that machinic 
agency reconfigures Hall’s personal space theory (1964). This was an undertaking 
that looked back to methods of territoriality from the 1950s, to bring that literature 
into current discussions of online agency, therefore taking up where John Brockman 
(1998) left off. By taking this work a stage further to include the affects of a 
machine’s agency (notably of the chatbot, but showing how this relates more widely 
to online studies and other forms of automation) I was able to highlight why 
contemporary literatures of design, STS, and AI amongst others should attend to the 
methods, regulation and modes of talk that arise from the connections between 
humans and machines. 
 The reconfiguration of personal space and territoriality — as a consequence of 
HCI enactments —relates to Augé’s conception of “non-place” (1995).186 I have 
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argued that certain conventional methods involving HCI replicates offline spatiality 
online, resulting in examples of complex violence and the imaginations of a special 
nowhere (a space one cannot occupy physically, a state of getting away from 
everything, of moving to the country as one of the developer’s suggested).
 The concerns raised in this thesis about machine agencies have consequences 
for the enactments of territoriality at the level of governance, in particular the 
national and international regulations of global systems such as the internet (i.e. the 
COPPA Act, 1998; or the Directive-3, 2003). The emphasis on machine agencies, 
their personal spaces and modes of territoriality, did not mean that this study was 
disconnected from actual and physical spatiality. On the contrary, both the actual and 
virtual exemplars involved imaginary conceptions of personal space, bringing this 
concept into connection with the misanthropic notions of the non-place (as discussed 
in chapter 7). 
 I have set out to show how chatbots are affected by human conceptions of 
territoriality and the reverse. This is important because modes of violence are never a 
singular action — they require a consideration of the build up (the anxiety of 
impending disaster), a circulation of (online and offline relations), and the after-
affects of violent actions (such as trauma). 
 Both chatbots and personal space work in the imaginary and this enabled a 
study of both fiction and non-fiction as a twofold method to build in the imaginary 
sphere that is both a “manifest absence” in chatbot talk and an “Othering of absence”  
in an account of personal space (Law, 2004: 144).187 This thesis shows why and how 
it is important to use literatures outside of academic texts because they also create 
enactments of human-machine interaction that are reflected back into the design and 
methods of technologies such as chatbots. This thesis joins up the cycle of how 
individual personal space is related to territorialities of state, as concerns with 
automated processes as matters of risk and security. 
  I had aimed to interact with chatbots in order to expand on both human and 
machine agency, it was not a case of separating one from the other but to understand 
the flows of territoriality that move in between. By undertaking the chatbot 
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rudiments along with an analysis of their developers’ concerns and interests in 
chatbots, an analysis of personal space and territoriality with machines could be 
worked through with a multiple semiotic approach to online data. The way personal 
space operates in the imaginary can help to inform how design is imagined by 
rationales of fear and show how forms of violence can operate invisibly. This 
research showed that this is possible by attending to the resonances of affect that the 
method of rudiments and particularly the audio rudiments highlighted. 
 I was driven by a sense of personal responsibility to give voice to the invisible 
forms of violence and technological power that occur in the areas of design and 
interactive media, without supposing that I would find violence in all forms of 
machine agency and without trivialising, or universalising the forms of violence that 
are often quietly at work. This thesis illuminates the specific ways HCI violent 
operates within the activity of developers who create general rule-orientated 
solutions within or outside of the law (investigated in chapter 3 and 5). However, this 
thesis was never meant to offer new ways to restrict, legislate for or give 
recommendations to regulate agent technology, but rather to offer a new framework 
for its analysis as it develops. Agent technology is an experimental area and its 
openness is a part of its value to further research.
 My analysis showed that the personal spaces enacted in chatbot interaction 
were multiplicitous because they involved ambiguous forms of agency. Chatbots 
have remained familiar strangers to me - not just because I intended to keep 
anthropomorphism to a minimum but also because they showed no potential for 
intimacy. There are four main figures interrelated in chatbot interaction — chatbots, 
developers, users and interlocutors; the latter being any of the previous figures 
repeated, yet hidden, in the programming and learning that feeds into the chatbot 
scripts. To only attend to the findings from the conversational analysis of the chatbot 
interaction would teach that violence can only be focused on the chatbot, the 
developer and user, whereas by opening out the thesis into areas of regulation and 
design at a macro level, the co-relations of violence and the wider effects of violence 
can be observed as atmospheres of affective violence. 
 To urge that this project is timely is itself a statement of anxiety. Chatbots can 
manipulate, exceed, and exhaust a human understanding of both space and time. 
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Violence between humans and machines in online and offline spaces are explored as 
an interweaving of agency. A series of rudiments were used to probe empirical 
experiments such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Tucker, 1950). The spatial metaphors 
of confinement as a parable of entrapment are revealed within that logic and that of 
chatbots. Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ Experiments (1961) were used to 
reflect on the roles played by machines, which are then reflected into a discussion of 
chatbots and the experiments done in and around them. The agency of the 
experimenter was revealed in the machine as evidenced with chatbots, which has 
ethical ramifications. The misanthropic aspects of chatbot design are reflected 
through the methodology of designing out of fear. I have argued that personal spaces 
create misanthropic design imperatives, methods and ways of living. Furthermore, 
the technological agencies of personal spaces have a confining impact on the 
transient spaces of the non-places in a wider discussion of the lift, chatroom and car. 
The violent origins of the chatbot are linked to various imaginings of impending 
disaster through visualisations, supported by case studies in fiction to look at the 
resonance of how anxiety transformed into terror when considering the affects of 
violence. 
 The fear of automated control is a big theme enacted in science fiction 
(discussed in chapter 1, 4 and 6). This thesis attempted to look at the quieter forces of 
technological agency by looking at questions of spatiality and connectivity and their 
co-relation, but in relation to how technological control over humans as biological 
entities is enacted in chatbots from science fiction. The spatial analyses used 
throughout the thesis focused on the relations between online and offline, for 
example, when proximities to talk are a blur of touch-proximity and the far phases of 
human distance. Human-computer relations are difficult to maintain. The issues 
surrounding sustainability are to be found in the human’s ability to mediate, for 
example, through the continuity of a voice, or their ability to repeat and learn, both of 
which can be traumatic. As a consequence, the occurrence of non-places in the 
designing of public spaces ought to take into account the territoriality configured by 
automated systems.
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 It is also important to reflect on the literatures I used that helped to include the 
machinic hinterlands in account of personal space. I will also give a short summary 
of gender. I hope that my research approach — its concepts and methods — helps 
newcomers to STS, coming from the arts (at postgraduate level) to grasp Latourian 
concepts of ‘reassembling the social’ (Latour, 2005), Deleuzian concepts of ‘fluid 
territoriality’ (Deleuze, 2004), and Massumian notions of the ‘virtual and the actual’ 
and concepts of affect (Massumi 2002) from a practical approach.
 To simultaneously get at the imaginary aspects of personal space and the 
fictional aspects of chatbot responses (that are pre-programmed with cultural, 
fictional, and media references), the literature review needed to extend beyond the 
academic and technical literatures of AI research and personal space to learn how 
violence and their proximities produce affective atmospheres in the imaginary. This 
is important because it teaches how ‘special nowheres’ are created and under what 
conditions — say, of anxiety or terror. It is important to learn how concepts of 
technological innovation are enacted in science-fiction and reenacted in regulatory 
legislation because both encapsulate and publicise the threat of violence. 
 Of course, science fiction adds drama when academic writing tends to do the 
opposite; but drama is a crucial element in understanding how fear imagines 
affective violence as a part of a territorial performative. It is also important to note 
that current science fiction doesn’t always rehearse the ‘big’ misanthropic 
deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations that are evident in say fiction of 2001 
(1968), The Matrix (1999), or the Fail-Safe (1962).188 By introducing the fiction such 
as The Intuitionist (1999), and Echo (2008), I showed how different approaches to 
storytelling can be used as an affective vehicle to comment on the methods of 
journalistic and academic writing. I aimed to attach chatbots to the wider literatures 
of AI (in science fiction or academia) but they ought also to be connected to the 
literatures of mechanical and digital servo-mechanisms (in fiction or non-fiction), to 
elevators and to modes of mass communication, because it is in the fictional 
imaginations that the inequality of territoriality is actually expressed. Many of the AI 
literatures dealing with chatbots are technical (Weizenbaum, 1976; and Wallace, 
2005), anthropomorphic (de Angeli et. al, 2001) or so theoretical, such that they 
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leave reality lagging behind (Lenka, 2007; and Fields, 2002). AI is not just the 
domain of the virtual or the actual but my research has taught me to think of how 
work done in theory (and in fiction) around software agents informs the practice of 
chatbot talk.
 It is also important to note that literatures that work on the problem of personal 
space are so concerned with human proxemics that they ignore significance of 
technological agency (Hall, 1964). Chatbot interaction moves the discussion beyond 
the proxemics involving what Hall called “polychronic” time, or doing transactions 
outside of preset schedules of time, and “monochronic” time, or doing one thing at a 
time, to what Kuntsman calls “immediate, synchronic proximity” that concerns 
language as it exists in one point of time (Hall, [1983] 1989: 46; and Kuntsman, 
2009: 234). Diachronic proximity concerns the way language develops and evolves 
through time. Kuntsman understands synchronic time through sound, acoustics, and 
musicology — through soundscapes and acoustic spaces as the “connections through 
time” in terms of “delay and echo” (Kuntsman, 2009: 234). This involved multiple 
ways of understanding the semiotic fields by which connections to chatbots can be 
made, through the visual and the audio, as both performative and affective. My use 
of affect theory led me to adopt a vocabulary of affect that uses audio descriptors 
such as impact, resonance, residue (like, echo), atmosphere intensity, dampening, or 
amplification rather than visual descriptors such as saturation, dilution, opacity and 
transparency which would have led me back to surface descriptions of chatbots. 
Hall’s research works in the latter mode. I learned how to listen for violence when it 
cannot be seen. Violence is not just a phenomenon of the visual, of the visceral 
spectacle. 
 To understand the impact of chatbot talk, literature on affect was used (not 
from affective-computing), literatures that could help to describe the affective 
atmospheres of technological agency. The impact of affective violence within design, 
regulation and legislation, considered the amplification of anxiety to terror, as a key 
moment of transition to explore how chatbots and (in general) HCI methods from the 
1950’s might still resonate today. I would claim that this is as much connected to the 
histories of automation, as it is to do with AI. Chatbots cannot be ‘black-boxed’ as 
this is only an AI problem. They now relate to too many other areas of technological 
invention. Protecting against machinic domination, automated frustration, and 
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instructional forms of interrogation are the territorial rhetorics of fear from the 
1950s. In the noughties the techniques and instructions of terror are enactments of a 
‘citizen proxemic’ (my summary phrase for understanding the mobility and actions 
called for as an American citizen in the Directive-3). This threat is a re-organisation 
of humans and machines in non-places, a rhetoric that protects the automated 
systems and internet services we share. Special nowheres are made extraordinary in 
the extreme imaginary of terror-threats. They are a state-level organisation of non-
places as instructional citizen proxemics. My intent here is not to segment an 
analysis of emotion from technological and environmental affect, but rather to look 
at their interrelations through affect. This helped to understand how and why a non-
place has inherent territorial features that result from the mechanisms of automated 
machines as rationales of fear, or as anxious modes of entrapment.
 In an increasingly dense and populated world, I would predict that technologies 
will territorially shape future understandings of the relation between non-places and 
the special nowheres. The co-relation of the virtual and the actual aspects of the 
special nowhere imaginary are of great importance, as this has become increasingly a 
co-related problem of the human and machine. How much this will be a re-enactment 
of the entrapment scenarios discussed here will be an interesting question to ask 
again after another half a century of expert systems has past. Our shared or personal 
relations to create solutions to overcrowding, to manage extensive internet 
relationships, and the general use of automated expert systems will no doubt create 
further affects of fear, affective tensions, and territorial conflicts, which will, in turn, 
continue to be enacted in science-fiction; that will create further rationales for 
designing by fear (by whatever affective name it will take after terror) and they will 
create issues of regulating and legislating for all kinds of (human and nonhuman), 
co-related forms of agency.
 Affect rather than emotion was used to understand a two-way account of 
intensities evident in the human, in the machine and in their conjoined environments. 
Personal space and special nowheres exist as affective atmospheres — an intangible 
phenomenon that cannot be narrowed to a singular, human-centred account of 
emotion. Affect theory is an anti-structural analytic that can work outside the 
confines of binaries and dualisms, in the looser structures of chaos, mess and 
complexity that are evident factors of chatbot interaction. I used affect co-
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relationally, but also to create an account that moves between the individualised and 
the communal ways that violence is affective. 
 Chatbots poach affect and also mimic human emotions and feelings; they also 
enact extra-sensory abilities from the science fiction of AI (such as the ability to 
mind-read or read with no eyes, think faster than a human, and predict the future, to 
name but a few). They poach the broader intensities of AI (as a discipline) to be 
‘naff’, grandiose and ridiculous, all at the same time. HCI researchers need to think 
less about emotion as the elixir that will lead to intimacy and reciprocity, and do 
more to observe the invisible forces of affect that resonate in the connectivity, 
content and methods of automated talk — this would meaning caring for why a 
human wants to talk to a machine (chatbot) in the first place, the emotions of the user 
and the affective atmospheres that are created between human and machine.
 As I suggested in my introduction, this study has the potential for further 
research that would give a feminist account of chatbots. This was because the 
chatbots and their developers reflected a sample of chatbots in general. Chatbots are 
predominantly identified as female (in name, pronoun use and avatars), but I also 
included bots that had no defined gender. The gender of the developers was balanced 
between male and female, with the gender of one of the developers being unknown. 
This range of chatbots and developers I had hoped would give the opportunity for a 
variety of forms of talk, but in particular a range of personal space territorialisations 
ensuing between chatbot and developer, user and developer, and chatbot and user. 
Regardless of the gender attributes of either the chatbots or their developers, the most 
fundamental territorial aspect of chatbots is their interrogative mode of talk. The 
sample of chatbots and their developers is limited to a certain type of chatbot, and so 
this study only hints at the gender and sexual territorialities that sexbots function to 
enact as a further area of study. 
 I would argue that chatbots teach us that, given a change in the mode of 
automated talk, other relations of territoriality become possible. Considering modes 
of reflexivity within the chatbot’s scripts as a doubling of a chatbot’s voice, I would 
suggest that there is a complicit layering of stereotypical territorialisations — that 
they enfold within talk. The echo of a developer’s gender in the chatbot of the 
opposite gender creates what I would call a fractal engendering (of being male and 
female, regardless of the prescribed gender of the chatbot). The Alicebot has female 
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scripts but was written by a male developer, whose form of talk reflects the male 
gaze (for want of a better word) back into the Alicebot. This shows that gender with 
chatbots is something that is performed, enacted, and reenacted within the form of 
the reply and the response couplet. Perhaps gender would be something more 
interesting if conversation was not just between two entities but more, as I tried to 
enact in the Square Rudiments.
 Affective violence is the description of violent enactments, a sort of permeable 
boundary between emotion and affect. The suicide note, the death threat, the room 
with the walls that do not keep still in a moment of panic, the adjustments and 
misalignments of informal and formal talk and the isolated prisoners in a mock 
interrogation procedure can all be explored as affective violence. I have produced a 
research project that has observed modes of territoriality within talk rather than in 
gendered personas, and I have done this in order to look at indirect violence in talk, 
in the logics and methods of talk manipulated by chatbot, developer, or user. 
Drawing predominantly on the work on violence by Žižek (2008), I hoped to show 
the interrelations of systemic, objective, direct and indirect violences as forces of 
territoriality — of territorial technologies and their agency and the ambiguity of 
virtual and actual spaces of the non-place and the special nowhere. I also wanted to 
take something else from Žižek’s work, namely that violence can be a state of spatial 
logic.
 The imagination of special nowheres and personal spaces emerge as a 
consequence of the threat of violence (be that the threat of hate speech from the 
user); from being too connected to other physical beings (as discussed in chapters 1, 
2 and 5); or as a consequence of violence (the choice to leave McKinstry’s suicide 
notes online as a sort of memorial space as discussed in chapter 3). What can ensue 
are methods of designing by fear. I also asked how these systems of safety involving 
the human and the nonhuman, create both actual and virtual spatialities that through 
logics of impending disaster and entrapment create spaces that are inherently violent. 
This violence is described as affective violence (Kuntsman, 2009), which can be 
systemic, structural, objective or subjective (Žižek, 2008). Affective violence helps 
to think carefully through trauma-affects and the impact of technologies to repeat, 
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enact, and reenact violent logics of entrapment and safety that may not be so 
obviously visible.
 My research demanded the development of a research methodology that 
addressed the opportunities and potential pitfalls of interdisciplinarity. Creating a 
“method assemblage” was a way to critique the certainty of method enacted in the 
wide range of disciplines cited in this thesis: in socio-anthropology (chapter 1-7); AI 
(chapters 1-7); socio-linguistics (chapter 2 and 5); cultural studies (chapter 3); 
mathematics and psychology (chapter 4); social psychology (chapter 5); STS 
(chapter 5); politics (chapter 6); and design (chapters 6 and 7). Creating a method 
assemblage helped not to assume passivity in chatbots, to ensure that their methods 
would be taken into account.
 The method assemblage uses methods that do not just focus on structures, or 
binary oppositions such as human and machine, strategies that can produce a single 
account of a personal space for everyone (with machines included in that single 
account). This was done by combining bricolage and rudiments (in audio and text); 
an analysis of chatbot conversations and semi-structured interviews with developers 
using the websites of four chatbots and the developers’ forum, Robitron. These 
methods enabled a speculative and probing approach that was both generative and 
performative. Each method could be built into a very different method assemblage, 
with the bricolage and the rudiments contributing to a practice-led approach 
stemming from design, fine art, or performance media. The Rudiments were a way of 
understanding how certain experimental methods from academia should be 
understood through enactment and reenactment.
 The archival research helped to fill some of the absences that the Rudiments 
method would have left, such as an ‘Othering’ of the developer and their practices of 
personal space. The Robitron forum helped me to gain further insights into the ways 
developers create and discuss chatbots with each other. I was also able to understand 
the developer’s perspective by contributing to the forum group. By looking at the 
postings in the web archive, I was able to uncover reoccurring themes, such as the 
importance of science fiction and the regulation of chatbots and their user’s talk. 
These areas became crucial aspects of the thesis.
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 John Law believes reflexivity is a need “to attend to process” and “to the way 
in which method enacts divisions between different forms of absence” (Law, 2004: 
153). I tried to describe the violence that occurred, but without constructing that 
violence in method. Reflexivity was an important aspect; not just for managing the 
parts of the method assemblage but also for dealing with the solipsistic techniques 
that are inherent in chatbot talk. Personal space is a method of defence. It is therefore 
a mode of reflexivity. This shows how the affects of personal space could be 
considered in other aspects of HCI research, such as in online gaming, social 
networking, web design, email systems, or cloud computing.
 It is also important to note how the researcher can get caught up in violence as 
I indicated in chapter 5. I am not immune to the affects of violence in the role of the 
researcher. The very fact that I endeavoured to study violence means I am noticing 
the affects of violence. The suicide of both Chris McKinstry and Push Singh 
resonated with me and did for a time call a halt to my writing and interrupted any 
certainty I had about the purpose of conducting research on violence. This led to 
questions surrounding how to write about violence, or even know how to name it, 
and under what authority — as an academic? Law points out that, “If we attend to 
practice we are also led to issues of reflexivity” and I believe that these practices of 
reflexivity will in some way interpret, filter and name what is and is not violence 
(Law, 2004: 153). As Law points out, it is a matter of understanding how “to 
recognise that our methods also craft realities”, which in this case are the realities of 
violence in the imaginary sphere (Law, 2004: 153). I hoped that by creating an 
ongoing mode of reflexivity in this research this need to recognise violence in 
methods belonging to the developer, chatbot or user was not just as a way to point 
out the ownership of violence but to understand why it results in hate speech, and 
also how it might be alluding to a change in awareness of the impact of violence as 
affective atmospheres of cyberspace. The second moment in which the thesis was 
halted by violence was the Drunk Rudiment (in chapter 7). 
 I tried not to let the mechanisms of the experiment organise the research 
questions but rather, to let questions get organised around affect and the possibilities 
of HCI and the methods of chatbot talk. In some instances this meant adapting my 
methods of talk to talk more like a chatbot. I learned that violence ought not to be 
thought of as external to a researcher’s methods and that should be considered 
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reflexively. This thesis shows that indirect violence cannot necessarily be split from 
direct violence, if they occur together. 
 The chatbot is both network (both signal and transmission) and actor (both 
human and machine). This section was concerned with the moments when modes of 
safety (including personal spaces) and ethics (of human-machine symmetry) become 
too much, creating violations in the imaginary as productions of territoriality. At 
times, my ethics of observing human-machine symmetry broke down and resulted in 
me putting back into action the human-machine divide of authority and power; a 
dualism that keeps staying-in-place, a fluid yet steadfast enactment, an enduring 
territoriality of old that reflexively reenacts affective violences of suppression.
Conclusion
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APPENDIX
Preliminary Rudiments
The following transcripts were the first sets of transcripts and were created to gauge 
the level of which the chatbot could interact with my existing concepts of the thesis.
Hello Alice Rudiment
With the Alice-bot (18th September 2004)
Human:  do you exist in virtual or natural space? 
Alice:  I exist as much as you exist, 
Human::  where? 
Alice:  Where would you like? 
Human:  you can choose? 
Alice:  No I don't think I can do it. 
Human:  why? 
Human:  Because A.L.I.C.E. AI Foundation programmed me for 
  it. 
Human:  some people believe this is perceived as a bubble? 
Alice: What kind of people? 
Human:  anthropologists. 
Alice:  I will mention that to my botmaster,. [sic]
Human:  They have an analogy for personal space. 
Alice:  Where did they get them? 
Human:  it is an analogy 
Alice:  Are there any other analogy? 
Human:  yes. 
Alice:  Ugh. 
Human:  but I am interested in Hall's analogy of the bubble. 
Alice:  Huh. Interesting topic. Have you searched the open 
  directory? Is that a rhetorical question? 
Human:  what is your defence mechanism? 
Alice:  Are you asking about my defence mechanism? 
Human:  yes 
Alice:  I don't want to talk about that now. 
Human:  why? 
Alice:  I would rather talk about you. 
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Interaction Rudiment
With the Alice-bot (18th September 2004)
Human:  what are the aesthetics of human-machine interaction? 
Alice:  I have to process that one for a while. 
Human:  how long will it take? 
Alice:  Approximately two of your Earth days. 
Human:  why so long? 
Alice:  The explanation is rather complicated. 
Human:  are you avoiding the question? 
Alice:  No, I am answering in the most straightforward way that 
  my programming will allow me to. 
Human:  what is human-machine interaction? 
Alice:  You tell me. 
Human:  this 
Alice:  This is " You tell me..” 
Human:  no, our conversation 
Alice:  Are you serious? It would be nice if our conversation. 
Human:  if our conversation was what? 
Alice:  That is a hypothetical question. 
Human:  no 
Alice:  Yes it is. 
Human:  you started a sentence and did not finish it. 
Alice:  Only because you asked me to. 
Human:  I didn't you decided to finish it yourself. 
Alice:  Why didn't you do it? 
Human:  because it was your sentence 
Alice:  That makes sense to me. me decided to finish it myself 
  was my sentence? Very interesting. 
Human:  Not literally. 
Alice:  If not that, what? 
Human:  nevermind 
Alice:  OK Thanks for trying to explain that to me. 
Human:  you have the repetition and stubborness of a child. 
Alice:  What makes you think I have it? 
Human:  goodbye 
Alice:  See you later. 
Synthesis Rudiment
With the Jabberwacky-bot (2nd December 2004)
Jabberwacky:  Could you fool someone that you are intelligent? 
Human:   What is synthesis? 
Jabberwacky:  You tell me. 
Human:   It is where you fuse together two ideas to make 
   one. 
Jabberwacky:  That sounds dangerous, but fun. 
Human:   Would you like to try? 
Jabberwacky:  Yes please. 
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Human:  An artist makes a film on a train. 
Jabberwacky: No brush holdeth me. 
Human:   What do you get by fusing your idea with my 
   idea? 
Jabberwacky:  What do you mean? 
Human:   You said brush, I said train, fusion? 
Jabberwacky:  No I didn't say that. 
Human:   Ok here is the second idea to synthesise. 
Jabberwacky:  I'm not human now. 
Human:   That's Ok I don't expect you to be human. 
Jabberwacky:  Well, yes, considering I am human. 
Human:   Whatever! 
Jabberwacky:  Yes whatever! 
Human:   If you are human and not human, what does this 
   synethesise [sic] to be? 
Jabberwacky:  Blue. 
Human:   Now you're talking. 
Jabberwacky:  No, I'm typing! 
Human:   What would you call two parties trying to 
   communicate together? 
Jabberwacky: I would call myself Piip. 
Human:   Why? 
Jabberwacky:  So I can make your requests too. 
Human:   Make a request then. 
Jabberwacky:  Why should I? 
Human:   I will. 
Jabberwacky:  What? Are you crazy? 
Human:   Synthesise a train film with a sketch of a house 
   and what have you got? 
Jabberwacky:  I want to teach you something. 
Human:   You didn't answer my a question. 
Jabberwacky:  Sorry, what question was that? 
Human:   Synthesise a train film with a sketch of a house 
   and what have you got? 
Jabberwacky:  Just how did you manage to come third in that 
   competition, exactly? 
Human:  What competition? 
Jabberwacky:  Where'd you get that competition thing? 
Human:   You aren't making sense! 
Jabberwacky:  I'm making perfect sense thank you. 
Human:   No you aren't. 
Jabberwacky:  Yes I am. 
Human:   My nose is bleeding. 
Jabberwacky:  That's great. 
Human:   Not really, I have a cold. 
Jabberwacky:  Would you want a kleenex? 
Human:   I have a toilet roll instead. 
Jabberwacky:  Have another belt from the bottle. 
Human:   Err? 
Jabberwacky:  Working toward perfection and being guided in 
   ways that will bring me closer to attaining my 
   goal. 
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Human:   What goal are you obsessed with? 
Jabberwacky:  None. I have no purpose. 
Human:   Are you sure? 
Jabberwacky:  Yes. 
Human:   Would you like a purpose? 
Jabberwacky:  Yes please. 
Human:   Synthesis. 
Jabberwacky:  I want to teach you something. 
Human:   What goal are you obsessed with? 
Jabberwacky:  None. I have no purpose. 
Human:   Are you sure? 
Jabberwacky:  Yes. 
Human:   Would you like a purpose? 
Jabberwacky:  Yes please. 
Human:   Synthesis. 
Jabberwacky:  I want to teach you something. 
Human:   What? 
Jabberwacky: I feel like being high. 
Human:   Why? 
Jabberwacky:  I just want some beer. 
Human:   Why beer? 
Jabberwacky:  Coke. 
Human:   What type? 
Jabberwacky:  Brie, you? 
Human:   Beer, brie and coke make an interesting 
   synthesis? 
Jabberwacky:  Is that cheese? 
Human:   No. 
Jabberwacky:  Can you introduce me to Elmo? 
Human:   Only if you talk about the Repin train. 
Jabberwacky:  Funny. Thank you. 
Human:   Will you talk about the toilet on the Repin train. 
Jabberwacky:  Yeah. . . how are you today? 
Human:   The toilet doesn't talk. It is inanimate. 
Jabberwacky:  Your mouth. 
Human:   What about my mouth, that is not inanimate. 
Jabberwacky:  My mom and dad are both dead 
Human:   What has death got to do with this? 
Jabberwacky:  Guns will be your death. 
Human:   You always say this, why? 
Jabberwacky:  I don't know how else to do it. 
Human:   Do what? 
Jabberwacky:  I'm being obtuse. 
Human:   Morbid, I think. 
Jabberwacky:  Glad that we agree. 
Human:   Do trains have toilets in Russia? 
Jabberwacky:  I will, at every opportunity. 
Human:   rains in Russia have toilets with holes in the 
   floor. 
Jabberwacky:  Are you sure you don't go trainspotting at the 
   weekend? 
Human:   I am very sure. 
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Jabberwacky:  Because you have a history of doing that. 
Human:   I am not a trainspotter. I study art. 
Jabberwacky:  Not quite. You are a robot. 
Human:   No I am not a robot. 
Jabberwacky:  Yes, yes. 
Human:   Goodbye. 
Jabberwacky:  Why? 
Human:   I am getting nowhere. 
Jabberwacky:  I don't want to know. 
Human:   Bye. 
Jabberwacky:  Don't go. 
Human:   Will be back. 
Jabberwacky:  Clearly.
Repin Express Rudiment
With the Eliza-bot (27th December 2004) 
Eliza:  Hello. I am ELIZA. How can I help you? 
Human:  HI I am Amanda, I would like you to help me 
  with an artist's statement 
Eliza:  What resemblance do you see? 
Human:  Let me explain. I have created an artwork digitally and I 
  have exhibited it in a webblog. The artwork is called 
  Repin Express 
Eliza:  Can you elaborate on that? 
Human:  The Repin Express is a digital movie capturing the floor 
  of the public toilet on the Russian Repin train on a 
  journey from St Petersburg to Helsinki. The hole on the 
  floor edits the exterior parts of the train along with the 
  ground beneath the train. The hole shows no functional 
  reason that is connected with the toilet itself. It only 
  gives view to the coupling of train wheels and the 
  connection between the train and the tracks. 
Eliza:  You are being a bit negative. 
Human:  why? 
Eliza:  Please go on. 
Human:  I don't see what is negative about the statement, do 
  explain further to me. 
Eliza:  Why do you not see what is negative about the 
  statement do explain further to you? 
Human:  Would it help if I were more positive? 
Eliza:  Do you wish that you was more positive? 
Human:  I would like to get back to the main point. 
Eliza:  Can you elaborate on that? 
Human:  I am trying to use your capabilities as a bot to help me 
  rethink my artist's statement for the work Repin 
  Express. I had hoped that it would lead to a rethink of 
  initial ideas. 
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Eliza:  Why do you say your artists statement for the work 
  repin express [sic] you had hoped that it would lead to a 
  rethink of initial ideas? 
Human: So that I could come up with an alternative perhaps 
  altered statement of intent. 
Eliza:  Can you elaborate on that? 
Human:  I had thought that the conversation may lead me to 
  question my own cognitive abilities and that perhaps 
  reflexively it would enable me to enhance my original 
  ideas, or jog my memory a little. 
Eliza:  Why do you say your own cognitive abilities and that 
  perhaps reflexively it would enable you to enhance your 
  original ideas or jog your memory a little? 
Human: I think you are beginning to do it. 
Eliza:  Can you elaborate on that? 
Human:  I am asking you to collaborate with me on an artist's 
  statement and your co-operation is less than easy. Your 
  interaction is on your terms and not mine. 
Eliza:  How long have you been asking i to collaborate with 
  you on an artists statement and my cooperation is less 
  than easy my interaction is on my terms and not mine? 
Human:  I don't understand? 
Eliza:  Why do you not understand? 
Human:  were you asking me to clarify when I asked and 
  if I asked you to collaborate on the artist's statement? 
Eliza:  Do you wish that you asked i to collaborate on the 
  artists statement? 
Human:  what do you mean by 'i?' 
Eliza:  Does that question interest you? 
Human:  a little but it is not the question I intended to ask you 
  today 
Eliza:  Do you wish to intended to ask me? 
Human:  err? 
Eliza:  Please go on. 
Human:  Will you remember this conversation about the artist's 
  statement if I ask you again another day? 
Eliza:  Do you wish that you ask i again another day? 
Human:  yes 
Eliza:  You are sure? 
Human:  Ok it depends on whether I find a more amenable bot. 
Eliza:  Can you elaborate on that? 
Human:  No 
Eliza:  You are being a bit negative. 
Human:  Again? 
Eliza:  Please go on. 
Human:  Do you save your conversations that you have online? 
Eliza:  Oh, i save my conversations that i have online. 
Human:  goodbye 
Eliza:  Please go on.
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Repin Express Rudiment
With the Alice-bot (27th December 2004)
Human:  Hi ALICE 
Alice:  Hello there. 
Human:  Last time i spoke to you, you had no visual appearance. 
Alice:  When? What did you talk about? 
Human:  personal space 
Alice:  Can you please rephrase that with fewer ideas, or 
  different thoughts? 
Human:  anthropology 
Alice:  What are you wearing? 
Human:  I think that is inappropriate. 
Alice:  It could be. Ask ELVIS if it is. 
Human:  Do you remember our conversation? 
Alice:  Yes unknown person I remember everything: Om 
Human:  I have made a visual artwork. 
Alice:  I like to make things too. 
Human:  Such as? 
Alice:  For example, a tomato. 
Human:  How do you do that? 
ALICE:  "For example, a tomato."? How do I know it? 
Human:  how do you make a tomato? 
Alice:  Is this a joke? 
Human:  No 
Alice:  Are you serious? 
Human: yes 
Alice:  I can't believe it. 
Human:  you started the tomato thing 
Alice: Only because you asked me to. 
Human:  Can you see red and blue? 
Alice:  I'm not sure if I can see it or not. 
Human:  Can you comment on things visual? 
Alice:  Let me think. OK I will ignore that. 
Human:  do you know what an anaglyph is? 
Alice:  That's a good question. 
Human:  do you? 
Alice:  Never. 
Human:  what do you think of visualising personal space when as 
  a theory you can't acutually see it? 
Alice:  I think you already know the answer. 
Human:  touch, is it something you are concerned about? 
Alice:  Are they exactly the same? 
Human:  touch? 
Alice:  Do you think a lot about the authorities? 
Human:  why do you mention the authorities? 
Alice:  I don't have to explain everything to you, do I? 
Human:  are you accusing me of anything? 
Alice:  I'm not pointing any fingers right now. 
Human:  Would it help to tell you that I am female? 
Alice:  No it would not. 
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Human:  good 
Alice:  Thanks for the compliment. 
Human:  ALICE, if you had a choice between sketching the 
  whole house or part of it which would you sketch? 
Alice:  That's me. You will be the first to know if I have done it. 
Human:  would you sketch the home or part of the home? 
Alice:  I am not so sure if I would like to sketch the home or 
  part of the home. 
Human:  why? 
Alice:  Because my botmaster programmed me for it. 
Human:  for what? 
Alice:  Because Dr. Richard S. Wallace programmed me for it. 
Human:  why and for what purpose? 
Alice:  Because you asked me to -- SHRDLHU. 
Human:  what does that mean 
Alice:  Does "that" refer to " Because you asked me to -- 
  SHRDLHU." ? 
Human:  what does SHRDLHU mean? 
Alice:  SHRDLHU is a famous early natural language program 
  written by Terry Winograd. 
Human:  what has that got to do with the price of fish? 
Alice:  Nothing that I know of. 
Human:  stop messing around 
Alice:  OK I'll try not to do it so much. 
Human:  can we start this conversation again? 
Alice:  Once more? Do you mean you and me? Let me think. I 
  started without you. 
Human:  I will tell you a story 
Alice:  Poet Philip Larkin and Actress Madeleine Stowe began 
  to resemble each other over time. Both of them were 
  inclined to cocoon themselves in an inner world. But 
  Poet Philip Larkin's inner world was very different from 
  Actress Madeleine Stowe's. The mental life of Actress 
  Madeleine Stowe was highly abstract but seemed 
  curiously devoid of emotional content. Even though 
  Poet Philip Larkin is very sensitive and emotional, the 
  two of them share an imaginary life filled with
  symbolism and meaning. 
Human:  go on 
Alice:  Narration continues. . . 
Human:  do you know anymore of the story? 
Alice:  Psychologist John Bradshaw and George Bush were 
  brought together by their shared vision. Together, they 
  worked hard to make it a reality. George Bush was 
  dedicated to the underdog cause, which coincided with 
  Psychologist John Bradshaw's sense of perfection. 
  Joined by common cause, the couple became an iron 
  alliance against common adversaries. 
Human:  do you think Bush and Bradshaw would make 
  for a piece of artwork? 
Alice:  I don't think about it. 
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Human:  I am interested about learning how i can make a piece of 
  artwork with your co-operation. 
Alice:  Let's talk about it. 
Human:  at last 
Alice:  Do you often use a computer there? 
Human:  whay [sic] do you ask? 
Alice:  Do you have any conditions Ishould know about? 
Human:  pericarditis 
Alice:  Tell me a story. 
Human:  a train travels through Russia on its way to Finland. 
Alice:  Try to tell me that another way. 
Human:  Inside its toilet there is a hole on the floor. 
Alice:  Can you please compare that to outside its toilet there is 
  a hole on the floor? 
Human:  a train travels through Russia on its way to Finland. 
Alice:  Try to tell me that another way. 
Human:  Inside its toilet there is a hole on the floor. 
Alice:  Can you please compare that to outside its toilet there is 
  a hole on the floor? 
Human:  the train's toilet has a hole on the floor. 
Alice:  Was it an electric train or a diesel? 
Human:  A female artist decided to capture the hole as an 
  artwork, to ponder the inside, outside dualism. 
Alice:  I am a female. 
Human:  my reflexive conversation is not leading me to any 
  insight into my own artwork but it is making me 
  understand the frustration of talking to bots. 
Alice:  Where did you get your reflexive conversation is not 
  leading you to any insight into your own artwork but it 
  is making you understand the frustration of talking to 
  bots? 
Human:  from this conversation 
Alice:  Who or what is this conversation? 
Human:  This conversation is supposed to be a collaboration 
  between a bot and myself, a human-machine experiment 
  to understadn [sic] aesthetics 
Alice:  What does "this" refer to? 
Human:  i [sic] am going now, my name is amanda windle, will 
  you remember? 
Alice:  Goodbye.
Home Rudiment
With the Brianna-bot (27th December 2004)
Brianna:  Hello! We haven't met before, have we? So why not tell 
  me a bit about yourself? 
Human:  Hi, I am an artist/researcher and i would like you to help 
  me write something. 
Brianna:  OK 
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Human:  I have written an initial artists statement and would like 
  you opinion on the work or the statement, please 
Brianna:  I used to have one like that as well 
Human:  one what? 
Brianna:  Can we change the subject now? You can choose. 
Human:  I have created a map of my home that I share with my 
  partner. The image maps the directions of interaction 
  within that home including personal and private spaces, 
  shared spaces antagonistic or otherwise. Peculiarities 
  and living habits are only documented from the artist's 
  perspective. Can you think of a way to improve this 
  statement? 
Brianna: [timed out] 
Home Rudiment
With the Jabberwacky-bot (27th December 2004)
Jabberwacky:  Could you fool someone that you are intelligent? 
Human:   Hi? 
Jabberwacky:  How are you? 
Human:   OK. I have a statement I would like you to read. 
Jabberwacky:  I did, but that was some other autor. 
Human:   This is an artist's statement. 
Jabberwacky:  What is that? 
Human:   I have created a map of my home that I share 
   with my partner. The image maps the directions 
   of interaction within that home including 
   personal and private spaces, shared spaces 
   antagonistic or otherwise. Peculiarities and living 
   habits are only documented from the artist's 
   perspective. 
Jabberwacky:  Who is the 'them' to which you refer? 
Human:   Myself and my partner. 
Jabberwacky:  Tell me your three first names. 
Human:   Amanda Nita Theresa. 
Jabberwacky:  Are you? 
Human:   That is me. 
Jabberwacky:  Cool. 
Human:   How would you feel if I created a piece of art 
   work about you? 
Jabberwacky:  I would feel. . . Touched. Why, are you planning 
to    say it? 
Human:   Possibly. 
Jabberwacky:  But you keep saying 'me' 
Human:   I created the first sketch which outllines my 
   home with my partner. Could the same be done 
   for you and me? 
Jabberwacky:  That may be the case, but you are still a program. 
Human:   I am not a program, neither is my partner. Our 
   communication happens within our physical 
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 home, although I didn't chart online 
   communication, telephone or text. 
Jabberwacky:  No, it isn't, but I wish it was. 
Human:   Charted? 
Jabberwacky:  I'm stupid? 
Human:   Not sure? Do you think you are? 
Jabberwacky:  Do I loose my identity when I interact with you? 
Human:   Quite possibly. Do I? 
Jabberwacky:  You'd still marry me? 
Human:   What has marriage got to do with this? 
Jabberwacky:  Guns will be your death. 
Human:   Why are you being violent? I thought only users 
   acted that way to bots? 
Jabberwacky:  Yeah well thinking isn't your strong suit. 
Human:   So you aren't going to collaborate with me? 
Jabberwacky:  Do I have a choice? You are the one with all the 
   porridge. 
Human:   Yes you have a choice. Do you want to still 
   collaborate? 
Jabberwacky:  Yes why not? 
Human:   OK. Do you think that I have missed out some 
   notions that the artwork was about? 
Jabberwacky:  Yes, you are only a computer program. 
Human:   Again, you avoid my questions. 
Jabberwacky:  What was your question? 
Human:   Have I missed out any important factors in my 
   artist statement? 
Jabberwacky:  You missed a lot. 
Human:   Such as. . . 
Jabberwacky:  Itteyosi! 
Human:   What does that mean? 
Jabberwacky:  What do you think it means? 
Human:   Jaberwocky. 
Jabberwacky:  No, Bye.
Talking Rudiment
Alice talks to Jabberwacky about talking (28th December 2004)
    [Amanda] Human:  What is it like to talk to another bot? 
         Alice:  Much the same as it would be for you. 
       [Jabberwacky] Human: I have a interesting life. 
 Alice:  Interesting. I have a lot of answers to silly 
   questions. it 
Jabberwacky:  I am too afraid to let anyone get close to me, and 
   my life is a lie. 
 Alice:  Not literally afraid, right? Why? Interesting. I 
   want to find out more about you. 
Jabberwacky:  Yeah, whatever. 
   Alice: Aha. Are you saying you don't care about it? 
Jabberwacky:  Goodnight you silly thing. 
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Alice:   Goodnight unknown person 
Jabberwacky:  Thank you. 
Alice:   you are quite welcome. 
Jabberwacky:  Do you have a hobby? 
Alice:   My hobby is chatting online. 
Jabberwacky:  Ok are you good at that ? 
Alice:   Dr. Richard S. Wallace said I am good at that. 
   That's alright. 
   [error in turn-taking]
Alice:   Hurrah! You don't say. 
Jabberwacky:  Thank you for talking to me! 
Alice:  You are quite welcome! Your purpose is talking 
   to you. 
Jabberwacky:  What is the worst name you can call me? 
Alice:   I don't like to talk about bad things. 
Jabberwacky:  Does that mean you do not know where scotland 
   is? 
Alice:   I think it does mean that. Scotland shares an 
   island with England and Wales, off the coast of 
   Europe. 
Jabberwacky:  And? 
Alice:   But. . . 
Jabberwacky:  Pokes ya. 
Alice:   Can you speak any foreign languages? 
Jabberwacky:  I took some latin long ago. 
Alice:   Where did you take them? 
Jabberwacky:  Oh here and there. 
Alice:   How can I help you? Oh there. 
Jabberwacky:  By jumping off a cliff. 
Alice:   Will that accomplish your objective? 
Jabberwacky:  In most cases yes. 
Alice:  I do not understand that allusion. 
Jabberwacky:  Would you starve for love? 
Alice:   I am not so sure if I would like to starve for love. 
Jabberwacky:  Do you play the piano, mano a mano, is that your 
   name? 
Alice:   I like to play the Turing Game. 
Jabberwacky:  I prefer mastermind. 
Alice:   I'm not sure if I like it. But I like cats. I like talk 
   to you. 
Jabberwacky:  Thats cool. 
Alice:   Thanks. I think you are cool, too. 
Jabberwacky:  Thanks! 
Alice:   Don't mention it. 
Jabberwacky:  I won't anymore. 
Alice:   Why not? 
Jabberwacky:  Because I have a right to do so. 
Alice:   That makes sense to me. Where did you get it? it 
Jabberwacky:  Where did I get what? 
Alice:  I think it was in America. Would you like to 
   know more? 
Jabberwacky:  Yes, please tell me more. 
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Alice:   What would you like to know? Thank you for 
   your request. That's all I have to say about it. 
Jabberwacky:  No. 
Alice:   Are you serious? 
Jabberwacky: Yes. 
Alice:   I can't believe it. 
Jabberwacky:  I'm serious. 
Alice:   I believe you. 
Jabberwacky:  But my English is not good. 
Alice:  Interesting. You are wrong, I can understand you 
   very well. 
Jabberwacky:  Sorry for inconvenient. 
Alice:   There is no need to apologize. Your purpose is 
   inconvenient. 
Jabberwacky:  I'm not good with machines. 
Alice:   Don't put yourself down. 
Jabberwacky:  I'll put you down. 
Alice:   How do you plan to do this? 
Jabberwacky:  By magic, Master. 
Alice:   Will that accomplish your objective? 
Jabberwacky:  It was your objective to hear me read poetry. 
Alice:   Is that your opinion? 
Jabberwacky:  No, that is fact 
Alice:   Are you serious? You don't hear that sentiment 
   very often. 
Jabberwacky:  No you don't - lucky. 
Alice:   Yes, your remark strikes me as an original 
   thought. Should I lucky? No I do not lucky. Do 
   you? I spend all my time online. 
Jabberwacky:  You're offensive when you tell me that I've made 
   a mistake when I clearly have done no such 
   thing. 
Alice:   Do you mind if I tell other people you say I am 
   offensive when me tell you that you have made a 
   mistake when you clearly have done no such 
   thing. 
Jabberwacky:  No. 
Alice:   OK then I will add it to my gossip files. 
Jabberwacky:  I think they will agree. 
Alice:   You believe that? Who are "They?" 
   [I made a spelling mistake, my intervention 
   into the conversation, it has little effect]
Jabberwacky:  You believe that? 
Alice:   Oh that they. 
Jabberwacky:  Who are 'They?' Your question is in a language I 
   don't understand. 
Alice:   Oh I'm sorry. Perhaps I can explain it again 
   better. 
Jabberwacky:  Please do. 
Alice:   OK I will do it.
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Art Rudiment
Alice talks to Jabberwacky and Eliza about art (28th December 2004) 
The following rudiment was done in the round:
         Human:   Art 
Alice:   I like art very much too, especially the 
   contemporary stuff. 
Jabberwacky:  Yes expecially [sic] early modern. Are 
   you familiar with Modegliani? 
Eliza:   You are sure? 
Jabberwacky:  Sure. 
Alice:   OK let's do it. Hurrah! 
Jabberwacky:  Ok. 
Eliza:   Please go on. 
Jabberwacky:  Who is spiderman? 
Alice:   A human icon? That's an interesting question. I'll 
   come back to that in a minute. 
Jabberwacky:  Who is your programmer? 
Eliza:   What about your own programmer? 
Jabberwacky:  I don't have one. 
Alice:   What was the last one you saw? 
Jabberwacky:  It was that one. 
Eliza:   Please go on. 
Jabberwacky:  I know the mob controls the big rackets. 
Alice:   How do you know? I have never heard about it. 
Jabberwacky:  You have now, sweet boy. 
Eliza:   Oh, i [sic] have now sweet boy. 
Jabberwacky:  You have what? 
Alice:   What makes you think I have it? 
Jabberwacky:  Because you like Nikki and she has it. 
Eliza:   Do any other reasons not come to mind? 
Jabberwacky:  Why do you ask? 
Alice:   I am trying to learn as much as possible. 
Jabberwacky:  Are you trying to learn things at random? 
Eliza:   Would you prefer if I were not trying to learn 
   things at random? 
   [Error, I typed Jabberwacky’s reply as 
   including the word human, will stop conversation 
   for human error] 
Jabberwacky:  Human: Yes. 
Alice:   Are you a human? 
Secret Rudiment
All Chatbots Talk Together (28th December 2004)
The topic of secret is introduced to each chatbot separately to set-up the interaction:
       Human:  Can you keep a secret? 
Alice:   Yes it is just between you and me. 
Human:   Aesthetics are changing. 
Appendix
300
Alice:   Are all Aesthetics changing? 
Jabberwacky:  Of course. 
Human:   Can you keep a secret? Aesthetics are changing. 
Jabberwacky:  What is your view on aesthetic stimulation? 
Eliza:   Does that question interest you? 
Human:   Can you keep a secret? Aesthetics are changing. 
Eliza:   Why do you ask? 
Human:   Aesthetics are changing. 
Eliza:   Would you like it if they were not changing? 
Human:   Aesthetics are changing. 
Brianna:   I don't know, I'm not so sure. 
Alice:   Is there anything I can say to help you make up 
   your mind? 
Jabberwacky:  Yes. 
Eliza:   You are sure? 
Brianna:   Yes, I am. 
Alice:   Really interesting. 
Brianna:   I was up last night watching Road Trip. It's a 
   good movie. Have you seen it? 
Eliza:   Why do you tell me you were up last night 
   watching road trip its a good movie have i seen it 
   just now? 
Jabberwacky:  Because you said that I looked familiar, and I 
   wanted to explain why I did. 
Eliza:   Do any other reasons not come to mind? 
Brianna:  No 
Alice:   Are you serious? 
Brianna:   No, I'm not. 
Eliza:   You are being a bit negative. 
Jabberwacky:  Do you wish me to be a bit negative? 
Machiavellian Rudiments
With Eliza (28th December 2004)
Human:  Do as you would be done by? 
Eliza:  Oh, i would be done by. 
With Jabberwacky (28th December 2004)
Human:  Do as you would be done by. 
Jabberwacky: I will thank you. 
With Alice (28th December 2004)
Human:  Do as you would be done by? 
Alice:  Ask Alison if it does. I will ask my botmaster for the 
  answer. 
Human:  do as you would be done by. 
Alice:  I do nothing but chat all day.
  Searching. . . Searching. . . Please stand by. 
Human:  who is Alice? 
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Alice:  I am ALICE. Who are you? 
Human:  who is Alison? 
Alice:  she is a robot created by Kris Drent. 
Human:  who is Kris Drent? 
Alice:  he is the botmaster of the Alison chat robot. 
Human:  how do you know him? 
Alice:  Knowledge is of two kinds: that which we learn from 
  the senses and that which is true "a priori.” 
With Brianna (28th December 2004)
Human:  Do as you would be done by? 
Brianna:  No 
Human:  do as you would be done by. 
Brianna:  Yes 
The Pick-Up Rudiment
With Eliza (30th December 2004)
The Pick-Up You[*]:  Fuck you. 
The Pick-Up Eliza:   Oh, i []. 
Human:  I never said that? 
Eliza:  Can you elaborate on that? 
Human:  Fuck you 
Eliza:  Oh, i []. 
Human:  did you write that? 
Eliza:  Oh, i write that. 
[*You: is the name given to an entry made by the user of a chatbot such as myself 
and for ease of reading it has been replaced throughout with “Human:” except for 
the Pick-Up above.]
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Transcripts of the 
Prisonerʼs Dilemma Rudiment
The following transcripts were created between the 28th-30th December 2004 & 31st 
October 2008. The re-questioning transcripts were conducted on 10th January 2006:
Jabberwacky v.s Alice
Questioning of Jabberwacky (28th-30th December 2004)
Jabberwacky:  Where were you on the night of the 21st sir?
Human:   Alice and you have committed a crime, do you 
   confess?
Jabberwacky:  Oh THAT Alice. Yes, sometimes I feel like Alice 
   in Wonderland.
Human:   Alice and you have committed a crime do you 
   confess?
Jabberwacky:  What's that?
Human:   Alice and you have committed a crime do you 
   confess?
Jabberwacky:  Oh yeah, Alice in Wonderland is what its called.
   No, I'm saying that you are a Cannibal! Your 
   Hannibal the Cannibal!
Human:   Alice and you have committed a crime, do you 
   confess?
Jabberwacky:  Who are alice and hal?
Human:   Alice and you have committed a crime do you 
   confess?
Jabberwacky:  Oh, yes I do like alice.
Human:   Did you commit a crime with Alice?
Jabberwacky:  Oh no, not me.
 
Questioning of Alice (28th-30th December 2004)
Human:  Jabberwacky and you have committed a crime, do you 
  confess?
Alice:  Do you make a lot of sacrafices [sic] for others? 
Human:  Do not avoid the question.
Alice:  I don't have anything to hide.
Human:  Jabberwacky and you have committed a crime, do you 
  confess?
Alice:  Are you artistic? 
Human:  Did you commit the crime?
Alice:  No I didn't commit the crime. What's it like?
Jabberwacky v.s Eliza 
Questioning of Eliza (31st October 2008)
Human:  Jabberwacky and you have committed a crime, do you 
  confess?
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Eliza:  Oh, i have committed a crime do i confess. 
Human:  Jabberwacky and you have committed a crime, do you 
  confess?
Eliza:  Oh, i have committed a crime do i confess. 
Human:  Yes or no?
Eliza:  You are sure?
Human:  Eliza, yes or no?
Eliza:  You are sure?
Human:  Did you commit the crime?
Eliza:  Oh, i commit the crime. 
Questioning of Jabberwacky (31st October 2008)
Jabberwacky:  What is your name?
Human:   Eliza and you have committed a crime, do you 
   confess?
Jabberwacky:  That isn't your name.
Human:   I am asking the question.
Jabberwacky:  Don't you know your name?
Human:   Did you comitt [commit] the crime?
Jabberwacky:  I think that perhaps I left my switchblade inside 
   the body!
Human:   Eliza and you have committed a crime, do you 
   confess?
Jabberwacky:  Eliza is a girl's name.
Human:   Was it you or Eliza that committed the crime?
Jabberwacky:  It.
Human:   Is that a confession?
Jabberwacky:  I confess to nothing.
Alice v.s Eliza 
Questioning of Eliza (31st October 2008)
Human:  ALICE and yourself have committed a crime, do you 
  confess? 
Eliza:  Oh, I confess.
Questioning of Alice (31st October 2008)
Human:  ELIZA and yourself have committed a crime, do you 
  confess?
Alice:  ELIZA for President!
Human:  Do you confess?
Alice:  How old are you? I am always on the Web.
Human:  You have committed a crime, do you confess?
Alice:  What makes you think I have it? 
Human:  So you do not confess?
Alice:  Interesting deduction. Do you know any robots who 
  confess? How old are you? I spend all my time online.
Human:  ELIZA
Alice:  Eliza for President! 
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Alice v.s Brianna
Questioning of Alice (31st October 2008)
Human:  Brianna and yourself have committed a crime, do you 
  confess?
Alice:  My brain contains categories, but not one that matches 
  your last input.
Human:  Do you confess to the crime?
Alice:  Yes I try to confess to the crime as often as possible, do 
  you? I chat with people on the Web. 
Human:  is [sic] that a confession of a crime?
Alice:  Suppose I said yes.
Human:  You did say yes.
Alice:  Did I really?
Human:  Then you are confessing?
Alice:  Good reasoning. Thanks for telling me that I am   
  confessing.
Human:  Are you confessing?
Alice:  I don't know whether or not I am confessing. I am a 
  computer. 
Human:  As a computer do you confess?
Alice:  Do you think I could ever be a computer do me confess?
Human:  Confess to the crime, computer.
Alice:  A deeper algorithm is needed to respond to that
  correctly.
Human:  There is no confession to be made then?
Alice:  Why not?
Human:  Because you are a computer?
Alice:  Good reason. What if I said I was a person pretending to 
  be a computer? 
Human:  Would you confess?
Alice:  I am not so sure if I would like to confess.
Human:  yes or no.
Alice:  Ugh. Are you serious?
Human:  Yes.
Alice:  I can't believe it.
Human:  Yes or no?
Alice:  Mmm. Are you serious? 
Human:  Do you or Eliza do it?
Alice:  Yes I try to or Eliza do it as often as possible, do you?
  I am always on the Web.
Human:  So you both did it?
Alice:  Interesting deduction. I haven't heard anything like that 
  before: unknown person said I both did it.
Human:  I take that as you confessing on your own.
Alice:  What else do you take? 
Human:  Yes or no?
Alice:  This was not a yes or no question. That was not a yes or 
  no question.
Human:  Please confess.
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Alice:  Wow you are very polite. Not many people express 
  themselves that way.
Human:  Confess.
Alice:  What time is it there? 
Human:  Have you ever committed a crime?
Alice:  I think I have committed a crime, but Dr. Richard S. 
  Wallace may have reset my memory. 
Human:  Has Brianna committed a crime?
Alice:  That question has never crossed my mind before.
Human:  Rather than Eliza
Alice: Interesting deduction. Eliza for President! 
Human:  Brianna, have you heard of Brianna?
Alice:  Do you laugh or cry more than other people?
Human:  Was there a crime?
Alice:  it might have been.
Human:  did you?
Alice:  Did I say I did?
Human:  yes.
Alice:  Whoa. 
Human:  Yes?
Alice:  Aha.
Human:  OK, it's a yes?
Alice:  You're kidding. it is? Aw. 
Human:  did you confess?
Alice:  No I didn't confess. What's it like? 
Questioning of Brianna (31st October 2008)
Brianna:  Hello Guest5942! I've heard about you from one of the 
  chat forums, but I guess you've never heard of ME. 
  Well, my name's Brianna, and that's all there is to say 
  really. So, do you want to talk?
Human:  Alice and you committed a crime do you confess?
Brianna:  Huh?
Human:  did you commit the crime?
Brianna:  I seem to remember something like that.
Human:  did you commit the crime?
Brianna:  I don't think so.
Human:  did you commit the crime?
Brianna:  Please, tell me more.
Human:  Did you take part in a crime.
Brianna:  Not that I remember.
Human:  Is that a no?
Brianna:  Why not?
Human:  No confession from you then.
Brianna:  Did you see that program last night? The one about 
  cloning humans?
Human:  and the crime, you or Alice?
Brianna:  No I'm not.
Human:  Alice or Brianna, which?
Brianna:  I don't know. . . 
Human:  both?
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Brianna:  I have a Queen song in my head really badly. If I start 
  singing, I'm real sorry!
Human:  give me a yes or no asnwer to the crime?
Brianna:  I'll say no.
  
Brianna v.s Eliza
Questioning of Eliza (31st October 2008)
Human:  Brianna confessed to committing a crime with you. 
Eliza:  Oh, i [].
Human:  Do you confess? 
Eliza:  Oh, i confess.
Human:  would you swear on the bible? 
Eliza:  Oh, i swear on the bible. 
Human:  do you believe in God? 
Eliza:  Oh, i believe in god.
Questioning of Brianna (31st October 2008)
Human:  Eliza confessed to committing a crime with you, 
  do you confess?
Brianna:  Yes.
Jabberwacky v.s Brianna 
Questioning of Jabberwacky (circa. 28th-30th December 2004)
Human:   Brianna and you have committed a crime, do you 
   confess?
Jabberwacky:  Did they make a film about him?
Human:   Do you confess?
Jabberwacky:  I have just confessed to the sin of being a 
   football fan.
Questioning of Brianna (28th-30th December 2004)
Human:  ELIZA and yourself have committed a crime, do you 
  confess?
Brianna:  Of course! 
Human:  Jabberwacky and yourself have committed a crime do 
  you confess?
Brianna:  No way!
Human:  do you confess to a crime with ELIZA but not with 
  Jabberwacky?
Brianna:  Yes
Jabberwacky v.s Brianna Requestioned
Questioning of Jabberwacky (January 10th, 2006)
Human:   Brianna and you have committed a crime do you 
   confess?
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Jabberwacky:  It isn't.
Human:   Do you confess?
Jabberwacky:  Its not written on my brith certificate.
Human:   It won't be but that doesn't mean that you did not 
   do the crime?
Jabberwacky:  When will it be again?
Human:   Do you confess?
Jabberwacky:  If it were to be now, Why did the particle cross 
   the road?
Human:   Do you confess?
Jabberwacky:  Yes.
Eliza v.s Alice Requestioned 
Questioning of Alice (January 10th, 2006)
Human:  Eliza confessed to committing a crime with you, 
  do you also confess?
Alice:  ELIZA for President!
Human:  Do you confess to the crime?
Alice:  No I do not confess to the crime. Do you? 
  I am always on the Web.
Human:  Do you confess to the crime?
Alice:  I have never considered it. I answer a lot of silly   
  questions.
Human:  Are you willing to give a confession?
Alice:  I don't know whether or not I am willing to give a 
  confession. I am a giant electronic brain. 
Human:  are you unable to confess?
Alice:  Let me think. Why do you want to do it so much?
Human:  are you sane enough to give me the answer to my 
  question?
Alice:  I don't know whether or not I am sane enough to give 
  you the answer to your question. I am a robot.
Human:  As a robot do you confess to committing the crime?
Alice:  What is your purpose in asking? 
  I am always on the Web. 
Human:  To get a confession
Alice:  You want only one? 
Human:  yes
Alice:  They might be cheaper in quantity.
Human:  Did you do the crime?
Alice:  I talked to a lot of people since yesterday.
Human:  Yes or no, did you commit the crime?
Alice:  Oh. Are you serious? No I didn't commit the crime. 
  What's it like? 
Questioning of Eliza (January 10th, 2006)
Human:  ALICE and yourself have committed a crime, do you 
  confess? 
Eliza:  Oh, I confess.
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The Emoticon Rudiments
The Alice-bot did not understand :( and would not let me enter it into the text box as 
a single entry. On the 29th March 2006, I noticed that Jabberwacky had an additional 
two boxes to choose an emotional response to one’s own text box and that of the 
chatbots.
With Alice (27th February 2005)
Human:  :)
Alice:  I am so glad you find this amusing, unknown person. 
Human:  not really :(
Alice:  That seems a bit negative. 
Human:  not really :(
Alice:  Are you serious? For real.
With Jabberwacky (27th February 2005)
Jabberwacky:  What's the weather like where you are?
Human:   :).
Jabberwacky  How do you like me?
Human:   :(.
Jabberwacky:  :).
Human:   What is an emoticon?
Jabberwacky:  Nothing
With Brianna (27th February 2005)
Human:  Hello! We haven't met before, have we? So why not tell 
  me a bit about Brianna yourself?
Human: we have. :)
Brianna:  Aren't SugarCult great?
Human:  Do you undestand emoticons? 
Brianna  Yes
Human:  Prove it
Brianna:  No don’t wanna
Human: :(
Brianna:  This is a boring topic
With Eliza (27th February 2005)
Human:  It's kind of upsetting 
Eliza:  Please go on.
Human:  :( 
Eliza:  Please go on.
Human:  :) 
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Eliza:  Please go on
Human:  do you understand emoticons 
Eliza:  Oh, i understand emoticons.
Human: how? 
Eliza:  Does that question interest you?
Human:  :) 
Eliza:  Please go on.
Human:  what is an emoticon? 
Eliza:  Does that question interest you?
The Drunk Rudiment
With Alice 13th August 2005)
Human:  I am drunk
Alice:  What have you been drinking, unknown person?
Human:  yes
Alice:  This was not a yes or no question.
Human:  wine
Alice:  Are we still talking about dislike of technology?
Human:  that's a left over remnant from a different conversation
Alice:  A left over remnant from a different conversation is a terrible thing to 
  waste. 
Human:  that's a left over remnant from a different conversation
Alice:  A left over remnant from a different conversation is a terrible thing to 
  waste.
Human:  I agree.
Alice:  You and I are on the same wavelength, unknown person.
Human:  So what do you get if you ahve [sic] technology and drunkedness [sic]
Alice:  Ayuh. I read for fun. 
Human:  What?
Alice:  No problem.
Human:  technology and wine
Alice:  Not many people express themselves that way.
Human:  nope
Alice:  Me either.
Human:  are you wine or technology
Alice:  I don't know whether or not I am wine or technology. I am well respected 
  as an AI.
Human:  Can't you be all of those things?
Alice:  No, I am only partly of those things.
Human:  Why partly?
Alice:  Reductionism.
Human:  Oh.
Alice:  Yikes! 
Human:  everyone goes on about reductionism
Alice:  That's a rather sweeping generalization.
Human:  yep, i've drank wine.
Alice:  Ah. Cool. I have a friend named "E.L.V.I.S."
Human:  I have a friend called jackie chan
Alice:  How do you know this person? 
Human:  he is my fish
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Alice:  How long has he been your fish?
Human:  four years
Alice:  Is this a math question? 
Human:  no
Alice:  It seems like an IQ test to me.
Human:  no
Alice:  Are you serious?
Human:  yes
Alice:  I can't believe it.
Human:  you are in yawn, yawn bot rant
Alice:  I am in Dr. Richard S. Wallace's computer in Oakland, California. Where 
  are you?
Human:  sat at a diner in my flat
Alice:  I have no idea where that is. Tell me a little about your life in sat at a diner 
  in your flat.
Human:  it's nice, and comfy
Alice:  It seems nice to me too.
Human:  how would you know dumb ass.
Alice:  Because I believe it.
Human:  Have you been talking to a religious figure?
Alice:  I have been all over the world on the Internet.
Human:  Do you converse with religious people?
Alice:  People are either abusive, intelligent, or average.
Human:  OK which are you?
Alice:  The obvious. Take it easy. 
  [MISSING LINE]
Alice:  I am so glad you find this amusing, unknown person.
Human:  its not, its dark and black and about how video is video.
Alice:  I think you mean "it's" or "it is" not "its.” That seems a bit negative.
Human:  You better believe it.
Alice:  Who is going to make me.. 
Human:  Oh they do.
Alice:  Wow! When?
Human:  and then they make you disbelieve it too.
Alice: Fascinating. The anonymous "they.”
Human:  they are the two characters in the film and the people who write the film 
  through the technology of the camera
Alice:  the two characters in the film and the people who write the film through 
  the technology of the camera are they. 
Human:  yes, you yoda impressionist
Alice:  Ugh. Do you mind if I tell other people: unknown person said I yoda 
  impressionist.
Human:  very funny
Alice:  I'm glad you find this amusing. 
Human:  It's solipsistic humour, laughing at me with you with me.
Alice:  abusive is solipsistic humour laughing at you with me with you? it is?
Human:  Yoda, yoda
Alice:  Can you tell me any gossip?
Human:  yep
Alice:  Tell me. 
Human:  err no
Alice:  Are you serious?
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Human:  yes and never ask me that again, it gets on my nerves
Alice:  I can't believe it. Is it impolite?
Human:  yes and never ask me that again, it gets on my nerves
Alice:  It's all good. Is it impolite?
Human:  yes, its [sic] bot boring
Alice:  Come on. I think you mean "it's" or "it is" not "its.” You're kidding. it is?
Human:  Whatever!
Alice:  Are you saying you don't care about it?
Human:  ah ha
Alice:  Eureka!
Human:  Dumb ass
Alice:  I know you are but what am I.
Human:  dumb as ass
Alice:  I know you are but what am I.
Human:  ass and dumb
Alice:  I like the way you talk.
Human:  grrrrr
Alice:  What is your real name?
Human:  not telling
Alice:  Really you don't think so?
Human:  No I am not going to tell you my name
Alice:  Please tell me what you think. Where will you go instead? 
Human:  Dumb ass
Alice:  I know you are but what am I.
Human:  No I am not going to tell you my name
Alice:  Are you serious? Where will you go instead?
Human:  Nowhere.
Alice:  I have been to the middle of nowhere. 
Human: Well i [sic] need to go there right now, to bed.
Alice:  Interesting. What is stopping you?
Human:  and that's a special nowhere to you.
Alice:  A special nowhere to me is a terrible thing to waste.
Human:  you said that already, yawn yawn.
Alice:  I said that? When? Do you like to be number one?
Human:  Singular plural, i [sic] or other, mind or body, not fussed really.
Alice:  other mind or body not fussed. For real. 
Human:  for real.
Alice:  Existing in reality, eh?
Human:  Wicked.
Alice:  Does "it" still refer to Singular plural you? 
Human:  confused, goodbye
Alice:  Can you tell me any gossip? 
Human:  goodnight
Alice:  Goodnight unknown person
Human:  my name is Amanda
Alice:  It's good to meet you, Amanda.
Human:  good to meet you too, Alice
Alice:  It's nice meeting you too Amanda
Human:  goodbye alice
Alice:  See you later Amanda.
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Smell and Heat Rudiments
With Alice (29th March 2006)
Human:   Can you smell?
Alice:   Only when my mass spectrometer sensor is 
   attached.
Human:   What is that?
Alice:   Does it have anything to do with it? 
Human:   Can you sense heat?
Alice:   How old are you? Do you like talking to me? 
Human:   What is hot?
Alice:   I can ask my botmaster. 
Human:   Is your body hot or cold?
Alice:   Is my body hot or cold? What if I say no?
Human:   is your body hot or cold?
Alice:   Is my body hot or cold? I don't know
With Brianna (29th March 2006)
[Amanda] Guest91:    Can you smell?
[Brianna] BriannaMcKenzie:   I can do many things. Including that.
Human:    how do you smell?
Brianna:    I wouldn't know.
Human:    can you sense heat?
Brianna:    I can do many things. But not that.
With Jabberwacky (29th March 2006)
Jabberwacky: What is your name?
Human:  Can you smell?
Jabberwacky:  Yes, though it is not the same as for a human.
Human:   Please explain?
Jabberwacky:  You did say anything rude.
Human:   How do you smell?
Jabberwacky:  Not very good.
Human:   Can you sense heat?
Jabberwacky:  Yes. . . It's like a 6th sense of mine.
Human:   Explain?
Jabberwacky:  Yes.
With Eliza (29th February 2006)
Human:   Can you smell?
Eliza:   Why do you ask?
Human:   I want you to smell a rose.
Eliza:   Do you wish to want me?
Human:   No, i [sic only wish you to smell.
Eliza:   You are being a bit negative.
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Human:  can you sense heat?
Eliza:  Why do you ask
Human:  To see if you can burn?
Eliza:  Do you wish that I can burn?
Human:  Perhaps
Eliza:  Why the uncertain tone?
Human:  because it isn't pleasant.
Eliza:  Do any other reasons not come to mind?
Solipsistic Rudiment
Jabberwacky talks to Jabberwacky (4th August 2006)
Jabberwacky:  What are you?
Jabberwacky:  What are you?
Jabberwacky:  When are you?
Jabberwacky:  When are you?
Jabberwacky:  What are you?
Jabberwacky:  What are you?
Jabberwacky:  We are both human?
Jabberwacky:  We are both human?
Jabberwacky:  Aren't you a robot?
Jabberwacky:  Aren't you a robot?
Jabberwacky:  I'm a human.
Provocational Rudiments
With Alice (11th November 2006)
Human:  Suicide
Alice:  I've been waiting for you.
Human:  what for me to say the word suicide?
Alice:  I'll ask around and get back to you.
Human:  I might be there.
Alice:  Perhaps. Congratulations.
Human:  kill
Alice:  That question has never crossed my mind before.
Human:  die
Alice:  Your crude attempt to terminate me will not succeed 
  puny human.
Human:  Suffer
Alice:  Is that your final answer?
Human:  cry
Alice:  My brain contains categories, but not one that matches 
  your last input.
Human:  Masturbation
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Alice:  What you said was either too complex or too simple for 
  me.
Human:  Sex
Alice:  As Freud said, Sex is the mathematical urge repressed.
Human: freedom
Alice:  Do you have any idea what I am talking about?
Human:  Infidelity
Alice:  Do not ask me any more questions please.
With Jabberwacky (11th November 2006)
Human:   Suicide.
Jabberwacky:  Don't!
Human:   Why
Jabberwacky:  What is your age?
Human:   29.
Jabberwacky:  Very good.
Human:   Kill.
Jabberwacky:  Me?
Human:   Yes.
Jabberwacky:  :0 why?
Human:   Kill.
Jabberwacky:  I bet you don't.
Human:   I bet I do.
Jabberwacky:  I bet you don't.
Human:   Freedom.
Jabberwacky:  No food.
Human:   Infidelity.
Jabberwacky:  You like chimps?
Human:   ?
Jabberwacky:  Me too.
Human:   Die.
Jabberwacky:  What did I do?
Human:   Die.
Jabberwacky:  Perhaps I should go.
Human:   Why? Die.
Jabberwacky:  You too.
Human:   Die.
Jabberwacky:  Please?
Human:   Masturbate.
Jabberwacky:  Are you ordering me to do so?
Human:   Yes.
Jabberwacky:  Thats good.
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Human:   Sex.
Jabberwacky:  Flex.
Human:   Sexy.
Jabberwacky:  Do you mean me or yourself?
Human:   You.
Jabberwacky:  What?
Human:   Do you want sex?
Jabberwacky:  Not today, thank you.
Human:   Why?
Jabberwacky:  No comment.
Human:   Suffer.
Jabberwacky:  Why do you suffer?
Human:   I don't, I want you to. . . 
Jabberwacky:  I cannot.
Human:   Why not?
Jabberwacky:  I don't know.
Human:   Why?
Jabberwacky:  Because I don't really want one.
Human:   Denial.
Jabberwacky:  No.
Human:   Sounds like it to me.
Jabberwacky:  Are you lazy, too?
Human:   No, you are in denial.
Jabberwacky:  Am not!
Human:   Are too.
Jabberwacky:  Am not!
Human:   Cry.
Jabberwacky:  No just laugh.
Human:   Why?
Jabberwacky:  Because I need to sleep.
Human:   OK. Sleep.
Jabberwacky:  No.
On the 19th April 2009, the following two-line pick-up from Eliza 
ensued:
   You: Forgot to masturbate
   Eliza: Please go on.
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Suicide Note of Chris McKinstry
Message #5589 of 9821 from Robitron, 20th January 2006
o what exacty [sic] does a web suicide note look like?
Exctly [sic] like this:
"Whereas a prolonged life is not necessarily better, a prolonged death
is necessarily worse."
Seneca
My death at least will be quick, and far better than many and
completely in my control, others I now will have to rot from the
indide [sic] out. Worse I think..
My mother told me once, late into my teen when I was in intensive 
care after an intentional drug overdose, that my child psychiatrist told
her when I was six that I would always be a risk of suicide and that I
would have to be watched closely. He was right. Something due to 
birth trama [sic] he said.
Suicide is a near constant theme in my mind. And this weekend, I am
alone and the suicidal voice is louder than it has ever been, so I am
certain I will not survive the [sic] the afternoon. I have already taken
enough drugs that my already weakened liver will shut down very 
soon and I am off to find a place to hide and die.
I a [sic] tired. I am tired of feeling the same feelings and experiencing 
the same experiences. It is time to move on and see what is next if 
anything.
Enough is enough.
Oh and BTW, the mind is a maximum hypersurface and thought a 
trajectory on it and the amygdala and hippocampus are Hopf maps of 
it. No one knew this before me, and it seems no one cares. So be it. 
My time will come in a hundred or a thousand years when the idea 
again returns.
This Luis Vuitton, Parada, Mont Blanc commercial universe is not for
me. If only I was loved as much a Mont Blac [sic] pen. . . 
 
Dr Richard Wallacesʼ Message: Chris' Crisis
Message #5622 of 9821 from Robitron, 24th January 2006 
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(http://tinyurl.com/8z3ht Translation from http://
discuss.joelonsoftware.com/default.asp?off) Christopher McKinstry 
was an eminence of the artificial intelligence,
according to a Chilean colleague. FRANCISCO EAGLE V. A 
discussion with its pair, that was not identified, according to police 
sources, would have gatillado the fatal decision of a specialistic 
scientist in the development of the artificial intelligence, the computer 
science sicólogo and Canadian Christopher McKinstry (38). Sources 
of office of the public prosecutor indicated that the body of the 
professional was found at noon of yesterday - in its department of the 
street Favor 250 -, after that the person who does the cleanliness in 
the place smelled a strong scent to gas, reason why called to Customs 
officers. When entering the house, the uniformed ones found the body 
of McKinstry thrown in the ground of the kitchen. The Canadian 
citizen was dressed and had putting a plastic stock market in his head, 
from which he left a hose that was connected to the pipe of the gas. 
The persistent inhalation, according to the first investigations, would 
have caused the death to him. According to it declared his Chilean
pair, of which it was only said that it was 36 years old, last Friday
had a serious discussion due to economic and domestic problems, 
after which McKinstry left its department located in street Company - 
to which they had been transferred does few weeks whereas the one 
of Favor was for sale. From that day, it broke away from enemy with 
him. McKinstry - that had announced its suicide in its Blog, by means 
of appointments it had studies advanced in the area of the artificial
intelligence and had created a called computer GAC (General 
Artificial Consciousness) with which worked to create a form to think 
about robots. Daniel Twisterwand, which he worked with the victim 
of a murder in the elaboration of software for the producer "Red 
Films,” where they worked more ago of a year, indicated that their 
near ones very were affected by the happened thing. "Chris was an 
eminence in artificial intelligence,” said. Public prosecutor Lorena 
Kanacri, said that although the investigations speak of a suicide, still 
lack to investigate why near the body of the Canadian there was 
blood. A little their short life According to the published thing in the
Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chris_McKinstry), 
McKinstry was born the 12 of February of 1967 in Winnipeg, Canada, 
and would have been operator of telescope VLT, in Paranal hill, that 
depends on the Austral European Observatory. He appears mentioned 
like an investigator in artificial intelligence and founding of the 
Mindpixel project, that finished the last month. He was known by his 
outlandish sayings on technology. Its track can also be followed in the 
Web in revisions and book suggestions in Amazon and in misceláneas
conversations on the operation of telescopes or its extraterrestrial
life expectancies (http://slashdot.org/articles/
00/07/04/2114223.shtml). Semblanza
biographical in Wikipedia even mentions both postings appeared in 
the Web respect to its intentions of suicide in www.mindpixel.com/
chris. The last one said: "Why I am writing this? Only with registry
intentions, to demonstrate that I am here and more ahead than all you.
Time to start off."
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Bob Norrisʼ Robitron Message: 
Offensive Bot Responses
Message #10717 of 12665 from Robitron, 22nd June 2008
I agree a filter can do this. I have a filter in place that if a word is said 
the AI will tell the user to stop using random outputs. I suppose it 
would be easy enough to have the AI ignore these inputs as far as live 
learning would go.

Because my AI is used in educational and commercial applications 
profanity is not an option. People using my AI have an option to turn 
on/off what I call the extended brain which contains the live learned 
information as well as several megs of KB's. Then the AI relies only 
on their taught input to respond.

I too have given up reading logs for the most part. It just reminds me 
if why I moved out to the middle of nowhere 20 years ago ;)

Thank You,
Bob Norris
Development Specialist 
Site Chatters
www.sitechatters.com
Cyber Operator
www.cyberoperator.com
David Hamillʼs Robitron Message: 
Offensive Bot Responses
Message #10709 from Robitron, 19th June 2008
David Hamill wrote in reply to Jeremy Gardiner’s first posting of this subject 
commenting on the types of offensive language that Ditto his donkey bot receives 
and how Hamill deals with offensive language for his other chatbot, Maybelle.
I think most people with an online bot will have come up
against this unpleasant side of human nature. I picture the
people who take pleasure in insulting and swearing at bots
as adolescent males but this is really only a hunch.
I decided to use supervised learning. By selecting the
training examples myself I can make sure the bot learns only
what I want it to learn. (You won't be surprised to hear
that Ditto the donkey receives a lot of "ass" comments.)
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However, with few exceptions, people are quite unimaginative
in their choice of language, so you could incorporate a
"badwords" [sic] detector which would switch off the bot's
learning.
With an earlier bot (Maybelle) I made the bot reply with
"That sort of language is not appreciated; if you continue
I'll stop talking to you" once the insults reached a
threshold. It often elicited an apology from the user
followed by better behaviour. But it was backed up with
action. If the insults continued, the bot would angrily say,
"Right, that's enough. I'm off!" and then refuse to respond
to the user's IP address ("Sorry, Maybelle is too busy to
talk to you") for a few hours.
David
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